Book 36: Divorce (Talak) | Minhaj al-Talibin Imam Nawawi
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature: classical Arabic
Contents
كتاب الْخُلْعِ
BOOK .— DIVORCE
هُوَ فُرْقَةٌ بِعِوَضٍ بِلَفْظِ طَلَاقٍ أَوْ خُلْعٍ.
شَرْطُهُ
زَوْجٌ يَصِحُّ طَلَاقُهُ، فَلَوْ خَالَعَ عَبْدٌ أَوْ مَحْجُورٌ عَلَيْهِ
بِسَفَهٍ صَحَّ، وَوَجَبَ دَفْعُ الْعِوَضِ إلَى مَوْلَاهُ وَوَلِيُّهُ.
وَشَرْطُ
قَابِلِهِ إطْلَاقُ تَصَرُّفِهِ فِي الْمَالِ، فَإِنْ اخْتَلَعَتْ أَمَةٌ بِلَا
إذْنِ سَيِّدٍ بِدَيْنٍ أَوْ عَيْنِ مَالِهِ بَانَتْ، وَلِلزَّوْجِ فِي
ذِمَّتِهَا مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ فِي صُورَةِ الْعَيْنِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ قِيمَتُهَا، وَفِي
صُورَةِ الدَّيْنِ الْمُسَمَّى، وَفِي قَوْلٍ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَإِنْ أَذِنَ
وَعَيَّنَ عَيْنًا لَهُ أَوْ قَدَّرَ دَيْنًا فَامْتَثَلَتْ تُعَلَّقُ
بِالْعَيْنِ وَبِكَسْبِهَا فِي الدَّيْنِ، وَإِنْ أَطْلَقَ الْإِذْنَ اقْتَضَى
مَهْرَ الْمِثْلِ مِنْ كَسْبِهَا.
وَإِنْ خَالَعَ سَفِيهَةً أَوْ
قَالَ طَلَّقْتُكِ عَلَى أَلْفٍ فَقَبِلَتْ طَلُقَتْ رَجْعِيًّا.
فَإِنْ
لَمْ تَقْبَلْ لَمْ تَطْلُقْ.
وَيَصِحُّ اخْتِلَاعُ الْمَرِيضَةِ
مَرَضَ الْمَوْتِ، وَلَا يُحْسَبُ مِنْ الثُّلُثِ إلَّا زَائِدٌ عَلَى مَهْرِ
مِثْلٍ.
وَرَجْعِيَّةٍ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، لَا بَائِنٍ.
وَيَصِحُّ
عِوَضُهُ قَلِيلاً وَكَثِيرًا دَيْنًا وَعَيْنًا وَمَنْفَعَةً، وَلَوْ خَالَعَ
بِمَجْهُولٍ أَوْ خَمْرٍ بَانَتْ بِمَهْرِ مِثْلٍ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ بِبَدَلِ
الْخَمْرِ.
وَلَهُمَا التَّوْكِيلُ، فَلَوْ قَالَ لِوَكِيلِهِ
خَالِعْهَا بِمِائَةٍ لَمْ يَنْقُصْ مِنْهَا، وَإِنْ أَطْلَقَ لَمْ يَنْقُصْ عَنْ
مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ، فَإِنْ نَقَصَ فِيهِمَا لَمْ تَطْلُقْ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَقَعُ
بِمَهْرِ مِثْلٍ، وَلَوْ قَالَتْ لِوَكِيلِهَا اخْتَلِعْ بِأَلْفٍ فَامْتَثَلَ
نَفَذَ، وَإِنْ زَادَ فَقَالَ اخْتَلَعْتُهَا بِأَلْفَيْنِ مِنْ مَالِهَا
بِوَكَالَتِهَا بَانَتْ، وَيَلْزَمُهَا مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ الْأَكْثَرُ
مِنْهُ وَمِمَّا سَمَّتْهُ، وَإِنْ.
أَضَافَ الْوَكِيلُ الْخُلْعَ
إلَى نَفْسِهِ فَخُلْعُ أَجْنَبِيٍّ وَالْمَالُ عَلَيْهِ، وَإِنْ أَطْلَقَ
فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّ عَلَيْهَا مَا سَمَّتْ وَعَلَيْهِ الزِّيَادَةُ.
وَيَجُوزُ
تَوْكِيلُهُ ذِمِّيًّا.
وَعَبْدًا وَمَحْجُورًا عَلَيْهِ بِسَفَهٍ،
وَلَا يَجُوزُ تَوْكِيلُ مَحْجُورٍ عَلَيْهِ فِي قَبْضِ الْعِوَضِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ
صِحَّةُ تَوْكِيلِهِ امْرَأَةً بِخُلْعِ زَوْجَتِهِ أَوْ طَلَاقِهَا.
وَلَوْ
وَكَّلَا رَجُلاً تَوَلَّى طَرَفًا، وَقِيلَ الطَّرَفَيْنِ.
BOOK .— DIVORCE
Section
Divorce
is the separation of husband and
wife for a compensation paid
by the
wife, whether the husband uses the
word “ repudiation ” or the
word “
divorce/' Divorce is permitted only to a
husband who can law-
fully repudiate his
wife. Thus a slave or a man legally
incapable by
reason of lunacy can
divorce only on condition that the
master or
curator receive the compensation
paid. A female slave may claim a
divorce even without her master’s
authorisation, whether the com-
pensation
consists in some obligation on her
part or in some particular
object.
If it consists of some particular
object the divorced slave is
personally
responsible to her former husband for
proportional dower ;
or, according to
one authority, for the value of the
object she has
promised. Where her
master has authorised the slave to
obtain a
divorce he may either
designate a particular object as compensation
or fix the amount of the
obligation she may contract t owards her
husband
with this object. In the
former case the husband may claim
the object
as his property, in the
latter he may recover the amount
from the
slave’s subsequent earnings, if
she has not exceeded the limits of
the
authorisation. Where the authorisation
has been given without any
restriction
as to the amount, compensation will
still be paid from the
slave’s
future earnings, and will consist of
the proportional dower of
the slave
in question. When a husband proposes a
divorce or a repu-
diation for a thousand
pieces of money to his imbecile
wife, he* accept-
ance merely operates as
a revocable repudiation ; if she refuses the
offer,
she is not repudiated. On the
other hand, a woman may lawfully obtain
a
divorce upon her death-bed, in which
case the compensation is a debt
due
from the estate, unless it exceeds
the proportional dower, when the
excess
becomes a charge upon the third of
which she may dispose. *A
revocable
repudiation does not prevent a woman
claiming a divorce,
but an irrevocable one
does.
Compensation has neither a maximum
nor a minimum. It may
consist of an
obligation on the part of the wife,
or of some particular
thing, or even
of the use of such thing. But a
woman who has promised,
e.(j, an
unknown thing, or a quantity of wine,
owes proportional dower,
instead of the
compensation agreed upon. However, according
to one
jurist, the promise of a
quantity of wine obliges the woman
to pay its
value instead.
Divorce
may be effected by means of an
agent, both on the one side
and
on the other ; but the husband’s
agent may not consent to a divorce
for a less sum than that lixed
by his principal, nor for a sum less
than
the proportional dower where his
principal has given him no instructions
upon the matter. Where the agent
has not observed this rule there is
no divorce, nor repudiation ; though
one authority maintains that in
these
circumstances the divorce holds good and
proportional dower
is due ipso facto.
Where the wife’s agent has been
authorised by her
to offer a thousand
pieces of money as compensation, and
he has done
so, the divorce is
of course valid. And this is so
also where the agent
has promised
two thousand pieces instead of one
thousand, saying that
he was acting
in accordance with his instructions ; but
in that case
the compensation is
ipso facto reduced to the amount of
the propor-
tional dower ; or, according to
one authority, either to the sum fixed
by the wife, or to the
proportional dower, whichever is most advan-
tageous for the husband. If the
wife’s agent effects the divorce upon
his own responsibility, the act is
considered as done by a third party,
that is to say that the agent
is personally responsible for the compensation
promised. *If the agent omits to
declare his capacity as agent, or the
fact that he is acting upon
his own responsibility, the wife owes
the amount
of compensation she had
authorised her agent to offer, and
the balance
offered is owed by the
agent. An infidel subject of a Moslem
prince, a
slave, and a person legally
incapable through imbecility, may act as
agents for offering or accepting a
divorce ; but legal incapacity prevents
an
agent from taking possession of the
compensation, f A husband
may lawfully appoint a
woman to be his agent for divorce
or repudia-
tion. But husband and wife
may not appoint the same individual
to represent them in a divorce ;
though some jurists allow this.
فصل [في الصيغة وما يتعلق بها]
الْفُرْقَةُ بِلَفْظِ
الْخُلْعِ طَلَاقٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ فَسْخٌ لَا يُنْقِصُ عَدَدًا، فَعَلَى
الْأَوَّلِ لَفْظُ الْفَسْخِ كِنَايَةٌ.
وَالْمُفَادَاةُ كَخُلْعٍ
فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَفْظُ الْخُلْعِ صَرِيحٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ كِنَايَةٌ، فَعَلَى
الْأَوَّلِ لَوْ جَرَى بِغَيْرِ ذِكْرِ مَالٍ وَجَبَ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَصِحُّ بِكِنَايَاتِ الطَّلَاقِ مَعَ النِّيَّةِ
وَبِالْعَجَمِيَّةِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ بِعْتُك نَفْسَك بِكَذَا
فَقَالَتْ اشْتَرَيْت فَكِنَايَةُ خُلْعٍ، وَإِذَا بَدَأَ بِصِيغَةِ مُعَاوَضَةٍ
كَطَلَّقْتُكِ أَوْ خَالَعْتُكِ بِكَذَا، وَقُلْنَا: الْخُلْعُ طَلَاقٌ فَهُوَ
مُعَاوَضَةٌ فِيهَا شَوْبُ تَعْلِيقٍ، وَلَهُ الرُّجُوعُ قَبْلَ قَبُولِهَا.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ
قَبُولُهَا بِلَفْظٍ غَيْرِ مُنْفَصِلٍ.
فَلَوْ اخْتَلَفَ إيجَابٌ
وَقَبُولٌ كَطَلَّقْتُكِ بِأَلْفٍ فَقَبِلَتْ بِأَلْفَيْنِ وَعَكْسُهُ أَوْ
طَلَّقْتُك ثَلَاثًا بِأَلْفٍ فَقَبِلَتْ وَاحِدَةً بِثُلُثِ أَلْفٍ فَلَغْوٌ،
وَلَوْ قَالَ طَلَّقْتُك ثَلَاثًا بِأَلْفٍ فَقَبِلَتْ وَاحِدَةً بِأَلْفٍ،
فَالْأَصَحُّ وُقُوعُ الثَّلَاثِ وَوُجُوبُ أَلْفٍ.
وَإِنْ بَدَأَ
بِصِيغَةِ تَعْلِيقٍ كَمَتَى أَوْ مَتَى مَا أَعْطَيْتِنِي فَتَعْلِيقٌ فَلَا
رُجُوعَ لَهُ، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ الْقَبُولُ لَفْظًا وَلَا الْإِعْطَاءُ فِي
الْمَجْلِسِ، وَإِنْ قَالَ إنْ أَوْ إذَا أَعْطَيْتِنِي فَكَذَلِكَ لَكِنْ
يُشْتَرَطُ إعْطَاءٌ عَلَى الْفَوْرِ.
وَإِنْ بَدَأَتْ بِطَلَبِ
طَلَاقٍ فَأَجَابَ فَمُعَاوَضَةٌ فِيهَا شَوْبُ جَعَالَةٍ فَلَهَا الرُّجُوعُ
قَبْلَ جَوَابِهِ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ فَوْرٌ لِجَوَابِهِ، وَلَوْ طَلَبَتْ ثَلَاثًا
بِأَلْفٍ فَطَلَّقَ طَلْقَةً بِثُلُثِهِ فَوَاحِدَةً بِثُلُثِهِ.
وَإِذَا
خَالَعَ أَوْ طَلَّقَ بِعِوَضٍ فَلَا رَجْعَةَ، فَإِنْ شَرَطَهَا فَرَجْعِيٌّ
وَلَا مَالَ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ بَائِنٌ بِمَهْرِ مِثْلٍ.
وَلَوْ قَالَتْ
طَلِّقْنِي بِكَذَا وَارْتَدَّتْ فَأَجَابَ إنْ كَانَ قَبْلَ دُخُولٍ أَوْ
بَعْدَهُ وَأَصَرَّتْ حَتَّى انْقَضَتْ الْعِدَّةُ بَانَتْ بِالرِّدَّةِ، وَلَا
مَالَ، وَإِنْ أَسْلَمَتْ فِيهَا طَلُقَتْ بِالْمَالِ، وَلَا يَضُرُّ تَخَلُّلُ
كَلَامٍ يَسِيرٍ بَيْنَ إيجَابٍ وَقَبُولٍ.
Section
Separation in terms of
a divorce is really a repudiation, and this
must be taken into consideration
where it is a question of the necessity
of an intermediate husband, if one
desires to remarry the woman in
question. One jurist, however, maintains
that a divorce has the same
consequences
as a dissolution of marriage for
redhibitory defects,
which means that in
his opinion a divorce does not count
as a repudia-
tion, as regards the
necessity for an intermediate husband.
According to those authorities who
consider divorce as really re-
pudiation,
the word “ dissolve ” should be considered
as an implicit
term for describing
divorce, fbut the word “ ransom ” is,
according to
them, the equivalent of
divorce ; while the jurist who likens
it to a
dissolution of marriage for
redhibitory defects is of a contrary opinion.
According to the former theory, that
divorce is repudiation, ftlie wife
owes
the husband as compensation the amount
of the proportional
dower, unless there
is some special stipulation as to
the amount. This
theory considers also
that the divorce is valid even
though pronounced
in terms that imply
repudiation, provided that such is the
intention ;
and even though use is
made of some other language than
Arabic. It
is considered that a divorce
is implied where the husband says, “ I
sell
you yourself for so much,” and
the woman answers, “ I buy myself.”
Where the husband begins by
making the offer, and adds the amount
of compensation, e.g . by saying, “ I want
to repudiate you,” or “ I
want to
divorce you for so much,” it is
in any case a conditional offer
to
effect a bilateral agreement, even according
to the theory that con-
siders divorce
equivalent to repudiation. Consequently the
husband
can always withdraw his words,
so long as the wife has not declared
her acceptance of the offer made
her. Moreover, the law requires that
in these circumstances acceptance must
be declared before any consider-
able
interval has elapsed from the time
of the offer. The acceptance
must
relate to the offer. Thus there is
no divorce where the husband
says, “ I
want to repudiate you for one
thousand pieces of money,” and
the
wife accepts, replying, “ It is agreed,
but for two thousand,” or
vice versa .
Nor is there any divorce where the
husband says, “ I wish
to repudiate you
throe times for one thousand pieces
of money,” and
the wife answers, “ I
only accept one for a third of that
amount.” But
where, on the other
hand, there is no essential difference
the divorce is
valid. Thus if the
husband says, “ I wish to repudiate you
three times
for a thousand pieces of
money,” and the wife answers, “ I accept
ono
repudiation for that sum,” he
has legally repudiated her thrice for the
amount declared. When it is not a
conditional offer of divorce that the
husband makes, but a conditional divorce
that he pronounces, saying
for example, “
when you give me,” or “ when you
have given me,” the
law allows no
retractation on his part. In this
case verbal acceptance
is not required
nor even immediate payment. The words “
if you give
me,” or “ when you
have given me,” bring about identical
legal conse-
quences, except that they
require payment to be made as soon
as possible.
If, instead of the
husband, it is the wife who has
taken the initiative
in asking to be
repudiated, and the husband has consented ;
this is a
bilateral contract of the
same nature as a piece of job work.
In this
case the wife may withdraw
her request at anytime before her husband
has granted it ; and he must
make up his mind as soon as
possible,
otherwise the offer is
considered as ipso facto withdrawn. A request
on the wife’s part “ to be
repudiated three times for one thousand
pieces
of money/’ granted by the
husband for one repudiation only, and for
a third of the amount, results in
the woman being only once repudiated.
A divorce, or a repudiation for
compensation, is never revocable,
unless
the parties have reserved this right ;
but such a reservation
ipso facto annuls
the stipulation as to the compensation.
Only one
authority considers, even where
there has been this reserve, that the
divorce has the effect of an
irrevocable repudiation, and maintains that
the wife owes proportional dower in
addition. When a wife, after
requesting to
be repudiated for a certain amount,
abjures Islam, and
does not retract
her error before the oiul of her
period of legal retire-
ment, she is
considered to have lost her status
as wife by the fact of
apostasy,
and owes nothing as compensation, whether
her husband
has or has not granted
her request, and whether the marriage
has or
has not been consummated. But
where the wife has returned to the
faith before the expiry of her
period of retirement ; she is considered
as repudiated for the sum offered ;
at least if the husband has in the
meanwhile granted her request. A divorce
is not rendered invalid
because offer
and acceptance are separated by some
unimportant
words.
فَصْلٌ [في الألفاط الملزمة للعوض وما يتبعها]
قَالَ:
أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ، وَعَلَيْك أَوْ وَلِي عَلَيْك كَذَا، وَلَمْ يَسْبِقْ طَلَبُهَا
بِمَالٍ وَقَعَ رَجْعِيًّا قَبِلَتْ أَمْ لَا وَلَا مَالَ، فَإِنْ قَالَ أَرَدْت
مَا يُرَادُ بِطَلَّقْتُك بِكَذَا وَصَدَّقَتْهُ فَكَهُوَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ
سَبَقَ بَانَتْ بِالْمَذْكُورِ، وَإِنْ قَالَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ عَلَى أَنَّ لِي
عَلَيْك كَذَا فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ كَطَلَّقْتُكِ بِكَذَا، فَإِذَا قَبِلَتْ
بَانَتْ وَوَجَبَ الْمَالُ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ إنْ ضَمِنْت لِي أَلْفًا
فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ فَضَمِنَتْ فِي الْفَوْرِ بَانَتْ وَلَزِمَهَا الْأَلْفُ.
وَإِنْ
قَالَ مَتَى ضَمِنْت فَمَتَى ضَمِنَتْ طَلُقَتْ، وَإِنْ ضَمِنَتْ دُونَ الْأَلْفِ
لَمْ تَطْلُقْ، وَلَوْ ضَمِنَتْ أَلْفَيْنِ طَلُقَتْ، وَلَوْ قَالَ طَلِّقِي
نَفْسَك إنْ ضَمِنْت لِي أَلْفًا فَقَالَتْ: طَلَّقْتُ وَضَمِنْتُ أَوْ
عَكْسَهُ بَانَتْ بِأَلْفٍ، فَإِنْ اقْتَصَرَتْ عَلَى أَحَدِهِمَا فَلَا، وَإِذَا
عَلَّقَ بِإِعْطَاءِ مَالٍ فَوَضَعَتْهُ بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ طَلُقَتْ، وَالْأَصَحُّ
دُخُولُهُ فِي مِلْكِهِ، وَإِنْ قَالَ إنْ أَقْبَضْتِنِي فَقِيلَ كَالْإِعْطَاءِ،
وَالْأَصَحُّ كَسَائِرِ التَّعْلِيقِ فَلَا يَمْلِكُهُ، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ
لِلْإِقْبَاضِ مَجْلِسٌ.
قُلْت: وَيَقَعُ رَجْعِيًّا،
وَيُشْتَرَطُ لِتَحَقُّقِ الصِّفَةِ أَخْذٌ بِيَدِهِ مِنْهَا، وَلَوْ مُكْرَهَةً،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ، وَلَوْ عَلَّقَ بِإِعْطَاءِ عَبْدٍ وَوَصَفَهُ بِصِفَةِ
سَلَمٍ فَأَعْطَتْهُ لَا بِالصِّفَةِ لَمْ تَطْلُقْ أَوْ بِهَا مَعِيبًا فَلَهُ
رَدُّهُ وَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ قِيمَتُهُ سَلِيمًا.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ عَبْدًا طَلُقَتْ بِعَبْدٍ إلَّا مَغْصُوبًا فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَهُ مَهْرُ
مِثْلٍ.
وَلَوْ مَلَكَ طَلْقَةً فَقَطْ فَقَالَتْ طَلِّقْنِي
ثَلَاثًا بِأَلْفٍ فَطَلَّقَ الطَّلْقَةَ فَلَهُ أَلْفٌ، وَقِيلَ ثُلُثُهُ،
وَقِيلَ إنْ عَلِمَتْ الْحَالَ فَأَلْفٌ وَإِلَّا فَثُلُثُهُ.
وَلَوْ
طَلَبَتْ طَلْقَةً بِأَلْفٍ فَطَلَّقَ بِمِائَةٍ وَقَعَ بِمِائَةٍ، وَقِيلَ
بِأَلْفٍ، وَقِيلَ لَا تَقَعُ، وَلَوْ قَالَتْ طَلِّقْنِي غَدًا بِأَلْفٍ
فَطَلَّقَ غَدًا أَوْ قَبْلَهُ بَانَتْ بِمَهْرِ مِثْلٍ، وَقِيلَ فِي قَوْلٍ
بِالْمُسَمَّى.
وَإِنْ قَالَ: إذَا دَخَلْت الدَّارَ فَأَنْتِ
طَالِقٌ بِأَلْفٍ فَقَبِلَتْ وَدَخَلْت طَلُقَتْ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ بِالْمُسَمَّى،
وَفِي وَجْهٍ، أَوْ قَوْلٍ بِمَهْرِ الْمِثْلِ.
وَيَصِحُّ
اخْتِلَاعُ أَجْنَبِيٍّ، وَإِنْ كَرِهَتْ الزَّوْجَةُ وَهُوَ كَاخْتِلَاعِهَا
لَفْظًا وَحُكْمًا.
وَلِوَكِيلِهَا أَنْ يَخْتَلِعَ لَهُ،
وَلِلْأَجْنَبِيِّ تَوْكِيلُهَا فَتَتَخَيَّرُ هِيَ، وَلَوْ اخْتَلَعَ رَجُلٌ
وَصَرَّحَ بِوَكَالَتِهَا كَاذِبًا لَمْ تَطْلُقْ وَأَبُوهَا كَأَجْنَبِيٍّ
فَيَخْتَلِعُ بِمَالِهِ، فَإِنْ اخْتَلَعَ بِمَالِهَا وَصَرَّحَ بِوَكَالَةٍ أَوْ
وِلَايَةٍ لَمْ تَطْلُقْ، أَوْ بِاسْتِقْلَالٍ فَخُلْعٌ بِمَغْصُوبٍ.
Section
The following words on
the part of a husband : “ You are
repudiated
and you owe,” or “ you
owe me so much,” constitute merely a
revocable
repudiation, unless the wife has
herself previously asked to be repu-
diated and offered the same amount
as compensation. It does not even
matter whether the wife accepts the
offer made to her by the husband,
for in any case the phrase
does not imply that the money is
due by her
as compensation, f Only
where the husband afterwards declares that
he meant delinitely to repudiate his
wife for the amount mentioned,
and
she accepts this subsequent explanation,
must she be considcied
as divorced.
Where the wife has begun by asking
for repudiation for a
compensation, the
above phrase is considered as a favourable
reply to
her request, and she is
consequently divorced. According to our school
the phrase, “You are repudiated on
condition that you owe me so much,”
is equivalent to the phrase, “You
are repudiated for so much ; ” that is
to say that the wife, if she
consents, is divorced, and owes the
promised
amount. It is the same
where the husband says, “ You will
be repu-
diated if you will guarantee
me a thousand pieces of money,” provided
that the wife gives an affirmative
reply as soon as possible. The phrase,
“ When you guarantee me one thousand
pieces of money you are re-
pudiated,”
does not involve repudiation if the
wife only guarantees
some smaller sum,
but it does if she guarantees the
amount mentioned
or double that amount.
Similarly the following words pronounced
by a husband against his wife, “ If
you guarantee me 'one thousand
pieces of
money you may yourself pronounce your
repudiation,” have
the effect of divorcing
her for one thousand pieces of money
if she
definitely accepts the entire
proposal ; but not if she merely guarantees
the amount without divorcing herself,
or repudiates herself without
guaranteeing
the amount. A repudiation pronounced on
condition
that the woman transfers some
amount of money has effect as soon
as
the stipulated amount has been
delivered to the husband, fwlio becomes
its owner from that moment. A
stipulation to deliver is equivalent,
according to some, to a stipulation
to transfer ; but according to the
greater
number of authorities it is merely
an ordinary suspensive con-
dition. It is
understood that in this case possession
need not be taken
immediately.
[By
adding a condition to “ deliver ” instead
of one to “ transfer ”
the
compensation, a mere revocable repudiation is
pronounced ; and
the condition is
fulfilled by the fact of the husband
taking possession
of the object, even
as the result of some violence.]
A
condition that a wife shall give a slave
possessing certain specified
qualities, as
in a contract of salam, is not
fulfilled if the slave given has
not
all tho qualities stipulated, and the
woman is consequently not
considered to
be repudiated ; but if the slave,
though possessed of the
stipulated
qualities, is tainted with redhibitory
defects, the condition
is fulfilled and
the repudiation consummated ; but without
prejudice
to the husband’s right to
return the slave on account of his
defects,
and to claim as compensation
the amount of the proportional dower.
According to one authority, however,
he can claim in these circumstances
only the value of the slave,
had he had no defects. A condition
to give
“ a slave,” without further
description, is fulfilled by the transfer
of
any slave, whatever his qualities
may be ; provided it is not a usurped
slave, for in that case the
husband can claim as compensation the
amount
of the proportional dower.
Where a woman asks her husband
to repudiate her three times, for
a
thousand pieces of money, while the
husband has only one repudiation
left
to pronounce, he has a right to
demand the entire sum when pro-
nouncing
this repudiation. Others, however, maintain
that only a
third of the amount
is due to him under these
circumstances ; while
still others are of
opinion that he can demand the
thousand pieces if
the woman acted
knowingly, but only a third if she
made a mistake
as to the number of
repudiations her husband could still pronounce.
If the wife asks for a repudiation
for a thousand pieces of money, and
the husband replies by repudiating
her for a hundred, she owes him only
the amount declared by him. Others
maintain that in this case she
owes
him a thousand ; while still others do
not admit any obligation,
as there
has been no consent. A request to be
repudiated “ to-morrow
for a thousand pieces
of money,” results in the woman
being obliged
to pay proportional dower,
if the husband repudiates her either
on the
next day or earlier without
adding that she shall be free from
the next
day. According to one
authority, however, there are jurists that
do not
allow this subtle interpretation,
but consider the wife liable for the
amount
mentioned if the repudiation takes
place, even though it maybe before
the day indicated by her. In
any case this repudiation is irrevocable.
ffWhero a husband says to his
wife, “When you enter the house
you
are repudiated for a thousand pieces of
money,” she is really re-
pudiated if
she accepts the proposal and enters
the house, and she owes
her husband
the amount mentioned. A single authority
maintains
that in this case she owes
proportional dower, and others raise this
opinion
to the rank of a dogma.
A
third party may lawfully ask for the
divorce of another’s wife,
even against
her will. To this proposal must be
applied all we have
said about the
expressions used inordinary divorce and
their consequences
when used by or
to the wife herself. A person appointed
by the wife
as her agent to
ask for a divorce may do so either
as her agent or upon
his own
responsibility. A third party may even
appoint the wife herself
an agent to
ask for a divorce in the interests
of that third party ; but
the wife
may of course refuse to act as
such agent. If a third party
asks
for a woman’s divorce and falsely states
that the wife has appointed
such
third party her agent, the husband’s
consent has no legal effect.
A father
may ask for his daughter’s divorce
like any other person ;
that is
to say that when acting in his
own name ho is personally re-
sponsible
for the compensation ; but when acting
on his daughter’s
account, either in
his quality as guardian, or falsely
alleging an appoint-
ment by her, there
is no divorce. A father who of his
own accord
promises compensation from his
daughter’s property is as little justified
as if lie had promised his
son-in-law a usurped object.
فصل [في الاختلاف في الخلع أو في عوضه]
ادَّعَتْ خُلْعًا
فَأَنْكَرَهُ صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَإِنْ قَالَ طَلَّقْتُك بِكَذَا فَقَالَتْ
مَجَّانًا بَانَتْ وَلَا عِوَضَ وَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَا فِي جِنْسِ عِوَضِهِ، أَوْ
قَدْرِهِ وَلَا بَيِّنَةَ تَحَالَفَا وَوَجَبَ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَلَوْ خَالَعَ
بِأَلْفٍ وَنَوَيَا نَوْعًا لَزِمَ، وَقِيلَ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَلَوْ قَالَ
أَرَدْنَا دَنَانِيرَ فَقَالَتْ بَلْ دَرَاهِمَ أَوْ فُلُوسًا تَحَالَفَا عَلَى
الْأَوَّلِ، وَوَجَبَ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ بِلَا تَحَالُفٍ فِي الثَّانِي.
وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
Section
Where the husband
denies the fact of a divorce asserted
by his wife,
there is a presumption
in his favour on his taking an
oath. Where,
on the other hand, the
husband maintains that he has repudiated
his wife
for so much, while she
asserts that she has been simply
repudiated
without compensation, the law
presumes an irrevocable repudiation
without
compensation. In proceedings as to the
nature or amount of
the compensation
the court should, in default of
proof, administer
an oath to the
litigants ; when, if both take it,
the wife owes proportional
dower.
If
a divorce has been obtained for a
compensation of “ a thousand ”
without
specifying what, but the parties are
in agreement as to the
nature of
the things of which this quantity
has been stipulated, the wife
owes
her husband a thousand things of this
kind. Some authorities,
however, maintain
that a stipulation of “a thousand ”
without adding
what, is inadmissible in a
court of law, and that the woman
always
owes in such a case proportional
dower. The same controversy exists
as
to the case where one of the
parties maintains that the stipulation
of
“ a thousand ” implies “ dinars,” and the
other that it means
“ drahms ” or
copper money. According to the first
theory the court
should administer an
oath to both parties ; but according
to those
authorities who do not
admit the validity of such a vague
stipulation,
the wife owes proportional
dower when she does not deny the
husband’s
claim altogether, without its
being necessary to administer an oath
to the parties.
كتاب الطَّلَاقِ
BOOK .— REPUDIATION
يُشْتَرَطُ لِنُفُوذِهِ التَّكْلِيفُ إلَّا السَّكْرَانَ.
وَيَقَعُ
بِصَرِيحِهِ بِلَا نِيَّةٍ، وَبِكِنَايَةٍ بِنِيَّةٍ، فَصَرِيحُهُ الطَّلَاقُ
وَكَذَا الْفِرَاقُ وَالسَّرَاحُ عَلَى الْمَشْهُورِ كَطَلَّقْتُك وَأَنْتِ
طَالِقٌ وَمُطَلَّقَةٌ وَيَا طَالِقُ، لَا أَنْتِ طَلَاقٌ وَالطَّلَاقُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَتَرْجَمَةُ الطَّلَاقِ بِالْعَجَمِيَّةِ صَرِيحٌ
عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ وَأَطْلَقْتُك وَأَنْتِ مُطْلَقَةٌ كِنَايَةٌ، وَلَوْ
اشْتَهَرَ لَفْظٌ لِلطَّلَاقِ كَالْحَلَالِ أَوْ حَلَالُ اللَّهِ عَلَيَّ حَرَامٌ
فَصَرِيحٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْت: الْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ كِنَايَةٌ،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَكِنَايَتُهُ كَأَنْتِ خَلِيَّةٌ بَرِيَّةٌ
بَتَّةً بَتْلَةٌ بَائِنٌ اعْتَدِّي اسْتَبْرِئِي رَحِمَك الْحَقِي بِأَهْلِك،
حَبْلُك عَلَى غَارِبِك، لَا أَنْدَهُ سَرْبَكِ، اُعْزُبِي اُغْرُبِي دَعِينِي
وَدِّعِينِي وَنَحْوِهَا، وَالْإِعْتَاقُ كِنَايَةُ طَلَاقٍ وَعَكْسُهُ.
وَلَيْسَ
الطَّلَاقُ كِنَايَةَ ظِهَارٍ وَعَكْسُهُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنْتِ
عَلَيَّ حَرَامٌ أَوْ حَرَّمْتُك وَنَوَى طَلَاقًا أَوْ ظِهَارًا حَصَلَ، أَوْ
نَوَاهُمَا، تَخَيَّرَ وَثَبَتَ مَا اخْتَارَهُ، وَقِيلَ طَلَاقٌ، وَقِيلَ
ظِهَارٌ، أَوْ تَحْرِيمَ عَيْنِهَا لَمْ تَحْرُمْ، وَعَلَيْهِ كَفَّارَةُ
يَمِينٍ، وَكَذَا إنْ لَمْ تَكُنْ نِيَّةٌ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَالثَّانِي لَغْوٌ
وَإِنْ قَالَهُ لِأَمَتِهِ وَنَوَى عِتْقًا ثَبَتَ، أَوْ تَحْرِيمَ عَيْنِهَا
أَوْ لَا نِيَّةَ فَكَالزَّوْجَةِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ هَذَا الثَّوْبُ
أَوْ الطَّعَامُ أَوْ الْعَبْدُ حَرَامٌ عَلَيَّ فَلَغْوٌ.
وَشَرْطُ
نِيَّةِ الْكِنَايَةِ اقْتِرَانُهَا بِكُلِّ اللَّفْظِ، وَقِيلَ يَكْفِي
بِأَوَّلِهِ.
وَإِشَارَةُ نَاطِقٍ بِطَلَاقٍ لَغْوٌ، وَقِيلَ
كِنَايَةٌ، وَيُعْتَدُّ بِإِشَارَةِ أَخْرَسَ فِي الْعُقُودِ وَالْحُلُولِ،
فَإِنْ فَهِمَ طَلَاقَهُ بِهَا كُلُّ أَحَدٍ فَصَرِيحَةٌ، وَإِنْ اخْتَصَّ
بِفَهْمِهِ فَطِنُونَ فَكِنَايَةٌ.
لَوْ كَتَبَ نَاطِقٌ طَلَاقًا،
وَلَمْ يَنْوِهِ فَلَغْوٌ، وَإِنْ نَوَاهُ فَالْأَظْهَرُ وُقُوعُهُ.
فَإِنْ
كَتَبَ إذَا بَلَغَك كِتَابِي فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ فَإِنَّمَا تَطْلُقُ
بِبُلُوغِهِ.
وَإِنْ كَتَبَ إذَا قَرَأْت كِتَابِي وَهِيَ قَارِئَةٌ
وَإِنْ لَمْ تَكُنْ قَارِئَةً فَقُرِئَ عَلَيْهَا فَقَرَأَتْهُ طَلُقَتْ وَإِنْ
قُرِئَ عَلَيْهَا فَلَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، طَلُقَتْ.
BOOK .— REPUDIATION
Section
In
order that a repudiation should bo valid
the law requires that the
husband
should be a sane adult Moslem. A
repudiation may be pro-
nounced in a state
of drunkenness. A repudiation is valid,
even where
pronounced unintentionally, if
the husband uses explicit terms ; but
if he uses implicit terms, he
must really intend to repudiate his wife.
By explicit terms are
meant, repudiation,”
separation,” dis-
missal,” repudiate
you,” You are repudiated,”
You are dis-
charged,” repudiated
woman ! ” ; fbut where the mere
words you ”
and
repudiation,” with or without the article,
are pronounced without
indicating the
relation between them, such a meaningless
exclamation
has no legal effect. Our
school admits that repudiation may be ex-
plicitly pronounced in any other language
as well as in Arabic, provided
the
expressions employed correspond to the
terms just mentioned. The
following
expressions are considered to be implicit
terms : render
you your liberty,”
or You are free.” fLocal
expressions specially
used to denote
repudiation, even though not actually mentioning
repudiation itself, are considered by
law as explicit. Thus some persons
say, the woman I was permitted
to enjoy,” or the woman God
per-
mitted me to enjoy will henceforth
be to me a person with whom con-
nection is forbidden.”
[fOn the
contrary these words should be considered
as implicit.]
As implicit terms are
also considered the following : You
are hence-
forth isolated,” free,”
“separated,” cut off,”
irrevocably re-
pudiated,” You must
observe on my account a period of
legal retire-
ment,” or period of
purification,” Go back to your
family,” Your
rope is on your
withers,” have no further need
of you,” Leave me,”
Go
away,” Leave me alone,”
Bid me good-bye,” etc. Enfranchise-
ment
is an implicit manner of announcing
repudiation ; and vice versa ,
repudiation
implies enfranchisement ; but repudiation does
not imply
injurious comparison, nor vice
versa . Such phrases as : Connection
with you is henceforth forbidden
me,” or declare connection with
you to be forbidden me,” indicate
either a repudiation or an injurious
comparison, according to the husband’s
intention ; and if he had both
in
view he may afterwards declare which
of the two he intends to effect.
According to come authorities, however,
these phrases always imply
a repudiation,
while according to others they always
imply an injurious
comparison. The phrase,
“ Your eye/ or any other part of
the body,
“ is forbidden me, does
not render cohabitation with the woman
positively prohibited to her husband,
but the latter owes the expiation
prescribed for perjury, *even though
he may have had no intention of
forbidding himself cohabitation with her.
However, according to
another doctrine,
such phrases should be considered as
not said. Such
phrases as we have
mentioned, if pronounced against a slave,
have the
effect of enfranchising her,
if such is the master’s intention ;
but if he
intended thus to forbid
himself the right of cohabiting with
her as regards
the part of the
body referred to, or if he had
no particular intention
when using these
phrases, they have the same effect
as regards the
slave as in the
case of the wife. If, in
repudiation, one uses implicit
terms, the
intention must accompany the whole
sentence ; or, according
to some
authorities, the first word.
A person
who has the use of his tongue
may not indicate repudiation
by signs ;
though some authorities admit signs in
these circumstances
as equivalent to
implicit terms. As to a mute it is
agreed that he may
legally form and
dissolve all kinds of obligations by
means of signs ;
and, where every
one understands what he means, signs
constitute on
his part an explicit
method of repudiation. Where, on the
other hand,
persons of highly developed
intelligence can alone understand the signs,
they are considered as an implicit
manner of communicating the mute’s
ideas.
A husband who, though having the use
of his tongue, mites
to his wife
that she is repudiated, obtains the
desired effect. But if
he has so
mitten without serious intention the
marriage remains valid.
If a husband mites
to his wife : “ You are repudiated
from the time
this letter reaches
you,” the repudiation is effected by
the receipt of
the letter ; but if
he uses the phrase, from the
time you have read my
letter,” the
result depends upon whether the woman
can read. If she
can, she is
repudiated only from the moment she
has read it herself,
fnot if another
person reads it to her ; if she
cannot and if the letter is
read
to her, this has the same effect
as if she had read it herself.
فصل [في تفويض الطلاق إليها]
لَهُ تَفْوِيضُ طَلَاقِهَا
إلَيْهَا، وَهُوَ تَمْلِيكٌ، فِي الْجَدِيدِ فَيُشْتَرَطُ لِوُقُوعِهِ
تَطْلِيقُهَا عَلَى الْفَوْرِ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ طَلِّقِي بِأَلْفٍ
فَطَلَّقَتْ بَانَتْ وَلَزِمَهَا أَلْفٌ، وَقِيلَ قَوْلٌ تَوْكِيلٌ فَلَا
يُشْتَرَطُ فَوْرٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَفِي اشْتِرَاطِ قَبُولِهَا خِلَافُ
الْوَكِيلِ، وَعَلَى الْقَوْلَيْنِ لَهُ الرُّجُوعُ قَبْلَ تَطْلِيقِهَا، وَلَوْ
قَالَ: إذَا جَاءَ رَمَضَانُ فَطَلِّقِي لَغَا عَلَى التَّمْلِيكِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ أَبِينِي نَفْسَك فَقَالَتْ أَبَنْت وَنَوَى وَقَعَ وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَلَوْ
قَالَ طَلِّقِي فَقَالَتْ أَبَنْت وَنَوَتْ، أَوْ أَبِينِي وَنَوَى فَقَالَتْ
طَلَّقْت وَقَعَ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ طَلِّقِي وَنَوَى ثَلَاثًا فَقَالَتْ
طَلَّقْت وَنَوَتْهُنَّ فَثَلَاثٌ وَإِلَّا فَوَاحِدَةٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ ثَلَاثًا فَوَحَّدَتْ أَوْ عَكْسَهُ فَوَاحِدَةٌ.
Section
A husband may lawfully
grant his wife the right to
pronounce her
own repudiation, a proceeding
which Shafii in his second period likened
to a transfer of property. The law
requires that a wife so authorised
should
exercise the right soon afterwards. Thus
one may say to one’s
wife : “ You
may yourself pronounce your repudiation
for one thousand
pieces of money,”
and after this she is irrevocably
repudiated upon pro-
nouncing the repudiation,
and also owes the sum mentioned. One
jurist, however, compares this proceeding
to an appointment as agent
by the
husband, fand consequently does not insist
on the wife’s pro-
nouncing the
repudiation soon afterwards. Admitting this
principle
the difficulty arises whether
the husband’s offer must be formally
accepted
by the woman to enable her
to use her right of pronouncing her
own re-
pudiation, a controversy we have
discussed when speaking of the agent.
However, whatever may be the nature
of the proceeding, all are agreed
that the husband may retract his
words, so long as the wife is
not really
repudiated. When, on the
other hand, the proceeding is admitted to
be merely a transfer of property,
the phrase, “ When wo are in the
month of Ramadan you may pronounce
your repudiation,” though
used by some,
is devoid of meaning and consequently
void.
Repudiation takes place also
in the following cases : —
.
If the husband says to the wife, “
Do the act that obliges me
henceforth to abstain from you ; ”
to which she replies, “ I do it ; ” at
any rate where the intention on
both sides was to imply a repudiation,
but not otherwise.
. If the
husband uses an explicit phrase, and
the vTife replies
implicitly, intending to
indicate repudiation.
. If the
husband uses an implicit phrase, intending
to indicate
repudiation, and the woman
replies explicitly.
In virtue of
these principles three repudiations are
admitted, if
such is the intention
on both sides, even where neither
the husband
on granting his wife the
right to repudiate herself, nor the
wife on
accepting the offer, may
have actually spoken of “ three.” On the
other hand, there is only one
repudiation —
. f Where neither of
the parties speaks of “ three,” and
only one
intends to accomplish a
triple-repudiation ; and
. Where one
of the parties uses the number “
three,” but the other
speaks of only
one repudiation.
فصل [في بعض شروط الصيغة والمطلق]
مَرَّ بِلِسَانِ نَائِمٍ
طَلَاقٌ لَغَا، وَلَوْ سَبَقَ لِسَانٌ بِطَلَاقٍ بِلَا قَصْدٍ لَغَا، وَلَا
يُصَدَّقُ ظَاهِرًا إلَّا بِقَرِينَةٍ.
وَلَوْ كَانَ اسْمُهَا
طَالِقًا فَقَالَ يَا طَالِقُ وَقَصَدَ النِّدَاءَ لَمْ تَطْلُقْ، وَكَذَا إنْ
أَطْلَقَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ؛ وَإِنْ كَانَ اسْمُهَا طَارِقًا أَوْ طَالِبًا فَقَالَ
يَا طَالِقُ وَقَالَ أَرَدْت النِّدَاءَ فَالْتَفَّ الْحَرْفُ صُدِّقَ.
وَلَوْ
خَاطَبَهَا بِطَلَاقٍ هَازِلاً أَوْ لَاعِبًا أَوْ وَهُوَ يَظُنُّهَا
أَجْنَبِيَّةً بِأَنْ كَانَتْ فِي ظُلْمَةٍ أَوْ أَنْكَحَهَا لَهُ وَلِيُّهُ أَوْ
وَكِيلُهُ وَلَمْ يَعْلَمْ وَقَعَ.
وَلَوْ لَفَظَ أَعْجَمِيٌّ بِهِ
بِالْعَرَبِيَّةِ وَلَمْ يَعْرِفْ مَعْنَاهُ لَمْ يَقَعْ، وَقِيلَ إنْ نَوَى
مَعْنَاهَا وَقَعَ.
وَلَا يَقَعُ طَلَاقُ مُكْرَهٍ، فَإِنْ ظَهَرَتْ
قَرِينَةُ اخْتِيَارٍ بِأَنْ أُكْرِهَ عَلَى ثَلَاثٍ، فَوَحَّدَ، أَوْ صَرِيحٍ
أَوْ تَعْلِيقٍ فَكَنَّى أَوْ نَجَّزَ أَوْ عَلَى طَلَّقْتُ فَسَرَّحَ أَوْ
بِالْعُكُوسِ وَقَعَ، وَشَرْطُ الْإِكْرَاهِ قُدْرَةُ الْمُكْرِهِ عَلَى
تَحْقِيقِ مَا هَدَّدَ بِهِ بِوِلَايَةٍ أَوْ تَغَلُّبٍ، وَعَجْزُ الْمُكْرَهِ
عَنْ دَفْعِهِ بِهَرَبٍ وَغَيْرِهِ وَظَنِّهِ أَنَّهُ إنْ امْتَنَعَ حَقَّقَهُ،
وَيَحْصُلُ بِتَخْوِيفٍ بِضَرْبٍ شَدِيدٍ أَوْ حَبْسٍ أَوْ إتْلَافِ مَالٍ
وَنَحْوِهَا، وَقِيلَ يُشْتَرَطُ قَتْلٌ، وَقِيلَ قَتْلٌ أَوْ قَطْعٌ أَوْ ضَرْبٌ
مَخُوفٌ.
وَلَا تُشْتَرَطُ التَّوْرِيَةُ بِأَنْ يَنْوِيَ
غَيْرَهَا، وَقِيلَ إنْ تَرَكَهَا بِلَا عُذْرٍ وَقَعَ.
وَمَنْ
أَثِمَ بِمُزِيلِ عَقْلِهِ مِنْ شَرَابٍ أَوْ دَوَاءٍ نَفَذَ طَلَاقُهُ
وَتَصَرُّفُهُ لَهُ وَعَلَيْهِ قَوْلاً وَفِعْلاً عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَفِي
قَوْلٍ لَا، وَقِيلَ عَلَيْهِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ رُبْعُك أَوْ بَعْضُك
أَوْ جُزْؤُك أَوْ كَبِدُكِ أَوْ شَعْرُك أَوْ ظُفْرُك طَالِقٌ وَقَعَ، وَكَذَا
دَمُك عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، لَا فَضْلَةٌ كَرِيقٍ وَعَرَقٍ، وَكَذَا مَنِيٌّ
وَلَبَنٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ قَالَ لِمَقْطُوعَةِ يَمِينٍ يَمِينُك طَالِقٌ
لَمْ يَقَعْ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنَا مِنْك طَالِقٌ
وَنَوَى تَطْلِيقَهَا طَلُقَتْ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْوِ طَلَاقًا فَلَا، وَكَذَا إنْ
لَمْ يَنْوِ إضَافَتَهُ إلَيْهَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنَا مِنْك
بَائِنٌ اُشْتُرِطَ نِيَّةُ الطَّلَاقِ، وَفِي الْإِضَافَةِ الْوَجْهَانِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ اسْتَبْرِئِي رَحِمِي مِنْك فَلَغْوٌ، وَقِيلَ إنْ نَوَى طَلَاقَهَا
وَقَعَ.
Section
Repudiation pronounced in a
dream is void ; and it is the same
with regard to a repudiation pronounced
by a husband by mistake, with
no
definite intention. The words used should
always be interpreted
in accordance with
the succession of ideas they represent.
Thus a
woman whose name is Talik
is not repudiated by the mere
words
Talik, if the intention
is to call her, for where there
is no special intention
to call her.
Even in the case of a woman of
the name Tarik or Talib
the law
admits a presumption in favour of her
husband who says to her
Talik , if
he declares afterwards that he only
meant to call her, but
made a
mistake in the letter. This, however,
is without prejudice to
the fact
that a repudiation pronounced by way of
banter or jest carries
all the legal
consequences of a real repudiation ; as
does also a repudiation
pronounced against a
woman erroneously supposed not to be one’s
wife, either because her features
cannot be distinguished in the obscurity,
or because the husband does not
yet know her, the marriage having been
concluded by his tutor or agent. A
stranger who pronounces a repudia-
tion in
Arabic without understanding the meaning
of his words is not
considered to
have repudiated his wife ; though,
according to some
authorities, this
repudiation is valid, if the husband’s
intention is to
repudiate, even though
he may not understand every word he
uses.
A repudiation extorted by violence
has no legal effect, unless it duly
appears that the husband already had
the intention of repudiating his
wife,
e.g. if after being constrained to
pronounce a triple repudiation,
he reduces
it to a single one ; or if after
being constrained to pronounce
it
explicitly or conditionally, he pronounces
it implicitly or uncon-
ditionally ; or
lastly if after having been forced
to say, “ I repudiate
you,” he says, “ I
dismiss you,” or vice versa. By “
violence ” in a
legal sense is meant
the power to cause a person the ill
with which one
has threatened him,
whether such power consists in authority
or legal
force, provided the person
in question cannot escape and really
believes
the threat will be carried
out if he does not do what is
demanded. Thus
it is considered “ violence
” to threaten any one with serious blows,
imprisonment, loss of property, etc. ;
though, according to some
authorities, a
menace, to be a cause of nullity,
must relate to a person’s
life, or
to the loss of a limb, or to
blows that would endanger life.
Violence
is a cause of absolute nullity, even
if the person against whom
it is
exercised has made no mental reservation
upon obeying. Only
a few authorities
assert that a person neglecting without
valid excuse
to make a mental reservation,
when obeying violence, cannot claim
nullity. By “ mental reservation ” is
meant, e.g . the act of thinking
of
another person when repudiating one’s own
wife under pressure of
a menace.
When one has temporarily lost
one’s reason through liquor or
medicine,
one is none the less capable of
pronouncing repudiation or
disposing of
one’s property in general ; and, according
to our school,
one is none the
less responsible for one’s words and
actions. Only one
of our jurists
denies all consequence to the words
or actions of a drunken
man ; while
several admit his responsibility, but
maintain that he can
never derive
any advantage from such a condition.
Repudiation is valid where reference
is made to “ A quarter of you,”
“ A
part of you,” “ One of your limbs,”
“ Your liver,” “ One of your
hairs,”
or “ One of your nails,” as being
repudiated. According to our
school it
is the same where one says, “ Your
blood is repudiated ; ” but
not if
one speaks of that which comes from
the human body, as saliva,
sweat,
sperm, or milk.
Our school does
not accept a repudiation where the husband
says
to his wife whose right hand
has been amputated, “ Your right hand is
repudiated.” The phrase, “ I am repudiated
by you,” spoken by the
husband,
implies a repudiation of his wife if
such was his intention ;
but if
by this obscure phrase he did not
mean to indicate repudiation,
for even
if his intention to repudiate did
not specially refer to his wife,
a
repudiation does not take place. Intention
to repudiate is also
rigorously necessary
where one says to one’s wife, “ I am
irrevocably
repudiated by you ; ” but
authorities are not agreed as to
whether these
words must refer to
some particular woman. Finally the phrase,
“ I
am about to observe a period of
purification,” spoken by the husband
is
senseless and consequently void ; though a
few authorities consider
it sufficient to
repudiate one’s wife if such was
one’s intention.
فَصْلٌ [في بيان محل الطلاق والولاية عليه]
خِطَابُ
الْأَجْنَبِيَّةِ بِطَلَاقٍ وَتَعْلِيقُهُ بِنِكَاحٍ وَغَيْرِهِ لَغْوٌ.
والأصحُّ:
صِحَّةُ تَعْلِيقِ الْعَبْدِ ثَالِثَةً كَقَوْلِهِ: إنْ عَتَقْت أَوْ إنْ
دَخَلْت فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثَلَاثًا فَيَقَعْنَ إذَا عَتَقَ أَوْ دَخَلَتْ بَعْدَ
عِتْقِهِ.
وَيَلْحَقُ رَجْعِيَّةً لَا مُخْتَلِعَةً، وَلَوْ
عَلَّقَهُ بِدُخُولِ فَبَانَتْ ثُمَّ نَكَحَهَا ثُمَّ دَخَلَتْ لَمْ يَقَعْ إنْ
دَخَلَتْ فِي الْبَيْنُونَةِ، وَكَذَا إنْ لَمْ تَدْخُلْ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَفِي
ثَالِثٍ يَقَعُ إنْ بَانَتْ بِدُونِ ثَلَاثٍ.
وَلَوْ طَلَّقَ دُونَ
ثَلَاثٍ وَرَاجَعَ أَوْ جَدَّدَ وَلَوْ بَعْدَ زَوْجٍ عَادَتْ بِبَقِيَّةِ
الثَّلَاثِ وَإِنْ ثَلَّثَ عَادَتْ بِثَلَاثٍ.
وَلِلْعَبْدِ
طَلْقَتَانِ فَقَطْ، وَلِلْحُرِّ ثَلَاثٌ.
وَيَقَعُ فِي مَرَضِ
مَوْتِهِ، وَيَتَوَارَثَانِ فِي عِدَّةِ رَجْعِيٍّ لَا بَائِنٍ، وَفِي الْقَدِيمِ
تَرِثُهُ.
Section
A repudiation pronounced against a
woman to whom one is not
married
is void, even where intended to
apply to an eventual marriage,
f On
the other hand, a slave, though he
can only pronounce a repudiation
twice,
may all the same pronounce a third
to take effect upon his eventual
enfranchisement, or upon the woman
entering such and such a house
after
that event. In the first case the
effect depends upon the en-
franchisement,
and in the second upon both the
enfranchisement and
an entry into the
house mentioned. The reader, however,
should be
reminded that this conditional
repudiation affects only a wife who has
been revocably repudiated, and not
one who has been divorced in the
meanwhile. Similarly a condition upon
which a free man has based a
third
repudiation, e.g. that the woman enters
such and such a house,
is not
fulfilled where she is irrevocably
separated for some other reason
after
the second repudiation, and taken back
again by her former
husband, and
then enters the house mentioned. Under
these circum-
stances it matters little
whether she has *or has not
previously entered
the house when free.
Another theory, however, admits these precepts
only in case of irrevocable
separation by divorce or of dissolution in
consequence of redhibitory defects, but
not in case of irrevocable
separation
caused by a new repudiation thrice
repeated, occurring
after the second
repudiation.
A husband who repudiates his
wife once or twice, but takes her
back
during her period of legal
retirement, or marries her again after its
expiry, and even after an
intervening marriage with another husband,
must, if he repudiates her again,
take count of the former repudiations
when determining whether this last
one is or is not revocable. If, on
the other hand, the new marriage
has been effected after the woman has
been previously repudiated thrice, she
may again be three times repu-
diated
before the new marriage is irrevocably
dissolved.
A repudiation may lawfully be
pronounced upon a death-bed.
During a period
of legal retirement rendered necessary by
a revocable
repudiation, the parties mutually
retain their right of succession. This
is not so in the case of
an irrevocable repudiation ; though Shafii in
his first period admitted the wife’s
right, even in these circumstances.
فَصْلٌ [في تعدد الطلاق بنية العدد فيه أو ذكره وما يتعلق بذلك]
قَالَ:
طَلَّقْتُك أَوْ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَنَوَى عَدَدًا وَقَعَ، وَكَذَا
الْكِنَايَةُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَاحِدَةً وَنَوَى
عَدَدًا فَوَاحِدَةٌ، وَقِيلَ الْمَنْوِيُّ.
قُلْت: وَلَوْ قَالَ
أَنْتِ وَاحِدَةٌ وَنَوَى عَدَدًا فَالْمَنْوِيُّ، وَقِيلَ وَاحِدَةٌ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَوْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يَقُولَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثَلَاثًا
فَمَاتَتْ قَبْلَ تَمَامِ طَالِقٌ لَمْ يَقَعْ أَوْ بَعْدَهُ قَبْلَ ثَلَاثًا
فَثَلَاثٌ، وَقِيلَ وَاحِدَةٌ، وَقِيلَ لَا شَيْءَ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ:
أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَتَخَلَّلَ فَصْلٌ فَثَلَاثٌ،
وَإِلَّا فَإِنْ قَصَدَ تَأْكِيدًا فَوَاحِدَةٌ أَوْ اسْتِئْنَافًا فَثَلَاثٌ،
وَكَذَا إنْ أَطْلَقَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَإِنْ قَصَدَ بِالثَّانِيَةِ تَأْكِيدًا
وَبِالثَّالِثَةِ اسْتِئْنَافًا أَوْ عَكَسَ فَثِنْتَانِ أَوْ بِالثَّالِثَةِ
تَأْكِيدَ الْأُولَى فَثَلَاثٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ:
أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَطَالِقٌ وَطَالِقٌ صَحَّ قَصْدُ تَأْكِيدِ الثَّانِي
بِالثَّالِثِ، لَا الْأَوَّلِ بِالثَّانِي، وَهَذِهِ الصُّوَرُ فِي مَوْطُوءَةٍ،
فَلَوْ قَالَهُنَّ لِغَيْرِهَا فَطَلْقَةٌ بِكُلِّ حَالٍ، وَلَوْ قَالَ لِهَذِهِ
إنْ دَخَلْت الدَّارَ فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَطَالِقٌ فَدَخَلَتْ فَثِنْتَانِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ لِمَوْطُوءَةٍ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ طَلْقَةً
مَعَ أَوْ مَعَهَا طَلْقَةٌ فَثِنْتَانِ، وَكَذَا غَيْرُ مَوْطُوءَةٍ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ طَلْقَةً قَبْلَ طَلْقَةٍ أَوْ بَعْدَهَا
طَلْقَةٌ فَثِنْتَانِ فِي مَوْطُوءَةٍ، وَطَلْقَةٌ فِي غَيْرِهَا، وَلَوْ قَالَ
طَلْقَةً بَعْدَ طَلْقَةٍ أَوْ قَبْلَهَا طَلْقَةٌ فَكَذَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ طَلْقَةً فِي طَلْقَةٍ وَأَرَادَ مَعَ فَطَلْقَتَانِ أَوْ الظَّرْفَ أَوْ
الْحِسَابَ أَوْ أَطْلَقَ فَطَلْقَةٌ، وَلَوْ قَالَ نِصْفَ طَلْقَةٍ فِي نِصْفِ
طَلْقَةٍ فَطَلْقَةٌ بِكُلِّ حَالٍ، وَلَوْ قَالَ طَلْقَةً فِي طَلْقَتَيْنِ
وَقَصَدَ مَعِيَّةً فَثَلَاثٌ أَوْ ظَرْفًا فَوَاحِدَةٌ، أَوْ حِسَابًا
وَعَرَفَهُ فَثِنْتَانِ، وَإِنْ جَهِلَهُ وَقَصَدَ مَعْنَاهُ فَطَلْقَةٌ، وَقِيلَ
ثِنْتَانِ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْوِ شَيْئًا فَطَلْقَةٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ ثِنْتَانِ إنْ
عَرَفَ حِسَابًا.
وَلَوْ قَالَ بَعْضَ طَلْقَةٍ فَطَلْقَةٌ، أَوْ
نِصْفَيْ طَلْقَةٍ فَطَلْقَةٌ إلَّا أَنْ يُرِيدَ كُلَّ نِصْفٍ مِنْ طَلْقَةٍ،
وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ قَوْلَهُ نِصْفَ طَلْقَتَيْنِ طَلْقَةٌ، وَثَلَاثَةَ
أَنْصَافِ طَلْقَةٍ أَوْ نِصْفَ طَلْقَةٍ وَثُلُثَ طَلْقَةٍ طَلْقَتَانِ، وَلَوْ
قَالَ نِصْفَ وَثُلُثَ طَلْقَةٍ فَطَلْقَةٌ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ
لِأَرْبَعٍ أَوْقَعْت عَلَيْكُنَّ أَوْ بَيْنَكُنَّ طَلْقَةً أَوْ طَلْقَتَيْنِ
أَوْ ثَلَاثًا أَوْ أَرْبَعًا وَقَعَ عَلَى كُلٍّ طَلْقَةٌ، فَإِنْ قَصَدَ
تَوْزِيعَ كُلِّ طَلْقَةٍ عَلَيْهِنَّ وَقَعَ فِي ثِنْتَيْنِ ثِنْتَانِ، وَفِي
ثَلَاثٍ وَأَرْبَعٍ ثَلَاثٌ، فَإِنْ قَالَ أَرَدْتُ بِبَيْنَكُنَّ بَعْضَهُنَّ
لَمْ يُقْبَلْ ظَاهِرًا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ طَلَّقَهَا ثُمَّ
قَالَ لِلْأُخْرَى أَشْرَكْتُك مَعَهَا أَوْ أَنْتِ كَهِيَ، فَإِنْ نَوَى
طَلُقَتْ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَكَذَا لَوْ قَالَ آخَرُ ذَلِكَ لِامْرَأَتِهِ.
Section
The phrase, “ I repudiate
you,” or “ You are repudiated,” implies
as many repudiations as the husband
intends ; and similarly with
phrases indicating
repudiation in an implicit manner. On
the other
hand, no account is taken
of the number intended by the
husband if
he expressly says only
once ;c though some authorities prefer,
even in
such a case, to keep to
the intention and not to the letter.
[On the con-
trary the majority maintain
that in this case also the intention
must be
regarded ; those authorities that
would keep to the letter are in the
minority.]
Where a husband is upon
the point of saying, “ You are repudiated
thrice,” and the phrase is
interrupted by the sudden death of
the woman,
there is no repudiation
if death occurs before the termination
of the
word “ repudiated.” If she
dies between the words “ repudiated ”
and “ thrice ” three repudiations must
be admitted. Some authorities,
however,
admit in such a case only one
repudiation, others none. If a
husband
says, “ You are repudiated,” “ You are
repudiated,” “ You are
repudiated,” these
phrases equal three repudiations if
separated by an
interval. If, on the
contrary, they follow immediately upon
each other
they constitute : —
. A
single repudiation, if the second and
third phrases were merely
intended by
the husband to be reaffirmations of
the first ;
. Three repudiations,
if he intended to reiterate his
will, *or had no
definite intention
in the matter ;
. Two repudiations,
if ho intended the Second to
reaffirm the iirst,
and the third to
be a reiteration of his will, or
vice versa ; or
. f Three
repudiations, if the third phrase was a
reaffirmation of
the first, and the
second a reiteration of his will.
When saying, “ You are repudiated,
and repudiated, and repudiated,”
the third
“ repudiated ” may lawfully be used to
reaffirm the second,
but not so the
second to reaffirm the first. All
this as to reaffirmation
and reiteration
relates only to a woman whose marriage
has been
consummated ; for where these
phrases are pronounced against a wife
before cohabitation there is only
one repudiation. However, if one
says
to one’s wife before cohabitation, “ You
are repudiated and re-
pudiated, if you
enter into such a place,” the fact
of entering is enough
to cause her
to be twice repudiated ; and this is
also the consequence
of the phrase, “
You will undergo one repudiation then
another,” or
“ accompanied by another,” it
making no difference in this case whether
the marriage has been consummated
for not. The words “ a repudiation
followed by another,” or “ preceded
by another ” constitute two re-
pudiations
if the marriage lias been consummated,
and otherwise one ;
and the same
with the words “ a repudiation which
follows another,”
or “ which precedes
another.” If one says, “ a repudiation
upon a
repudiation,” it is necessary
to distinguish between the cases where
the preposition “ upon ” has been
employed () in a conjunctive sense,
()
to indicate time or place, () in
an arithmetical sense, or () without
any specially indicated function. In
the first case the phrase is admitted
to imply two repudiations, and in
the three others one. It must also
be observed that the words, “ The
half of a repudiation upon the half of
a repudiation,” imply in all cases a
single repudiation. The phrase, “ A
repudiation upon two repudiations ” admits
of the following explana-
tions : —
. It signifies three repudiations,
when “ upon” is used in a con-
junctive
sense.
. It signifies one, when “
upon ” is used to indicate time and
place.
. It signifies two, when “
upon ” is taken in an arithmetical sense,
i.c. knowingly so taken ; but only
one when “ upon ” is taken in an
arithmetical sense by a husband who
does not know how to count, even
if he intends to attribute to
the phrase its ordinary meaning. Some
authorities admit two repudiations in
this last case.
. It signifies
one only where the husband does not
intend to attribute
to the word
“upon” any special function; though one
authority
admits two in these
circumstances, at any rate if the
husband knows
how to count.
“ A
partial repudiation ” is equivalent to a
whole one ; and the same
is true
of the phrase, “ Two halves of a
repudiation,” unless the husband
adds that
the two halves are distinct repudiations,
for in that case
there are two
complete repudiations, by virtue of the
explanation of
“ a partial repudiation.” f
Tho half of two repudiations ” means
one ; three halves,” and
the half of one repudiation plus the
third
of another,” imply two ;
but the half plus the third
of a repudiation ”
constitutes one only.
If one says to one’s four wives, “ I
inllict upon
you,” or “ You can
share amongst you — a repudiation,” or “ two
repudiations,” or three,” or
four,” all are repudiated once. However,
whore one intends each of the
repudiations to be shared amongst the
women, all are twice repudiated by
two repudiations, and thrice by three
repudiations or four repudiations, fit
must, of course, be understood
that
one cannot afterwards declare that one
intended the women to
share amongst
them the fractions of repudiations
pronounced against
them, as such a
complication would be obviously inconsistent
with the
words themselves. Finally, if a
husband repudiates one of his wives
and then says to another,
want you to share the repudiation with
her,” or You are as
she,” they are both repudiated, otherwise
not.
The same rule applies also to a
case where one husband repudiates
his
wife, and another says to his,
You are as she.”
فَصْلٌ [في الاستثناء]
يَصِحُّ الِاسْتِثْنَاءُ بِشَرْطِ
اتِّصَالِهِ، وَلَا يَضُرُّ سَكْتَةُ تَنَفُّسٍ وَعِيٍّ.
قُلْت:
وَيُشْتَرَطُ أَنْ يَنْوِيَ الِاسْتِثْنَاءَ قَبْلَ فَرَاغِ الْيَمِينِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ وَيُشْتَرَطُ عَدَمُ اسْتِغْرَاقِهِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ: أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثَلَاثًا إلَّا ثِنْتَيْنِ وَوَاحِدَةً فَوَاحِدَةٌ،
وَقِيلَ ثَلَاثٌ، أَوْ اثْنَتَيْنِ وَوَاحِدَةً إلَّا وَاحِدَةً فَثَلَاثٌ،
وَقِيلَ ثِنْتَانِ وَهُوَ مِنْ نَفْيٍ إثْبَاتٌ وَعَكْسُهُ، فَلَوْ قَالَ
ثَلَاثًا إلَّا ثِنْتَيْنِ إلَّا طَلْقَةً فَثِنْتَانِ، أَوْ ثَلَاثًا إلَّا
ثَلَاثًا إلَّا اثْنَتَيْنِ فَثِنْتَانِ، وَقِيلَ ثَلَاثٌ، وَقِيلَ طَلْقَةٌ،
أَوْ خَمْسًا إلَّا ثَلَاثًا فَثِنْتَانِ، وَقِيلَ ثَلَاثٌ أَوْ ثَلَاثًا إلَّا
نِصْفَ طَلْقَةٍ فَثَلَاثٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ:
أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ إنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ أَوْ إنْ لَمْ يَشَأْ اللَّهُ وَقَصَدَ
التَّعْلِيقَ لَمْ يَقَعْ، وَكَذَا يَمْنَعُ انْعِقَادَ تَعْلِيقٍ وَعِتْقٍ
وَيَمِينٍ وَنَذْرٍ وَكُلِّ تَصَرُّفٍ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ يَا طَالِقُ
إنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ وَقَعَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
أَوْ قَالَ أَنْتِ
طَالِقٌ إلَّا أَنْ يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى فَلَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
Section G
A repudiation may be
pronounced under some reservation, provided
this reservation immediately follows the
repudiation, except where one
may stop
to take breath, or because one is a
stammerer, [fit is also
rigorously
necessary that there should be an
intention to make a reser-
vation before
the oath is finished, where the
repudiation is accompanied
by an oath.]
The law requires that a reservation should
not be of a
kind to render the
whole act illusory. Hence the
phrase, You are
repudiated thrice,
less twice plus once,” indicates at
least one repudia-
tion ; and according to
some authorities it indicates three. By
virtue
of tho same principle the
expression, Two repudiations, plus one
less
one,” indicates three repudiations,
or, according to some authorities,
two. A
reservation may consist either in the
negation of a positive
fact, or in
the affirmation of a negative. Consequently
the words,
Three, less two less
one,” indicate two ; Three, less
three less two,”
also two, or
according to some three, and according
to others one.
Five loss three,”
mean two, or according to some
jurists three ;
ff Three less tho
half of another,” mean three. A
repudiation pro-
nounced under tho
reservation, If it please God,”
or Wijh God’s
permission,” is
of no effect where a suspensive condition
is intended ;
and similarly a repudiation
may not be made dependent upon any
suspensive condition consisting in some
future fact announced under
iho same
reservation of “ If it please God,”
or “ By God’s permission.’
This rule
applies not only to repudiation, but
also to enfranchisement,
to an oath
or a vow, and in general to all
ways of disposing of one’s
property, f
On the other hand, the words,
repudiated woman ! If
it please God,”
must be considered effective ; for in
this case the re-
pudiation does not
depend upon the will of God by
way of condition ;
but the
words, You are repudiated, with
God’s permission,” constitute
an illegal
reservation.
فَصْلٌ [في الشك في الطلاق]
شَكَّ فِي طَلَاقٍ فَلَا، أَوْ
فِي عَدَدٍ فَالْأَقَلُّ، وَلَا يَخْفَى الْوَرَعُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ
إنْ كَانَ ذَا الطَّائِرُ غُرَابًا فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ، وَقَالَ آخَرُ إنْ لَمْ
يَكُنْهُ فَامْرَأَتِي طَالِقٌ وَجُهِلَ لَمْ يُحْكَمْ بِطَلَاقِ أَحَدٍ، فَإِنْ
قَالَهُمَا رَجُلٌ لِزَوْجَتَيْهِ طَلُقَتْ إحْدَاهُمَا وَلَزِمَهُ الْبَحْثُ
وَالْبَيَانُ، وَلَوْ طَلَّقَ إحْدَاهُمَا بِعَيْنِهَا ثُمَّ جَهِلَهَا وُقِفَ
حَتَّى يَذَّكَّرَ، وَلَا يُطَالَبُ بِبَيَانٍ إنْ صَدَّقَتَاهُ فِي
الْجَهْلِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ لَهَا وَلِأَجْنَبِيَّةٍ إحْدَاكُمَا
طَالِقٌ وَقَالَ قَصَدْت الْأَجْنَبِيَّةَ قُبِلَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ زَيْنَبُ طَالِقٌ، وَقَالَ قَصَدْتُ أَجْنَبِيَّةً فَلَا عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ،
وَلَوْ قَالَ لِزَوْجَتَيْهِ إحْدَاكُمَا طَالِقٌ وَقَصَدَ مُعَيَّنَةً طَلُقَتْ،
وَإِلَّا فَإِحْدَاهُمَا، وَيَلْزَمُهُ الْبَيَانُ فِي الْحَالَةِ الْأَوْلَى،
وَالتَّعْيِينُ فِي الثَّانِيَةِ، وَتُعْزَلَانِ عَنْهُ إلَى الْبَيَانِ أَوْ
التَّعْيِينِ، وَعَلَيْهِ الْبِدَارُ بِهِمَا، وَنَفَقَتُهُمَا فِي
الْحَالِ.
وَيَقَعُ الطَّلَاقُ بِاللَّفْظِ، وَقِيلَ إنْ لَمْ
يُعَيِّنْ، فَعِنْدَ التَّعْيِينِ، وَالْوَطْءُ لَيْسَ بَيَانًا وَلَا
تَعْيِينًا، وَقِيلَ تَعْيِينٌ، وَلَوْ قَالَ مُشِيرًا إلَى وَاحِدَةٍ: هَذِهِ
الْمُطَلَّقَةُ فَبَيَانٌ، أَوْ أَرَدْت هَذِهِ وَهَذِهِ أَوْ هَذِهِ بَلْ هَذِهِ
حُكِمَ بِطَلَاقِهِمَا، وَلَوْ مَاتَتَا أَوْ إحْدَاهُمَا قَبْلَ بَيَانٍ
وَتَعْيِينٍ بَقِيَتْ مُطَالَبَتُهُ لِبَيَانِ الْإِرْثِ، وَلَوْ مَاتَ
فَالْأَظْهَرُ قَبُولُ بَيَانِ وَارِثِهِ لَا تَعْيِينِهِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ: إنْ كَانَ غُرَابًا فَامْرَأَتِي طَالِقٌ وَإِلَّا فَعَبْدِي حُرٌّ
وَجُهِلَ مُنِعَ مِنْهُمَا إلَى الْبَيَانِ، فَإِنْ مَاتَ لَمْ يُقْبَلْ بَيَانُ
الْوَارِثِ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، بَلْ يُقْرِعُ بَيْنَ الْعَبْدِ وَالْمَرْأَةِ،
فَإِنْ قَرَعَ عَتَقَ، أَوْ قَرَعَتْ لَمْ تَطْلُقْ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا
يَرِقُّ.
Section
Any ambiguity in the
phrasing of a repudiation should be inter-
preted in a sense favourable to the
marriage, whether that ambiguity
concerns
tho fact of the repudiation itself
or the number of times it is
pronounced. The husband cannot allege
natural shyness as an excuse
for
ambiguity of expression.
When one
husband says to his wife, You
are repudiated if this
bird is a
crow,” and another husband adds, If
it is not a crow my wifo
is
repudiated,” tho double repudiation does
not take place where neither
husband
knows if it be a crow or not.
But if the same person pronounces
the two sentences against two of
his wives, he wishes to divorce one
of
them ; and he must not only
ascertain the nature of tho bird, but
must inform the wife concerned.
Where a husband has repudiated
one of
his wives and forgets which, the
affair remains in suspense until
he
remembers ; and under these circumstances
he cannot bo obliged
by the wives
concerned to put an end to the
uncertainty. fA man who
says to his
wife and to another woman, One
of you is repudiated,”
and adds,
It is the other woman I meant,” has
a presumption in favour
of the truth
of his words, and the wife is
not repudiated. ffWhere,
howover,the wife
is called Zainab, and he says,
Zainab is repudiated,”
ho cannot
afterwards assert that the words refer
to another woman of
the same name.
The phrase, One of you is
repudiated,” pronounced
against two wives
involves the repudiation of that one
who is specially
meant, and she must
be informed ; but if neither be
specially intended,
it must bo decided
afterwards to which of tho two it
is to apply. In
either case both
wives are free until the husband has
informed them of
his previous intention
or of his subsequent decision. He
should do
this as soon as possible,
and he owes them ordinary maintenance
until
the matter has been decided
one way or the other. Tho repudiation
dates from the time of
pronouncement. Only a small number of autho-
rities make it date from the moment
the husband communicates his
decision,
where lie did not intend to indicate
one particular wife at the
time of
pronouncement. It should also be pointed
out to the reader that
subsequent
cohabitation with one of the wives
is not enough to indicate
which was
intended, nor to decide which should
be repudiated. Only a
few jurists
admit cohabitation to be a sufficient
indication of a husband's
subsequent decision.
Where, on the other hand, in these
circumstances
the husband points to one
of the wives and says, “ This is
the one I
have repudiated," it is
generally agreed that this is sufficient
to indicate
which of the two women
he had specially in view when pronouncing
the repudiation in the alternative ;
and where he says, This one and
that one," or " This one not
more than that one," he has repudiated
both. The obligation, either to say
which wife was meant, or to decide
to whom it shall apply, remains,
though one or both should previously
decease ; for it affects not only
the marriage but the right of succession.
Consequently, in case of the
husband's decease, before accomplishing
this
duty, *it is necessary to accept the
declaration of his hen*, as to the
wife whom the deceased intended to
repudiate ; though the heir can
never
decide which shall be repudiated, if
the deceased had not yet
definitely
decided. The words, “ If this bird
is a crow my wife is re-
pudiated,
and if it is not my slave is
free," have as their consequence
that
the person who had spoken them,
while ignorant of the nature of
tho
bird, is deprived of his rights both
over the wife and over the slave,
until he has ascertained it. In
this case, however, our school does not
admit the declaration of the hen,
in the case of the decease of the
speaker ; but the matter must be
decided by casting lots. If the slave
is thus selected he is ipso
facto enfranchised. If the wife wins, the
repudiation is inadmissible, fin this
latter case the slave is not reduced
to servitude, from which he has
been in some sort liberated, but his
situation remains in suspense.
فصل [في بيان الطلاق السني والبدعي]
الطَّلَاقُ سُنِّيٌّ
وَبِدْعِيٌّ.
وَيَحْرُمُ الْبِدْعِيُّ، وَهُوَ ضَرْبَانِ: طَلَاقٌ
فِي حَيْضٍ مَمْسُوسَةٍ، وَقِيلَ إنْ سَأَلَتْهُ لَمْ يَحْرُمْ، وَيَجُوزُ
خُلْعُهَا فِيهِ لَا أَجْنَبِيٍّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ
مَعَ آخِرِ حَيْضِك فَسُنِّيٌّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، أَوْ مَعَ آخِرِ طُهْرٍ لَمْ
يَطَأْهَا فِيهِ فَبِدْعِيٌّ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَطَلَاقٌ فِي
طُهْرٍ وَطِئَ فِيهِ مَنْ قَدْ تَحْبَلُ وَلَمْ يَظْهَرْ حَمْلٌ فَلَوْ وَطِئَ
حَائِضًا فَطَلَّقَهَا فَبِدْعِيٌّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيَحِلُّ خُلْعُهَا،
وَطَلَاقُ مَنْ ظَهَرَ، حَمْلُهَا.
وَمَنْ طَلَّقَ بِدْعِيًّا سُنَّ
لَهُ الرَّجْعَةُ، ثُمَّ إنْ شَاءَ طَلَّقَ بَعْدَ طُهْرٍ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ لِحَائِضٍ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ لِلْبِدْعَةِ وَقَعَ فِي الْحَالِ أَوْ
لِلسُّنَّةِ فَحِينَ تَطْهُرُ، أَوْ لِمَنْ فِي طُهْرٍ لَمْ تُمَسَّ فِيهِ أَنْت
طَالِقٌ لِلسُّنَّةِ وَقَعَ فِي الْحَالِ، وَإِنْ مُسَّتْ فِيهِ فَحِينَ تَطْهُرُ
بَعْدَ حَيْضٍ، أَوْ لِلْبِدْعَةِ فَفِي الْحَالِ إنْ مُسَّتْ فِيهِ، وَإِلَّا
فَحِينَ تَحِيضُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ طَلْقَةً حَسَنَةً
أَوْ أَحْسَنَ الطَّلَاقِ أَوْ أَجْمَلَهُ فَكَالسُّنَّةِ، أَوْ طَلْقَةً
قَبِيحَةٍ أَوْ أَقْبَحَ الطَّلَاقِ أَوْ أَفْحَشَهُ فَكَالْبِدْعَةِ، أَوْ
سُنِّيَّةً بِدْعِيَّةً أَوْ حَسَنَةً قَبِيحَةً وَقَعَ فِي الْحَالِ.
وَلَا
يَحْرُمُ جَمْعُ الطَّلْقَاتِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ
ثَلَاثًا أَوْ ثَلَاثًا لِلسُّنَّةِ، وَفَسَّرَ بِتَفْرِيقِهَا عَلَى أَقْرَاءٍ
لَمْ يُقْبَلْ إلَّا مِمَّنْ يَعْتَقِدُ تَحْرِيمَ الْجَمْعِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ
أَنَّهُ يُدَيَّنُ، وَيُدَيَّنُ مَنْ قَالَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَقَالَ أَرَدْت إنْ
دَخَلْت أَوْ إنْ شَاءَ زَيْدٌ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ نِسَائِي طَوَالِقُ
أَوْ كُلُّ امْرَأَةٍ لِي طَالِقٌ، وَقَالَ أَرَدْت بَعْضَهُنَّ فَالصَّحِيحُ
أَنَّهُ لَا يُقْبَلُ ظَاهِرًا إلَّا لِقَرِينَةٍ بِأَنْ خَاصَمَتْهُ وَقَالَتْ
تَزَوَّجْت فَقَالَ: كُلُّ امْرَأَةٍ لِي طَالِقٌ وَقَالَ أَرَدْت غَيْرَ
الْمُخَاصَمَةِ.
Section
A repudiation is either
in conformity with the Sonna, or contrary
to it and consequently forbidden.
Repudiations contrary to the Sonna
are
of two kinds : —
. A repudiation
during the menstruation of a woman with
whom
one has already cohabited. Some
authorities admit repudiation in
these
circumstances when at the request of
the woman herself ; and
all are agreed
that menstruation is no obstacle to
divorce, fexcept
when the request is
made by a third person. A repudiation in
the
words, “ You are repudiated at
the end of your present menstrues,"
fis in conformity with the Sonna ;
but our school considers as contrary
to the Sonna the expression, “At
the end of your present period of
purity/’
at least if the husband has
not cohabited with his wife during
that period.
. A repudiation during a
period of purity, when the husband has
had connection with his wife in
that period, and probably rendered her
pregnant, though the existence of
the foetus may not have been ascer-
tained. Neither may one lawfully repudiate
a woman during a period
of purity, fif
one has cohabited with her during
the menstruation that
preceded that period
; though there is no objection to a
divorce in these
circumstances, nor even
to a repudiation where the existence of a
foetus
has already been ascertained.
Where a woman has been repudiated
in a manner contrary to the
Sonna,
the practice has been introduced by
it of revoking the repudia-
tion, after
which the woman may be again
repudiated, in the first follow-
ing
period of purity. If a man says to
his wife during her menstrues,
“ You
are repudiated contrary to the Sonna/’
the repudiation is imme-
diately effected,
though it has to be revoked as
we have just said. But
where, in
these circumstances the husband says, “
You are repudiated
in accordance with
the Sonna/’ it begins from the first
following period
of purity.
Where
the repudiation is pronounced against the
woman not during
her menstrues, but
during her period of purity, the law
admits the two
following distinctions : —
. The expression, “You are
repudiated in accordance with the
Sonna,”
implies an immediate repudiation, if the
wife has not had con-
nection with
her husband during her present period
of purity ; otherwise
the repudiation
takes effect from the end of her
next menstruation.
. The expression, “
You are repudiated contrary to the Sonna,”
implies an immediate repudiation, if
the wife has had connection with
her
husband during her present period of
purity ; otherwise the re-
pudiation takes
effect from the beginning of her
next menstruation.
In both cases, however,
the repudiation may be revoked later.
The words, “ A regular repudiation,” “
The most regular,” or “ The
most
perfect,” are equivalent to “ according to
the Sonna,” while the
words “ faulty,” “
the most faulty,” or “ the most
abominable,” are
equivalent to “ contrary
to the Sonna.” The expressions, “ as much
in accordance with as contrary to
the Sonna,” or “ as regular as faulty,”
always designate an immediate repudiation.
Several repudiations may lawfully be
pronounced at one and the
same time
; but the law does not permit the
husband, after saying,
“ You are
repudiated thrice,” or “ Thrice in
accordance with the Sonna,”
to spread
out these three repudiations over three
of his wife’s periods
of purity ;
unless he belongs to a school which,
like that of Malik,
forbids pronouncing
more than one repudiation at a time,
fin this
matter the court should
respect the prescriptions of the school
to which
the husband belongs, even
where his ideas are not in
conformity with
the precepts of our
school, for it is a matter of
personal status. This
principle should be
observed also in a case where the
husband has used
such expressions as, “
You are repudiated, that is if you
enter the house,
or “ If Zaid
approves of it. fWhere, on the other
hand, the husband
says, “ All my
wives are repudiated, or “ Every wife I
have is repu-
diated, adding, “ I only
meant some of them, no account can
be taken
of his individual opinions,
as they are obviously opposed to common
sense and public order. Such a
reservation would only be admissible
if
it formed as it were a single
locution with the principal phrase ;
where, e.g. one of his wives
reproached a husband with having married
other wives instead of confining
himself to her, and he were to
reply,
“ I repudiate all my wives, adding,
“ except you alone.
فَصْلٌ [في تعليق الطلاق بالأزمنة ونحوها]
قَالَ أَنْتِ
طَالِقٌ فِي شَهْرِ كَذَا أَوْ فِي غُرَّتِهِ أَوْ أَوَّلِهِ وَقَعَ بِأَوَّلِ
جُزْءٍ مِنْهُ أَوْ فِي نَهَارِهِ أَوْ أَوَّلِ يَوْمٍ مِنْهُ فَبِفَجْرِ أَوَّلِ
يَوْمٍ، أَوْ آخِرِهِ فَبِآخِرِ جُزْءٍ مِنْ الشَّهْرِ، وَقِيلَ بِأَوَّلِ
النِّصْفِ الْآخَرِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ لَيْلاً إذَا مَضَى يَوْمٌ
فَبِغُرُوبِ شَمْسِ غَدِهِ، أَوْ نَهَارًا فَفِي مِثْلِ وَقْتِهِ مِنْ غَدِهِ
أَوْ الْيَوْمُ، فَإِنْ قَالَهُ نَهَارًا فَبِغُرُوبِ شَمْسِهِ وَإِلَّا لَغَا،
وَبِهِ يُقَاسُ شَهْرٌ وَسَنَةٌ.
أَوْ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ أَمْسِ،
وَقَصَدَ أَنْ يَقَعَ فِي الْحَالِ مُسْتَنِدًا إلَيْهِ وَقَعَ فِي الْحَالِ،
وَقِيلَ لَغْوٌ أَوْ قَصَدَ أَنَّهُ طَلَّقَ أَمْسِ، وَهِيَ الْآنَ مُعْتَدَّةٌ
صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ، أَوْ قَالَ طَلَّقْت فِي نِكَاحٍ آخَرَ، فَإِنْ عُرِفَ
صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَأَدَوَاتُ التَّعْلِيقِ:
مَنْ كَمَنْ دَخَلَتْ، وَإِنْ وَإِذَا، وَمَتَى، وَمَتَى مَا وَكُلَّمَا وَأَيُّ
كَأَيِّ وَقْتٍ دَخَلْت، وَلَا يَقْتَضِينَ فَوْرًا إنْ عُلِّقَ بِإِثْبَاتٍ فِي
غَيْرِ خُلْعٍ إلَّا أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ إنْ شِئْت، وَلَا تَكْرَارًا إلَّا كُلَّمَا،
وَلَوْ قَالَ إذَا طَلَّقْتُك فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثُمَّ طَلَّقَ أَوْ عَلَّقَ
بِصِفَةٍ فَوُجِدَتْ فَطَلْقَتَانِ، أَوْ كُلَّمَا وَقَعَ طَلَاقِي فَطَلَّقَ
فَثَلَاثٌ فِي مَمْسُوسَةٍ وَفِي غَيْرِهَا، طَلْقَةٌ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ
وَتَحْتَهُ أَرْبَعٌ إنْ طَلَّقْت وَاحِدَةً فَعَبْدٌ حُرٌّ، وَإِنْ ثِنْتَيْنِ
فَعَبْدَانِ، وَإِنْ ثَلَاثًا فَثَلَاثَةٌ، وَإِنْ أَرْبَعًا فَأَرْبَعَةٌ
فَطَلَّقَ أَرْبَعًا مَعًا أَوْ مُرَتِّبًا عَتَقَ عَشَرَةً، وَلَوْ عَلَّقَ
بِكُلَّمَا فَخَمْسَةَ عَشَرَ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَوْ عَلَّقَ
بِنَفْيِ فِعْلٍ فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ إنْ عَلَّقَ بِإِنْ كَإِنْ لَمْ تَدْخُلِي
وَقَعَ عِنْدَ الْيَأْسِ مِنْ الدُّخُولِ، أَوْ بِغَيْرِهَا فَعِنْدَ مُضِيِّ
زَمَنٍ يُمْكِنُ فِيهِ ذَلِكَ الْفِعْلُ وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ إنْ
دَخَلْتِ أَوْ أَنْ لَمْ تَدْخُلِي بِفَتْحِ أَنْ وَقَعَ فِي الْحَالِ.
قُلْت:
إلَّا فِي غَيْرِ نَحْوِيٍّ فَتَعْلِيقٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
The words, “ You will
bo repudiated in such and such a
month,
“ At the new moon of
such and such a month, or “ on the
first of such
and such a month,
imply a term expiring at the commencement
of the
first night of the month.
The term “ the day or “ the
first day of
the month expires
upon the appearance of dawn on the
first day ; while
the term “ the end
of the month expires at the
end of the last day
of the
month, or according to some at the
beginning of the latter half.
If one
says during the night, “ when a day
shall have elapsed, one
indicates the
following sunset ; but if one says
it during the day one
indicates the
corresponding hour of the succeeding day.
The expression
“ this day pronounced
during the day indicates a term expiring
upon
the next sunset ; pronounced at night
time it becomes a meaningless
expression,
and in consequence null and void.
The terms “ month
and “
year must be interpreted upon
the same principles.
A repudiation
commencing from some past time, e.g. “
You are re-
pudiated from yesterday,
though referring to the past, counts only
from the moment it was pronounced,
if such was the husband’s inten-
tion ;
though some maintain that such an
intention is incompatible
with the
expression mentioned, and that the act
is null and void. Where,
on the
other hand, the husband’s intention really
is that the repudiation
should take
effect from the previous day, the
woman is already in her
period of
legal retirement, at the time when
the repudiation is pro-
nounced ; and in
these circumstances a declaration of the
husband as
to his intention is
presumed to be true if substantiated
on oath. And
similarly where he
declares he was referring to a previous
marriage
with the same wife ; at any
rate if his remarriage with her is a
fact of
public notoriety.
Conditional
words or expressions, that is the
words “ whom/’ if,”
“ where,”
when,” from the time
that,” every time that,” what-
ever,” do not necessarily imply that
the act takes effect immediately
where
they refer to a definite future event,
provided always that a
divorce be
not intended. The single exception to
this rule is when the
husband
says, You are repudiated if
you like,” for such a condition
can
refer only to the wdshes of the
woman concerned. The phrase
every
time that ” requires a repetition of the
event upon which the
repudiation depends ;
but this is not the case with
the other expressions
mentioned above. The
words, When I repudiate you, you
are already
repudiated,” followed in fact
by a repudiation, simple or conditional,
constitute two repudiations, provided in
the latter case the condition
is
fulfilled. The expression, You are
repudiated as many times as I
can
repudiate you,” followed by a repudiation,
constitutes three re-
pudiations if the
marriage has been consummated but
otherwise only
one. The words,
If I repudiate one of my wives, one
of my slaves is
freed ; on the
repudiation of two wives, two slaves ;
of three, three ;
of four, four,”
pronounced by a husband who has four
wives, and
followed by the repudiation
of all four, either at once or
in succession,
implies the enfranchisement
of ten slaves ; ffand even of
fifteen, if
the condition is expressed
by the phrase, every time
that.” A con-
dition that a certain event
shall not take place, expressed by
the word
“ if,” e.g . if you
do not enter such and such a house,”
is fulfilled,
according to our school,
when it can no longer be reasonably
supposed
that the event will take
place. But when such a negative condition
is
expressed in some other way, it
is fulfilled only by the expiration of
the time within which it is
possible for the event to happen. Where,
on the other hand, the husband
has used the following words : You
are repudiated since you have
entered the house,” or Because you
have not entered it,” it is
known at once in a positive manner
if the
woman is repudiated or not.
[Unless the husband is not strong in
grammar, and consequently does not
always observe the difference
between the
conjunctions in ” and an ” ;
for in this case the ex-
pression is
considered as an ordinary condition.]
فصل [في أنواع التعليق بالحمل والولادة والحيض وغيرها]
عَلَّقَ
بِحَمْلٍ، فَإِنْ كَانَ حَمْلٌ ظَاهِرٌ وَقَعَ، وَإِلَّا فَإِنْ وَلَدَتْ لِدُونِ
سِتَّةِ أَشْهُرٍ مِنْ التَّعْلِيقِ بَانَ وُقُوعُهُ، أَوْ لِأَكْثَرَ مِنْ
أَرْبَعِ سِنِينَ أَوْ بَيْنَهُمَا وَوُطِئَتْ وَأَمْكَنَ حُدُوثُهُ بِهِ فَلَا،
وَإِلَّا فَالْأَصَحُّ وُقُوعُهُ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ إنْ كُنْت حَامِلاً
بِذَكَرٍ فَطَلْقَةً أَوْ أُنْثَى فَطَلْقَتَيْنِ فَوَلَدَتْهُمَا وَقَعَ
ثَلَاثٌ.
أَوْ إنْ كَانَ حَمْلُك ذَكَرًا فَطَلْقَةً أَوْ أُنْثَى
فَطَلْقَتَيْنِ فَوَلَدَتْهُمَا لَمْ يَقَعْ شَيْءٌ أَوْ إنْ وَلَدْت فَأَنْتِ
طَالِقٌ فَوَلَدَتْ اثْنَيْنِ مُرَتَّبًا طَلُقَتْ بِالْأَوَّلِ، وَانْقَضَتْ
عِدَّتُهَا بِالثَّانِي.
وَإِنْ قَالَ كُلَّمَا وَلَدْت فَوَلَدَتْ
ثَلَاثَةً مِنْ حَمْلٍ وَقَعَ بِالْأَوَّلَيْنِ طَلْقَتَانِ وَانْقَضَتْ
بِالثَّالِثِ، وَلَا يَقَعُ بِهِ ثَالِثَةٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ لِأَرْبَعٍ كُلَّمَا وَلَدَتْ وَاحِدَةٌ فَصَوَاحِبُهَا طَوَالِقُ
فَوَلَدْنَ مَعًا طَلُقْنَ ثَلَاثًا ثَلَاثًا أَوْ مُرَتَّبًا طَلُقَتْ
الرَّابِعَةُ ثَلَاثًا، وَكَذَا الْأُولَى إنْ بَقِيَتْ عِدَّتُهَا،
وَالثَّانِيَةُ طَلْقَةً، وَالثَّالِثَةُ طَلْقَتَيْنِ وَانْقَضَتْ عِدَّتُهُمَا
بِوِلَادَتِهِمَا، وَقِيلَ لَا تَطْلُقُ الْأُولَى، وَتَطْلُقُ الْبَاقِيَاتُ
طَلْقَةً طَلْقَةً، وَإِنْ وَلَدَتْ ثِنْتَانِ مَعًا ثُمَّ ثِنْتَانِ مَعًا
طَلُقَتْ الْأُولَيَانِ ثَلَاثًا ثَلَاثًا، وَقِيلَ طَلْقَةً، وَالْأُخْرَيَانِ
طَلْقَتَيْنِ طَلْقَتَيْنِ.
وَتُصَدَّقُ بِيَمِينِهَا فِي حَيْضِهَا
إذَا عَلَّقَهُ بِهِ، لَا فِي وِلَادَتِهَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا
تُصَدَّقُ فِيهِ فِي تَعْلِيقِ غَيْرِهَا.
وَلَوْ قَالَ إنْ
حِضْتُمَا فَأَنْتُمَا طَالِقَتَانِ فَزَعَمَتَاهُ وَكَذَّبَهُمَا صُدِّقَ
بِيَمِينِهِ وَلَمْ يَقَعْ، وَإِنْ كَذَّبَ وَاحِدَةً طَلُقَتْ فَقَطْ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ إنْ أَوْ إذَا أَوْ مَتَى طَلَّقْتُك فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ قَبْلَهُ ثَلَاثًا
فَطَلَّقَهَا وَقَعَ الْمُنَجَّزُ فَقَطْ، وَقِيلَ ثَلَاثٌ، وَقِيلَ لَا
شَيْءَ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: إنْ ظَاهَرْت مِنْك أَوْ آلَيْت أَوْ
لَاعَنْت أَوْ فَسَخْت بِعَيْبِك فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ قَبْلَهُ ثَلَاثًا ثُمَّ
وُجِدَ الْمُعَلَّقُ بِهِ فَفِي صِحَّتِهِ الْخِلَافُ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ: إنْ وَطِئْتُك مُبَاحًا فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ قَبْلَهُ ثُمَّ وَطِئَ لَمْ
يَقَعْ قَطْعًا.
وَلَوْ عَلَّقَهُ، بِمَشِيئَتِهَا خِطَابًا
اُشْتُرِطَتْ عَلَى فَوْرٍ، أَوْ غَيْبَةً، أَوْ بِمَشِيئَةِ أَجْنَبِيٍّ فَلَا
فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ قَالَ الْمُعَلَّقُ بِمَشِيئَتِهِ شِئْت كَارِهًا
بِقَلْبِهِ وَقَعَ، وَقِيلَ لَا يَقَعُ بَاطِنًا.
وَلَا يَقَعُ
بِمَشِيئَةِ صَبِيَّةٍ وَصَبِيٍّ، وَقِيلَ يَقَعُ بِمُمَيِّزٍ وَلَا رُجُوعَ لَهُ
قَبْلَ الْمَشِيئَةِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثَلَاثًا إلَّا
أَنْ يَشَاءَ زَيْدٌ طَلْقَةً فَشَاءَ طَلْقَةً لَمْ تَطْلُقْ، وَقِيلَ تَقَعُ
طَلْقَةً، وَلَوْ عَلَّقَ بِفِعْلِهِ فَفَعَلَ نَاسِيًا لِلتَّعْلِيقِ أَوْ
مُكْرَهًا لَمْ تَطْلُقْ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، أَوْ بِفِعْلِ غَيْرِهِ مِمَّنْ
يُبَالِي بِتَعْلِيقِهِ وَعَلِمَ بِهِ فَكَذَلِكَ، وَإِلَّا فَيَقَعُ قَطْعًا.
Section
A condition that
the wife is pregnant ” is fulfilled
as soon as the
existence of the
foetus is ascertained. If it is not
ascertained, an
accouchement before six
months is enough to indicate that
the condi-
tion was fulfilled at the
moment of repudiation ; but if an accouche-
ment does not take place until
between six months and four years after
the conditional repudiation, and if
the woman in question has in the
meantime cohabited again in such a
way as may have rendered her
pregnant, the condition is not
fulfilled, fin the absence of subsequent
cohabitation, the condition is fulfilled
by an accouchement up to the
extreme
limit of four years after the
repudiation. The phrase, “ If
you are
pregnant of a son you are once
repudiated, but if you are
pregnant
of a daughter you are twice repudiated,”
involves three re-
pudiations if the wife
gives birth to a son and a daughter ; but
the
phrase, “ If the child with
which you are pregnant is a son you
are
repudiated once, and if it is a
daughter twice ” involves no repudiation
in these circumstances. “ If you
have an accouchement you are
repudiated,”
signifies that a woman giving birth to
two children in
succession one after
the other, by the same husband, is
repudiated for
the first accouchement, and
her period of legal retirement is regarded
as terminated by the second ; while
the words, “ Every time you have
an
accouchement you will be repudiated,”
implies the consequence
that the giving
birth to three children, not only by
the same husband,
but during the
same accouchement, one after the other,
involves two
repudiations for the two
first children, and the expiry of
the period of
legal retirement at
the birth of the third. ffNow in
this case the third
repudiation has
not yet taken place; If a husband
pronounces against
his four wives the
words, “ Every time one of you has
an accouchement
the others will be
repudiated,” and all four have an
accouchement at
one and the same
time, each is repudiated thrice. Where,
on the other
hand, the accouchements
are successive, the fourth wife is
repudiated
thrice, and also the first,
provided that the latter’s period of
legal retire-
ment has not expired at
the time of the former’s accouchement.
As to
the second wife, she is
only repudiated once, upon the accouchement
of the first ; while the third is
twice repudiated, i.e. upon the accouche-
ments of the first and of the
second ; and further the periods of legal
retirement of the second and third
expire upon their respective accouche-
ment.
Some authorities, however, arrive at a
different result, admitting
that in such a
case the first wife is not
repudiated, and that each of her
companions is repudiated once only. A
special case exists where the
wives
in question have their accouchements two
by two ; then each
of the two
first is repudiated thrice, or according
to some authorities
once, and each
of the two last twice.
A woman
repudiated on condition she has her
menstrues has a
presumption in her
favour bn declaring upon oath that
menstruation
has begun ; fbut no such
presumption exists in the case of an
accouche-
ment, for that is a fact that
can easily bo otherwise established. Nor
does any presumption exist where one
wife’s repudiation depends upon
the
menstruation of another. Consequently where a
husband pro-
nounces against two of his
wives the words, “ I repudiate you both if
you are actually both in a period
of menstruation,” and subsequently
denies
the simultaneous menstruation alleged by
the two women, he has
a presumption
in favour of his denial upon oath,
and the double re-
pudiation he has
pronounced does not take effect. If
he merely denies
the menstruation of
one of them, that one is repudiated
as a consequence
of the menstruation of
the other, admitted by the husband.
The words “ if,” or “ When I
repudiate you, you are already pre-
viously repudiated thrice,” followed really
by a repudiation, involve
only one ;
though according to some authorities they
constitute three,
and according to others
have no legal effect at all. This
divergence
of opinion exists also with
regard to the wrords, “ If I pronounce
against
you an injurious comparison,” or “
anathema,” or “ an oath of con-
tinence,”
or “If our mariiagc is dissolved on
my demand on account
of redhibitory
defects, consider yourself as previously
thrice repu-
diated,” at least where these
conditions are accomplished. However, a
repudiation pronounced as follows, “ If I
have with you lawdul carnal
intercourse,
you are previously repudiated,” is null
and void, even
though carnal intercourse
should take place.
Where a repudiation
depends on the will of the wife,
it should be
declared wuthin a short
time, at least when the repudiation
has been
pronounced while speaking to
her ; fbut this is not rigorously
necessary
where the repudiation has been
pronounced in the third person, nor
where this act depends upon the
will of a third party. If the person
upon whose will the repudiation
depends has really declared his decision,
the repudiation has its full legal
effect, even though that decision may
be contrary to his own wishes ;
though according to some jurists it is
not in these circumstances mentally
accomplished. A repudiation may
not depend
upon the will of a minor of either
sex ; though some jurists
admit such a
suspensive condition in the case of a
minor who has attained
the age of
discernment. In all cases where a
repudiation has been pro-
nounced on
condition that either the wife or
some third party wishes it,
it
cannot be retracted before the one
or the other has decided. The
phrase, “ You are repudiated thrice,
unless Zaid prefers that it should
be only once,” is no repudiation
if Zaid says he wishes it to
be once
only ; some, however, admit
in these circumstances a single repudia-
tion.
*When one has made a repudiation depend
upon some act one
is about to
perform oneself, the fact of having
accomplished this act,
either without
thinking of tlio consequences, or as
the result of some
violence, is not
sufficient to fulfil the condition. The
same principle
must be followed where
the repudiation depends upon the act
of a third
party, in all cases where
the latter has an interest in the
act, and knows
what the consequences
will be. Tor if it is an act
indifferent to the third
party, or
if he is ignorant that the
repudiation depends upon it, the
fact
of his accomplishing it without thinking,
or as the result of some
violence,
is enough for the fulfilment of the
condition.
فصل [في الإشارة إلى العدد وأنواع من التعليق]
قَالَ أَنْتِ
طَالِقٌ وَأَشَارَ بِأُصْبُعَيْنِ أَوْ ثَلَاثٍ لَمْ يَقَعْ عَدَدٌ إلَّا
بِنِيَّةٍ، فَإِنْ قَالَ مَعَ ذَلِكَ هَكَذَا طَلُقَتْ فِي أُصْبُعَيْنِ
طَلْقَتَيْنِ وَفِي ثَلَاثٍ ثَلَاثًا، فَإِنْ قَالَ أَرَدْت بِالْإِشَارَةِ
الْمَقْبُوضَتَيْنِ صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ عَبْدٌ إذَا
مَاتَ سَيِّدِي فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ طَلْقَتَيْنِ، وَقَالَ سَيِّدُهُ إذَا مِتُّ
فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ فَعَتَقَ بِهِ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهَا لَا تَحْرُمُ بَلْ لَهُ
الرَّجْعَةُ، وَتَجْدِيدُ قَبْلَ زَوْجٍ.
وَلَوْ نَادَى إحْدَى
زَوْجَتَيْهِ فَأَجَابَتْهُ الْأُخْرَى فَقَالَ أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَهُوَ يَظُنُّهَا
الْمُنَادَاةَ لَمْ تَطْلُقْ الْمُنَادَاةُ وَتَطْلُقُ الْمُجِيبَةُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ عَلَّقَ بِأَكْلِ رُمَّانَةٍ وَعَلَّقَ بِنِصْفٍ
فَأَكَلَتْ رُمَّانَةً فَطَلْقَتَانِ وَالْحَلِفُ بِالطَّلَاقِ مَا تَعَلَّقَ
بِهِ حَثٌّ أَوْ مَنْعٌ أَوْ تَحْقِيقُ خَبَرٍ، فَإِذَا قَالَ إنْ حَلَفْت
بِطَلَاقٍ فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ ثُمَّ قَالَ إنْ لَمْ تَخْرُجِي أَوْ إنْ خَرَجْت
أَوْ إنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ الْأَمْرُ كَمَا قُلْت فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ وَقَعَ
الْمُعَلَّقُ بِالْحَلِفِ، وَيَقَعُ الْآخَرُ إنْ وُجِدَتْ صِفَتُهُ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ إذَا طَلَعَتْ الشَّمْسُ أَوْ جَاءَ الْحُجَّاجُ فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ لَمْ
يَقَعْ الْمُعَلَّقُ بِالْحَلِفِ.
وَلَوْ قِيلَ لَهُ اسْتِخْبَارًا
أَطَلَّقْتهَا فَقَالَ نَعَمْ فَإِقْرَارٌ فَإِنْ قَالَ أَرَدْت مَاضِيًا
وَرَاجَعْت صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَإِنْ قِيلَ ذَلِكَ الْتِمَاسًا لِإِنْشَاءٍ
فَقَالَ نَعَمْ فَصَرِيحٌ وَقِيلَ كِنَايَةٌ.
Section
The words, “ You are
repudiated,” followed by the act of
lifting up
two or three fingers, do
not constitute two or three repudiations
re-
spectively, unless such was the
intention of the husband who pronounced
it
; but where, under these circumstances,
the husband adds, “ so
many times,”
then there are really either two or
threo repudiations.
But where, even in
this case, he declares upon oath
that he raised the
third finger only
with the intention of indicating the
two others united,
the presumption is
in his favour, and there are only
two repudiations.
When a slave says
to his wife, “ At my master’s death
you will be
repudiated twice,” after
which the master declares that the
slave in
question will be enfranchised
at his death, fthe master’s decease causes
the woman to be twice repudiated.
These two repudiations, though
originally
pronounced by a slave, are considered to
emanate from a free
man, and are
consequently revocable. It follows that
the couple can
remarry without an
intermediate husband.
If a husband calls
one of his wives and another answers
and he says
to her, “ You are
repudiated,” believing himself to be
speaking to the
wife he called, fit
is the wife that answers who is
repudiated.
The words, “ You are
repudiated if you eat a pomegranate, and
if
you eat the half of a
pomegranate,” result in a wife being twice
repudiated
if she eats a whole pomegranate.
The law admits an oath as a
way of rendering a repudiation condi-
tional,
whether the oath consists in an
incitement to perform some act,
or
in its prohibition, or in the
confirmation of some piece of news.
Thus, upon saying, “ You are
repudiated if I confirm my words on oath,”
or “ You are repudiated if you
have not come out of such and such
a house,” or “ If you have come
out of it,” or “ If the matter
is not as
I have told you,” a
repudiation takes effect, by the fact
of taking the oath,
or by the
fulfilment of the other conditions
mentioned. When, on the
other hand,
the second condition consists in a fact
about to happen,
such as sunrise or
the return of the pilgrimage, one
cannot lawfully
complete the repudiation
by an oath, since in that case
the first con-
dition is replaced by
the second.
If any one inquires
from a husband whether ho has repudiated
his
wife and he answers, “ yes,” it
is an admission on his part ; though he
may afterwards declare that ho was
speaking of a former repudiation
he had
since revoked ; and if ho confirms
this subsequent declaration
upon oath, he
has a presumption in favour of the
truth of his words.
But where the
inquiry is not purely interrogative, but
made with the
intention of requesting
the husband to proceed to a repudiation,
tho
affirmative reply is an explicit
manner of repudiation ; or, according
to
some authorities, an implicit one.
فصل [في أنواع أخرى من التعليق]
عَلَّقَ بِأَكْلِ رَغِيفٍ
أَوْ رُمَّانَةٍ فَبَقِيَ لُبَابَةٌ أَوْ حَبَّةٌ لَمْ يَقَعْ، وَلَوْ أَكَلَا
تَمْرًا وَخَلَطَا نَوَاهُمَا فَقَالَ إنْ لَمْ تُمَيِّزِي نَوَاك فَأَنْتِ
طَالِقٌ، فَجَعَلَتْ كُلَّ نَوَاةٍ وَحْدَهَا لَمْ يَقَعْ إلَّا أَنْ يَقْصِدَ
تَعْيِينًا وَلَوْ كَانَ بِفَمِهَا تَمْرَةٌ فَعَلَّقَ بِبَلْعِهَا ثُمَّ
بِرَمْيِهَا ثُمَّ بِإِمْسَاكِهَا فَبَادَرَتْ مَعَ فَرَاغِهِ بِأَكْلِ بَعْضٍ
وَرَمْيِ بَعْضٍ لَمْ يَقَعْ.
وَلَوْ اتَّهَمَهَا بِسَرِقَةٍ
فَقَالَ إنْ لَمْ تَصْدُقِينِي فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ فَقَالَتْ سَرَقْت مَا سَرَقْت
لَمْ تَطْلُقْ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: إنْ لَمْ تُخْبِرِينِي بِعَدَدِ
حَبِّ هَذِهِ الرُّمَّانَةِ قَبْلَ كَسْرِهَا فَالْخَلَاصُ أَنْ تَذْكُرَ عَدَدًا
يُعْلَمُ أَنَّهَا لَا تَنْقُصُ عَنْهُ ثُمَّ تَزِيدَ وَاحِدًا وَاحِدًا حَتَّى
تَبْلُغَ مَا يُعْلَمُ أَنَّهَا لَا تَزِيدُ عَلَيْهِ، وَالصُّورَتَانِ فِيمَنْ
لَمْ يَقْصِدْ تَعْرِيفًا.
وَلَوْ قَالَ لِثَلَاثٍ: مَنْ لَمْ
تُخْبِرْنِي بِعَدَدِ رَكَعَاتِ فَرَائِضِ الْيَوْمِ وَاللَّيْلَةِ فَقَالَتْ
وَاحِدَةٌ سَبْعَ عَشْرَةَ، وَأُخْرَى خَمْسَ عَشْرَةَ: أَيْ يَوْمَ جُمُعَةٍ،
وَثَالِثَةٌ إحْدَى عَشْرَةَ: أَيْ لِمُسَافِرٍ لَمْ يَقَعْ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ: أَنْتِ طَالِقٌ إلَى حِينٍ أَوْ زَمَانٍ أَوْ بَعْدَ حِينٍ طَلُقَتْ
بِمُضِيِّ لَحْظَةٍ.
وَلَوْ عَلَّقَ بِرُؤْيَةِ زَيْدٍ أَوْ
لَمْسِهِ وَقَذْفِهِ تَنَاوَلَهُ حَيًّا وَمَيِّتًا، بِخِلَافِ ضَرْبِهِ.
وَلَوْ
خَاطَبَتْهُ بِمَكْرُوهٍ كَيَا سَفِيهُ يَا خَسِيسُ فَقَالَ إنْ كُنْت كَذَاك
فَأَنْتِ طَالِقٌ إنْ أَرَادَ مُكَافَأَتَهَا بِإِسْمَاعِ مَا تَكْرَهُ طَلُقَتْ،
وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ سَفَهٌ، أَوْ التَّعْلِيقَ اُعْتُبِرَتْ الصِّفَةُ، وَكَذَا
إنْ لَمْ يَقْصِدْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَالسَّفَهُ مُنَافِي إطْلَاقَ التَّصَرُّفِ،
وَالْخَسِيسُ.
قِيلَ مَنْ بَاعَ دِينَهُ بِدُنْيَاهُ، وَيُشْبِهُ
أَنْ يُقَالَ: هُوَ مَنْ يَتَعَاطَى غَيْرَ لَائِقٍ بِهِ بُخْلاً.
Section
A condition of eating a
piece of bread or a pomegranate is not
fulfilled so long as there remains a
crumb or a pip. Where a husband
and
wife eat together some dates and mix
the seeds, and the husband
says to
the wife, “ If you don’t separate
your seeds from mine you are
repudiated,” and the wife puts each
seed aside, the condition of repudia-
tion
is not fulfilled and the marriage
remains intact, unless tho husband
wishes
her to indicate which seeds were
hers. When a woman has a
date in
her mouth and her husband repudiates
her on condition she
swallows it,
and then changes his mind and makes
it depend on her
spitting it out,
and then changes his mind again and
makes the repudia-
tion depend upon her
taking the date in the hollow of
her hand, and the
woman on hearing
these words quickly swallows half the
date and spits
out the other half,
the condition is not considered to
be fulfilled. When
a husband accuses his
wife of theft, and says to her, “
If you do not admit
that my
words are true you are repudiated,”
and she replies, “ I did
steal,” adding, “
I did not steal,” no repudiation takes
place. Where a
husband says, “ If
you do not name the number of
pips contained in
this pomegranate you
are repudiated,” the fulfilment of the
condition
may be avoided by the wife
first mentioning a number known to be a
minimum, and then continuing by
naming all numbers from that one
up
to what is known to be a maximum.
It must be understood of
course that
it was not the husband’s intention
to ascertain the number
of the pips,
for in that case the wife could
not escape the dilemma by
such an
evasive reply. This principle applies also
to the evasive answer
already cited
with reference to a wife accused of
theft. Where one says
to three of
one’s wives, “ I repudiate her who cannot
tell me the number
of micas that
are obligatory in twenty-four hours,” and
one of them
answers “seventeen,” and
another “fifteen, that is to say, Eriday,”
and the third “ eleven, that is
for a traveller,” none are repudiated.
When one says, “ You are repudiated
until such and such a time,” or
“
from such a time,” the time is due
the moment that a single instant
of
that term is passed. The condition,
“If you see so-and-so,” or “ If
you
touch him,” or “ If you accuse him
unjustly of the crime of forni-
cation,”
is fulfilled by the acts mentioned,
whether the individual in
question is
dead or alive. This, however, is not
the case with a condi-
tion referring,
e.g. to the act “ of giving him a
blow,” for this condition
clearly implies
that the individual in question is alive.
Where a wife pronounces against her
husband words considered
blamable, e.g. “
imbecile,” or “ ignoble husband,” and
he replies,
“ If I am so you are
repudiated,” the repudiation really has
effect if
the husband’s intention is
to punish his wife for her insulting
language*
even though he may not be
imbecile. Where, on the other hand, the
husband, by so replying, wishes to
make the repudiation really depend
on
the condition that he is imbecile,
the marriage remains intact if he
is
not. fAnd the same is the case
where the husband has no special
intention in saying this. A charge
of imbecility implies that the in-
dividual in question has not the
free disposition of his property ; and
that of being ignoble means,
according to some, that he sets more
store
by the things of the world
than by religion, which is practically
the same
as saying that with him
cupidity has the better of morality
and seein-
liness. []