Book 34: Dower (Sadaq) | Minhaj al-Talibin of Nawawi
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature: classical Arabic
Contents
- Book 34: Dower (Sadaq)
- Book 35: Sharing of the Husband’s Favours, and Disobedience of Wives (Kesm wa nushuz)
- Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi
كتاب الصَّدَاقِ
BOOK 34 .— DOWER
يُسَنُّ تَسْمِيَتُهُ فِي الْعَقْدِ، وَيَجُوزُ إخْلَاؤُهُ مِنْهُ.
وَمَا
صَحَّ مَبِيعًا صَحَّ صَدَاقًا.
وَإِذَا أَصْدَقَهَا عَيْنًا
فَتَلِفَتْ فِي يَدِهِ ضَمِنَهَا ضَمَانَ عَقْدٍ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ ضَمَانَ يَدٍ،
فَعَلَى الْأَوَّلِ لَيْسَ لَهَا بَيْعُهُ قَبْلَ قَبْضِهِ، وَلَوْ تَلِفَ فِي
يَدِهِ وَجَبَ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ.
وَإِنْ أَتْلَفَتْهُ فَقَابِضَةٌ،
وَإِنْ أَتْلَفَهُ أَجْنَبِيٌّ تَخَيَّرَتْ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، فَإِنْ فَسَخَتْ
الصَّدَاقَ أَخَذَتْ مِنْ الزَّوْجِ مَهْرَ مِثْلٍ وَإِلَّا غَرَّمَتْ
الْمُتْلِفَ، وَإِنْ أَتْلَفَهُ الزَّوْجُ، فَكَتَلَفِهِ وَقِيلَ كَأَجْنَبِيٍّ،
وَلَوْ أَصْدَقَ عَبْدَيْنِ فَتَلِفَ أَحَدُهُمَا قَبْلَ قَبْضِهِ انْفَسَخَ
فِيهِ لَا فِي الْبَاقِي عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ وَلَهَا الْخِيَارُ، فَإِنْ فَسَخَتْ
فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَإِلَّا فَحِصَّةُ التَّالِفِ مِنْهُ.
وَلَوْ
تَغَيَّبَ قَبْلَ قَبْضِهِ تَخَيَّرَتْ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، فَإِنْ فَسَخَتْ
فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ وَإِلَّا فَلَا شَيْءَ لَهَا وَالْمَنَافِعُ الْفَائِتَةُ فِي
يَدِ الزَّوْجِ لَا يَضْمَنُهَا، وَإِنْ طَلَبَتْ التَّسْلِيمَ فَامْتَنَعَ
ضَمِنَ ضَمَانَ الْعَقْدِ، وَكَذَا الَّتِي اسْتَوْفَاهَا بِرُكُوبٍ وَنَحْوِهِ
عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَهَا حَبْسُ نَفْسِهَا لِتَقْبِضَ الْمَهْرَ
الْمُعَيَّنَ وَالْحَالَّ لَا الْمُؤَجَّلَ، فَلَوْ حَلَّ قَبْلَ التَّسْلِيمِ
فَلَا حَبْسَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ كُلٌّ لَا أُسَلِّمُ
حَتَّى تُسَلِّمَ فَفِي قَوْلٍ يُجْبَرُ هُوَ وَفِي قَوْلٍ لَا إجْبَارَ، فَمَنْ
سَلَّمَ أُجْبِرَ صَاحِبُهُ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ يُجْبَرَانِ فَيُؤْمَرُ بِوَضْعِهِ
عِنْدَ عَدْلٍ، وَتُؤْمَرُ بِالتَّمْكِينِ فَإِذَا سَلَّمَتْ أَعْطَاهَا
الْعَدْلُ الْمَهْرَ.
وَلَوْ بَادَرَتْ فَمَكَّنَتْ طَالَبَتْهُ،
فَإِنْ لَمْ يَطَأْ امْتَنَعَتْ حَتَّى يُسَلِّمَ، وَإِنْ وَطِئَ فَلَا.
وَلَوْ
بَادَرَ فَسَلَّمَ فَلْتُمَكِّنْ، فَإِنْ امْتَنَعَتْ بِلَا عُذْرٍ اسْتَرَدَّ
إنْ قُلْنَا إنَّهُ يُجْبَرُ.
وَلَوْ اُسْتُمْهِلَتْ لِتَنَظُّفٍ
وَنَحْوِهِ أُمْهِلَتْ مَا يَرَاهُ قَاضٍ، وَلَا يُجَاوِزُ ثَلَاثَةَ أَيَّامٍ
لَا لِيَنْقَطِعَ حَيْضٌ.
وَلَا تُسَلَّمُ صَغِيرَةٌ وَلَا
مَرِيضَةٌ حَتَّى يَزُولَ مَانِعُ وَطْءٍ.
وَيَسْتَقِرُّ الْمَهْرُ
بِوَطْءٍ، وَإِنْ حَرُمَ كَحَائِضٍ.
وَبِمَوْتِ أَحَدِهِمَا لَا
بِخَلْوَةٍ فِي الْجَدِيدِ.
BOOK 34 .— DOWER
Section
The
Sonna Las introduced the practice of
stipulating in the contract of
marriage a
fixed dower, though this stipulation is
not rigorously
necessary. Anything that
may legally be sold may be made
use of for
dower. The husband who
has promised a certain object as dower is
liable for its loss before the
bride has taken possession of it, as
in other
agreement, or according to
one authority as if it were a
deposit intrusted
to him. If one
admits, with the majority of jurists
that a woman’s
title to a certain object
stipulated as dower is not absolute,
but merely
contractual, before possession
of it has been taken, one cannot
allow
her any right to dispose of
it by way of sale, until it
has been actually
delivered to her.
Prom this principle it also
follows : —
. That in case of
accidental loss, before taking possession, a
husband
owes proportional dower ; and the
wife cannot demand the value of the
thing originally promised.
. That
the woman is presumed to have taken
possession, if she '
has herself
caused the loss.
. That in
case of loss caused by the fault
of another person, she may
either
claim from her husband the payment
of proportional dower,
transferring to him
her claim against the other person,
or transfer to
that other person her
claim against her husband, and recover
damage
from that person. That is the
doctrine of our school.
Loss caused
by the husband’s fault has the same
consequences as
accidental loss ; or,
according to others, as loss caused
by another per-
son ; and where one
has promised as dower two specified
slaves, ono
of whom dies before
possession is taken, our school considers
the agree-
ment as cancelled so far
as the deceased slave is concerned.
The wife
then has a right of option,
i.e. she may either renounce the promised
dower, or accept the surviving
slave. In the first case the husband
owes proportional dower ; in the
second he must compensate her for
the loss of the dead slave by
giving her, in addition to the
surviving one,
a reasonable part of the
proportional dower. Our school also grants
a
right of option to the wife,
if the specified object that forms
the dower
lias been damaged by
redhibitory defects, before taking possession ;
but
in these circumstances she may
only choose between proportional dower
and
acceptance pure and simple of the
defective objects. The husband,
however,
is never liable for accidental loss
of produce from objects
promised as
dower, even where he may have been
able to deliver them
but have
refused such delivery on the ground
of his liability for the
execution
of the contract. Nor does our school
consider him obliged
to pay any
indemnity for the use he may make
of the promised object-
before delivery,
c.g. by riding an animal included in
the dower, or using
it in any
other way.
On the other hand,
the woman is not obliged to place
herself at her
husband’s disposition,
until she has taken possession of
the dower, at
any rate when this
consists of certain definite objects, and
the parties
have not stipulated any
time of payment, f Where, on the
other hand,
dower is promised by a
certain date, she cannot refuse
cohabitation, on
the ground that she
has not yet taken possession, even
though the
time may have expired. In
a case where the two parties have
stipulated
that neither shall be obliged
to perform the duties resulting from the
marriage contract, before the other
has done so, it is the husband,
accord-
ing to one jurist, who should
begin by delivering the dower ; while, accord-
ing to another, neither party can
oblige the other to begin by
fulfilling his
or her engagements, but
the one that begins can oblige the
other to
comply also. *But most
authorities maintain that under these circum-
stances the parties should jointly fulfil
their obligations ; that is to say
that the husband should begin by
depositing the dower with some
person
of irreproachable conduct, the wife should
then place herself at
her husband’s
disposition, and after this the depositary
should hand
her the dower. A woman
who, in spite of this stipulation of
joint ful-
filment, does not insist upon
her husband’s beginning by paying the
dower, may claim it as soon as
she has placed herself at his
disposition ;
but if the husband
does not accept her offer immediately upon
her declaring her readiness, she may
change her mind and refuse to
surrender herself to him until he
lias discharged his pecuniary obliga-
tion.
Where, on the contrary, the husband
has immediately accepted
cohabitation, his
wife can no longer draw back. If
the husband
in spite of a stipulation
of joint fulfilment, begins by paying, the
woman must place herself at once
at his disposition ; and, accord-
ing to
the authority who considers the husband
bound to pay in any
case, lie
may even claim back the dower if
she refuses without valid
excuse. Finally,
on insisting that his wife place
herself at his disposition,
the husband
should at her request allow her a
little time for her marriage
toilet.
The length of this delay may be
fixed, if necessary, by the
court,
but must not exceed three days. A
wife can never insist upon
any delay
on the ground that her menstrues are
not yet finished ; but
a minor and a
sick woman are not obliged to
surrender themselves to
their husband
before being physically capable of
fulfilling then conjugal
duties.
A wife’s
right to dower becomes irrevocable by
the fact of copulation,
even where
this is a prohibited act, e.g. during
menstruation. The right
becomes irrevocable
also upon the death of one of
the parties ; but not,
according to
the opinion of Shafii in his
Egyptian period, by the fact of
the
wife’s having crossed the threshold of
the bridal chamber without
giving herself
to the work of the flesh.
فصل [في بيان أحكام الصداق المسمى الصحيح والفاسد]
نَكَحَهَا
بِخَمْرٍ أَوْ حُرٍّ أَوْ مَغْصُوبٍ وَجَبَ مَهْرُ الْمِثْلِ.
وَفِي
قَوْلٍ قِيمَتُهُ أَوْ بِمَمْلُوكٍ وَمَغْصُوبٍ بَطَلَ فِيهِ، وَصَحَّ فِي
الْمَمْلُوكِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ وَتَتَخَيَّرُ، فَإِنْ فَسَخَتْ فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ،
وَفِي قَوْلٍ قِيمَتُهُمَا، وَإِنْ أَجَازَتْ فَلَهَا مَعَ الْمَمْلُوكِ حِصَّةُ
الْمَغْصُوبِ مِنْ مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ بِحَسَبِ قِيمَتِهِمَا، وَفِي قَوْلٍ تَقْنَعُ
بِهِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ زَوَّجْتُك بِنْتِي وَبِعْتُك ثَوْبَهَا بِهَذَا
الْعَبْدِ صَحَّ النِّكَاحُ وَكَذَا الْمَهْرُ وَالْبَيْعُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ،
وَيُوَزَّعُ الْعَبْدُ عَلَى الثَّوْبِ وَمَهْرِ مِثْلٍ.
وَلَوْ
نَكَحَ بِأَلْفٍ عَلَى أَنَّ لِأَبِيهَا أَوْ أَنْ يُعْطِيَهُ أَلْفًا
فَالْمَذْهَبُ فَسَادُ الصَّدَاقِ وَوُجُوبُ مَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ.
وَلَوْ
شَرَطَ خِيَارًا فِي النِّكَاحِ بَطَلَ النِّكَاحُ، أَوْ فِي الْمَهْرِ
فَالْأَظْهَرُ صِحَّةُ النِّكَاحِ لَا الْمَهْرِ، وَسَائِرُ الشُّرُوطِ إنْ
وَافَقَ مُقْتَضَى النِّكَاحِ أَوْ لَمْ يَتَعَلَّقْ بِهِ غَرَضٌ لَغَا، وَصَحَّ
النِّكَاحُ وَالْمَهْرُ.
وَإِنْ خَالَفَ وَلَمْ يُخِلَّ
بِمَقْصُودِهِ الْأَصْلِيِّ كَشَرْطِ أَنْ لَا يَتَزَوَّجَ عَلَيْهَا أَوْ لَا
نَفَقَةَ لَهَا صَحَّ النِّكَاحُ وَفَسَدَ الشَّرْطُ، وَالْمَهْرُ.
وَإِنْ
أَخَلَّ كَأَنْ لَا يَطَأَ أَوْ يُطَلِّقَ بَطَلَ النِّكَاحُ.
وَلَوْ
نَكَحَ نِسْوَةً بِمَهْرٍ فَالْأَظْهَرُ فَسَادُ الْمَهْرِ، وَلِكُلٍّ مَهْرُ
مِثْلٍ.
وَلَوْ نَكَحَ لِطِفْلٍ بِفَوْقِ مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ أَوْ
أَنْكَحَ بِنْتًا لَا رَشِيدَةً أَوْ رَشِيدَةً بِكْرًا بِلَا إذْنٍ بِدُونِهِ
فَسَدَ الْمُسَمَّى، وَالْأَظْهَرُ صِحَّةُ النِّكَاحِ بِمَهْرِ مِثْلٍ.
وَلَوْ
تَوَافَقُوا عَلَى مَهْرٍ كَانَ سِرًّا وَأَعْلَنُوا زِيَادَةً فَالْمَذْهَبُ
وُجُوبُ مَا عُقِدَ بِهِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَتْ لِوَلِيِّهَا زَوِّجْنِي
بِأَلْفٍ فَنَقَصَ عَنْهُ بَطَلَ النِّكَاحُ، فَلَوْ أَطْلَقَتْ فَنَقَصَ عَنْ
مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ بَطَلَ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَصِحُّ بِمَهْرِ مِثْلٍ.
قُلْت:
الْأَظْهَرُ صِحَّةُ النِّكَاحِ فِي الصُّورَتَيْنِ بِمَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
A husband who has
promised for dower things that cannot
form the
basis of a contract, e.g . wine,
a free man, or something usurped, owes
proportional dower, or, according to
one jurist, the value the wine
would
have if it were vinegar, the man
would have if he wore a slave,
or
the usurped thing would have if it
had remained in the possession
of
the rightful owner. *A promise to
give something of which one
is the
rightful owner and also something usurped
is null as regards
the latter but
valid as to the former, without
prejudice to the wife’s
right —
.
To renounce the two promised objects,
and claim proportional
dower, or,
according to one authority, the value
of the two promised
objects ; or
. To accept the object that
may lawfully form the basis of a contract,
plus a reasonable part of the
proportional dower, in compensation for
the loss of the other object.
Only one authority maintains that
she must in all cases be content
with the lawful object and nothing
more, unless she prefers proportional
dower.
By stipulating as follows : “I
give you my daughter in marriage,
and I also give you these clothes,
if you will give me this slave
here,”
one has legally combined a
marriage, *a dower and an exchange, the
slave constituting partly an equivalent
for the clothes, and partly
proportional
dower. On the other hand, a stipulation “
that the woman
shall bo given in
marriage for a thousand pieces of money,
which pieces
belong or shall be
given to her father,” does not
constitute, according
to our rite, a legal
promise of fixed dower ; such a
stipulation, though
not affecting the
validity of the marriage, obliges the
husband to pay
proportional dower.
A
marriage cannot be concluded by granting
one of the parties a
conventional
option of cancellation within a certain
time ; *but if such
option has been
stipulated, not with regard to the
marriage itself but
with regard to
the dower, this clause only is null,
while the marriage
remains valid. As
to tho other conditions that may be
added to a
marriage contract, it is
necessary to distinguish —
. Conditions
already implicit in the law relating
to marriage,
and such as are without
any object. Both are considered as
of no
effect ; but the marriage and
the stipulation as to the dower remain
valid.
. Conditions inconsistent
with the precepts of the law
relating to
marriage. Such are illicit,
and have the effect of invalidating the
stipulation as to dower ; but they
leave the marriage intact, so long as
they are not incompatible with the
fundamental object of that institu-
tion.
Among such conditions are reckoned, for
instance, a stipulation
that the husband
cannot take another wife so long as
he is married to
the first, or a
stipulation that he is not liable
for maintenance. Where,
however, these
conditions are incompatible with the
fundamental object
of marriage, e.g . a
stipulation that would deprive a husband
of his right
of cohabitation with
his wife, or a stipulation that he
would repudiate
her, the marriage itself
is null and void.
*If, when
marrying several wives at once, one
promises a joint
dower, the contract is
illegal so far as concerns the
dower, but the
marriage remains intact,
and each wife may claim proportional
dower.
*It is the same where a
guardian concludes a marriage for his ward,
while granting tho bride a larger
dower than sho could claim as pro-
portional dower ; or where the father
or grandfather, who may legally
dispose
of a girl’s hand without asking her
consent, stipulates for her a
dower
less than her proportional dower. When
the parties agree in
secret upon a
certain dower, but declare publicly that
they have agreed
upon a larger dower,
it is the dower which they really
have in view that
the husband should
pay, at least according to our
school. A marriage
is null and void
where a woman’s guardian, after receiving
from her a
request to give her
in marriage for a thousand pieces of
money, gives her
in marriage for a
less sum. And similarly, where the
woman has given
her guardian no
instructions as to dower, but he has
stipulated for a sum
inferior to her
proportional dower. A single authority has
maintained
that in this case the
marriage remains intact, but the
stipulation is void
and the woman
can therefore insist upon proportional
dower. [*In
both of the two cases
cited the marriage is valid ; but
the husband owes
proportional dower.]
فصل [في التفويض]
قَالَتْ رَشِيدَةٌ: زَوِّجْنِي بِلَا
مَهْرٍ، فَزَوَّجَ وَنَفَى الْمَهْرَ أَوْ سَكَتَ فَهُوَ تَفْوِيضٌ صَحِيحٌ.
وَكَذَا
لَوْ قَالَ سَيِّدُ أَمَةٍ زَوَّجْتُكَهَا بِلَا مَهْرٍ، وَلَا يَصِحُّ تَفْوِيضُ
غَيْرِ رَشِيدَةٍ.
وَإِذَا جَرَى تَفْوِيضٌ صَحِيحٌ فَالْأَظْهَرُ
أَنَّهُ لَا يَجِبُ شَيْءٌ بِنَفْسِ الْعَقْدِ.
فَإِنْ وَطِئَ
فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ.
وَيُعْتَبَرُ بِحَالِ الْعَقْدِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَلَهَا قَبْلَ الْوَطْءِ مُطَالَبَةُ الزَّوْجِ بِأَنْ يَفْرِضَ مَهْرًا،
وَحَبْسُ نَفْسِهَا لِيَفْرِضَ، وَكَذَا لِتَسْلِيمِ الْمَفْرُوضِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ رِضَاهَا بِمَا يَفْرِضُهُ الزَّوْجُ.
لَا
عِلْمُهُمَا بِقَدْرِ مَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَيَجُوزُ
فَرْضٌ مُؤَجَّلٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَفَوْقَ مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ، وَقِيلَ
لَا إنْ كَانَ مِنْ جِنْسِهِ.
وَلَوْ امْتَنَعَ مِنْ الْفَرْضِ أَوْ
تَنَازَعَا فِيهِ فَرَضَ الْقَاضِي نَقْدَ الْبَلَدِ حَالًّا.
قُلْت:
وَيُفْرَضُ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ وَيُشْتَرَطُ عِلْمُهُ بِهِ وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَا
يَصِحُّ فَرْضُ أَجْنَبِيٍّ مِنْ مَالِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَالْفَرْضُ
الصَّحِيحُ كَمُسَمًّى فَيَتَشَطَّرُ بِطَلَاقٍ قَبْلَ وَطْءٍ، وَلَوْ طَلَّقَ
قَبْلَ فَرْضٍ وَوَطْءٍ فَلَا شَطْرَ.
وَإِنْ مَاتَ أَحَدُهُمَا
قَبْلَهُمَا لَمْ يَجِبْ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
قُلْت:
الْأَظْهَرُ وُجُوبُهُ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
When a woman whose
intelligence is sufficiently developed for her
to manage her property, asks her
guardian to give her in marriage with-
out dower, and he therefore refuses
the dower offered by the husband, or
does not stipulate one, this act
is considered as a perfectly legal liberality.
This is also the case where
the master gives in marriage one of
his female
slaves, declaring at the
same time that he wants no dower
for her. But
a free woman whose
intelligence is not yet sufficiently
developed for her
to manage her
property, cannot be legally married
without stipulating
some dower, even with
her consent. *However, this remission of
dower
has this result only, that the
husband owes his wife nothing in
virtue of
the marriage contract ; but
it does not prevent him from owing
pro-
portional dower if the marriage is
consummated, fto be assessed accord-
ing
to the woman’s condition at the time
of the contract. A free woman
thus
given in marriage without dower, may
also insist upon her husband
assigning
her a dower before cohabitation ; and she
need not place
herself at her
husband’s disposition until it has been
so assigned, fand
delivered. It is
also rigorously necessary that the wife
should declare
herself to be satisfied
with the dower assigned her by her
husband ; *but
the law does not
require that the two parties should
know exactly the
amount that the
woman would be able to claim as
proportional dower.
Under these circumstances
the husband can validly assign a fdower
within a certain time, or of an
amount exceeding proportional dower.
Only a
few authorities have expressed the opinion
that dower assigned
in this way upon
the wife’s demand cannot exceed her
proportional
dower in the case where
both dowers would consist in things
of the same
kind. If the husband
refuses to assign his wife a dower
under these
circumstances, or if the
two interested parties cannot come to
an agree-
ment upon the subject, the
court must determine the amount in money
current in the locality, and this
amount can bo claimed immediately.
[The
court can only give judgment for an
amount that would appear
to it to
be reasonable as proportional dower ; it
should first therefore
ascertain the
amount of this latter.]
*j*A third
party cannot lawfully assign a dower to a
woman whose
guardian has not stipulated
for one, even though such person may
be
willing to pay it from his
own property.
Dower assigned by the
husband or determined by the court
is subject
to the same rules as
ordinary fixed dower, that is to say
that half is due
upon repudiation
before cohabitation, while nothing is due
upon repudia-
tion not only before
cohabitation but even before assignment of
the
dower. *Death of one of the
parties before cohabitation or assignment
takes place does not make
proportional dower obligatory. [*On the
contrary, in this case proportional
dower would really be due.]
فصل [في بيان مَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ]
مَهْرُ الْمِثْلِ: مَا
يُرْغَبُ بِهِ فِي مِثْلِهَا، وَرُكْنُهُ الْأَعْظَمُ نَسَبٌ، فَيُرَاعَى
أَقْرَبُ مَنْ تُنْسَبُ إلَى مَنْ تُنْسَبُ إلَيْهِ وَأَقْرَبُهُنَّ أُخْتٌ
لِأَبَوَيْنِ ثُمَّ لِأَبٍ ثُمَّ بَنَاتُ أَخٍ ثُمَّ عَمَّاتٌ كَذَلِكَ، فَإِنْ
فُقِدَ نِسَاءُ الْعَصَبَةِ أَوْ لَمْ يُنْكَحْنَ أَوْ جُهِلَ مَهْرُهُنَّ
فَأَرْحَامٌ كَجَدَّاتٍ وَخَالَاتٍ، وَيُعْتَبَرُ سِنٌّ وَعَقْلٌ وَيَسَارٌ
وَبَكَارَةٌ وَثُيُوبَةٌ وَمَا اخْتَلَفَ بِهِ غَرَضٌ، فَإِنْ اخْتَصَّتْ
بِفَضْلٍ أَوْ نَقْصٍ زِيدَ أَوْ نُقِصَ لَائِقٌ فِي الْحَالِ، وَلَوْ سَامَحَتْ
وَاحِدَةٌ لَمْ تَجِبْ مُوَافَقَتُهَا، وَلَوْ خَفَضْنَ لِلْعَشِيرَةِ فَقَطْ
اُعْتُبِرَ.
وَفِي وَطْءِ نِكَاحٍ فَاسِدٍ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ يَوْمَ
الْوَطْءِ، فَإِنْ تَكَرَّرَ فَمَهْرٌ فِي أَعْلَى الْأَحْوَالِ.
قُلْت:
وَلَوْ تَكَرَّرَ وَطْءٌ بِشُبْهَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ فَمَهْرٌ، فَإِنْ تَعَدَّدَ
جِنْسُهَا تَعَدَّدَ الْمَهْرُ.
وَلَوْ كَرَّرَ وَطْءَ مَغْصُوبَةٍ
أَوْ مُكْرَهَةً عَلَى زِنًا تَكَرَّرَ الْمَهْرُ.
وَلَوْ تَكَرَّرَ
وَطْءُ الْأَبِ وَالشَّرِيكِ وَسَيِّدٍ مُكَاتَبَةً فَمَهْرٌ، وَقِيلَ مُهُورٌ،
وَقِيلَ إنْ اتَّحَدَ الْمَجْلِسُ فَمَهْرٌ، وَإِلَّا فَمُهُورٌ وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
Section
“ Proportional dower ” is
the amount a woman may claim as dower
in due proportion to the dowers
stipulated or obtained by other women
of. the same condition. It is
estimated —
. According to the
genealogy of the person in question,
i.e. according
to the dowers granted
to the women who are the nearest
agnates of the
man from whom she
derives her origin, such as her
whole sister, her sister
on the
father’s side, the daughters of her
whole brother or brother on
the
father’s side, her father’s sisters, and
so on. If there are no agnates
who are women, or if they have
not yet been given in marriage, or
if
their dowers are unknown, their
relatives on the mother’s side, such as
mother’s mother or sisters, are
taken into consideration.
. According
to the wife’s age, mental faculties,
wealth, virginity,
or otherwise, and in
general all qualities usually apj^reciated
in a spouse.
If a wife has special
qualities or defects, that give her
greater or less
value than her
relations, she must also be granted a
dower either greater
or less as the
case may be. The fact that one
of her female relatives
consented to
receive an exceptionally small dower ought
not to be taken
into consideration ;
but the fact that they usually
consent to receive a
smaller dower
when given in marriage to a member
of the family ought
to be so.
Proportional dower is always due
after an illegal marriage followed
by
coition. In this case the amount is
estimated according to the value
of
the woman upon the day the coition
took place ; or where cohabita-
tion is
prolonged, according to the highest value
the woman had during
the whole
period she was in her husband’s house.
[Prolonged cohabitation in consequence
of an error as to the validity
of the marriage obliges the husband
to pay only a single dowrer ; but if
the error arose from several
successive causes, e.g. if the husband co-
habited with his wrife at first
under the belief that he had married
her,
and afterwards under the belief
that she was his slave, he owes
as many
dowers as he has committed
errors. Cohabitation with a usurped slave,
or with a person forced to undergo
forbidden carnal intercourse, has for
effect that the woman may claim
as many dowers as there have been
acts
of coition. Cohabitation, however,
even prolonged, between a father
and his
son’s slave, between the joint owner
of a slave and that slave,
or
between a master and his slave undergoing
enfranchisement by con-
tract, necessitates
payment of a single dower only ; though
there are
some authorities who admit
even in these circumstances a plurality of
dowers, unless where there has been
no separation between the acts of
coition.]
فصل [في تشطير المهر وسقوطه]
الْفُرْقَةُ قَبْلَ وَطْءٍ
مِنْهَا أَوْ بِسَبَبِهَا، كَفَسْخِهِ بِعَيْبِهَا تُسْقِطُ الْمَهْرَ.
وَمَا
لَا كَطَلَاقٍ وَإِسْلَامِهِ وَرِدَّتِهِ وَلِعَانِهِ وَإِرْضَاعِ أُمِّهِ أَوْ
أُمِّهَا يُشَطِّرُهُ.
ثُمَّ قِيلَ: مَعْنَى التَّشْطِيرِ أَنَّ
لَهُ خِيَارَ الرُّجُوعِ، وَالصَّحِيحُ عَوْدُهُ بِنَفْسِ الطَّلَاقِ، فَلَوْ
زَادَ بَعْدَهُ فَلَهُ.
وَإِنْ طَلَّقَ وَالْمَهْرُ تَالِفٌ
فَنِصْفُ بَدَلِهِ مِنْ مِثْلٍ أَوْ قِيمَةٍ.
وَإِنْ تَعَيَّبَ فِي
يَدِهَا، فَإِنْ قَنِعَ بِهِ وَإِلَّا فَنِصْفُ قِيمَتِهِ سَلِيمًا، وَإِنْ
تَعَيَّبَ قَبْلَ قَبْضِهَا فَلَهُ نِصْفُهُ نَاقِصًا بِلَا خِيَارٍ، فَإِنْ
عَابَ بِجِنَايَةٍ وَأَخَذَتْ أَرْشَهَا فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ لَهُ نِصْفَ
الْأَرْشِ.
وَلَهَا زِيَادَةٌ مُنْفَصِلَةٌ، وَلَهَا خِيَارٌ فِي
مُتَّصِلَةٍ، فَإِنْ شَحَّتْ فَنِصْفُ قِيمَةٍ بِلَا زِيَادَةٍ، وَإِنْ سَمَحَتْ
لَزِمَهُ الْقَبُولُ.
وَإِنْ زَادَ وَنَقَصَ كَكِبَرِ عَبْدٍ
وَطُولِ نَخْلَةٍ وَتَعَلُّمِ صَنْعَةٍ مَعَ بَرَصٍ، فَإِنْ اتَّفَقَا بِنِصْفِ
الْعَيْنِ، وَإِلَّا فَنِصْفُ قِيمَةٍ، وَزِرَاعَةُ الْأَرْضِ نَقْصٌ،
وَحَرْثُهَا زِيَادَةٌ، وَحَمْلُ أَمَةٍ وَبَهِيمَةٍ زِيَادَةٌ وَنَقْصٌ.
وَقِيلَ:
الْبَهِيمَةُ زِيَادَةٌ، وَإِطْلَاعُ نَخْلٍ زِيَادَةٌ مُتَّصِلَةٌ.
وَإِنْ
طَلَّقَ وَعَلَيْهِ ثَمَرٌ مُؤَبَّرٌ لَمْ يَلْزَمْهَا قَطْفُهُ، فَإِنْ قَطَفَتْ
تَعَيَّنَ نِصْفُ النَّخْلِ، وَلَوْ رَضِيَ بِنِصْفِ النَّخْلِ وَتَبْقِيَةِ
الثَّمَرِ إلَى جِدَادِهِ أُجْبِرَتْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيَصِيرُ النَّخْلُ فِي
يَدِهَا، وَلَوْ رَضِيَتْ بِهِ فَلَهُ الِامْتِنَاعُ وَالْقِيمَةُ.
وَمَتَى
ثَبَتَ خِيَارٌ لَهُ أَوْ لَهَا لَمْ يَمْلِكْ نِصْفَهُ حَتَّى يَخْتَارَ ذُو
الِاخْتِيَارِ.
وَمَتَى رَجَعَ بِقِيمَةٍ اُعْتُبِرَ الْأَقَلُّ
مِنْ يَوْمَيْ الْإِصْدَاقِ وَالْقَبْضِ.
وَلَوْ أَصْدَقَ تَعْلِيمَ
قُرْآنٍ وَطَلَّقَ قَبْلَهُ، فَالْأَصَحُّ تَعَذُّرُ تَعْلِيمِهِ.
وَيَجِبُ
مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ بَعْدَ وَطْءٍ، وَنِصْفُهُ قَبْلَهُ.
وَلَوْ طَلَّقَ
وَقَدْ زَالَ مِلْكُهَا عَنْهُ فَنِصْفُ بَدَلِهِ.
فَإِنْ كَانَ
زَالَ وَعَادَ تَعَلَّقَ بِالْعَيْنِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
وَهَبَتْهُ لَهُ ثُمَّ طَلَّقَ فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّ لَهُ نِصْفَ بَدَلِهِ،
وَعَلَى هَذَا لَوْ وَهَبَتْهُ النِّصْفَ فَلَهُ نِصْفُ الْبَاقِي وَرُبُعُ
بَدَلِ كُلِّهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ النِّصْفُ الْبَاقِي وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَتَخَيَّرُ
بَيْنَ بَدَلِ نِصْفِ كُلِّهِ أَوْ نِصْفِ الْبَاقِي وَرُبُعِ بَدَلِ كُلِّهِ،
وَلَوْ كَانَ دَيْنًا فَأَبْرَأَتْهُ لَمْ يَرْجِعْ عَلَيْهَا عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَيْسَ لِوَلِيٍّ عَفْوٌ عَنْ صَدَاقٍ عَلَى
الْجَدِيدِ.
Section
A separation of the
parties before the consummation of the
marriage,
either at the wife’s instance,
or in consequence of some fact for
which
she is responsible, e.g . a dissolution
of marriage by reason of redhibitory
defects in the wife, puts an
end to the husband’s obligation to
pay dower.
Where separation before
consummation has been caused, either by an
act of the husband, such as
repudiation, conversion, apostasy, anathema ;
or by reason of some third
party, as relationship through fosterage,
caused by an act of the mother
of one of the parties ; the husband
is
always liable for half the dower
which the wife could have claimed had
the marriage remained intact. The
obligation to leave to the wife
half
the dower is explained by some
authorities in this way that tho
husband has the right to renounce
the marriage at the price of this
sacrifice ; ffbut most jurists maintain
that the half reverts to him ipso
facto upon repudiation, etc.
Any
increase derived from the dower after
the separation belongs
half to the
husband, and if tho wife separated
from her husband has
already taken
possession of the dower, she must
indemnify the husband
if the dower
has perished while in her possession.
This compensation
takes place by replacing
the perished objects by other similar
ones, if
they are sold by measure
or weight, or otherwise by paying
their value.
If the objects that
form the dower have not perished but
have merely
become deteriorated while in
the wife’s possession, the husband can
none the less recover the half
if he is satisfied with that, or
he can
abandon the whole of the
dower as it is to the wife,
and claim half the
value it had
before deterioration. Deterioration before the
wife has
taken possession results under
these circumstances in obliging the
husband to be satisfied with half
the dower as it is ; but if
this deteriora-
tion has been caused by a
third party from whom the wife has
recovered
damages, she should give over
half of this to her husband. As
to increase
derived from the dower
before the separation of the parties,
the wife
profits by it where the
increase has a separate existence from the
principal object ; but where this
increase remains united to the principal
object then half of it goes to
the husband if the wife prefers to
let him
have his half in kind,
but if she prefers to give him
half of the original
value she alone
profits by the increase. The husband
must in all cases
respect the wife’s
decision as to this. Where an object
that forms part
of a dower has
become both ameliorated and deteriorated before
separation, e.g. if a palm tree lias
grown, or a slave become older or learnt
a new trade, but has also become
tainted with leprosy, the husband
becomes
part owner, i.e. owns half the
object, if the interested parties
agree
to settle the account in that way,
otherwise he receives only the
original
value of the half that reverts to
him. The sowing of a field is
considered a deterioration, its mere
ploughing an amelioration. The
pregnancy
of a slave or of an animal counts
as both profit and loss,
though
according to some jurists that of an
animal is pure profit.
The
production of a spathe on a palm-tree is
considered as an increase
that remains
united to the principal object. Where a
palm-tree forming
a dower already at the
moment of separation bears fertilised
fruit, the
wife is not obliged to
pluck them, and if of her own
accord she does so,
she indicates by
this her desire that the tree shall
half belong to her.
When, under
these circumstances, the husband does not
oppose the
wife’s request that only
half the palm-tree shall be given
him provided
the fruit are not
plucked before the season, fthe wife
cannot draw back
from her proposal
and must gather the fruits, while
the tree becomes
the joint and
undivided property of the pair. When,
on the other hand,
it is the
husband who makes the suggestion, the
wife’s consent does not
prevent his
changing his mind, and paying her
half the value of the tree ;
provided always that the ownership
of the half of the tree is never
vested in the husband, so long
as the party that has a right of
option
has not yet decided.
By “
original value of dower ” is understood
the minimum value of
the object
between the day when dower was
promised and the day the
wife took
possession.
Where a husband has promised
his wife, in place of dower, to
teach
her the Koran, and where, by a
repudiation before the instruction is
complete, the fulfilment of this
promise is impossible, then he owes her
proportional dower ; or, if the
marriage has not been followed by co-
habitation, only half.
A woman repudiated
before consummation of marriage, who has
already transferred the ownership of
the dower of which she had taken
possession, owes her husband half
the value of what she received ; fbut
if she has lost the dower and
then regained it, it is on the
original object
itself that the husband
may make good his claim.
*A
woman who gives her husband her
dower after receiving it, and is
afterwards repudiated before consummation,
still none the less owes
him half
of what she received ; and by virtue
of the same principle a
wife who
has given her husband only half of
what she received, owes
him the half
of what is left, plus a quarter of
the whole dower. Another
jurist, however,
allows the husband in these circumstances
only the half
of the remainder,
while according to a third he may
choose between half
the whole amount
of the dower, and half of the
remainder plus a quarter
of the whole.
Where, on the other hand, the dower
does not consist in
a particular object
but in an obligation on the
husband’s part, our school
allows him
nothing if, in the above circumstances,
his wife has rendered
it to him.
According to the opinion adopted by
Shafii in his second
period, the
wife’s guardian can never give up
the rights set out in this
section.
فصل [في المتعة]
لِمُطَلَّقَةٍ قَبْلَ وَطْءٍ مُتْعَةٌ، إنْ
لَمْ يَجِبْ شَطْرُ مَهْرٍ وَكَذَا لِمَوْطُوءَةٍ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَفُرْقَةٌ
لَا بِسَبَبِهَا كَطَلَاقٍ.
وَيُسْتَحَبُّ أَنْ لَا تَنْقُصَ عَنْ
ثَلَاثِينَ دِرْهَمًا، فَإِنْ تَنَازَعَا قَدَّرَهُ الْقَاضِي بِنَظَرِهِ
مُعْتَبِرًا حَالَهُمَا، وَقِيلَ، وَقِيلَ حَالَهَا، وَقِيلَ أَقَلَّ مَالٍ.
فصل
[في الاختلاف في المهر والتحالف فيما سمي منه]
اخْتَلَفَا فِي
قَدْرِ مَهْرٍ أَوْ صِفَتِهِ تَحَالَفَا، وَيَتَحَالَفُ وَارِثَاهُمَا أَوْ
وَارِثُ وَاحِدٍ وَالْآخَرُ ثُمَّ يُفْسَخُ الْمَهْرُ، وَيَجِبُ مَهْرُ
مِثْلٍ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَتْ تَسْمِيَةً فَأَنْكَرَهَا تَحَالَفَا فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَتْ نِكَاحًا وَمَهْرَ مِثْلٍ فَأَقَرَّ
بِالنِّكَاحِ وَأَنْكَرَ الْمَهْرَ أَوْ سَكَتَ فَالْأَصَحُّ تَكْلِيفُهُ
الْبَيَانَ، فَإِنْ ذَكَرَ قَدْرًا وَزَادَتْ تَحَالَفَا، وَإِنْ أَصَرَّ
مُنْكِرًا حَلَفَتْ وَقَضَى لَهَا.
وَلَوْ اخْتَلَفَ فِي قَدْرِهِ
زَوْجٌ وَوَلِيُّ صَغِيرَةٍ أَوَمَجْنُونَةٍ تَحَالَفَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَتْ نَكَحَنِي يَوْمَ كَذَا بِأَلْفٍ، وَيَوْمَ كَذَا بِأَلْفٍ وَثَبَتَ
الْعَقْدَانِ بِإِقْرَارِهِ أَوْ بِبَيِّنَةٍ لَزِمَهُ أَلْفَانِ، فَإِنْ قَالَ
لَمْ أَطَأْ فِيهِمَا أَوْ فِي أَحَدِهِمَا صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ وَسَقَطَ
الشَّطْرُ، وَإِنْ قَالَ كَانَ الثَّانِي تَجْدِيدَ لَفْظٍ لَا عَقْدًا لَمْ
يُقْبَلْ.
Section
A woman repudiated before
*or after consummation of marriage, to
whom the law does not allow
half dower, may demand a pecuniary
indemnity called motah. This is so
also in the case of separation, at
any rate when this separation is
not the result of anything for which
the
woman is responsible. It is
recommended that the motah should never
be less than thirty drahms, and
where the parties cannot agree as to
the
amount of the motah , the decision
rests with the court, which should
take into account the condition of
both the litigants. Some authorities,
however, maintain that the court
should have regard to the husband’s
condition only ; some only to that
of the wife ; others admit no legal
minimum, provided that the motah
consists of something that can form
the basis of a legal obligation.
Section
In case of proceedings
as to the amount or the quality
of the dower,
the court should, in
default of proof, administer an oath
to the parties,
and, if necessary,
to their respective heirs. Where both
sides take an
oath, the law presumes
that no fixed dower has been legally
promised,
and consequently the husband
owes proportional dower. fThe same
rule
applies to the case where the wife
maintains in court that her
husband
promised her a specified dower, and he
denies it. flf the wife
alleges in
court the existence of the marriage
and the promise of a pro-
portional dower
; while the husband admits the marriage,
but denies
the promise of dower, or
says nothing upon this head ; the
court should
ask him to repeat his
defence more precisely. If he then
mentions an
amount inferior to the
proportional dower demanded by his wife,
the
general rule must be followed
and an oath administered to both parties.
But if the husband still denies
the promise, or says nothing, the
oath is
administered to the woman
only, and judgment entered according to
her
demand, fin the case where
proceedings are taken about the amount
of dower, not between the husband
and wife, but between the husband
and the guardian of a minor or
the curator of a lunatic, the rule
mentioned above as to the mutual
oaths of the parties is observed all
the same. Where a wife alleges that
her husband married her on such
and
such a day for a thousand pieces of
money, and again on another
following
day for the same amount, he owes
two thousand if the two ,
contracts
are established, either by an admission
on his part, or by other
proof.
When the husband, in these circumstances,
admits the two
contracts, but denies
his liability, either on the ground
that he has not
cohabited with his
wife at all, or on the ground
that he did not do so
after
one of the two marriages, and
confirms this statement on oath,
the
presumption is in his favour, but he
loses his right to recover half
the
dower he has paid. But if he
asserts that on the second occasion he
was merely repeating the words of
the former contract, without intending
to
conclude a second marriage, this means of
defence is not admissible.
فصل [في وليمة العرس]
وَلِيمَةُ الْعُرْسِ سُنَّةٌ.
وَفِي
قَوْلٍ أَوْ وَجْهٍ وَاجِبَةٌ.
وَالْإِجَابَةُ إلَيْهَا فَرْضُ
عَيْنٍ، وَقِيلَ كِفَايَةٍ، وَقِيلَ سُنَّةٌ.
وَإِنَّمَا تَجِبُ
أَوْ تُسَنُّ بِشَرْطِ أَنْ لَا يَخُصَّ الْأَغْنِيَاءَ وَأَنْ يَدْعُوَهُ فِي
الْيَوْمِ الْأَوَّلِ، فَإِنْ أَوْلَمَ ثَلَاثَةً لَمْ تَجِبْ فِي الثَّانِي،
وَتُكْرَهُ فِي الثَّالِثِ، وَأَنْ لَا يُحْضِرَهُ لِخَوْفٍ أَوْ طَمَعٍ فِي
جَاهِهِ، وَأَنْ لَا يَكُونَ ثَمَّ مَنْ يَتَأَذَّى بِهِ أَوْ لَا يَلِيقُ بِهِ
مُجَالَسَتُهُ وَلَا مُنْكَرٌ، فَإِنْ كَانَ يَزُولُ بِحُضُورِهِ
فَلْيَحْضُرْ.
وَمِنْ الْمُنْكَرِ فِرَاشُ حَرِيرٍ وَصُورَةُ
حَيَوَانٍ عَلَى سَقْفٍ أَوْ جِدَارٍ أَوْ وِسَادَةٍ أَوْ سِتْرٍ أَوْ ثَوْبٍ
مَلْبُوسٍ، وَيَجُوزُ مَا عَلَى أَرْضٍ وَبِسَاطٍ وَمِخَدَّةٍ.
وَمَقْطُوعُ
الرَّأْسِ وَصُورَةُ شَجَرٍ.
وَيَحْرُمُ تَصْوِيرُ حَيَوَانٍ.
وَلَا
تَسْقُطُ إجَابَةٌ بِصَوْمٍ، فَإِنْ شَقَّ عَلَى الدَّاعِي صَوْمُ نَفْلٍ
فَالْفِطْرُ أَفْضَلُ.
وَيَأْكُلُ الضَّيْفُ مِمَّا قُدِّمَ لَهُ
بِلَا لَفْظٍ، وَلَا يَتَصَرَّفُ فِيهِ إلَّا بِالْأَكْلِ.
وَلَهُ
أَخْذُ مَا يَعْلَمُ رِضَاهُ بِهِ.
وَيَحِلُّ نَثْرُ سُكَّرٍ
وَغَيْرُهُ فِي الْإِمْلَاكِ، وَلَا يُكْرَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيَحِلُّ
الْتِقَاطُهُ، وَتَرْكَهُ أَوْلَى.
Section
The marriage feast is
an institution of the Sonna. According
to one
authority its observance is
strictly necessary ; and some even raise
this
idea to the rank of a dogma.
An invitation to a marriage feast
should
be accepted as if it were an
individual obligation, or, according
to
others, as one for which the Moslem
community is collective^
responsible. Some
jurists, however, consider such acceptance
merely
as an obligation introduced by
the Sonna, i.e. of the same nature
as the
marriage feast itself. Whatever
may be its nature the obligation exists
only under the following conditions : —
. That the invitation is not
only sent to rich persons from whom
a
present may be expected.
.
That the invitation is for one day
only ; for if the invitation
mentions
three consecutive days, the guests may
excuse themselves
from attending on the
second day ; while it will be even
blamable in
them to accept the
invitation for the third day also.
. That the invitation is not
accepted from fear, or as a thing to
bo
proud of.
. That one is
not afraid of meeting among the
guests some one from
whom one has
received an injury, or with whom it
is not fitting for one
to appear
in the same gathering.
. That
the feast is not accompanied by
illicit amusements ; unless
one feels
assured that one’s presence will cause
the shocking objects to
be banished.
By “shocking objects ” are to be
understood, c.g. silken
carpets, representations
of animals upon the ceiling, walls,
cushions
along the walls, curtains or
garments ; but such representations may
lawfully be depicted upon the floor,
and upon carpets or cushions spread
upon the floor. One may even
depict upon the ceiling or the walls
images of animals without heads, or
representations of trees. For it is
only forbidden to depict living
things in their natural state.
Fasting is no reason for
refusing an invitation to a wedding feast
;
and so far as regards a
supererogatory fast, it is even preferable
to break
it if one’s absence is
likely to embarrass the host.
The
guests should eat of the dishes
offered them, without saying an}'-
thing.
They must not put their fingers in
the dishes except to take out
a
piece of food offered to eat, unless
it be from some motive that they
know the host will approve. They
may blamelessly throw pieces of
sugar,
etc., at the newly married pair.
They may even pick up again
what
they have thrown ; but it is better
not to.
كتاب الْقَسْمِ وَالنُّشُوزُ
BOOK . — SHARING OF THE HUSBAND S FAVOURS ; AND DISOBEDIENCE OF WIVES
يَخْتَصُّ الْقَسْمُ بِزَوْجَاتٍ.
وَمَنْ بَاتَ عِنْدَ بَعْضِ
نِسْوَتِهِ لَزِمَهُ عِنْدَ مَنْ بَقِيَ.
وَلَوْ أَعْرَضَ عَنْهُنَّ
أَوْ عَنْ الْوَاحِدَةِ لَمْ يَأْثَمْ.
وَيُسْتَحَبُّ أَنْ لَا
يُعَطِّلَهُنَّ.
وَتَسْتَحِقُّ الْقَسْمَ مَرِيضَةٌ وَرَتْقَاءُ
وَحَائِضٌ وَنُفَسَاءُ، لَا نَاشِزَةٌ.
فَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْفَرِدْ
بِمَسْكَنٍ دَارَ عَلَيْهِنَّ فِي بُيُوتِهِنَّ، وَإِنْ انْفَرَدَ فَالْأَفْضَلُ
الْمُضِيُّ إلَيْهِنَّ، وَلَهُ دُعَاؤُهُنَّ، وَالْأَصَحُّ تَحْرِيمُ ذَهَابِهِ
إلَى بَعْضٍ وَدُعَاءِ بَعْضٍ، إلَّا لِغَرَضٍ كَقُرْبِ مَسْكَنِ مَنْ مَضَى
إلَيْهَا أَوْ خَوْفٍ عَلَيْهَا.
وَيَحْرُمُ أَنْ يُقِيمَ
بِمَسْكَنِ وَاحِدَةٍ وَيَدْعُوهُنَّ إلَيْهِ.
وَأَنْ يَجْمَعَ
بَيْنَ ضَرَّتَيْنِ فِي مَسْكَنٍ إلَّا بِرِضَاهُمَا.
وَلَهُ أَنْ
يُرَتِّبَ الْقَسْمَ عَلَى لَيْلَةٍ وَيَوْمٍ قَبْلَهَا أَوْ بَعْدَهَا.
وَالْأَصْلُ
اللَّيْلُ، وَالنَّهَارُ تَبَعٌ، فَإِنْ عَمِلَ لَيْلاً وَسَكَنَ نَهَارًا
كَحَارِسٍ فَعَكْسُهُ.
وَلَيْسَ لِلْأَوَّلِ دُخُولٌ فِي نَوْبَةٍ
عَلَى أُخْرَى لَيْلاً إلَّا لِضَرُورَةٍ كَمَرَضِهَا الْمَخُوفِ، وَحِينَئِذٍ
إنْ طَالَ مُكْثُهُ قَضَى وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَلَهُ الدُّخُولُ
نَهَارًا لِوَضْعِ مَتَاعٍ وَنَحْوِهِ وَيَنْبَغِي أَنْ لَا يَطُولَ مُكْثُهُ
وَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَقْضِي إذَا دَخَلَ لِحَاجَةٍ وَأَنَّ لَهُ مَا سِوَى
وَطْءٍ مِنْ اسْتِمْتَاعٍ، وَأَنَّهُ يَقْضِي إنْ دَخَلَ بِلَا سَبَبٍ.
وَلَا
تَجِبُ تَسْوِيَةٌ فِي الْإِقَامَةِ نَهَارًا.
وَأَقَلُّ نُوَبِ
الْقَسْمِ لَيْلَةٌ وَهُوَ أَفْضَلُ، وَيَجُوزُ ثَلَاثًا، لَا زِيَادَةَ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَالصَّحِيحُ وُجُوبُ قُرْعَةٍ لِلِابْتِدَاءِ،
وَقِيلَ يَتَخَيَّرُ.
وَلَا يُفَضِّلُ فِي قَدْرِ نَوْبَةٍ لَكِنْ
لِحُرَّةٍ مِثْلَا أَمَةٍ، وَتَخْتَصُّ بِكْرٌ جَدِيدَةٌ عِنْدَ زِفَافٍ بِسَبْعٍ
بِلَا قَضَاءٍ، وَثَيِّبٌ بِثَلَاثٍ، وَيُسَنُّ تَخْيِيرُهَا بَيْنَ ثَلَاثٍ
بِلَا قَضَاءٍ، وَسَبْعٍ بِقَضَاءٍ.
وَمَنْ سَافَرَتْ وَحْدَهَا
بِغَيْرِ إذْنِهِ فَنَاشِزَةٌ، وَبِإِذْنِهِ لِغَرَضِهِ يَقْضِي لَهَا،
وَلِغَرَضِهَا لَا فِي الْجَدِيدِ.
وَمَنْ سَافَرَ لِنُقْلَةٍ
حَرُمَ أَنْ يَسْتَصْحِبَ بَعْضَهُنَّ، وَفِي سَائِرِ الْأَسْفَارِ الطَّوِيلَةِ
وَكَذَا الْقَصِيرَةُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ يَسْتَصْحِبُ بَعْضَهُنَّ بِقُرْعَةٍ، وَلَا
يَقْضِي مُدَّةَ سَفَرِهِ.
فَإِنْ وَصَلَ الْمَقْصِدَ وَصَارَ
مُقِيمًا قَضَى مُدَّةَ الْإِقَامَةِ، لَا الرُّجُوعِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَمَنْ
وَهَبَتْ حَقَّهَا لَمْ يَلْزَمْ الزَّوْجَ الرِّضَا، فَإِنْ رَضِيَ وَوَهَبَتْ
لِمُعَيَّنَةٍ بَاتَ عِنْدَهَا لَيْلَتَيْهِمَا، وَقِيلَ يُوَالِيهِمَا، أَوْ
لَهُنَّ سَوَّى أَوْ لَهُ فَلَهُ التَّخْصِيصُ، وَقِيلَ يُسَوِّي.
BOOK . — SHARING OF THE HUSBAND S FAVOURS
; AND DISOBEDIENCE OF WIVES
Section
The husband should distribute
his favours equally between his wives.
If he falls into the habit of
passing the night with one of them,
he should
do so with the others
in rotation; but it is not
considered a sin if he prefers
to
sleep by himself, whether he has
many wives or only one. But this
permission granted to the husband to
sleep apart gives him no right to
neglect his wives ; in that case
it would be blamable. A wife who is
sick or ratka or karna , or who
has menstrues or lochia that prevent
coition, does not on that account
lose her right to receive her husband
in her turn ; but a disobedient wife
cannot claim this right.
A husband
who has no room reserved for himself
alone must visit
his wives in their
own rooms ; and this is the
preferable course even where
he has a
particular room to himself, though
strictly speaking he may
then make
his wives come to him in rotation.
But he is forbidden —
. fTo go
and see one of his wives in
her room, and make another
come to
his room, unless for some adequate
reason, e.g. where the former
is
lodged nearer to him than the
latter, or where he is afraid to
make
the former cross a garden or a
road, or on account of her youth,
etc.
. To instal himself in
the apartment of one of his wives,
and there
receive the visits of the
others in rotation.
. To lodge
two wives in the same room, unless
with their consent.
The husband may
arrange as he pleases the way in
which ho visits
his wives in
turn, whether ho goes in the morning
and stays till next
morning, or goes
in the evening and stays till next
evening ; in any
case it is the
night that constitutes the essential part
of the visit, and the
day is
merely an accessory. The only exception
is for a husband whose
occupation is
at night, for instance, a watchman, in
which case the rule
is inverted.
Where the night constitutes the basis
of the visit, the
husband should not
leave the wife whoso turn it is
during the night
to visit another
wife, except in case of necessity,
e.g. if the latter becomes
dangerously
ill. Even then, if the absence is
prolonged, the wife whose
turn it
was should be afterwards compensated.
During the day, how-
ever, the husband
may go to his other wives, not
only in case of necessity,
but for
any purpose, to arrange his things,
etc., provided his absence is
not
excessively prolonged, flf during the day
one leaves the wife
whoso turn it
is, to make a necessary visit into
the room of another, one
need not
compensate tho former, provided always one
does not have
connection with the
latter, though there is no objection
to caressing
her. f f But where, on
the other hand, one leaves the wife
whose turn it
is to go and see
another without adequate motive one must
always
compensate tho former ; though in
general one is not obliged to pass
an
equal portion of the day with
one’s wives when visiting them in
rotation.
The husband may regulate
the duration of each periodic visit
as he
pleases, provided that the
visits are not for less than one
night and one
accessory day, and
provided, according to our school, that
they are not
for more than three
nights and three days. It is to
be recommended
not to exceed the
minimum, f f On the other hand, the
husband may not
himself choose which
wife shall have the first turn, for
this must be
decided by lot. This
rule, however, has been brought into
question by
some jurists who maintain
that the husband may himself lawfully
indicate in what order he shall
periodically visit his wives. He may
not grant to one of his wives
a longer visit than he pays the
others ;
except that a free wife may
demand that her husband shall remain
twice as long during each visit
to her than with a slave wife ; and
with
the further exception that if
he takes a new wife he must be
with her for
seven consecutive nights
if she is a virgin, or if otherwise,
for three ; and
in both these cases
he owes no compensation to his other
wives. Finally,
the Sonna has introduced
tho practice of allowing a new wife
who is
not a virgin the choice
between three nights without subsequent
compensation to the other wives, or
seven nights with such com-
pensation.
A wife who starts alone upon a
journey, without being authorised
to do
so by her husband, should be
considered as a disobedient wife
who
consequently cannot demand upon her return
that her husband
shall make up for
the visits she has lost by her
absence. When, on the
contrary, she
has undertaken the voyage with her
husband’s authorisa-
tion, one must distinguish,
so far as concerns compensation, between
a
journey undertaken in the husband’s
interest or in the wife’s. In the
former case she should be
subsequently compensated ; in the latter,
Shafii, during his Egyptian period,
rejected compensation. A husband
may not
select some of his wives to
accompany him upon a change of
domicile ;
but in all other cases of change
of abode, fwhetlier for a long
or a
short journey, he may be accompanied
by some of his wives, chosen
by
lot. IIo need not afterwards compensate
those that remain behind
unless at
the end of his journey ho makes a
prolonged stay, in which case
he
must do so for the length of
that stay, fbut not for the time
occupied
in the return journey.
A
husband may decline to allow one of
his wives to transfer to another
her
right to his favours, but when he
has consented, and one wife has
renounced her rights in favour of
another specially designated, he must
pass
with the latter all the nights which
he would have passed with both.
In
these circumstances some authorities allow
the husband to let the
ordinary
visit follow immediately upon that which
is the result of this
renunciation,
even where these visits do not come
next to one another in
the usual
order of rotation. Where a wife renounces
her rights generally
in favour of
all the other wives, the husband
should share his nights
equally with
the others ; where she renounces in
favour of the husband
the latter may
dispose of these free nights as he
pleases ; though,
according to some
jurists, he must even in this case
observe an equal
distribution.
فصل [في بعض أحكام النشوز وسوابقه ولواحقه]
ظَهَرَتْ
أَمَارَاتُ نُشُوزِهَا وَعَظَهَا بِلَا هَجْرٍ، فَإِنْ تَحَقَّقَ نُشُوزٌ وَلَمْ
يَتَكَرَّرْ وَعَظَ وَهَجَرَ فِي الْمَضْجَعِ، وَلَا يَضْرِبُ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
قُلْت: الْأَظْهَرُ يَضْرِبُ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ،
فَإِنْ تَكَرَّرَ ضَرَبَ.
فَلَوْ مَنَعَهَا حَقًّا كَقَسْمٍ
وَنَفَقَةٍ أَلْزَمَهُ الْقَاضِي تَوْفِيَتَهُ، فَإِنْ أَسَاءَ خُلُقَهُ
وَآذَاهَا بِلَا سَبَبِ نَهَاهُ، فَإِنْ عَادَ عَزَّرَهُ.
وَإِنْ
قَالَ كُلٌّ: إنَّ صَاحِبَهُ مُتَعَدٍّ تَعَرَّفَ الْقَاضِي الْحَالَ بِثِقَةٍ
يُخْبِرُهُمَا وَمَنَعَ الظَّالِمَ، فَإِنْ اشْتَدَّ الشِّقَاقُ بَعَثَ حَكَمًا
مِنْ أَهْلِهِ وَحَكَمًا مِنْ أَهْلِهَا، وَهُمَا وَكِيلَانِ لَهُمَا، وَفِي
قَوْلٍ مُوَلَّيَانِ مِنْ الْحَاكِمِ، فَعَلَى الْأَوَّلِ يُشْتَرَطُ رِضَاهُمَا
فَيُوَكِّلُ حَكَمَهُ بِطَلَاقٍ وَقَبُولِ عِوَضِ خُلْعٍ، وَتُوَكِّلُ حَكَمَهَا
بِبَذْلِ عِوَضٍ وَقَبُولِ طَلَاقٍ بِهِ.
Section
At the first
indication of disobedience to marital
authority a wife
should be exhorted by
her husband without his immediately breaking
off relations with her. When she
manifests her disobedience by an act
which, though isolated, leaves no
doubt as to her intentions, he should
repeat his exhortations, and confine
her to her chamber, but without
striking her. [*He may have recourse
to blows, even where disobedience
is
manifested by an isolated act.] Only
where there are repeated acts
of
disobedience may a husband inflict corporal
chastisement.
A husband who keeps from
his wife what she may legally claim,
e.g. refuses her her proper turn
in his visits, or does not give her
sufficient for her necessary maintenance,
should be ordered by the court
to
fulfil his obligations. A husband of a
worrying temperament, or one
who treats
his wife harshly without her giving
him any cause for it,
should first
receive an exhortation from the court,
and if this is without
result must
undergo what correction the court may
think fit. Where
husband and wife
accuse each other, the court should
appoint some
reliable man to ascertain
the facts of the case. The latter,
after hearing
what both parties have
to say, should take whatever measures are
rendered necessary by the circumstances
in order that the party in the
wrong may for the future perform
his or her duty towards the injured
party. In a case of very grave
discord the court should appoint two
arbitrators, one from the husband’s
family and one from the wife’s,
who
should then arrange the matter as if
they were the agents of the
parties
; or, according to c jurist, by
virtue of their nomination by
the
court. If they are considered as
agents, the interested parties must
approve their nomination, and the
arbitrator for the husband must be
authorised by him to pronounce
repudiation, or to accept compensation
for
a divorce ; while the arbitrator for the
wife should be authorised by
her to
offer compensation for a divorce, or to
accept repudiation, also
for a compensation.[]