Book 33: Marriage (Nikah) | Minhaj al-Talibin of Nawawi
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature dan reference: classical Arabic
List of Contents
- Book 33: Marriage (Nikah)
- Chapter I General provisions
- Chapter II Prohibited marriages
- Chapter III Marriage of infidels
- Chapter IV Right of option; ifaf : and marriage between slaves
- Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi
كتاب النِّكَاحِ
BOOK 33 .— MARRIAGE
هُوَ مُسْتَحَبُّ لِمُحْتَاجٍ إلَيْهِ يَجِدُ أُهْبَتَهُ، فَإِنْ فَقَدَهَا
اُسْتُحِبَّ تَرْكُهُ، وَيَكْسِرُ شَهْوَتَهُ بِالصَّوْمِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَحْتَجْ
كُرِهَ إنْ فَقَدَ الْأُهْبَةَ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا لَكِنْ الْعِبَادَةُ
أَفْضَلُ.
قُلْتُ: فَإِنْ لَمْ يَتَعَبَّدْ فَالنِّكَاحُ أَفْضَلُ
فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَإِنْ وَجَدَ الْأُهْبَةَ وَبِهِ عِلَّةٌ كَهَرَمٍ أَوْ مَرَضٍ
دَائِمٍ أَوْ تَعْنِينٍ كُرِهَ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَيُسْتَحَبُّ
دَيِّنَةٌ بِكْرٌ نَسِيبَةٌ لَيْسَتْ قَرَابَةً قَرِيبَةً، وَإِذَا قَصَدَ
نِكَاحَهَا سُنَّ نَظَرُهُ إلَيْهَا قَبْلَ الْخِطْبَةِ وَإِنْ لَمْ تَأْذَنْ،
وَلَهُ تَكْرِيرُ نَظَرِهِ وَلَا يَنْظُرُ غَيْرَ الْوَجْهِ وَالْكَفَّيْنِ،
وَيَحْرُمُ نَظَرُ فَحْلٍ بَالِغٍ إلَى عَوْرَةِ حُرَّةٍ كَبِيرَةٍ أَجْنَبِيَّةٍ
وَكَذَا وَجْهُهَا وَكَفَّيْهَا عِنْدَ خَوْفِ فِتْنَةٍ، وَكَذَا عَنْدَ
الْأَمْنِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَلَا يَنْظُرُ مِنْ مَحْرَمِهِ بَيْنَ سُرَّةٍ
وَرُكْبَةٍ، وَيَحِلُّ مَا سِوَاهُ، وَقِيلَ مَا يَبْدُو فِي الْمِهْنَةِ فَقَطْ،
وَالْأَصَحُّ حِلُّ النَّظَرِ بِلَا شَهْوَةٍ إلَى الْأَمَةِ إلَّا مَا بَيْنَ
سُرَّةٍ وَرُكْبَةٍ.
وَإِلَى صَغِيرَةٍ إلَّا الْفَرْجِ.
وَأَنَّ
نَظَرَ الْعَبْدِ إلَى سَيِّدَتِهِ وَنَظَرَ مَمْسُوحٍ كَالنَّظَرِ إلَى
مَحْرَمٍ، وَأَنَّ الْمُرَاهِقَ كَالْبَالِغِ.
وَيَحِلُّ نَظَرُ
رَجُلٍ إلَى رَجُلٍ إلَّا مَا بَيْنَ سُرَّةٍ وَرُكْبَةٍ.
وَيَحْرُمُ
نَظَرُ أَمْرَدَ بِشَهْوَةٍ.
قُلْتُ: وَكَذَا بِغَيْرِهَا فِي
الْأَصَحِّ الْمَنْصُوصِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ عِنْدَ الْمُحَقِّقِينَ
أَنَّ الْأَمَةَ كَالْحُرَّةِ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَالْمَرْأَةُ
مَعَ امْرَأَةٍ كَرَجُلٍ وَرَجُلٍ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ تَحْرِيمُ نَظَرِ
ذِمِّيَّةٍ إلَى مُسْلِمَةٍ.
وَجَوَازُ نَظَرِ الْمَرْأَةِ إلَى
بَدَنِ أَجْنَبِيٍّ سِوَى مَا بَيْنَ سُرَّتِهِ وَرُكْبَتِهِ إنْ لَمْ تَخَفْ
فِتْنَةً.
قُلْتُ: الْأَصَحُّ التَّحْرِيمُ كَهُوَ إلَيْهَا،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَنَظَرُهَا إلَى مَحْرَمِهَا
كَعَكْسِهِ.
وَمَتَى حَرُمَ النَّظَرُ حَرُمَ الْمَسُّ.
وَمُبَاحَانِ
لِفَصْدٍ وَحِجَامَةٍ وَعِلَاجٍ.
قُلْتُ: وَيُبَاحُ النَّظَرُ
لِمُعَامَلَةٍ وَشَهَادَةٍ.
وَتَعْلِيمٍ وَنَحْوِهَا بِقَدْرِ
الْحَاجَةِ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَلِلزَّوْجِ النَّظَرُ إلَى
كُلِّ بَدَنِهَا.
BOOK 33 .— MARRIAGE
CHAPTER I.— GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section
Marriage is to
be recommended for every man who
feels the need of
it, provided lie
is able to undertake the pecuniary
obligations that
result from it. Otherwise
it is better to abstain and repress
one’s
passions by fasting. Marriage is a
blamable act for a man who does
not
feel the need of it, and is
not able to support the expense ; but
not for one who, though not
needing it, is yet able to undertake
its
obligations. It is preferable,
however, that such a person should
remain
a celibate and devote himself entirely to
religious practices.
[jShould such a man
not possess a temperament suitable for an
austere life, it is better for
him to take a wife, though it is
not strictly
necessary. But it is
blamable in him to marry if, though
able to
support the expense, he is
physically incapable of fulfilling his marital
duties, by reason of decrepitude,
chronic malady, impotence, etc.]
One
should preferably choose, as a wife, a
virgin, of religious
sentiments and
well-established descent, not too nearly
related to
the husband.
The Sonna
has introduced the practice of seeing a
woman one
proposes to marry, even
without her knowing it, and even several
times, before demanding her in
marriage ; but the suitor must not see
any more of his future wife
than the face and hands. The law
forbids
a male adult to look upon
the shameful parts of a free adult woman,
a “ stranger ” to him — i.e. not his
near relative, wife or slave. This
prohibition extends, in ordinary
circumstances, to the face and hands,
ffeven though one may be sure
of not feeling any lascivious sensa-
tions. Relatives within the prohibited
degrees need conceal only that
part
of the body between the navel and
the knees ; or, according to
some
authorities, the parts of the body
that are invisible when such
women
are engaged upon their household duties, f
As to a female slave
any one may
see her body, except between navel
and knees ; and a
girl under age
need only conceal her pudendum; unless
upon looking
at either one experiences
lascivious sensations, in which case they
should cover the whole body, f A
slave with regard to his mistress
and a eunuch with regard to any
woman, are considered as men within
the prohibited degrees. A minor of
either sex approaching majority
should
observe the law as if majority were
already attained. Men
may look at
each other, provided they keep concealed
the part of the
body between navel
and knees ; but it is forbidden to
look upon the
body of a beardless
youth, if it excites desire.
[f One
should avoid altogether looking upon a
beardless youth, for
fear of exciting
an infamous passion ; this is Shafii’s
personal opinion.
fThe best authors
consider a female slave as subject to
the same rule
as a free woman, so
far as regards the prohibition of
being seen.]
Women among themselves
should observe the rule laid down for
men ; fthough an infidel woman,
subject of a Moslem prince, may not
look upon a Moslem woman, f A woman
may lawfully look upon the
body of a
foreigner, except between navel and knees,
unless fleshly
desires arc thereby
excited, [fit is forbidden for a woman
to look
upon a man, in the same
way as for a man to look upon a
woman.] A
woman may look upon a
relative within the prohibited degrees, as
a
man may. A prohibition of looking
upon implies that of touching ;
though one may both look upon
and touch any part of the body, for
the purpose of bleeding, or applying
a cupping glass, or dressing a
sick
or wounded member.
[It is
permissible, if necessity requires it, to
look upon any woman
with whom one
wishes to enter into commercial relations,
or who is
a witness in a court of
law, or where it is necessary to
give her some
instruction, etc.]
A
husband has a right to see all parts
of his wife’s body.
فصل [في الخطبة]
تَحِلُّ خِطْبَةُ خَلِيَّةٍ عَنْ نِكَاحٍ
وَعِدَّةٍ، لَا تَصْرِيحٌ لِمُعْتَدَّةٍ، وَلَا تَعْرِيضٌ لِرَجْعِيَّةٍ،
وَيَحِلُّ تَعْرِيضٌ فِي عِدَّةِ وَفَاةٍ وَكَذَا لِبَائِنٍ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَتَحْرُمُ خِطْبَةٌ عَلَى خِطْبَةِ مَنْ صُرِّحَ
بِإِجَابَتِهِ إلَّا بِإِذْنِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يُجَبْ وَلَمْ يُرَدَّ، لَمْ
تَحْرُمْ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَمَنْ اُسْتُشِيرَ فِي خَاطِبٍ ذَكَرَ
مَسَاوِئَهُ بِصِدْقٍ.
وَيُسْتَحَبُّ تَقْدِيمُ خُطْبَةٍ قَبْلَ
الْخِطْبَةِ وَقَبْلَ الْعَقْدِ، وَلَوْ خَطَبَ الْوَلِيُّ فَقَالَ الزَّوْجُ:
الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ وَالصَّلَاةُ عَلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ
وَسَلَّمَ قَبِلْتُ صَحَّ النِّكَاحُ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، بَلْ يُسْتَحَبُّ
ذَلِكَ.
قُلْتُ: الصَّحِيحُ لَا يُسْتَحَبُّ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ، فَإِنْ طَالَ الذِّكْرُ الْفَاصِلُ لَمْ يَصِحَّ.
Section
One may ask for
the hand of any woman who is
unmarried, or
whose legal period of
retirement is finished ; but a woman whose
period
is not yet completed may not
be openly demanded in marriage. A
woman repudiated in a revocable manner
can never be demanded in
marriage
during her retirement, even indirectly.
But one may, if one
uses ambiguous
terms, make a proposition of this nature
to a widow,
during hor retirement, *or
to a woman repudiated irrevocably. The
law
forbids asking for the hand of a
woman who has already received
and
formally accepted a similar proposition from
another, except with
the consent of
ono’s rival ; *but until a woman has
decided as to the
first offer, there
is no objection to making her a
second. When a
woman asks advice
from a third party as to a man who
has made her
an offer of marriage,
tliis third party is bound to give
her sincere and
truthful information.
It is commendable that a demand
in marriage, as well as tho contract,
should be preceded by some edifying
words ; ffthough strictly speaking
it is
enough, for the validity of tho
marriage, that the bride’s guardian
should
say these words, and that the
husband should simply answer :
“ Glory
to God, and grace to his apostle —
God grant him his grace and
blessing — I
accept, etc.” [ffThis fashion is not
at all commendable.]
Tho niarriago is
not legally binding, if the offer is
separated from the
acceptance by a long
religious ceremony.
فصل [في أركان النكاح وغيرها]
إنَّمَا يَصِحُّ النِّكَاحُ
بِإِيجَابٍ؛ وَهُوَ زَوَّجْتُكَ أَوْ أَنْكَحْتُك، وَقَبُولٌ: بِأَنْ يَقُولَ
الزَّوْجُ تَزَوَّجْتُ أَوْ نَكَحْتُ أَوْ قَبِلْتُ نِكَاحَهَا أَوْ
تَزْوِيجَهَا، وَيَصِحُّ تَقَدُّمُ لَفْظِ الزَّوْجِ عَلَى الْوَلِيِّ، وَلَا
يَصِحُّ إلَّا بِلَفْظِ التَّزْوِيجِ أَوْ الْإِنْكَاحِ.
وَيَصِحُّ
بِالْعَجَمِيَّةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، لَا بِكِنَايَةٍ قَطْعًا، وَلَوْ قَالَ
زَوَّجْتُكَ فَقَالَ قَبِلْتُ لَمْ يَنْعَقِدْ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ: زَوِّجْنِي فَقَالَ زَوَّجْتُكَ أَوْ قَالَ الْوَلِيُّ تَزَوَّجْهَا
فَقَالَ تَزَوَّجْتُ صَحَّ.
وَلَا يَصِحُّ تَعْلِيقُهُ، وَلَوْ
بُشِّرَ بِوَلَدٍ فَقَالَ إنْ كَانَ أُنْثَى فَقَدْ زَوَّجْتُكَهَا، أَوْ قَالَ
إنْ كَانَتْ بِنْتِي طَلُقَتْ وَاعْتَدَّتْ فَقَدْ زَوَّجْتُكَهَا فَالْمَذْهَبُ
بُطْلَانُهُ.
وَلَا تَوْقِيتُهُ.
وَلَا نِكَاحُ
الشِّغَارِ وَهُوَ زَوَّجْتُكَهَا عَلَى أَنْ تُزَوِّجَنِي بِنْتَكَ وَبُضْعُ
كُلِّ وَاحِدَةٍ صَدَاقُ الْأُخْرَى فَيَقْبَلُ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَجْعَلْ الْبُضْعَ
صَدَاقًا فَالْأَصَحُّ الصِّحَّةُ، وَلَوْ سَمَّيَا مَالاً مَعَ جَعْلِ الْبُضْعِ
صَدَاقًا بَطَلَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا يَصِحُّ إلَّا بِحَضْرَةِ
شَاهِدَيْنِ، وَشَرْطُهُمَا حُرِّيَّةٌ، وَذُكُورَةٌ وَعَدَالَةٌ وَسَمْعٌ
وَبَصَرٌ، وَفِي الْأَعْمَى وَجْهٌ وَالْأَصَحُّ انْعِقَادُهُ بِابْنَيْ
الزَّوْجَيْنِ وَعَدُوَّيْهِمَا، وَيَنْعَقِدُ بِمَسْتُورِي الْعَدَالَةِ عَلَى
الصَّحِيحِ، لَا مَسْتُورِ الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْحُرِّيَّةِ، وَلَوْ بَانَ فِسْقُ
الشَّاهِدِ عِنْدَ الْعَقْدِ فَبَاطِلٌ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَإِنَّمَا يَبِينُ
بِبَيِّنَةٍ أَوْ اتِّفَاقِ الزَّوْجَيْنِ، وَلَا أَثَرَ لِقَوْلِ الشَّاهِدَيْنِ
كُنَّا فَاسِقَيْنِ، وَلَوْ اعْتَرَفَ بِهِ الزَّوْجُ وَأَنْكَرَتْ فُرِّقَ
بَيْنَهُمَا، وَعَلَيْهِ نِصْفُ الْمَهْرِ إنْ لَمْ يَدْخُلْ بِهَا وَإِلَّا
فَكُلُّهُ.
وَيُسْتَحَبُّ الْإِشْهَادُ عَلَى رِضَا الْمَرْأَةِ
حَيْثُ يُعْتَبَرُ رِضَاهَا، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ.
Section
A marriage is not
constituted except by an offer, expressed
in terms
such as : “I give you
in marriage,” or “ I give you for
wife,” followed by
acceptance, expressed
in terms such as : “I take her
as wife,” “I marry
her,” “ I consent
to marry her,” or “ I accept your
offer.” The validity
of the marriage
is unaffected by the husband or the
guardian being the
first to express
his will ; but it is rigorously necessary
that the guardian
should make use of
the words “give in marriage,” or
“give for wife.”
Arabic for any
other language may be used, provided
that consent is
expressed on both
sides in explicit terms. Consequently, our
school
does not accept the validity
of a marriage where the husband replies,
“
I accept,” without specifying what, to the
guardian who says to him,
“ I give
you her in marriage ; ” but there is
no objection to the consent
being
expressed in the words : “ Give her
me in marriage,” and “ I give
her
you,” or “ marry her,” and “ I marry her.”
The parties may not make their
consent depend upon any condition ;
and our school regards the contract
as wholly null where a father, hearing
his wife has given birth to a
child, cries out, “ If it is a
daughter, I give
her you in marriage
,* ” or where he says, “ If my
daughter is repudiated
by her present
husband, I will give her you in
marriage, after her legal
retirement. A
contract of marriage may not be made
for a certain
term ; nor have a reciprocal
character in such a way that the parties
are mutually exempt from dower, e.g.
by saying : “I give you my
daughter
in marriage on condition that you
give me yours, and that the
one’s
virginity becomes the other’s dower,” even
though such proposal
is accepted. fBut a
reciprocal marriage is perfectly regular,
if tho
value of virginity is not
taken into the calculation ; fit is
nullified when
such valuo enters however
little into tho amount of the dowers.
A marriage should be effected before
two witnesses, free, male,
of
irreproachable character, sound in hearing
and sight — though the
necessity of being
able to sec is doubtful. fTliero is
no objection to
the witnesses being
near relatives, e.g. sons of the
bridegroom and
bride, or their personal
enemies. ffNor does it matter if the
reputation
of the witnesses is doubtful ;
provided it is not notoriously bad ; but
the law insists positively upon
their being froo and Moslems. Though
our school regards as null a
marriage effected before witnesses whose
incompetence from notorious misconduct was
known at the time, this
circumstance
alleged after the celebration is only
admissible if legally
proved or admitted
by the parties. It is not
sufficiently established by
a mere subsequent
declaration of the witnesses themselves ;
and if only
the husband admits the
circumstances, while the wife denies it,
the
marriage is not null, but the
law requires a separation ; upon which
the
husband owes iiis wife half her
dower, if he has not yet had connec-
tion with her, or otherwise the
whole. It is commendable to choose
as witnesses persons agreeable to
the bride, at least Avhere her consent
is necessary to the marriage.
However, it is not necessary to ask
her
advice as to the witnesses.
فصل [فيمن يعقد النكاح وما يتبعه]
لَا تُزَوِّجُ امْرَأَةٌ
نَفْسَهَا بِإِذْنٍ وَلَا غَيْرَهَا بِوَكَالَةٍ وَلَا تَقْبَلُ نِكَاحًا
لِأَحَدٍ، وَالْوَطْءُ فِي نِكَاحٍ بِلَا وَلِيٍّ يُوجِبُ مَهْرَ الْمِثْلِ، لَا
الْحَدَّ، وَيُقْبَلُ إقْرَارُ الْوَلِيِّ بِالنِّكَاحِ إنْ اسْتَقَلَّ
بِالْإِنْشَاءِ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَيُقْبَلُ إقْرَارُ الْبَالِغَةِ الْعَاقِلَةِ
بِالنِّكَاحِ عَلَى الْجَدِيدِ.
وَلِلْأَبِ تَزْوِيجُ الْبِكْرِ
صَغِيرَةً أَوْ كَبِيرَةً بِغَيْرِ إذْنِهَا، وَيُسْتَحَبُّ اسْتِئْذَانُهَا،
وَلَيْسَ لَهُ تَزْوِيجُ ثَيِّبٍ إلَّا بِإِذْنِهَا، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ صَغِيرَةً
لَمْ تُزَوَّجْ حَتَّى تَبْلُغَ، وَالْجَدُّ كَالْأَبِ عِنْدَ عَدَمِهِ،
وَسَوَاءٌ زَالَتْ الْبَكَارَةُ بِوَطْءٍ حَلَالٍ أَوْ حَرَامٍ، وَلَا أَثَرَ
لِزَوَالِهَا بِلَا وَطْءٍ كَسَقْطَةٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَمَنْ عَلَى حَاشِيَةِ
النَّسَبِ كَأَخٍ وَعَمٍّ لَا يُزَوِّجُ صَغِيرَةً بِحَالٍ، وَتُزَوَّجُ
الثَّيِّبُ الْبَالِغَةُ بِصَرِيحِ الْإِذْنِ، وَيَكْفِي فِي الْبِكْرِ
سُكُوتُهَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَالْمُعْتِقُ.
وَالسُّلْطَانُ
كَالْأَخِ.
وَأَحَقُّ الْأَوْلِيَاءِ أَبٌ ثُمَّ جَدٌّ ثُمَّ
أَبُوهُ ثُمَّ أَخٌ لِأَبَوَيْنِ أَوْ لِأَبٍ ثُمَّ ابْنُهُ وَإِنْ سَفَلَ ثُمَّ
عَمٌّ ثُمَّ سَائِرُ الْعَصَبَةِ كَالْإِرْثِ، وَيُقَدَّمُ أَخٌ لِأَبَوَيْنِ
عَلَى أَخٍ لِأَبٍ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلَا يُزَوِّجُ ابْنٌ بِبُنُوَّةٍ، فَإِنْ
كَانَ ابْنَ ابْنِ عَمٍّ أَوْ مُعْتِقًا أَوْ قَاضِيًا زَوَّجَ بِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ
يُوجَدْ نَسِيبٌ زَوَّجَ الْمُعْتِقُ ثُمَّ عَصَبَتُهُ، كَالْإِرْثِ، وَيُزَوِّجُ
عَتِيقَةَ الْمَرْأَةِ مَنْ يُزَوِّجُ الْمُعْتَقَةَ مَا دَامَتْ حَيَّةً، وَلَا
يُعْتَبَرُ إذْنُ الْمُعْتِقَةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَإِذَا مَاتَتْ زَوَّجَ مَنْ
لَهُ الْوَلَاءُ، فَإِنْ فُقِدَ الْمُعْتِقُ وَعَصَبَتُهُ زَوَّجَ السُّلْطَانُ،
وَكَذَا يُزَوِّجُ إذَا عَضَلَ الْقَرِيبُ وَالْمُعْتِقُ، وَإِنَّمَا يَحْصُلُ
الْعَضْلُ إذَا دَعَتْ بَالِغَةٌ عَاقِلَةٌ إلَى كُفْءٍ وَامْتَنَعَ وَلَوْ
عَيَّنَتْ كُفُؤًا وَأَرَادَ الْأَبُ غَيْرَهُ فَلَهُ ذَلِكَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
Section
A woman cannot give
herself in marriage, even though her
guardian
should authorise her to do
so. Nor can she give in marriage
another
woman, even as agent of the
latter’s guardian ; nor effect a marriage
as agent for the husband. However,
if cohabitation ensues upon a
marriage
effected without a male guardian, proportional
dower is due,
and the couple are
not guilty of the crime of fornication.
The guardian’s admission is accepted
as sufficient proof of a marriage
where
he has a right to dispose of the
bride’s hand as lie pleases ; but not
where the bride’s consent is also
necessary. According to the opinion
adopted by Shafii in his second
period, the wife’s admission must also
be accepted, provided she is of
age, and sane.
A father can dispose
as he pleases of the hand of
his daughter, without
asking her consent,
whatever her age may be, provided
she is still a
virgin. It is,
however, always commendable to consult her
as to her
future husband ; and her
formal consent to the marriage is
necessary
if she has already lost
her virginity. Where a father disposes of
his
daughter’s hand during her minority,
she cannot be delivered to her
husband before she attains puberty.
In default of the father, the
father’s father exercises all his
powers. Loss of virginity puts an end
to the right of disposing of a
daughter’s hjand without her consent ; and
there is no difference in this
respect between a loss caused by licit co-
habitation and one that is the
consequence of unlawful intercourse.
On
the other hand, the right remains
intact where the loss has taken
place without carnal connection, as
for example in consequence of a fall
upon the ground. Collateral agnates,
such as whole brother, or half
brother on the father’s side or
father’s brother, cannot in any way engage
the hand of a daughter under age ;
and a woman who has lost her
virginity must manifest her consent
in explicit terms, when collateral
agnates
give her in marriage. As to an
adult virgin, it is enough that
she
does not oppose the choice of her
collateral agnates.
The persons who
have the right to assist a woman as
guardian at
her marriage are first
of all the father, then father’s
father, then his
father, then the
whole brother or half brother on the
father’s side, then
the latter’s son
or other agnate descendant, then father’s
whole brother
or half brother on
father’s side ; and lastly the other
agnates in the
order in which they
are called to the succession, *it
being understood
that a whole brother
always has priority over a half brother
on the
father’s side. A son, though
the nearest agnate, cannot give his own
mother in marriage, since a right of
guardianship does not pass into the
descendant line ; he can only do
so if he is also son of the
son of his
mother’s father’s brother,
or by right as patron or as
judge representing
the Sovereign. In
default of agnates in the ascendant
or collateral
line, a woman should be
given in marriage by her patron,
fand after
him by his agnates in
the order in which they are called
to the succession.
In the case of
an enfranchised slave who has no
patron, but a patroness,
she should be
given in marriage by the individual
who in these circum-
stances would be
the guardian of the patroness, ^without
the latter’s
consent being necessary.
After the death of the patroness,
the right
of assisting the enfranchised
slave as guardian devolves upon the same
person as does the patronage.
Lastly, in default of patron, or agnates
of patron or patroness, it is
the Sultan who should assist the
enfranchised
slave who wishes to marry,
as guardian of all the women in
his empire
who have no other, or
whose guardian, whether agnate or patron,
pre-
vents the marriage by abusing his
power. It is considered an abuse
of
power on the guardian’s part, where
an adult sane woman wishes
to marry
a suitable person and the guardian refuses
to give her to him ;
fbut not
where she wishes to marry a particular
individual, and her
father wishes to
give her to another who is also
suitable.
فصل [في موانع الولاية للنكاح]
لَا وِلَايَةَ لِرَقِيقٍ
وَصَبِيٍّ وَمَجْنُونٍ وَمُخْتَلِّ النَّظَرِ بِهَرَمٍ أَوْ خَبَلٍ، وَكَذَا
مَحْجُورٌ عَلَيْهِ بِسَفَهٍ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَمَتَى كَانَ الْأَقْرَبُ
بِبَعْضِ هَذِهِ الصِّفَاتِ فَالْوِلَايَةُ لِلْأَبْعَدِ، وَالْإِغْمَاءُ إنْ
كَانَ لَا يَدُومُ غَالِبًا اُنْتُظِرَ إفَاقَتُهُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ يَدُومُ
أَيَّامًا اُنْتُظِرَ، وَقِيلَ لِلْأَبْعَدِ.
وَلَا يَقْدَحُ
الْعَمَى فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا وِلَايَةَ لِفَاسِقٍ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَيَلِي الْكَافِرُ الْكَافِرَةَ.
وَإِحْرَامُ
أَحَدِ الْعَاقِدَيْنِ أَوْ الزَّوْجَةِ يَمْنَعُ صِحَّةَ النِّكَاحِ، وَلَا
يَنْقُلُ الْوِلَايَةَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَيُزَوِّجُ السُّلْطَانُ عِنْدَ إحْرَامِ
الْوَلِيِّ، لَا الْأَبْعَدُ.
قُلْت: وَلَوْ أَحْرَمَ الْوَلِيُّ
أَوْ الزَّوْجُ فَعَقَدَ وَكِيلُهُ الْحَلَالُ لَمْ يَصِحَّ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَوْ غَابَ الْأَقْرَبُ إلَى مَرْحَلَتَيْنِ زَوَّجَ
السُّلْطَانُ، وَدُونَهُمَا لَا يُزَوِّجُ إلَّا بِإِذْنِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَلِلْمُجْبِرِ التَّوْكِيلُ فِي التَّزْوِيجِ بِغَيْرِ إذْنِهَا، وَلَا
يُشْتَرَطُ تَعْيِينُ الزَّوْجِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَيَحْتَاطُ الْوَكِيلُ فَلَا
يُزَوِّجُ غَيْرَ كُفْءٍ، وَغَيْرُ الْمُجْبِرِ إنْ قَالَتْ لَهُ وَكِّلْ
وَكَّلَ، وَإِنْ نَهَتْهُ فَلَا، وَإِنْ قَالَتْ زَوِّجْنِي فَلَهُ التَّوْكِيلُ
فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ وَكَّلَ قَبْلَ اسْتِئْذَانِهَا فِي النِّكَاحِ لَمْ
يَصِحَّ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَلْيَقُلْ وَكِيلُ الْوَلِيِّ زَوَّجْتُك بِنْتَ
فُلَانٍ، وَلْيَقُلْ الْوَلِيُّ لِوَكِيلِ الزَّوْجِ زَوَّجْت بِنْتِي فُلَانًا،
فَيَقُولُ وَكِيلُهُ قَبِلْت نِكَاحَهَا لَهُ.
وَيَلْزَمُ
الْمُجْبِرَ تَزْوِيجُ مَجْنُونَةٍ بَالِغَةٍ وَمَجْنُونٍ ظَهَرَتْ حَاجَتُهُ،
لَا صَغِيرَةٍ وَصَغِيرٍ.
وَيَلْزَمُ الْمُجْبِرَ وَغَيْرَهُ إنْ
تَعَيَّنَ إجَابَةُ مُلْتَمِسَةِ التَّزْوِيجِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَتَعَيَّنْ
كَإِخْوَةٍ فَسَأَلَتْ بَعْضَهُمْ لَزِمَهُ الْإِجَابَةُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِذَا
اجْتَمَعَ أَوْلِيَاءُ فِي دَرَجَةٍ اُسْتُحِبَّ أَنْ يُزَوِّجَهَا أَفْقَهُهُمْ
وَأَسَنُّهُمْ بِرِضَاهُمْ فَإِنْ تَشَاحُّوا أُقْرِعَ، فَلَوْ زَوَّجَ غَيْرُ
مَنْ خَرَجَتْ قُرْعَتُهُ وَقَدْ أَذِنَتْ لِكُلٍّ مِنْهُمْ صَحَّ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ زَوَّجَهَا أَحَدُهُمْ زَيْدًا وَآخَرُ عَمْرًا، فَإِنْ
عُرِفَ السَّابِقُ فَهُوَ الصَّحِيحُ، وَإِنْ وَقَعَا مَعًا أَوْ جُهِلَ
السَّبْقُ وَالْمَعِيَّةُ فَبَاطِلَانِ، وَكَذَا لَوْ عُرِفَ سَبْقُ أَحَدِهِمَا
وَلَمْ يَتَعَيَّنْ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَلَوْ سَبَقَ مُعَيَّنٌ ثُمَّ اشْتَبَهَ
وَجَبَ التَّوَقُّفُ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ، فَإِنْ ادَّعَى كُلُّ زَوْجٍ عِلْمَهَا
بِسَبْقِهِ سُمِعَتْ دَعْوَاهُمَا بِنَاءً عَلَى الْجَدِيدِ، وَهُوَ قَبُولُ
إقْرَارِهَا بِالنِّكَاحِ، فَإِنْ أَنْكَرَتْ حُلِّفَتْ، وَإِنْ أَقَرَّتْ
لِأَحَدِهِمَا ثَبَتَ نِكَاحُهُ وَسَمَاعُ دَعْوَى الْآخَرِ، وَتَحْلِيفُهَا لَهُ
يَنْبَنِي عَلَى الْقَوْلَيْنِ فِيمَنْ قَالَ: هَذَا لِزَيْدٍ بَلْ لِعَمْرٍو
هَلْ يَغْرَمُ لِعَمْرٍو إنْ قُلْنَا نَعَمْ، فَنَعَمْ.
وَلَوْ
تَوَلَّى طَرَفَيْ عَقْدٍ فِي تَزْوِيجِ بِنْتِ ابْنِهِ بِابْنِ ابْنِهِ الْآخَرِ
صَحَّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا يُزَوِّجُ ابْنُ الْعَمِّ نَفْسَهُ
بَلْ يُزَوِّجُهُ ابْنُ عَمٍّ فِي دَرَجَتِهِ، فَإِنْ فُقِدَ فَالْقَاضِي، فَلَوْ
أَرَادَ الْقَاضِي، نِكَاحَ مَنْ لَا وَلِيَّ لَهَا زَوَّجَهُ مَنْ فَوْقَهُ مِنْ
الْوُلَاةِ أَوْ خَلِيفَتُهُ، وَكَمَا لَا يَجُوزُ لِوَاحِدٍ تَوَلِّي
الطَّرَفَيْنِ لَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يُوَكَّلَ وَكِيلاً فِي أَحَدِهِمَا أَوْ
وَكِيلَيْنِ فِيهِمَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
Section
The following are
incapable of assisting a woman at her
marriage as
guardian : a slave, a minor, a
lunatic, a person whose intelligence is
troubled by reason of senility, or
by the work of a malicious spirit ;
and even, according to our school, a
person legally incapable by reason
of
imbecility. In case of incapacity of
persons with a prior claim to
guardianship, it falls to those who
have second claim and so on. If the
guardian is in a state of
unconsciousness, and his attacks are usually
temporary, it is necessary to wait
until he comes to himself again, even
though the state of unconsciousness
should last several days. Under
these
circumstances, however, some jurists consider
that the right of
guardianship passes
to the next of those entitled, f
Blindness is no
obstacle to guardianship ;
but notorious misconduct is, at least
according
to our rite. As to an
infidel, he is only capable of
assisting as guardian
a woman who also
is an infidel.
A state of ihram ,
whether of the guardian, or of the
bride or bride-
groom, is an obstacle
to the validity of a marriage ; fbut the
ihram of
the guardian does not
transfer the right of guardianship. The
Sultan,
or the judge for him, should
then replace the guardian. [Even in
the case where one of the two
contracting parties, i.e. the guardian
or
the husband, appoints, previously to his
state of ihram , a competent
agent to
conclude the marriage in his name,
its validity is not to bo
accepted.
A legitimate guardian who is at a
distance of at least twro days’
journey should bo replaced by the
Sultan, i.e . by the judge ; fbut if ho
be at a less distance, the court
cannot proceed without his authorisation.
Guardians that have a right to
dispose of the hand of a woman as
they please, i.e. her father or
father’s father, can delegate an agent for
this purpose, *even without indicating
the husband they have in view.
In
this case the agent may give the
woman to whatever man he pleases,
provided it is a fitting match and
not a mesalliance. As to a guardian
who
has no right to dispose as he
pleases of the hand of the future
bride,
he should appoint an agent if
she desires it, but abstain from
doing so
if she forbids it ; fbut
where a woman asks her guardian to
give her the
requisite assistance for
her marriage, without saying anything further
the latter lias a right to delegate
an agent. ffBut such guardian can
never appoint an agent without first
obtaining the woman’s consent
to the
proposed marriage. A legitimate guardian’s agent
should say,
“ I give you in marriage
the daughter of so-and-so.” If it is
the husband
who is represented by an
agent, the guardian says to him, “ I
give my
daughter in marriage to
so-and-so,” and the agent answers, “ I accept
her as wife on behalf of my
principal.”
A father or father’s father
should, if possible, seek a husband for
their
adult daughter or grand-daughter in
a state of lunacy ; but as to an
adult male lunatic his curator
should not seek a wife for him,
unless he
is manifestly in need of
one ; and promises of marriage should
never be
made with regard to
lunatics under age of either sex,
A
guardian who has the right to
dispose as he pleases of the hand of
a woman cannot without good reason
decline to perform his duty, if ho
is asked to effect a marriage
desired by the woman in question ; the
same obligation rests upon the other
guardians, where they are person-
ally
indicated by the law, e.g. where the
bride has only one whole brother
or
half brother on the father’s side.
Where this is not the case, e.g .
where she has several brothers, f
any one of them should undertake the
duty upon the woman’s demand, though
it is to be recommended that
those
individuals whose degree of relationship
calls them equally to the
guardianship
should intrust this function to the
wisest or the eldest,
or decide the
matter by lot if they cannot
otherwise come to an agree-
ment. fin
these circumstances, however, if the bride
does not object,
she may, strictly
speaking, be given in* marriage by
any one of those
entitled, even
though the lot may have fallen upon
another.
If one of the persons
entitled to the guardianship gives a woman
in marriage to Zaid, and another
gives her to Amr, she belongs to the
husband who has the priority ; and
both marriages are void if effected
at the same time or if it
is not known which is the earlier.
This is also
the case, at least
according to our school, when it is
known that one of
the marriages
preceded the other, but it is not
known which ; but where
one is at
first believed to have the priority,
and afterwards doubts
arise upon the
subject, the matter remains in suspense
until the doubts
are dissipated. When
each of the two husbands asserts
that the woman
in question knows he
has the priority, it is impossible,
according to the
opinion of Shafii
in his -second period, to admit any
presumption in
favour of the one or
of the other ; in default of legal
proof the decision
then depends upon
the wife’s admission. Consequently if she
denies
being married to any one the
two husbands can only have an oath
administered to her ; and if she
admits being married to one of them
it is this last marriage that
is to be accepted as valid, without
prejudice
to the other husband’s right
to question the marriage in a court
of law,
and if necessary have an
oath administered to the wife. Such
is the
doctrine of authorities who
allow an admission expressed in the form,
“This object is Zaid’s, not Amr’s,”
as creating a pecuniary obligation
towards
the latter as well as a real
obligation towards the former ;
while
jurists who do not allow that in
such a case Amr can claim any
compensation do not allow either
that the marriage can be attacked
in
the circumstances just mentioned.
fPather’s father may lawfully effect
a marriage by himself alone
in his
double character as guardian of the
daughter of one of his sons,
and
as guardian or curator of the son
of another of his sons. But a
cousin on the father’s side cannot
in this way marry his cousin whose
guardian he is by right of
agnation, for in these circumstances the
guardianship devolves upon another agnate
cousin of the same degree
of
relationship, and after him upon the
judge as representing the
Sovereign. A
judge who wishes to marry a woman
having no other
guardian cannot marry
her to himself, but must be replaced
as guardian
by his superior magistrate
or by his substitute. With the exception
of father’s father no one can
effect a marriage entirely by himself,
neither as guardian of the two
parties interested, nor as tutor of the
one and agent of the other.
fNor can a marriage be effected by two
agents, one of the guardian and
the other of the bridegroom.
فصل [في الكفاءة]
زَوَّجَهَا الْوَلِيُّ غَيْرَ كُفْءٍ
بِرِضَاهَا أَوْ بَعْضَ الْأَوْلِيَاءِ الْمُسْتَوِينَ بِرِضَاهَا وَرِضَا
الْبَاقِينَ صَحَّ، وَلَوْ زَوَّجَهَا الْأَقْرَبُ بِرِضَاهَا فَلَيْسَ
لِلْأَبْعَدِ اعْتِرَاضٌ، وَلَوْ زَوَّجَهَا أَحَدُهُمْ بِهِ بِرِضَاهَا دُونَ
رِضَاهُمْ لَمْ يَصِحَّ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَصِحُّ، وَلَهُمْ الْفَسْخُ، وَيَجْرِي
الْقَوْلَانِ فِي تَزْوِيجِ الْأَبِ بِكْرًا صَغِيرَةً أَوْ بَالِغَةً غَيْرَ
كُفْءٍ بِغَيْرِ رِضَاهَا فَفِي الْأَظْهَرِ بَاطِلٌ، وَفِي الْآخَرِ يَصِحُّ،
وَلِلْبَالِغَةِ الْخِيَارُ، وَلِلصَّغِيرَةِ إذَا بَلَغَتْ، وَلَوْ طَلَبَتْ
مَنْ لَا وَلِيَّ لَهَا أَنْ يُزَوِّجَهَا السُّلْطَانُ بِغَيْرِ كُفْءٍ فَفَعَلَ
لَمْ يَصِحَّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَخِصَالُ الْكَفَاءَةِ: سَلَامَةٌ
مِنْ الْعُيُوبِ الْمُثْبِتَةِ لِلْخِيَارِ وَحُرِّيَّةٌ، فَالرَّقِيقُ لَيْسَ
كُفْئًا لِحُرَّةٍ، وَالْعَتِيقُ لَيْسَ كُفْئًا لِحُرَّةٍ أَصْلِيَّةٍ،
وَنَسَبٌ، فَالْعَجَمِيُّ لَيْسَ كُفْءَ عَرَبِيَّةٍ، وَلَا غَيْرُ قُرَشِيٍّ
قُرَشِيَّةً، وَلَا غَيْرُ هَاشِمِيٍّ وَمُطَّلِبِيٍّ لَهُمَا، وَالْأَصَحُّ
اعْتِبَارُ النَّسَبِ فِي الْعَجَمِ كَالْعَرَبِ، وَعِفَّةٌ فَلَيْسَ فَاسِقٌ
كُفْءَ عَفِيفَةٍ، وَحِرْفَةٌ فَصَاحِبُ حِرْفَةٍ دَنِيئَةٍ، لَيْسَ كُفْءَ
أَرْفَعَ مِنْهُ، فَكَنَّاسٌ وَحَجَّامٌ وَحَارِسٌ وَرَاعٍ وَقَيِّمُ الْحَمَّامِ
لَيْسَ كُفْءَ بِنْتِ خَيَّاطٍ، وَلَا خَيَّاطٌ بِنْتَ تَاجِرٍ أَوْ بَزَّازٍ،
وَلَا هُمَا بِنْتَ عَالِمٍ وَقَاضٍ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ الْيَسَارَ لَا
يُعْتَبَرُ، وَأَنَّ بَعْضَ الْخِصَالِ لَا يُقَابَلُ بِبَعْضٍ، وَلَيْسَ لَهُ
تَزْوِيجُ ابْنِهِ الصَّغِيرِ أَمَةً، وَكَذَا مَعِيبَةٌ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ،
وَيَجُوزُ مَنْ لَا تُكَافِئُهُ بِبَاقِي الْخِصَالِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
Section
A guardian can never
give a woman in marriage to a man of
inferior
condition, except with her entire
consent. Where there are several
persons
who, by their degree of agnation,
are equally competent as
guardian, the
consent of all is necessary to a
mesalliance, though it is
only one
of them that need preside at the
celebration of the marriage.
Agnates
further removed can never oppose a
mesalliance concluded
by one more nearly
related, acting as guardian, with the
full consent
of the woman in
question ; but a mesalliance concluded by
one of the
agnates intrusted with
the guardianship, without the consent of
the
others equally competent is wholly
illegal, even though the bride should
have given her consent. A single
authority maintains that in this
case
the validity of the marriage must be
accepted, until the other
agnates have
demanded its dissolution by the court. A
similar contro-
versy exists where a father
disposes of the hand of his virgin
daughter,
whether minor or adult, in
favour of a man of inferior condition,
without
obtaining her consent. According
to most authorities such a marriage
is
null and void, but according to the
jurist just mentioned the contract
is
valid unless the wife applies for
its cancellation. An adult wife
should
bring an action for this purpose at
once, but a minor should wait
until
she has attained her majority. fFinally
neither the Sultan as
ultimate guardian,
nor the judge for him, can legally
give a woman
in marriage to a man of
inferior condition, even though she may
desire it.
In order to
determine whether the suitor is a good
match, the
following must be taken
into consideration : —
. Absence of
redhibitory defects of body.
.
Liberty. A slave is not a suitable match
for a free woman, nor
an enfranchised
slave for a woman born free.
.
Birth. An Arab woman makes a mesalliance
by marrying a
man belonging to
another nation ; a woman of the Koraish
does so
if her husband is not
of the Koraish ; a woman who is a
descendant
of Hashim or of
Abd-al-Mottalib, i.e. who is of the
same blood as the
Prophet, can make
a suitable match only in the same
family, fin the
case of marriages
between persons belonging to foreign
nations, like
the Persians, genealogy must
be taken into consideration as in
the case
of Arabs.
. Character. A
man of notorious misconduct is not a
suitable
match for an honest woman.
. Profession. A man exercising a
humble profession is not a suitable
match
for the daughter of a man in a more
distinguished profession.
Thus a sweeper, a
barber, a watchman, a shepherd, or a servant
at a
bathhouse, is not a suitable
match for the daughter of a tailor ; while
the tailor in his turn is no
match for the daughter of a merchant
or a
second-hand dealer, who in then
turn are no suitable match for the
daughter of a learned man or a judge.
f Difference of fortune constitutes
no cause of mesalliance ; but
inequality
under one of the aspects above-mentioned
is not com-
pensated for by the
husband being superior to his wife
in other
respects.
A father or
father’s father should never marry his
son or his grandson
to a slave ;
nor, according to our school, to a
person with redhibitory
defects ; but with
these two exceptions the law does
not admit that a
man can make a
mesalliance by marrying a woman in any
respect
inferior to him.
فصل [في تزويج المحجور عليه]
لَا يُزَوَّجُ مَجْنُونٌ
صَغِيرٌ.
وَكَذَا كَبِيرٌ إلَّا لِحَاجَةٍ فَوَاحِدَةً، وَلَهُ
تَزْوِيجُ صَغِيرٍ عَاقِلٍ أَكْثَرَ مِنْ وَاحِدَةٍ، وَيُزَوِّجُ الْمَجْنُونَةَ
أَبٌ أَوْ جَدٌّ إنْ ظَهَرَتْ مَصْلَحَةٌ، وَلَا تُشْتَرَطُ الْحَاجَةُ وَسَوَاءٌ
صَغِيرَةٌ وَكَبِيرَةٌ ثَيِّبٌ وَبِكْرٌ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ أَبٌ وَجَدٌّ لَمْ
تُزَوَّجْ فِي صِغَرِهَا، فَإِنْ بَلَغَتْ زَوَّجَهَا السُّلْطَانُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ لِلْحَاجَةِ، لَا لِمَصْلَحَةٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَمَنْ حُجِرَ
عَلَيْهِ بِسَفَهٍ لَا يَسْتَقِلُّ بِنِكَاحٍ بَلْ يَنْكِحُ بِإِذْنِ وَلِيِّهِ
أَوْ يَقْبَلُ لَهُ الْوَلِيُّ، فَإِنْ أَذِنَ لَهُ وَعَيَّنَ امْرَأَةً لَمْ
يَنْكِحْ غَيْرَهَا، وَيَنْكِحْهَا بِمَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ أَوْ أَقَلَّ، فَإِنْ
زَادَ فَالْمَشْهُورُ صِحَّةُ النِّكَاحِ بِمَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ مِنْ الْمُسَمَّى،
وَلَوْ قَالَ انْكِحْ بِأَلْفٍ وَلَمْ يُعَيِّنْ امْرَأَةً نَكَحَ بِالْأَقَلِّ
مِنْ أَلْفٍ وَمَهْرِ مِثْلِهَا، وَلَوْ أَطْلَقَ الْإِذْنَ فَالْأَصَحُّ
صِحَّتُهُ، وَيَنْكِحُ بِمَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ مَنْ تَلِيقُ بِهِ، فَإِنْ قَبِلَ لَهُ
وَلِيُّهُ اُشْتُرِطَ إذْنُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيَقْبَلُ بِمَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ
فَأَقَلَّ، فَإِنْ زَادَ صَحَّ النِّكَاحُ بِمَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ
يَبْطُلُ.
وَلَوْ نَكَحَ السَّفِيهُ بِلَا إذْنٍ فَبَاطِلٌ، فَإِنْ
وَطِئَ لَمْ يَلْزَمْهُ شَيْءٌ، وَقِيلَ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَقِيلَ أَقَلُّ
مُتَمَوَّلٍ.
وَمَنْ حُجِرَ عَلَيْهِ لِفَلَسٍ يَصِحُّ نِكَاحُهُ،
وَمُؤَنُ النِّكَاحِ فِي كَسْبِهِ، لَا فِيمَا مَعَهُ.
وَنِكَاحُ
عَبْدٍ بِلَا إذْنِ سَيِّدِهِ بَاطِلٌ، وَبِإِذْنِهِ صَحِيحٌ، وَلَهُ إطْلَاقُ
الْإِذْنِ، وَلَهُ تَقْيِيدُهُ بِامْرَأَةٍ أَوْ قَبِيلَةٍ أَوْ بَلَدٍ، وَلَا
يَعْدِلُ عَمَّا أَذِنَ فِيهِ وَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ لِلسَّيِّدِ إجْبَارُ
عَبْدِهِ عَلَى النِّكَاحِ وَلَا عَكْسُهُ، وَلَهُ إجْبَارُ أَمَتِهِ بِأَيِّ
صِفَةٍ كَانَتْ، فَإِنْ طَلَبَتْ لَمْ يَلْزَمْهُ تَزْوِيجُهَا، وَقِيلَ إنْ
حَرُمَتْ عَلَيْهِ لَزِمَهُ، وَإِذَا زَوَّجَهَا فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ
بِالْمِلْكِ لَا بِالْوِلَايَةِ فَيُزَوِّجُ مُسْلِمٌ أَمَتَهُ الْكَافِرَةَ
وَفَاسِقٌ وَمُكَاتَبٌ، وَلَا يُزَوِّجُ وَلِيٌّ عَبْدًا صَبِيًّا وَيُزَوِّجُ
أَمَتَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
Section
The curator of a
lunatic minor cannot effect a marriage in
his name ;
and the curator of
an adult lunatic can do so only
if the latter is mani-
festly in
need of it, and then only with
one woman at a time. As to a
sane minor, his father or father’s
father can many him to as many wives
as the law permits. An insane
woman, whatever her age, and whether
she be virgin or not, should,
if possible, be given in marriage by
her father
or father’s father, not
only if she needs it but also
if it is in any way
advantageous
for her. But a husband ought not to
be sought for a
mad woman during
her minority, unless she is under
the guardianship
of her father or
father’s father. tUpon her majority it
is the Sultan
who should find her a
husband if she requires one, but not
if it be merely
for her advantage.
A person legally incapable by reason
of imbecility cannot legally
effect a
marriage in his own name ; his curator’s
authorisation is necessary
for this
purpose, unless the curator prefers to
effect it himself in the name
of
the person legally incapable. Where the
latter obtains the authorisa-
tion to
marry a specified woman he cannot marry
any other. He cannot
even marry the
woman specified unless he promises a
proportional
dower, or a definite dower,
inferior to what the woman could
claim as
proportional dower. **The promise
of even a definite and excessive
dower
does not, however, prejudice the validity
of the marriage ; for
the promised
dower is in that case ipso facto
reduced to a reasonable
amount . An
authorisation granted to a person legally
incapable to marry
a woman not specified
for a dower of at most one thousand
pieces of
money, gives him a right
to take what woman he pleases
provided her
proportional dower does not
exceed this sum. jTf he is authorised
generally without any restriction as
to the woman or the dower, he can
marry whom he likes provided her
proportional dower does not exceed
his
means, f As to the curator, he can
conclude no marriage in the name
of
the imbecile without his consent. Nor
can he allow more than
proportional
dower, or a dower inferior to what
the wife could claim
as proportional
dower ; and if this limit is
exceeded, though the marriage
remains
valid, the dower is ipso facto
reduced to a reasonable amount.
Only one
authority is of opinion that in this
case the marriage is null
and void.
Finally a marriage concluded by an
imbecile without the
authorisation of his
curator is absolutely null ; even though
cohabita-
tion should have resulted, he
owes his wife nothing. Others* however,
maintain that in this case he
owes her proportional dower ; and others
consider ho owes a small present,
which should not be something quite
without value.
A bankrupt is subject
to no restriction as to his right
to marry ;
but the expenses of
the marriage must be defrayed out of
what lie gains
personally, and not
out of the estate.
The law
regards as null and void a marriage
effected by a slave
without his master’s
consent, which may lawfully be given
either by a
general authorisation, or
restricted to a specified woman or one
of a
certain tribe or place, in
which case the slave must respect
the will of
his master. *However, a
master cannot lawfully force his male
slave
to marry, nor, on the other
hand, is he obliged to allow him
to marry. A
female slave cannot
oblige her master to give her in
marriage, unless
according to some
authors, cohabitation with her is
prohibited to the
master himself.
fMoreover, when giving a female slave in
marriage,
a master acts by virtue of
his right of ownership and not as
guardian ;
this is why the faculty
is granted not only to a Moslem with
respect
to his infidel slave, but
also to a master of notorious misconduct,
and to
a slave who is undergoing
enfranchisement by contract.
باب مَا يَحْرُمُ مِنْ النِّكَاحِ
CHAPTER II— PROHIBITED MARRIAGES
تَحْرُمُ الْأُمَّهَاتُ، وَكُلُّ مَنْ وَلَدَتْك أَوْ وَلَدَتْ مَنْ
وَلَدَكَ فَهِيَ أُمُّك، وَالْبَنَاتُ، وَكُلُّ مَنْ وَلَدْتَهَا أَوْ وَلَدْتَ
مَنْ وَلَدَهَا فَبِنْتُك.
قُلْت: وَالْمَخْلُوقَةُ مِنْ زِنَاهُ
تَحِلُّ لَهُ، وَيَحْرُمُ عَلَى الْمَرْأَةِ وَلَدُهَا مِنْ زِنًا، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ، وَالْأَخَوَاتُ وَبَنَاتُ الْإِخْوَةِ وَالْأَخَوَاتِ، وَالْعَمَّاتُ
وَالْخَالَاتُ، وَكُلُّ مَنْ هِيَ أُخْتُ ذَكَرٍ وَلَدَكَ فَعَمَّتُك، أَوْ
أُخْتُ أُنْثَى وَلَدَتْك فَخَالَتُك.
وَيَحْرُمُ هَؤُلَاءِ
السَّبْعُ بِالرَّضَاعِ أَيْضًا، وَكُلُّ مَنْ أَرْضَعَتْك أَوْ أَرْضَعَتْ مَنْ
أَرْضَعَتْك أَوْ مَنْ وَلَدَكَ أَوْ وَلَدَتْ مُرْضِعَتَك أَوْ ذَا لَبَنِهَا
فَأُمُّ رَضَاعٍ، وَقِسْ الْبَاقِي وَلَا يَحْرُمُ عَلَيْك مَنْ أَرْضَعَتْ
أَخَاك وَنَافِلَتَك، وَلَا أُمُّ مُرْضِعَةِ وَلَدِك وَبِنْتُهَا وَلَا أُخْتُ
أَخِيك: مِنْ نَسَبٍ وَلَا رَضَاعٍ وَهِيَ أُخْتُ أَخِيك لِأَبِيك لِأُمِّهِ
وَعَكْسُهُ، وَتَحْرُمُ زَوْجَةُ مَنْ وَلَدْتَ أَوْ وَلَدَكَ مِنْ نَسَبٍ أَوْ
رَضَاعٍ وَأُمَّهَاتُ زَوْجَتِك مِنْهُمَا وَكَذَا بَنَاتُهَا إنْ دَخَلْتَ
بِهَا، وَمَنْ وَطِئَ امْرَأَةً بِمِلْكٍ حَرُمَ عَلَيْهِ أُمَّهَاتُهَا
وَبَنَاتُهَا وَحَرُمَتْ عَلَى آبَائِهِ وَأَبْنَائِهِ، وَكَذَا الْمَوْطُوءَةُ
بِشُبْهَةٍ فِي حَقِّهِ، قِيلَ أَوْ لَا حَقِّهَا، الْمَزْنِيِّ بِهَا،
وَلَيْسَتْ مُبَاشَرَةً بِشَهْوَةٍ كَوَطْءٍ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ وَلَوْ اخْتَلَطَتْ
مَحْرَمٌ بِنِسْوَةِ قَرْيَةٍ كَبِيرَةٍ نَكَحَ مِنْهُنَّ، لَا بِمَحْصُورَاتٍ،
وَلَوْ طَرَأَ مُؤَبَّدُ تَحْرِيمٍ عَلَى نِكَاحٍ قَطَعَهُ كَوَطْءِ زَوْجَةَ
ابْنِهِ بِشُبْهَةٍ.
وَيَحْرُمُ جَمْعُ الْمَرْأَةِ وَأُخْتِهَا
أَوْ عَمَّتِهَا أَوْ خَالَتِهَا مِنْ رَضَاعٍ أَوْ نَسَبٍ فَإِنْ جَمَعَ
بِعَقْدٍ بَطَلَ، أَوْ مُرَتَّبًا فَالثَّانِي وَمَنْ حَرُمَ جَمْعُهُمَا
بِنِكَاحٍ حَرُمَ فِي الْوَطْءِ بِمِلْكٍ، لَا مِلْكُهُمَا فَإِنْ وَطِئَ
وَاحِدَةً حَرُمَتْ الْأُخْرَى حَتَّى يُحَرِّمَ الْأُولَى كَبَيْعٍ أَوْ نِكَاحٍ
أَوْ كِتَابَةٍ لَا حَيْضٍ وَإِحْرَامٍ، وَكَذَا رَهْنٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ
مَلَكَهَا ثُمَّ نَكَحَ أُخْتَهَا أَوْ عَكَسَ حَلَّتْ الْمَنْكُوحَةُ
دُونَهَا.
وَلِلْعَبْدِ امْرَأَتَانِ.
وَلِلْحُرِّ
أَرْبَعٌ فَقَطْ، فَإِنْ نَكَحَ خَمْسًا مَعًا بَطَلْنَ أَوْ مُرَتَّبًا
فَالْخَامِسَةُ.
وَتَحِلُّ الْأُخْتُ، وَالْخَامِسَةُ فِي عِدَّةِ
بَائِنٍ لَا رَجْعِيَّةٍ.
وَإِذَا طَلَّقَ الْحُرُّ ثَلَاثًا أَوْ
الْعَبْدُ طَلْقَتَيْنِ لَمْ تَحِلَّ لَهُ حَتَّى تَنْكِحَ، وَتَغِيبَ
بِقُبُلِهَا حَشَفَتُهُ أَوْ قَدْرُهَا، بِشَرْطِ الِانْتِشَارِ، وَصِحَّةِ
النِّكَاحِ، وَكَوْنِهِ مِمَّنْ يُمْكِنُ جِمَاعُهُ لَا طِفْلاً عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ فِيهِنَّ، وَلَوْ نَكَحَ بِشَرْطِ إذَا وَطِئَ طَلَّقَ أَوْ بَانَتْ
أَوْ فَلَا نِكَاحَ بَطَلَ، وَفِي التَّطْلِيقِ قَوْلٌ.
CHAPTER IL— PROHIBITED MARRIAGES
Section
In
the direct line it is forbidden to
marry —
. One’s mother, i.e . not
only the woman that bore one, but
any
that has borne one’s ancestor or
ancestress.
. One’s daughter, i.e . any
woman of whom one is the ancestor.
[The prohibition does not extend to
children born of a criminal connec-
tion,
though a woman can never marry her
descendant, even a descen-
dant by adultery
or incest.]
La the collateral line
one may not marry : one’s sisters,
nieces and
aunts ; understanding by “aunt”
any whole sister, half sister on the
father’s side or uterine sister of
one of his ancestors or ancestresses.
Relationship by fosterage is a cause
of prohibition in the same way
as
relationship properly so called ; and this
prohibition extends to the
same degrees.
By foster mother is understood any
person : () who has
given one suck ;
() who has given the breast either
to one’s nurse, or
to one’s ancestor
or ancestress ; () who is the
ancestress of one’s nurse ;
() who
is the ancestress of the man from
whom is derived one’s nurse’s
milk,
and so on.
One may legally
marry the nurse of one’s brother or
of one’s grand-
children, the mother or
the daughter of the nurse of one’s
own children,
and the uterine sister
or foster sister of one’s half
brother on the father’s
side or vice
versa .
By reason of affinity one
may not marry —
. The wife of
one of his descendants or ancestors,
there being no
distinction between those
properly so called and those by fosterage.
. One’s wife’s ancestresses,
understood in the same way.
.
One’s wife’s descendants by another
husband, similarly regarded.
Affinity does
not exist before marriage has been
consummated by
coition. A master who
has cohabited with his slave should
subsequently
abstain from all commerce
with her ancestresses or descendants ; and
all commerce with her is forbidden
to her master’s ancestors or
descendants.
It is the same in the case of
illegal cohabitation by
error, whether the
error was on the man’s side, or,
according to some
authors, on the woman’s
; but, on the other hand, coition
that consti-
tutes the crime of
fornication has no legal consequence so
far as affinity
is concerned. ^Affinity
exists only in consequence of coition,
and not
by reason of other
lascivious acts.
The fact of being
aware that a woman with whom commerce
is pro-
hibited to oneself, but whom
one does not know, is living in a
large town
does not prevent one
marrying a woman of that town ; but
when one
knows that such a woman is
amongst a small number of women, but
one does not know which she
is, then one should abstain from marriage
with any of them. If in case
of marriage with one of the women
of a
large town, one perceives too
late that one has accidentally married a
woman with whom commerce is entirely
prohibited one at any time,
e.g. the
wife of one’s father or of one’s
son, cohabitation must be at once
discontinued.
One may not have
at one time two wives of whom
one is the sister
or the aunt
of the other ; without distinction between
parentage
properly so called and parentage
by fosterage. Thus, if one marries
at one and the same time a
woman and her sister or her aunt,
there is
no marriage ; and if one
marries the two women the one after
the other,
the second marriage alone
is void. A prohibition to have two
women as
wives at the same time
implies a similar prohibition to have commerce
with them by right of property,
as in the case of two slaves ;
but such
prohibition is no obstacle
to the mere ownership in itself.
Thus, a
master who owns two female
slaves of whom one is the sister
or aunt of
the other and who
has cohabited with one of them, must
abstain from
commerce with the other,
until commerce with the first has become
forbidden him, i.e . until he has
sold her, given her in marriage, or
begun
to enfranchise her by contract.
The law does not, however, regard as
having the same result a temporary
cause preventing commerce with
the slave
in question, such as menstruation, ihram,
for having pledged
her to a creditor. A
master who marries a sister of one
of his female
slaves, or the husband
who becomes the owner of his wife’s
sister, should
cohabit with his wife,
and abstain from commerce with his slave.
A slave cannot have more than
two wives at a time, and a free man
not more than four. A marriage
concluded by a free man with five
wives at once is null as
regards all of them ; but if he
marries them one
after the other,
the fifth alone is void. Consequently
the sister of the
fifth wife can
become the wife of the person in
question, unless he must
abstain from
her on other grounds. Moreover, one
has the right to take
a fifth wife
after repudiating irrevocably one of the
four, even while the
repudiated wife
is still in her period of legal
retreat ; but this cannot be
done if
the repudiation is revocable.
A free
man may repudiate his wife twice,
and a slave his once, in a
revocable
way ; but after this triple, or
double, revocation, she cannot
be taken
back again until she has been the
legitimate wife of another
man, and
this intermediate husband has had
effective connection with
her. Our school
insists that this intermediate husband
should be capable
of performing conjugal
functions; consequently an intermediate marriage
of a woman with a young boy ancl
her connection with him would
be of
no use. Neither can the intermediate
marriage be on condition
that the
new husband shall repudiate his wife
immediately after first
having connection
with her, and that she shall be
ipso facto repudiated
from that moment,
or that the intermediate marriage shall
ipso facto
cease to exist from that
moment. One authority, however, admits
the
first condition.
فصل [في نكاح من فيها رق وتوابعه]
لَا يَنْكِحُ مَنْ
يَمْلِكُهَا أَوْ بَعْضَهَا، وَلَوْ مَلَكَ زَوْجَتَهُ أَوْ بَعْضَهَا بَطَلَ
نِكَاحُهُ، وَلَا تَنْكِحُ مَنْ تَمْلِكُهُ أَوْ بَعْضَهُ.
وَلَا
الْحُرُّ أَمَةَ غَيْرِهِ إلَّا بِشُرُوطٍ: أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ تَحْتَهُ حُرَّةٌ
تَصْلُحُ لِلِاسْتِمْتَاعِ، قِيلَ وَلَا غَيْرُ صَالِحَةٍ، وَأَنْ يَعْجِزَ عَنْ
حُرَّةٍ تَصْلُحُ، قِيلَ أَوْ لَا تَصْلُحُ، فَلَوْ قَدَرَ عَلَى غَائِبَةٍ
حَلَّتْ لَهُ أَمَةٌ إنْ لَحِقَهُ مَشَقَّةٌ ظَاهِرَةٌ فِي قَصْدِهَا أَوْ خَافَ
زِنًا مُدَّتَهُ، وَلَوْ وَجَدَ حُرَّةً بِمُؤَجَّلٍ أَوْ بِدُونِ مَهْرِ
الْمِثْلِ فَالْأَصَحُّ حِلُّ أَمَةٍ فِي الْأُولَى، دُونَ الثَّانِيَةِ، وَأَنْ
يَخَافَ زِنًا، فَلَوْ أَمْكَنَهُ تَسَرٍّ فَلَا خَوْفَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَإِسْلَامُهَا وَتَحِلُّ لِحُرٍّ وَعَبْدٍ كِتَابِيَّيْنِ أَمَةٌ كِتَابِيَّةٌ
عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، لَا لِعَبْدٍ مُسْلِمٍ فِي الْمَشْهُورِ، وَمَنْ بَعْضُهَا
رَقِيقٌ كَرَقِيقَةٍ.
وَلَوْ نَكَحَ حُرٌّ أَمَةً بِشَرْطِهِ ثُمَّ
أَيْسَرَ أَوْ نَكَحَ حُرَّةً لَمْ تَنْفَسِخْ الْأَمَةُ، وَلَوْ جَمَعَ مَنْ لَا
تَحِلُّ لَهُ الْأَمَةُ حُرَّةً وَأَمَةً بِعَقْدٍ بَطَلَتْ الْأَمَةُ، لَا
الْحُرَّةُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
Section
One may not marry a
woman of whom one is the proprietor,
even in
part only ; and the fact
of becoming owner or part owner of a
woman
with whom one has already
contracted marriage is of itself
sufficient to
annul it. Neither may a
woman marry a slave of whom she is
owner or
part owner. A free man may
not even marry the slave of another,
except under the following conditions : —
. That he has no free
wife able to satisfy his passion ;
or, according
to some jurists, no
free wife at all.
. That he
is unable to marry a free woman able
to satisfy his passion ;
or, according
to some jurists, that he is unable
to marry any free woman.
On the
other hand, most authorities permit a free
man to marry the slave
of another,
in the case of the absence of
the woman whom he could
marry, when
it is manifestly difficult for him
to go to her, or when he is
afraid that the excitement of desire
will otherwise make him commit
the
crime of fornication. fA man who has
not the means to pay the
proportional dower a free woman could
claim, and who finds some one
willing to be content with a lower
sum not in excess of his means, may
not refuso this offer and marry a
slave ; but when the free woman will
not be content with a lower sum,
but is disposed to give facilities
as to
payment, marriage with a slave
is not prohibited.
. That he
is afraid of committing the crime of
fornication if he does
not marry ; f
but the law admits this excuse only
where he is unable to
purchase a
slave with whom cohabitation would be
permitted him by
right of ownership.
. That the slave is a Moslem.
A Moslem, whether free **or not,
should
never marry an infidel slave ; ffbut
an infidel, free or not,
member of a
religion founded upon a holy scripture,
may marry an infidel
slave.
A woman
partly enfranchised is regarded for this
purpose as entirely
servile. A free man,
who, after marrying a slave in conformity
with
the law, afterwards becomes enabled
to marry a free woman, or who
does
in fact marry one though strictly
speaking his means do not permit
of
it, keeps the slave all the same
as a legitimate wife. But if, on the
other hand, a free man, legally
unable to marry a slave, nevertheless
does
marry both a slave and a free woman,
*the contract is void so far
as
regards the slave, but remains valid
as to the free woman.
فصل [في حل نكاح الكافرة وتوابعه]
يَحْرُمُ نِكَاحُ مَنْ
لَا كتاب لَهَا كَوَثَنِيَّةٍ وَمَجُوسِيَّةٍ.
وَتَحِلُّ
كِتَابِيَّةٌ لَكِنْ تُكْرَهُ حَرْبِيَّةٌ وَكَذَا ذِمِّيَّةٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ،
وَالْكِتَابِيَّةُ يَهُودِيَّةٌ أَوْ نَصْرَانِيَّةٌ لَا مُتَمَسِّكَةٌ
بِالزَّبُورِ وَغَيْرِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ تَكُنْ الْكِتَابِيَّةُ إسْرَائِيلِيَّةً
فَالْأَظْهَرُ حِلُّهَا إنْ عُلِمَ دُخُولُ قَوْمِهَا فِي ذَلِكَ الدِّينِ قَبْلَ
نَسْخِهِ وَتَحْرِيفِهِ، وَقِيلَ يَكْفِي قَبْلَ نَسْخِهِ.
وَالْكِتَابِيَّةُ
الْمَنْكُوحَةُ كَمُسْلِمَةٍ فِي نَفَقَةٍ وَقَسْمٍ وَطَلَاقٍ، وَتُجْبَرُ عَلَى
غُسْلِ حَيْضٍ وَنِفَاسٍ وَكَذَا جَنَابَةٌ، وَتَرْكِ أَكْلِ خِنْزِيرٍ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ، وَتُجْبَرُ هِيَ وَمُسْلِمَةٌ عَلَى غَسْلِ مَا نَجُسَ مِنْ
أَعْضَائِهَا.
وَتَحْرُمُ مُتَوَلِّدَةٌ مِنْ وَثَنِيٍّ
وَكِتَابِيَّةٍ، وَكَذَا عَكْسُهُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَإِنْ خَالَفَتْ
السَّامِرَةُ الْيَهُودَ وَالصَّابِئُونَ النَّصَارَى فِي أَصْلِ دِينِهِمْ
حَرُمْنَ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَلَوْ تَهَوَّدَ نَصْرَانِيٌّ أَوْ
عَكْسُهُ لَمْ يُقَرَّ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ امْرَأَةً لَمْ تَحِلَّ
لِمُسْلِمٍ، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ مَنْكُوحَتَهُ فَكَرِدَّةِ مُسْلِمَةٍ، وَلَا
يُقْبَلُ مِنْهُ إلَّا الْإِسْلَامُ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ أَوْ دِينُهُ الْأَوَّلُ،
وَلَوْ تَوَثَّنَ لَمْ يُقَرَّ، وَفِيمَا يُقْبَلُ الْقَوْلَانِ، وَلَوْ
تَهَوَّدَ وَثَنِيٌّ أَوْ تَنَصَّرَ لَمْ يُقَرَّ، وَيَتَعَيَّنُ الْإِسْلَامُ
كَمُسْلِمٍ ارْتَدَّ.
وَلَا تَحِلُّ مُرْتَدَّةٌ لِأَحَدٍ، وَلَوْ
ارْتَدَّ زَوْجَانِ أَوْ أَحَدُهُمَا قَبْلَ دُخُولٍ تَنَجَّزَتْ الْفُرْقَةُ،
أَوْ بَعْدَهُ وَإِلَّا فَالْفُرْقَةُ مِنْ الرِّدَّةِ، وُقِفَتْ، فَإِنْ
جَمَعَهُمَا الْإِسْلَامُ فِي الْعِدَّةِ دَامَ النِّكَاحُ، وَيَحْرُمُ الْوَطْءُ
فِي التَّوَقُّفِ وَلَا حَدَّ.
Section
A Moslem may not marry
a woman of a religion not founded upon
some holy scripture. Thus, he may
not marry an idolatress nor a fire-
worshipper ; but he may marry a
Jewess or a Christian ; though it is
always blamable to marry a woman,
whether Jewess or Christian, belong-
ing
to a nation not yet subjugated by
our arms ffor even a woman
belonging
to infidel subjects of our Sovereign.
By “ infidels whose
religion is founded
upon a holy scripture,” are understood
those people
who follow one of the
actually existing divine revelations, though
abrogated by the Koran, i.e. Jews
and Christians ; but not adherents of
religious sects founded only on the
psalms of David, and so on. Jewesses
may become wives of Moslems, even
when not strictly speaking of the
race of Israel, *provided their
nation was converted to Judaism before
that revelation was abrogated by the
Koran, and before the text of the
law of Moses had been altered
by theologians. Some jurists, however,
consider only the first of these
two conditions as strictly necessary. A
Jewess or a Christian, the legitimate
wife of a Moslem, has the same
right
to maintenance, sharing of marital
favours, and with regard to
repudiation,
as Moslem wives, provided she observes
the precepts of
the law with regard
to menstruation, lochia, *and grave
impurities in
general, and does not
eat pork. A Moslem’s wife, of whatever
religion
she may be, should at her
husband’s order wash herself, when any
part
of her body is affected by
some impurity.
A Moslem may never
marry an idolatress, even where the
mother *or
father of the woman in
question is Jewish or Christian. And women
belonging to Samaritan sects that
have seceded from Judaism, or
Sabaean
sects seceded from Christianity, differing
in each case as to some
essential
dogma, are deprived of the right to
marry a Moslem. But
women of Samaritan
or Sabaean sects that differ from
Judaism or
Christianity only in secondary
dogmas may marry a Moslem, just as
Jewish or Christian women may.
However, *since a Christian con-
verted to
Judaism, or a Jew converted to
Christianity enjoy no longer
the favour
of our protection, neither may a woman
in similar circum-
stances become the
legitimate wife of a Moslem ; and if a
Moslem’s wife
is converted from
Christianity to Judaism or vice versa ,
she should be
treated as a Moslem
wife who has abjured the faith. A
Jew or a
Christian who wishes to
change his religion should become a Moslem ;
unless, according to one author,
they arc returning to their original
religions after abandoning them. The
same controversy exists as to
whether a
Jew or a Christian, who has become
an idolater, can return
to the
religion they have left ; but they
can never enjoy our protection
while
remaining idolaters. An idolater who
becomes a Jew or a
Christian is
equally incapable of enjoying our
protection ; nor can he
return to
his original religion. There is thus
no course open to him but
to
embrace Islam, as if he wore an
apostate.
A woman that has abjured
Islam can marry no one ; and apostasy,
whether of husband or wife, or
both, before a marriage has been followed
by cohabitation, involves ipso facto
an immediate separation. Where,
on the
other hand, cohabitation has already taken
place, the marriage
remains in suspense,
in the hope that the guilty party
or parties will
become convinced of
their error before the end of the
period of legal
retirement. If this
occurs, the marriage holds good as
if nothing had
happened ; but otherwise
separation is regarded as having taken
effect
from the moment of apostasy.
In all cases, however, carnal enjoyment
is forbidden to the parties while
their marriage remains in suspense;
though
an infraction of this precept does
not constitute the crime of
fornication.
باب نِكَاحِ الْمُشْرِكِ
CHATTER III.— THE MARRIAGE OF INFIDELS
أَسْلَمَ كِتَابِيٌّ أَوْ غَيْرُهُ وَتَحْتَهُ كِتَابِيَّةٌ دَامَ
نِكَاحُهُ أَوْ وَثَنِيَّةٌ أَوْ مَجُوسِيَّةٌ فَتَخَلَّفَتْ قَبْلَ دُخُولٍ
تَنَجَّزَتْ الْفُرْقَةُ، أَوْ بَعْدَهُ وَأَسْلَمَتْ فِي الْعِدَّةِ دَامَ
نِكَاحُهُ، وَإِلَّا فَالْفُرْقَةُ مِنْ إسْلَامِهِ، وَلَوْ أَسْلَمَتْ وَأَصَرَّ
فَكَعَكْسِهِ.
وَلَوْ أَسْلَمَا مَعًا دَامَ النِّكَاحُ،
وَالْمَعِيَّةُ بِآخِرِ اللَّفْظِ.
وَحَيْثُ أَدَمْنَا لَا تَضُرُّ
مُقَارَنَةُ الْعَقْدِ لِمُفْسِدٍ هُوَ زَائِلٌ عِنْدَ الْإِسْلَامِ وَكَانَتْ
بِحَيْثُ تَحِلُّ لَهُ الْآنَ، وَإِنْ بَقِيَ الْمُفْسِدُ فَلَا نِكَاحَ
فَيُقَرُّ بِلَا وَلِيٍّ وَشُهُودٍ، وَفِي عِدَّةٍ هِيَ مُنْقَضِيَةٌ عِنْدَ
الْإِسْلَامِ، وَمُؤَقَّتٍ، إنْ اعْتَقَدُوهُ مُؤَبَّدًا، وَكَذَا لَوْ قَارَنَ
الْإِسْلَامَ عِدَّةُ شُبْهَةٍ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، لَا نِكَاحُ مَحْرَمٍ.
وَلَوْ
أَسْلَمَ ثُمَّ أَحْرَمَ ثُمَّ أَسْلَمَتْ وَهُوَ مُحْرِمٌ أُقِرَّ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ نَكَحَ حُرَّةً وَأَمَةً وَأَسْلَمُوا
تَعَيَّنَتْ الْحُرَّةُ وَانْدَفَعَتْ الْأَمَةُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَنِكَاحُ
الْكُفَّارِ صَحِيحٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَقِيلَ فَاسِدٌ، وَقِيلَ إنْ أَسْلَمَ
وَقُرِّرَ تَبَيَّنَّا صِحَّتَهُ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
فَعَلَى
الصَّحِيحِ لَوْ طَلَّقَ ثَلَاثًا ثُمَّ أَسْلَمَا لَمْ تَحِلَّ
بِمُحَلِّلٍ.
وَمَنْ قُرِّرَتْ فَلَهَا الْمُسَمَّى
الصَّحِيحُ.
وَأَمَّا الْفَاسِدُ كَخَمْرٍ، فَإِنْ قَبَضَتْهُ
قَبْلَ الْإِسْلَامِ فَلَا شَيْءَ لَهَا، وَإِلَّا فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَإِنْ
قَبَضَتْ بَعْضَهُ فَلَهَا قِسْطُ مَا بَقِيَ مِنْ مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ.
وَمَنْ
انْدَفَعَتْ بِإِسْلَامٍ بَعْدَ دُخُولٍ فَلَهَا الْمُسَمَّى الصَّحِيحُ إنْ
صُحِّحَ نِكَاحُهُمْ، وَإِلَّا فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ أَوْ قَبْلَهُ وَصُحِّحَ، فَإِنْ
كَانَ الِانْدِفَاعُ بِإِسْلَامِهَا فَلَا شَيْءَ لَهَا، وَبِإِسْلَامِهِ
فَنِصْفُ مُسَمًّى إنْ كَانَ صَحِيحًا، وَإِلَّا فَنِصْفُ مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ.
وَلَوْ
تَرَافَعَ إلَيْنَا ذِمِّيٌّ وَمُسْلِمٌ وَجَبَ الْحُكْمُ، أَوْ ذِمِّيَّانِ
وَجَبَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَنُقِرُّهُمْ عَلَى مَا نُقِرُّ لَوْ أَسْلَمُوا،
وَنُبْطِلُ مَا لَا نُقِرُّ.
CHATTER III.— THE MARRIAGE OF INEIDELS
Section
An infidel
of whatever religion who is converted
to Islam while married
to a woman
whose religion is founded upon some
holy scripture keeps
her as his wife
; but if she is an idolatress or a
fire-worshipper, and is
not converted with
him, separation takes place immediately
ipso facto,
where the marriage has
not yet been followed by cohabitation.
Other-
wise the continuation of the
marriage depends upon whether the woman
embraces the faith before the end
of her period of legal retirement. If,
before the expiry of this period
the wife’s conversion has not yet taken
place, the marriage is considered to
have been dissolved from the
husband’s
conversion ; and the same rule is
observed if it is the wife
who
is converted, while the husband remains
in a state of religious blind-
ness.
Where, on the other hand, both
parties embrace the faith at the
same time, the marriage remains
valid. The conversion is regarded as
simultaneous only where one of the
parties begins his declaration before
the
other has finished.
Where the
marriage remains valid, it is of no
consequence whether
it was originally
contracted in contravention of our law,
provided that
the cause of illegality
has ceased to exist at the time
of conversion, and
that the wife is
then a woman who can lawfully be
given to her husband.
If, however,
the cause of illegality still exists
at the time of conversion,
the
marriage is regarded as having never
been contracted. Moreover,
it is not
considered as an absolute illegality if
the marriage was not
concluded by a
guardian, nor before witnesses. A continuation
of the
marriage must also be
accepted in the following cases : —
. When it has been contracted
before the expiration of the period
of legal retirement, provided that
this period has expired at the moment
of conversion.
. In the case
of a temporary marriage, where the parties
have stipu-
lated a term equivalent to
perpetuity.
. When, at the time
of conversion, the woman is in retirement,
owing to a cohabitation due to
error, at least according to our school.
On the other hand, a marriage with a
person within the prohibited degrees
cannot continue after conversion ; though
our school admits the validity
of
the marriage, where the husband is
first converted and places himself
in a
state of Hiram, after which the wife
is converted also, before her
husband’s
ihram is over.
. When an
infidel who possesses a free wife and a
slave wife is con-
verted at the
same time as they are, he keeps
the free wife, according to
our
school, but should dismiss the slave.
ffMarriages of infidels con-
tracted in
conformity with their own laws are
recognised by ours as
valid ; though
some jurists maintain that our law
never admits the
validity of these
marriages, while others consider their
validity is
recognised only where upon
conversion it appears that the parties may
lawfully remain together, but otherwise
they must be regarded as null
and
void ab initio .
ffAn infidel who
repudiates his wife three times and
is converted
to Islam can take her
back again only after she has
belonged to an
intermediate husband.
An infidel who promised at his
marriage a specified dower according
to
our law, is liable for it even
after his conversion if the marriage is
not thereby dissolved as we have
explained above. But if the dower
consists of prohibited things such
as wine and so on, and the marriage
remains valid after conversion, then
the three following cases must be
distinguished : —
. Where at
the moment of conversion the woman
has already taken
possession of the
prohibited objects, she keeps them and
can claim
nothing further.
. Where
she has not yet taken possession,
her husband owes her
proportional dower.
. Where she has only partly
taken possession she can claim for the
rest a reasonable part of the
proportional dower.
A woman whose marriage
has been dissolved, either by her conver-
sion to Islam or by her husband’s
conversion, may claim the specified
dower
promised, provided it consists of
permissible articles, and that the
marriage, followed by cohabitation, is
not otherwise attackable. If
not, she
can only claim proportional dower. If
cohabitation has not
yet taken place, a
distinction is made between the case
where the dis-
solution is a consequence
of the wife’s conversion, and that
where it is
caused by the husband’s.
In the first she can claim nothing,
but in
the second the husband owes
her half of the specified dower promised,
if consisting of permissible articles,
and otherwise half of the proportional
dower ; all upon the condition already
mentioned, that the marriage
is dissolved
solely by conversion and not from
any other cause of
nullity.
The
court may not refuse to pronounce
judgment if one of the parties
is
an infidel subject of our Sovereign,
*or even where both are so ; but
should decide as if both were
Moslems.
فصل [في أحكام زوجات الكافر إذا أسلم على أكثر من مباحة]
أَسْلَمَ
وَتَحْتَهُ أَكْثَرُ مِنْ أَرْبَعٍ وَأَسْلَمْنَ مَعَهُ أَوْ فِي الْعِدَّةِ أَوْ
كُنَّ كِتَابِيَّاتٍ لَزِمَهُ اخْتِيَارُ أَرْبَعٍ، وَيَنْدَفِعُ مَنْ زَادَ،
وَإِنْ أَسْلَمَ مَعَهُ قَبْلَ دُخُولٍ أَوْ فِي الْعِدَّةِ أَرْبَعٌ فَقَطْ
تَعَيَّنَ.
وَلَوْ أَسْلَمَ وَتَحْتَهُ أُمٌّ وَبِنْتُهَا
كِتَابِيَّتَانِ أَوْ أَسْلَمَتَا فَإِنْ دَخَلَ بِهَا حَرُمَتَا أَبَدًا، أَوْ
لَا بِوَاحِدَةٍ تَعَيَّنَتْ الْبِنْتُ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَتَخَيَّرُ، أَوْ
بِالْبِنْتِ تَعَيَّنَتْ، أَوْ بِالْأُمِّ حَرُمَتَا أَبَدًا، وَفِي قَوْلٍ
تَبْقَى الْأُمُّ.
أَوْ وَتَحْتَهُ أَمَةٌ أَسْلَمَتْ مَعَهُ، أَوْ
فِي الْعِدَّةِ أُقِرَّ إنْ حَلَّتْ لَهُ الْأَمَةُ، وَإِنْ تَخَلَّفَتْ قَبْلَ
دُخُولٍ تَنَجَّزَتْ الْفُرْقَةُ، أَوْ إمَاءٌ وَأَسْلَمْنَ مَعَهُ أَوْ فِي
الْعِدَّةِ اخْتَارَ أَمَةً إنْ حَلَّتْ لَهُ عِنْدَ اجْتِمَاعِ إسْلَامِهِ
وَإِسْلَامِهِنَّ، وَإِلَّا انْدَفَعْنَ.
أَوْ حُرَّةٌ وَإِمَاءٌ
وَأَسْلَمْنَ مَعَهُ أَوْ فِي الْعِدَّةِ تَعَيَّنَتْ وَانْدَفَعْنَ، وَإِنْ
أَصَرَّتْ فَانْقَضَتْ عِدَّتُهَا اخْتَارَ أَمَةً، وَلَوْ أَسْلَمَتْ وَعَتَقْنَ
ثُمَّ أَسْلَمْنَ فِي الْعِدَّةِ فَكَحَرَائِرَ فَيَخْتَارُ أَرْبَعًا.
وَالِاخْتِيَارُ
اخْتَرْتُكِ أَوْ قَرَّرْتُ نِكَاحَكِ أَوْ أَمْسَكْتُكِ أَوْ ثَبَّتُّكِ،
وَالطَّلَاقُ اخْتِيَارٌ، لَا الظِّهَارُ وَالْإِيلَاءُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَا
يَصِحُّ تَعْلِيقُ اخْتِيَارٍ وَلَا فَسْخٍ.
وَلَوْ حَصَرَ
الِاخْتِيَارَ فِي خَمْسٍ انْدَفَعَ مَنْ زَادَ، وَعَلَيْهِ التَّعْيِينُ
وَنَفَقَتُهُنَّ حَتَّى يَخْتَارَ، فَإِنْ تَرَكَ الِاخْتِيَارَ فِي النِّكَاحِ
حُبِسَ.
فَإِنْ مَاتَ قَبْلَهُ اعْتَدَّتْ حَامِلٌ بِهِ، وَذَاتُ
أَشْهُرٍ وَغَيْرُ مَدْخُولٍ بِهَا بِأَرْبَعَةِ أَشْهُرٍ وَعَشْرٍ، وَذَاتُ
أَقْرَاءٍ بِالْأَكْثَرِ مِنْ الْأَقْرَاءِ وَأَرْبَعَةِ أَشْهُرٍ وَعَشْرٍ،
وَيُوقَفُ نَصِيبُ زَوْجَاتٍ حَتَّى يَصْطَلِحْنَ.
Section
An infidel who, at
the time of his conversion to Islam,
possesses more
than four wives, should
choose four to keep and dismiss the
others ; it
being understood that all
the four embrace the faith, either
at the same
time as their husband
or before the termination of their
period of retire-
ment, or that they
are followers of some religion founded
upon a holy
scripture. Where, on the
other hand, only four wives embrace the
faith, either with him or before
the termination of their period of retire-
ment, they remain his lawful wives
to the exclusion of the others, even
though he has not yet cohabited
with them. An infidel who, at the
time
of his conversion is bound by
marriage to a mother and to her daughter,
and has had commerce with both,
must subsequently abstain from both
the
one and the other. His cohabitation
with them is in this case
prohibited
for ever, even though they may be
followers of a religion
founded upon a
sacred book, or may have embraced
the faith. But if
he has cohabited
with neither, the daughter remains his
legitimate wife ;
though according to
one author he may choose whichever
he prefers.
If he has cohabited with
the daughter only, she remains his
lawful wife ;
but if he has
cohabited with the mother only, then
cohabitation with
both the one and
the other is prohibited him for
ever, though,
according to one author,
tho mother may in this case remain
his lawful
wife.
An infidel who,
at the time of his conversion, is
married to a slave
who follows his
example either immediately or before the
end of the
period of retirement, may
keep her as his lawful wife, unless
coition
with her is prohibited him
on other grounds ; but if the slave
remains
an infidel at the expiry of
that term, separation takes place at once
if so facto . A convert married to
several slave women who all follow
his example either immediately or
before the end of their period of
retirement, should choose one to
remain his wife ; but this choice may
not fall upon one with whom
cohabitation was forbidden him at the
time of conversion. Of these he
may keep none. A convert married
to a
free woman and several slaves who
are all converted with him,
either
immediately or before the end of the
period of retirement, should
keep the
free woman as his sole wife and
dismiss the others. He may
choose
one of his slave women only if
his free wife perseveres in her
errors at the end of her
period of retirement. Where the convert
has a
free wife who embraces the
faith at the same time as himself,
and where
also his slave wives
obtain their liberty and are then
converted before
the end of their
period of retirement, it is as if
at the time of his con-
version he
had only free wives, and he may
at his choice select the four
wives
whom he wishes to keep.
When
signifying his wishes upon this subject,
the convert may use
the words : “ I
choose you/’ “ I confirm our marriage,” “ I
retain you,”
“ I wish you to remain ” ;
and he is considered to have
implicitly chosen
one of his wives
if he repudiates her, j*but not if
he pronounces against
her an injurious
assimilation or an oath of continence.
The convert
may not make his
decision subject to any condition ; nor
may he go
back upon his choice.
If he should choose five wives
instead of four,
he must afterwards
indicate the one he wishes to
dismiss. All the wives
of a husband
who has become a Moslem have an
equal right to main-
tenance until he
has decided which to retain. If he
does not decide
the court should
force him to do so by imprisonment.
Where a new
convert dies before deciding,
all his widows should observe the legal
period of retirement ; that is to
say, a pregnant widow is in retirement
until her churching ; a widow having
no fixed courses, or a widow who
has
had no commerce with her husband,
for four months and ten days ;
a
widow having regular courses, for three
periods of purity, in all not
less
than four months and ten days. From
the estate of a deceased
convert must
be reserved a sum sufficient to give
his widows their due,
when their
respective rights have been ascertained.
فصل [في مؤنة المسلمة أو المرتدة]
أَسْلَمَا مَعًا
اسْتَمَرَّتْ النَّفَقَةُ.
وَلَوْ أَسْلَمَ وَأَصَرَّتْ حَتَّى
انْقَضَتْ الْعِدَّةُ فَلَا، وَإِنْ أَسْلَمَتْ فِيهَا لَمْ تَسْتَحِقَّ
لِمُدَّةِ التَّخَلُّفِ فِي الْجَدِيدِ.
وَلَوْ أَسْلَمَتْ أَوَّلاً
فَأَسْلَمَ فِي الْعِدَّةِ أَوْ أَصَرَّ فَلَهَا نَفَقَةُ الْعِدَّةِ عَلَى
الصَّحِيحِ.
وَإِنْ ارْتَدَّتْ فَلَا نَفَقَةَ، وَإِنْ أَسْلَمَتْ
فِي الْعِدَّةِ، وَإِنْ ارْتَدَّ فَلَهَا نَفَقَةُ الْعِدَّةِ.
باب
الْخِيَارِ وَالْإِعْفَافِ وَنِكَاحِ الْعَبْدِ
وَجَدَ أَحَدُ
الزَّوْجَيْنِ بِالْآخَرِ جُنُونًا أَوْ جُذَامًا أَوْ بَرَصًا، أَوْ وَجَدَهَا
رَتْقَاءَ أَوْ قَرْنَاءَ.
أَوْ وَجَدَتْهُ عِنِّينًا أَوْ
مَجْنُونًا ثَبَتَ الْخِيَارُ فِي فَسْخِ النِّكَاحِ.
وَقِيلَ إنْ
وَجَدَ بِهِ مِثْلَ عَيْبِهِ فَلَا.
وَلَوْ وَجَدَهُ خُنْثَى
وَاضِحًا فَلَا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ حَدَثَ بِهِ عَيْبٌ
تَخَيَّرَتْ إلَّا عُنَّةً بَعْدَ دُخُولٍ، أَوْ بِهَا تَخَيَّرَ فِي
الْجَدِيدِ.
وَلَا خِيَارَ لِوَلِيٍّ بِحَادِثٍ، وَكَذَا
بِمُقَارِنِ جَبٍّ وَعُنَّةٍ، وَيَتَخَيَّرُ بِمُقَارِنِ جُنُونٍ، وَكَذَا
جُذَامٌ وَبَرَصٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَالْخِيَارُ عَلَى الْفَوْرِ،
وَالْفَسْخُ قَبْلَ دُخُولٍ يُسْقِطُ الْمَهْرَ وَبَعْدَهُ الْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ
يَجِبُ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ إنْ فُسِخَ بِمُقَارِنٍ أَوْ بِحَادِثٍ بَيْنَ الْعَقْدِ
وَالْوَطْءِ جَهِلَهُ الْوَاطِئُ، وَالْمُسَمَّى إنْ حَدَثَ بَعْدَ وَطْءٍ.
وَلَوْ
انْفَسَخَ بِرِدَّةٍ بَعْدَ وَطْءٍ فَالْمُسَمَّى.
وَلَا يَرْجِعُ
الزَّوْجُ بَعْدَ الْفَسْخِ بِالْمَهْرِ عَلَى مَنْ غَرَّهُ فِي الْجَدِيدِ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ
فِي الْعُنَّةِ رَفْعٌ إلَى حَاكِمٍ، وَكَذَا سَائِرُ الْعُيُوبِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَتَثْبُتُ الْعُنَّةُ بِإِقْرَارِهِ أَوْ بَيِّنَةٍ عَلَى إقْرَارِهِ، وَكَذَا
بِيَمِينِهَا بَعْدَ نُكُولِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِذَا ثَبَتَتْ ضَرَبَ
الْقَاضِي لَهُ سَنَةً، بِطَلَبِهَا، فَإِذَا تَمَّتْ رَفَعَتْهُ إلَيْهِ فَإِنْ
قَالَ وَطِئْتُ حَلَفَ، فَإِنْ نَكَلَ حُلِّفَتْ فَإِنْ حَلَفَتْ أَوْ أَقَرَّ
اسْتَقَلَّتْ بِالْفَسْخِ، وَقِيلَ يَحْتَاجُ إلَى إذْنِ الْقَاضِي أَوْ
فَسْخِهِ، وَلَوْ اعْتَزَلَتْهُ أَوْ مَرِضَتْ أَوْ حُبِسَتْ فِي الْمُدَّةِ لَمْ
تُحْسَبْ، وَلَوْ رَضِيَتْ بَعْدَهَا بِهِ بَطَلَ حَقُّهَا، وَكَذَا لَوْ
أَجَّلَتْهُ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَوْ نَكَحَ وَشُرِطَ فِيهَا
إسْلَامٌ أَوْ فِي أَحَدِهِمَا نَسَبٌ أَوْ حُرِّيَّةٌ أَوْ غَيْرُهُمَا،
فَأُخْلِفَ فَالْأَظْهَرُ صِحَّةُ النِّكَاحِ، ثُمَّ إنْ بَانَ خَيْرًا مِمَّا
شُرِطَ فَلَا خِيَارَ، وَإِنْ بَانَ دُونَهُ فَلَهَا الْخِيَارُ، وَكَذَا لَهُ
فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ ظَنَّهَا مُسْلِمَةً أَوْ حُرَّةً فَبَانَتْ
كِتَابِيَّةً أَوْ أَمَةً وَهِيَ تَحِلُّ لَهُ فَلَا خِيَارَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ،
وَلَوْ أَذِنَتْ فِي تَزْوِيجِهَا بِمَنْ ظَنَّتْهُ كُفْئًا فَبَانَ فِسْقُهُ
أَوْ دَنَاءَةُ نَسَبِهِ وَحِرْفَتِهِ فَلَا خِيَارَ لَهَا.
قُلْتُ:
وَلَوْ بَانَ مَعِيبًا أَوْ عَبْدًا فَلَهَا الْخِيَارُ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
وَمَتَى فُسِخَ بِخُلْفٍ فَحُكْمُ الْمَهْرِ وَالرُّجُوعِ
بِهِ عَلَى الْغَارِّ مَا سَبَقَ فِي الْعَيْبِ، وَالْمُؤَثِّرُ تَغْرِيرٌ
قَارَنَ الْعَقْدَ، وَلَوْ غُرَّ بِحُرِّيَّةِ أَمَةٍ وَصَحَّحْنَاهُ فَالْوَلَدُ
قَبْلَ الْعِلْمِ حُرٌّ، وَعَلَى الْمَغْرُورِ، قِيمَتُهُ لِسَيِّدِهَا
وَيَرْجِعُ بِهَا عَلَى الْغَارِّ، وَالتَّغْرِيرُ بِالْحُرِّيَّةِ لَا
يُتَصَوَّرُ مِنْ سَيِّدِهَا بَلْ مِنْ وَكِيلِهِ أَوْ مِنْهَا، فَإِنْ كَانَ
مِنْهَا تَعَلَّقَ الْغُرْمُ بِذِمَّتِهَا، وَلَوْ انْفَصَلَ الْوَلَدُ مَيِّتًا
بِلَا جِنَايَةٍ فَلَا شَيْءَ فِيهِ.
وَمَنْ عَتَقَتْ تَحْتَ
رَقِيقٍ أَوْ مَنْ فِيهِ رِقٌّ تَخَيَّرَتْ فِي فَسْخِ النِّكَاحِ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ
أَنَّهُ عَلَى الْفَوْرِ، فَإِنْ قَالَتْ جَهِلْت الْعِتْقَ صُدِّقَتْ
بِيَمِينِهَا إنْ أَمْكَنَ: بِأَنْ كَانَ الْمُعْتِقُ غَائِبًا، وَكَذَا إنْ
قَالَتْ جَهِلْت الْخِيَارَ بِهِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، فَإِنْ فَسَخَتْ قَبْلَ وَطْءٍ
فَلَا مَهْرَ، وَبَعْدَهُ بِعِتْقٍ بَعْدَهُ وَجَبَ الْمُسَمَّى، أَوْ قَبْلَهُ
فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَقِيلَ الْمُسَمَّى، وَلَوْ عَتَقَ بَعْضُهَا أَوْ كُوتِبَتْ
أَوْ عَتَقَ عَبْدٌ تَحْتَهُ أَمَةٌ فَلَا خِيَارَ.
Section
Where husband and wife
embrace Islam together, the husband’s
obligation to maintain his wife is
not interrupted. Where, on the con-
trary,
she is not converted before the
expiry of her period of retirement,
he owes her nothing for the
interval during which she has not
been of
the same religion as
himself. This, at least, was Shafii’s
decision during
his stay in Egypt.
Where the woman’s conversion precedes the
man’s,
whether the latter takes place
before the end of the period of
legal
retirement, or whether he continues
in his errors, the woman may claim
maintenance for the whole period of
her retirement. A wife who abjures
Islam
loses at the same time all right
to maintenance, even though she
returns
to the faith before the expiry of
her period of retirement ; but
a wife
whose husband becomes an apostate
continues to be maintainable
by him
during the whole of the period of
her retirement.
فصل [في الإعفاف]
CHAPTER IV.— RIGHT OP OPTION, IFAF, AND MARRIAGE BETWEEN SLAVES
يَلْزَمُ الْوَلَدَ إعْفَافُ الْأَبِ وَالْأَجْدَادِ عَلَى الْمَشْهُورِ
بِأَنْ يُعْطِيَهُ مَهْرَ حُرَّةٍ، أَوْ يَقُولَ انْكِحْ وَأُعْطِيَكَ الْمَهْرَ،
أَوْ يَنْكِحَ لَهُ بِإِذْنِهِ وَيُمْهِرَ أَوْ يُمَلِّكَهُ أَمَةً أَوْ
ثَمَنَهَا ثُمَّ عَلَيْهِ مُؤْنَتُهُمَا.
وَلَيْسَ لِلْأَبِ
تَعْيِينُ النِّكَاحِ دُونَ التَّسَرِّي وَلَا رَفِيعَةٍ، وَلَوْ اتَّفَقَا عَلَى
مَهْرٍ فَتَعْيِينُهَا لِلْأَبِ.
وَيَجِبُ التَّجْدِيدُ إذَا
مَاتَتْ أَوْ انْفَسَخَ بِرِدَّةٍ أَوْ فَسَخَهُ بِعَيْبٍ، وَكَذَا إنْ طَلَّقَ
بِعُذْرٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِنَّمَا يَجِبُ إعْفَافُ فَاقِدِ
مَهْرٍ مُحْتَاجٍ إلَى نِكَاحٍ وَيُصَدَّقُ إذَا ظَهَرَتْ الْحَاجَةُ بِلَا
يَمِينٍ.
وَيَحْرُمُ عَلَيْهِ وَطْءُ أَمَةِ وَلَدِهِ،
وَالْمَذْهَبُ وُجُوبُ مَهْرٍ لَا حَدٍّ، فَإِنْ أَحْبَلَ فَالْوَلَدُ حُرٌّ
نَسِيبٌ، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ مُسْتَوْلَدَةً لِلِابْنِ لَمْ تَصِرْ مُسْتَوْلَدَةً
لِلْأَبِ، وَإِلَّا فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهَا تَصِيرُ، وَأَنَّ عَلَيْهِ قِيمَتَهَا
مَعَ مَهْرٍ، لَا قِيمَةَ وَلَدٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَحْرُمُ
نِكَاحُهَا، فَلَوْ مَلَكَ زَوْجَةَ وَالِدِهِ الَّذِي لَا تَحِلُّ لَهُ
الْأَمَةُ لَمْ يَنْفَسِخْ النِّكَاحُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَيْسَ
لَهُ نِكَاحُ أَمَةٍ مُكَاتَبَةٍ، فَإِنْ مَلَكَ مُكَاتَبٌ زَوْجَةَ سَيِّدِهِ
انْفَسَخَ النِّكَاحُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
CHAPTER IV.— RIGHT OP OPTION, IFAF, AND
MARRIAGE BETWEEN SLAVES
Section
Any
one who becomes aware that he has
married a person afflicted with
madness,
elephantiasis or leprosy has a right to
renounce the marriage.
The law makes
no distinction as to which party has
been deceived in
this way. A husband
may also renounce a wife he has just
married, on
perceiving that she is
ratka or karna , and consequently unsuited for
coition ; while a wife may renounce
her husband on discovering him to
be
impotent or castrated. According to some
authorities, however, a
party possessing a
defect discovered in the other has
no right of option,
Hermaphrodism alone
does not give a right of option ; at
any rate if
the hermaphrodite inclines
manifestly towards the sex declared.
A
wife’s right to renounce her marriage
by reason of her husband’s
defects
is not limited to defects existing
at the time of the contract, but
extends to such as he may have
acquired subsequently ; with the
exception
of impotence, for a husband who becomes
impotent after
cohabiting with his wife
can no longer be renounced by her.
As to the
husband, according to the
opinion of Shafii in his second
period, he as
well as the wife
has a right of option for redhibitory
defects, even though
these only become
manifest during marriage ; but in this
case a right of
option can never be
exercised by the wife’s guardian. Nor
can he do
this on account of
castration or impotence existing at the
time of the
contract ; but he can in
the case of so-existing madness, felephantiasis
or leprosy of the husband. In
all cases redhibition during marriage
should be exercised soon after the
discovery of the defect.
Benunciation
of marriage on account of redhibitory
defects previous
to all carnal intercourse
invalidates a woman’s right to dower. If,
on
the contrary, the renunciation takes
place after consummation a dis-
tinction must
be made between proportional and fixed
dower. fPro-
portional dower is due
whether the defects existed at the
time of the
contract, or whether
they became manifest between the time
of the
contract and the first
coition ; but in neither case must
the party
renouncing knowingly indulge in
coition. fThe fixed dower is due only
where renunciation is based upon
defects ascertained after the first
coition. It is due also if
after that event the apostasy of one
of the
parties entails renunciation. In
no case can the husband proceed against
the person who has deceived him,
whether for dower due in consequence
of cohabitation, or for cancellation
on account of redhibitory defects ;
this is the opinion towards which
Shafii inclined in his second period.
Impotence, fand the other
redhibitory defects, have no legal effect
until brought before the court.
Impotence should be accepted as true,
not only upon the admission of
the party in court, but also upon
proof
that such admission has been
made elsewhere, fit may also be proved
by the claimant’s oath, if the
other party refuses to confirm his
denial on
oath. In whatever manner
impotence has been proved, the court
cannot immediately pronounce dissolution
of marriage in consequence,
but must
grant the husband a year’s delay in
which to acquit himself
of the
physical obligations resulting from marriage.
On its expiry the
wife may summons
her husband a second time. If the
husband alleges
cohabitation with his wife
in the interval he must confirm this
assertion
upon oath, otherwise the woman
is sworn. If she takes the oath
tendered
her, or if the husband
admits impotence, she can of her own
accord
declare herself to be free
from the bonds of matrimony, though some
maintain she has not this right
yet, unless the court authorises it
or has
itself pronounced dissolution of
marriage in explicit terms. If during
the year’s probation the wife
refuses to yield herself to coition,
or if the
husband cannot cohabit
with her by reason of her sickness,
or if she is
imprisoned, the period
during which the husband has been
prevented
from executing the order of
the court is not taken account of.
And the
woman entirely loses her
right to declare herself free on
account of her
husband’s impotence, after
the year’s probation, if she is
proved to have
accepted him again f
for to have granted him further delay.
* Where there is a stipulation on
the part of the husband that his
wife
must be a Moslem, or on the
part of one of the parties that
the other must
be of an undisputed
genealogy, free, etc., dissolution does
not take place
ipso facto because
the party is not of the quality
guaranteed. If the
party in question
is of better condition than that
stipulated for, no
right of option
exists ; otherwise either wife for husband
may exercise
this right. * Where the
quality of Moslem or free woman has
not been
expressly guaranteed, but the
husband merely had reason to believe the
one or the other, he cannot
renounce the marriage on perceiving sub-
sequently that his wife is of
another religion, provided that religion is
founded upon some sacred book, or
upon discovering that she is a slave ;
provided always that cohabitation with
her is not prohibited on other
grounds. And similarly the wife,
upon her side, after having consented
to marry a man she believed was a
suitable match for her, without
making
any express stipulation with regard to
it, cannot exercise a right
of option
upon discovering that she has married a
man of notorious
misconduct, or that
she has made an unsuitable match as
regards her
husband’s genealogy or
profession. [On the other hand, if
the woman
discovers too late that
she has married a man with redhibitory
defects
or a slave she may exercise a
right of option.]
Dissolution of
marriage on the ground that a party
does not answer
to the conditions
stipulated has the same result as
regards dower and
damages as dissolution
on account of redhibitory defects, with
this
difference that in the case in
question that the deceit must have existed
at the time of the contract
before it can become a ground for damages.
According to those authors who
do not admit a dissolution of
marriage
follows immediately ipso facto where the
husband having stipu-
lated that his wife
shall be a free woman discovers afterwards
that she
is a slave, a child born
before discovery of the truth is
free, and the
father owes his wife’s
master the value of the child by
way of damages.
All this is without
prejudice to his right of action
against the person who
has deceived
him, if such action is permissible,
and provided that it is
not the
master himself who has duped him by
giving him his slave in
marriage as
if she were a free woman. Consequently,
the value of the
child is only
due where the father has been
deceived by the master’s
agent or by
the slave herself ; it being understood
that deception on the
part of the
slave also entails her having to
compensate her husband as
soon as
she has the means of doing so,
though she cannot be seized for
this
purpose. If through no one’s fault
the child is still-born, the
husband
owes nothing to his wife’s master.
A
woman who becomes enfranchised during her
union with a slave,
even a partially
enfranchised slave, may claim a dissolution
of marriage
on this ground alone,
*provided she takes proceedings at once.
But the
court may allow this last
rule to be departed from where the
woman
declares upon oath her ignorance
of the enfranchisement, and puts
forward
some probable ground for such ignorance,
for example the
absence of her
master ; *or where she declares that
she was ignorant of
her right of
cancellation. Naturally an enfranchised woman
whose
marriage has been so dissolved,
and who has not yet had commerce
with
her husband, can claim no dower
; but she can claim the fixed dower
promised where the dissolution has
been demanded by her in conse-
quence
of an enfranchisement subsequent to the
consummation of the
marriage. Where, on
the other hand, she does not make
use of her right
of cancellation
until after commerce with her husband,
and bases her
claim upon a prior
enfranchisement, she can only recover
proportional
dower ; though some authorities
allow her fixed dower in this case
also. No right of option exists
where the wife is only partially enfran-
chised, or is undergoing enfranchisement
by contract. Nor does it
exist in
favour of an enfranchised husband united
in the bonds of matri-
mony with a
slave.
Section
IJaf is an obligation
recognised by law. It means that one
must
see to it that one’s father,
**father’s father, or **mother’s father, do
not take to evil courses, by
coming to their assistance, if they have
not sufficient means to procure a
female companion. One may acquit
oneself
of this duty —
. By giving
one’s father or grandfather enough for a
free woman’s
dower :
. by
saying to them, “ Get married ; I will
pay the dower ” ;
. by
contracting a marriage in their name, by
virtue of an authorisa-
tion from them,
but promising dower on one’s own account ;
or
. by giving them a female
slave, or the money necessary to buy
one.
The household expenses are also
chargeable to the child or grand-
child.
The father or grandfather must be
content with the way in
which their
child or grandchild wishes to discharge
this duty. They
cannot insist upon a
legitimate wife if child or grandchild
wishes to give
a slave as concubine.
Neither can they insist upon a particular
person
whose price or dower is very
high ; but if they are in agreement
with
child or grandchild as to the
sum, then it is for them to
obtain for that
sum the person they
prefer. One is even bound to supply
a new com-
panion to father or
grandfather, not only where the first
marriage or
concubinage has been dissolved
by death, apostasy or redhibitory defects
in the woman, fbut also where
father or grandfather has repudiated his
wife for some valid reason. IJaf
is obligatory only where a father or
grandfather needs a companion but has
not the means to procure one.
The
fact of need is legally established
by the declaration of the interested
party, which does not require to
be confirmed on oath.
In no
case may father or grandfather cohabit
with a slave of child
or grandchild ;
though, according to our school, an
infraction of this
rule entails only
an obligation to pay dower, and not
liability to punish-
ment for fornication. A
child born of such prohibited commerce is
free, and his father’s legitimate
descendant ; but if the contravention
has
been committed with regard to a slave
of son or grandson already
enfranchised
by reason of maternity, the latter
does not become the
enfranchised slave
of the father or grandfather because
she has borne him
a son. *But if
she was not such an enfranchised
slave to the son or
grandson, she
becomes so to the father or
grandfather, who then owes
the former
her value plus dower, but not the
value of the child. In
consequence a
father or grandfather cannot contract a
lawful marriage
with a slave of his
son or grandson ; fbut where the son
or grandson
becomes the owner of his
father’s or grandfather’s wife, the marriage
remains valid. One cannot marry a
slave of a male slave who is under-
going enfranchisement by contract ; and where
such male slave becomes
owner of a
female slave who is already his
master’s wife, this marriage
is ipso
facto dissolved.
فصل [في نكاح الرقيق]
السَّيِّدُ بِإِذْنِهِ فِي نِكَاحِ
عَبْدِهِ.
لَا يَضْمَنُ مَهْرًا وَنَفَقَةً فِي الْجَدِيدِ، وَهُمَا
فِي كَسْبِهِ بَعْدَ النِّكَاحِ الْمُعْتَادِ وَالنَّادِرِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ
مَأْذُونًا لَهُ فِي تِجَارَةٍ فَفِيمَا بِيَدِهِ مِنْ رِبْحٍ وَكَذَا رَأْسُ
مَالٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ مُكْتَسِبًا وَلَا مَأْذُونًا لَهُ
فَفِي ذِمَّتِهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ عَلَى السَّيِّدِ.
وَلَهُ
الْمُسَافَرَةُ بِهِ وَيَفُوتُ الِاسْتِمْتَاعُ، وَإِذَا لَمْ يُسَافِرْ لَزِمَهُ
تَخْلِيَتُهُ لَيْلاً لِلِاسْتِمْتَاعِ.
وَيَسْتَخْدِمُهُ نَهَارًا
إنْ تَكَفَّلَ الْمَهْرَ وَالنَّفَقَةَ وَإِلَّا فَيُخْلِيهِ لِكَسْبِهِمَا
وَإِنْ اسْتَخْدَمَهُ بِلَا تَكَفُّلٍ لَزِمَهُ الْأَقَلُّ مِنْ أُجْرَةِ مِثْلٍ
وَكُلِّ الْمَهْرِ وَالنَّفَقَةِ، وَقِيلَ يَلْزَمُهُ الْمَهْرُ
وَالنَّفَقَةُ.
وَلَوْ نَكَحَ فَاسِدًا وَوَطِئَ فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ
فِي ذِمَّتِهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ فِي رَقَبَتِهِ.
وَإِذَا زَوَّجَ
أَمَتَهُ اسْتَخْدَمَهَا نَهَارًا وَسَلَّمَهَا لِلزَّوْجِ لَيْلاً، وَلَا
نَفَقَةَ عَلَى الزَّوْجِ حِينَئِذٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ أَخْلَى فِي دَارِهِ
بَيْتًا وَقَالَ لِلزَّوْجِ تَخْلُو بِهَا فِيهِ لَمْ يَلْزَمْهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَلِلسَّيِّدِ السَّفَرُ بِهَا وَلِلزَّوْجِ صُحْبَتُهَا.
وَالْمَذْهَبُ
أَنَّ السَّيِّدَ لَوْ قَتَلَهَا أَوْ قَتَلَتْ نَفْسَهَا قَبْلَ دُخُولٍ سَقَطَ
مَهْرُهَا، وَأَنَّ الْحُرَّةَ لَوْ قَتَلَتْ نَفْسَهَا، أَوْ قَتَلَ الْأَمَةَ
أَجْنَبِيٌّ أَوْ مَاتَتْ فَلَا، كَمَا لَوْ هَلَكَتَا بَعْدَ دُخُولٍ.
وَلَوْ
بَاعَ مُزَوَّجَةً فَالْمَهْرُ لِلْبَائِعِ فَإِنْ طَلُقَتْ قَبْلَ دُخُولٍ
فَنِصْفُهُ لَهُ.
وَلَوْ زَوَّجَ أَمَتَهُ بِعَبْدِهِ لَمْ يَجِبْ
مَهْرٌ.
Section
According to the
opinion adopted by Shafii in his
second period, a
master who has
authorised his slave to marry, is
not obliged to under-
take payment either
of the dower or maintenance that the
wife or children
may claim. For
these one may distrain upon what the
slave gains by
his ordinary work and
also upon any accidental profits he
may realise.
In the case of a slave
generally authorised, the profit he makes,
fand
even the capital furnished by
his master, may be distrained upon for
dower and maintenance. In the case
of a slave who makes no profit
and
has not been generally authorised, both
charges must be defrayed by
him
after his enfranchisement like a personal
debt. Only one authority
admits the
master’s responsibility in this case.
An authorisation to a slave to
marry does not prejudice his master’s
right to acquire his company on a
journey even though the slave may
be
in this way prevented from fulfilling
his conjugal duties ; but so long
as
the master does not take his slave
on a journey, he should allow' him
to pass his nights with his
wife. As to the master’s right to
the slave’s
services during the day,
this exists only where the former
has guaranteed
payment of dower and
maintenance, for otherwise he must dispense
vrith the slave’s services, until
the latter, by his labour, has
gained enough
money for this purpose.
If the master has guaranteed payment
of dower
and maintenance he may
dispose of the slave’s services and
pay him a
reasonable salary, or else
himself entirely undertake to defray the
cost
of dower and maintenance, whichever
he prefers as being most
advantageous.
Some authorities, however, allow him no
choice in the
matter, but consider
him obliged to pay dower and
maintenance, unless
he prefers to forego
the slave’s services. A slave who, in
contravention
of the law, marries without
his master’s authorisation, is personally
responsible for proportional dower, if
the marriage has been followed
by
cohabitation. One authority even considers
that payment of the
dower in such
case is a real charge involving if
necessary the seizure of
the slave
after his enfranchisement. If it is
not the case of a male but
of a
female slave whom the master has
given in marriage, the latter
retains a
right to the fruit of her labour
during the day, but must sur-
render
her to her husband for the night,
fin this case the husband is
not
liable for maintenance. fNeither is the
husband obliged to accept
an offer
to remain with his wife in the
master’s house, even though the
latter
may be willing to allot a room
specially for the use of the new
menage . A master may take with him a
married female slave on a
journey,
but in that case her husband has a
right to accompany her.
Our school
considers that there is no obligation
on the part of the
husband to
pay dower to the master, if the
latter has put the female
slave to
death, or if she has committed
suicide, before the marriage has
been
really consummated. On the other hand,
our school maintains
the obligation of
paying dower, if it is a free woman
who has killed her-
self in similar
circumstances ; or if, instead of the
master, it is another
person who has
killed the slave ; or if the slave
has died an accidental
death. In all
these cases dower is obligatory as
in the case of an
accidental death
after a first cohabitation with a wife
whether free or
not. The master who
sells a married slave may retain the dower
obtained for her ; and he may
even keep half of it, if she
is repudiated
by her husband before
cohabitation. Dower is not due if
both parties
belong to the same master.
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