Book 45: Relationship by Fosterage (Rada'ah) | Minhaj al-Talibin Imam Nawawi
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature dan reference: classical Arabic books
Contents
- Book 45: Relationship by Fosterage (Rada'ah)
- Book 46: Maintenance (Nafakat)
- Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi
كتاب الرَّضَاعِ
BOOK 45 .— RELATIONSHIP BY FOSTERAGE
بِلَبَنِ امْرَأَةٍ حَيَّةٍ بَلَغَتْ تِسْعَ سِنِينَ، وَلَوْ حَلَبَتْ فَأُوجِرَ
بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا حَرَّمَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَوْ جُبِّنَ أَوْ نُزِعَ مِنْهُ
زُبْدٌ حَرَّمَ، وَلَوْ خُلِطَ بِمَائِعٍ حَرَّمَ إنْ غَلَبَ فَإِنْ غُلِبَ
وَشَرِبَ الْكُلَّ قِيلَ أَوْ الْبَعْضَ حَرَّمَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَيُحَرِّمُ
إيجَارٌ وَكَذَا إسْعَاطٌ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، لَا حُقْنَةٌ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ
وَشَرْطُهُ: رَضِيعٌ حَيٌّ لَمْ يَبْلُغْ سَنَتَيْنِ تَنْبِيهٌ: ابْتِدَاءُ
الْحَوْلَيْنِ مِنْ تَمَامِ انْفِصَالِ الرَّضِيعِ كَمَا فِي نَظَائِرِهِ، فَإِنْ
ارْتَضَعَ قَبْلَ تَمَامِهِ خَمْسَ رَضَعَاتٍ، وَضَبْطُهُنَّ بِالْعُرْفِ فَلَوْ
قَطَعَ إعْرَاضًا تَعَدَّدَ، أَوْ لِلَّهْوِ وَعَادَ فِي الْحَالِ أَوْ تَحَوَّلَ
مِنْ ثَدْيٍ إلَى ثَدْيٍ فَلَا.
وَلَوْ حَلَبَ مِنْهَا دَفْعَةً
وَأَوْجَرَهُ خَمْسًا أَوْ عَكْسُهُ فَرَضْعَةٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ خَمْسٌ وَلَوْ
شُكَّ هَلْ خَمْسًا أَمْ أَقَلَّ، أَوْ هَلْ رَضَعَ فِي حَوْلَيْنِ أَمْ
بَعْدُ؟ فَلَا تَحْرِيمَ، وَفِي الثَّانِيَة قَوْلٌ، أَوْ وَجْهٌ، وَتَصِير
الْمُرْضِعَةُ أُمَّهُ، وَاَلَّذِي مِنْهُ اللَّبَنُ أَبَاهُ، وَتَسْرِي
الْحُرْمَةُ إلَى أَوْلَادِهِ، وَلَوْ كَانَ لِرَجُلٍ خَمْسٌ مُسْتَوْلِدَاتٍ
أَوْ أَرْبَعُ نِسْوَةٍ وَأُمُّ وَلَدٍ فَرَضَعَ طِفْلٌ مِنْ كُلٍّ رَضْعَةً
صَارَ ابْنَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ فَيَحْرُمْنَ عَلَيْهِ لِأَنَّهُنَّ مَوْطُوآتُ
أَبِيهِ، وَلَوْ كَانَ بَدَلَ الْمُسْتَوْلَدَاتِ بَنَاتٌ أَوْ أَخَوَاتٌ فَلَا
حُرْمَةَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَآبَاءُ الْمُرْضِعَةِ مِنْ نَسَبٍ أَوْ رَضَاعٍ
أَجْدَادٌ لِلرَّضِيعِ، وَأُمَّهَاتُهَا جَدَّاتُهُ، وَأَوْلَادُهَا مِنْ نَسَبٍ
أَوْ رَضَاعٍ إخْوَتُهُ وَأَخَوَاتُهُ وَإِخْوَتُهَا وَأَخَوَاتُهَا أَخْوَالُهُ
وَخَالَاتُهُ، وَأَبُو اللَّبَنِ جَدُّهُ، وَأَخُوهُ عَمُّهُ وَكَذَا الْبَاقِي،
وَاللَّبَنُ لِمَنْ نُسِبَ إلَيْهِ وَلَدٌ نَزَلَ بِهِ بِنِكَاحٍ أَوْ وَطْءِ
شُبْهَةٍ لَا زِنًا، وَلَوْ نَفَاهُ بِلِعَانٍ انْتَفَى اللَّبَنُ عَنْهُ وَلَوْ
وَطِئْت مَنْكُوحَةً بِشُبْهَةٍ، أَوْ وَطِئَ اثْنَانِ بِشُبْهَةٍ فَوَلَدَتْ
فَاللَّبَنُ لِمَنْ لَحِقَهُ الْوَلَدُ بِقَائِفٍ أَوْ غَيْرِهِ، وَلَا
تَنْقَطِعُ نِسْبَةُ اللَّبَنِ عَنْ زَوْجٍ مَاتَ أَوْ طَلَّقَ، وَإِنْ طَالَتْ
الْمُدَّةُ أَوْ انْقَطَعَ وَعَادَ فَإِنْ نَكَحَتْ آخَرَ وَوَلَدَتْ مِنْهُ
فَاللَّبَنُ بَعْدَ الْوِلَادَةِ لَهُ وَقَبْلَهَا لِلْأَوَّلِ إنْ لَمْ يَدْخُلْ
وَقْتَ ظُهُورِ لَبَنِ حَمْلِ الثَّانِي، وَكَذَا إنْ دَخَلَ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ
لِلثَّانِي وَفِي قَوْلٍ لَهُمَا.
BOOK 45 .— RELATIONSHIP BY FOSTERAGE
Section
Relationship by
fosterage exists where a child has taken
the breast
of a living woman who has
at least completed her ninth year,
or even
if it has received as
nourishment feither milk extracted from
the breasts
of a woman afterwards
deceased, or a woman’s milk curdled or
skimmed,
or mixed with some other
liquid *in whatever proportion and whether
it is all or only partly drunk —
this, at least, is the opinion of
some
authorities. According to our school
relationship by fosterage is estab-
lished
not only by the fact of suckling,
but also by the introduction of
milk
into a child’s body by the mouth or
by the nose ; *but there is no
such relationship where the introduction
is effected by means of a
washing.
The law requires, moreover, as conditions
essential to the
establishment of
relationship by fosterage that the
nursling is alive at
the moment of
taking the milk, that it is not
yet two years old, and that
it
has taken or sucked the milk at
least five times. Custom must
determine
what is meant by “ times ” in this
respect, but in any case
a nursling
takes milk as many times as it
ceases to suck, except where it
leaves the breast out of caprice
to begin again immediately afterwards,
or
leaves one breast to take the other.
When one has five times given
a
nursling milk at one night from its
nurse’s breast, or vice versa , it is
considered to have sucked only once
; though according to one authority,
it
has then sucked the five required
times. In cases where it is doubtful
whether the child has or has
not sucked five times, and in cases
where
it is doubtful whether it has
done so before it is two years
old, there is
no relationship by
fosterage. A single jurist is of the
contrary opinion
where there is a doubt
as to the age ; and this opinion
is even considered
by others as an
admitted doctrine.
A nurse is her
nursling’s foster-mother ; the man who has
rendered
her pregnant and is consequently
the cause of the milk is regarded as
its foster-father ; and the prohibition
extends not only to the nursling
but
also to its progeny. f One is even
considered a foster-father where
one possesses
either five slaves enfranchised by reason
of maternity or
four wives and one
such slave, and the nursling has
taken the breast of
each but once.
Marriage with any of these five
persons is for ever
forbidden to the
nursling as they have all cohabited
with his foster-
father, *This is
why no relationship by fosterage would
exist in the
case supposed if it
were a question not of slaves enfranchised
by reason
of maternity but daughters
or married sisters of the man in
question.
The ancestors of the nurse
on either side become the nursling’s
ancestors
by fosterage, and the nurse’s
children its foster brothers and sisters,
without distinction between natural
ancestors and children and those
that
are so by fosterage. Similarly the
nurse’s brothers and sisters are
the
nursling’s maternal uncles and aunts by
fosterage, and the father
of the nun
who is the cause of the milk
its foster grandfather, his
brother its
paternal uncle by fosterage, and so on.
A woman’s milk is held ipso
facto to be caused by the father
of the
child to which she gives
birth, whether she is rendered pregnant by
marriage or by error under the
belief that cohabitation is lawful ; but
not if the pregnancy is the
consequence of an act of criminal
fornication.
The disavowal of a child
implies a disavowal of the mother’s milk.
In
the case where a married woman
has by error had carnal commerce
with another than her husband, and
even in the case where a woman
has
cohabited by error with two different
husbands, the milk is considered
to
be caused by the man whom the
law declares to be the father of tho
child, even where the paternity has
been declared, in default of other
proof, by a physiognomist. Moreover,
relationship by fosterage with
the man
who is the cause of the milk
exists in spite of the previous
dissolution of the nurse’s marriage
by the death of her husband or by
her repudiation, however long ago
the separation took place, and even
if the milk has disappeared from
her breast and then returned to it.
It is only when a separated woman
accepts a new husband and has a
child by him that the swelling
of her breasts must be attributed to
him.
Consequently, where a woman who has
married again sees her breasts
swell
before her accouchement of a child of
the second marriage it is
to the
previous husband that this state of
the breasts must be attributed,
even
where a new pregnancy is manifested. One
jurist, however, in
these last
circumstances attributes the appearance of
the milk to the
second husband, and
another to both of them together.
فصل [في حكم الرضاع الطارئ على النكاح تحريما وغرما]
تَحْتَهُ
صَغِيرَةٌ فَأَرْضَعَتْهَا أُمُّهُ أَوْ أُخْتُهُ أَوْ زَوْجَةٌ أُخْرَى
انْفَسَخَ نِكَاحُهُ، وَلِلصَّغِيرَةِ نِصْفُ مَهْرِهَا، وَلَهُ عَلَى
الْمُرْضِعَةِ نِصْفُ مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ كُلُّهُ وَلَوْ رَضَعَتْ مِنْ
نَائِمَةٍ فَلَا غُرْمَ وَلَا مَهْرَ لِلْمُرْتَضِعَةِ.
وَلَوْ
كَانَ تَحْتَهُ كَبِيرَةٌ وَصَغِيرَةٌ فَأَرْضَعَتْ أُمُّ الْكَبِيرَةِ
الصَّغِيرَةَ انْفَسَخَتْ الصَّغِيرَةُ وَكَذَا الْكَبِيرَةُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ،
وَلَهُ نِكَاحُ مَنْ شَاءَ مِنْهُمَا وَحُكْمُ مَهْرِ الصَّغِيرَةِ وَتَغْرِيمُهُ
الْمُرْضِعَةَ مَا سَبَقَ، وَكَذَا الْكَبِيرَةُ إنْ لَمْ تَكُنْ مَوْطُوءَةً
فَإِنْ كَانَتْ مَوْطُوءَةً فَلَهُ عَلَى الْمُرْضِعَةِ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ وَلَوْ أَرْضَعَتْ بِنْتُ الْكَبِيرَةِ الصَّغِيرَةَ حُرِّمَتْ
الْكَبِيرَةُ أَبَدًا وَكَذَا الصَّغِيرَةُ إنْ كَانَتْ الْكَبِيرَةُ مَوْطُوءَةً
وَلَوْ كَانَ تَحْتَهُ صَغِيرَةٌ فَطَلَّقَهَا فَأَرْضَعَتْهَا امْرَأَةٌ صَارَتْ
أُمَّ امْرَأَتِهِ، وَلَوْ نَكَحَتْ مُطَلَّقَتُهُ صَغِيرًا وَأَرْضَعَتْهُ
بِلَبَنِهِ حُرِّمَتْ عَلَى الْمُطَلِّقِ وَالصَّغِيرِ أَبَدًا وَلَوْ زَوَّجَ
أُمَّ وَلَدِهِ عَبْدَهُ الصَّغِيرَ فَأَرْضَعَتْهُ لَبَنَ السَّيِّدِ حُرِّمَتْ
عَلَيْهِ وَعَلَى السَّيِّدِ، وَلَوْ أَرْضَعَتْ مَوْطُوءَتُهُ الْأَمَةُ
صَغِيرَةً تَحْتَهُ بِلَبَنِهِ أَوْ لَبَنِ غَيْرِهِ حُرِّمَتَا عَلَيْهِ وَلَوْ
كَانَ تَحْتَهُ صَغِيرَةٌ وَكَبِيرَةٌ فَأَرْضَعَتْهَا انْفَسَخَتَا وَحَرُمَتْ
الْكَبِيرَةُ أَبَدًا وَكَذَا الصَّغِيرَةُ إنْ كَانَ الْإِرْضَاعُ بِلَبَنِهِ،
وَإِلَّا فَرَبِيبَةٌ وَلَوْ كَانَ كَبِيرَةٌ وَثَلَاثٌ صَغَائِرُ
فَأَرْضَعَتْهُنَّ حَرُمَتْ أَبَدًا، وَكَذَا الصَّغَائِرُ إنْ أَرْضَعَتْهُنَّ
بِلَبَنِهِ أَوْ لَبَنِ غَيْرِهِ وَهِيَ مَوْطُوءَةٌ، وَإِلَّا فَإِنْ
أَرْضَعَتْهُنَّ مَعًا بِإِيجَارِهِنَّ الْخَامِسَةَ انْفَسَخْنَ، وَلَا
يَحْرُمْنَ مُؤَبَّدًا، أَوْ مُرَتَّبًا لَمْ يَحْرُمْنَ، وَتَنْفَسِخُ الْأُولَى
وَالثَّالِثَةُ، وَتَنْفَسِخُ الثَّانِيَةُ بِإِرْضَاعِ الثَّالِثَةِ، وَفِي
قَوْلٍ لَا يَنْفَسِخُ، وَيَجْرِي الْقَوْلَانِ فِيمَنْ تَحْتَهُ صَغِيرَتَانِ
أَرْضَعَتْهُمَا أَجْنَبِيَّةٌ مُرَتَّبًا أَيَنْفَسِخَانِ أَمْ الثَّانِيَةَ؟
Section
If a man’s mother,
sister, or wife gives her breast to
a very young
girl who has been
promised him in marriage, his marriage
with the
young girl is ipso facto
dissolved, and he owes her half
dower. He can,
however, recover from
the woman who without his knowledge has
given her breast to the child
half the proportional dower, or, according
to one jurist, the whole
proportional dower. If the breast has been
given unconsciously, e.g. during sleep,
the woman who has done so is
not responsible, nor can the young
girl claim anything. When one has
two wives, one adult and one
still a child, and the former’s mother
gives
her breast to the latter’, the
marriage is ipso facto dissolved both with
the one and with the other ;
but there is no objection to taking
one of
them back as wife. Under
these circumstances the above principles
must be observed as to the
young girl’s dower and the responsibility
of
the mother-in-law ; and also to
the adult wife’s dower, provided she has
not yet had commerce with her
husband. Where, on the other hand,
the husband has already cohabited
with his adult wife and consequently
owes her the whole dower, *he
can recover from her mother what she
would have been able to claim
as proportional dower. Finally in the
case where it is the daughter
of one of his wives by a former
marriage
who has given her breast to
the child-wife, commerce with the adult
wife who is the nurse’s mother
is for ever forbidden the husband ; while
commerce with the child-wife is
prohibited only where there has been
cohabitation between him and the
mother of the nurse in question.
Where a man, after accepting a minor
as his wife, repudiates her,
and
some woman gives her breast to the
child, that woman becomes
none the
less the husband’s mother-in-law by
fosterage, and cohabitation
with her is
consequently forbidden him. Where a repudiated
wife
remarries with a child she afterwards
nourishes with the milk of her
previous marriage, commerce with her
becomes for ever forbidden both
to
her former husband and to the child
she has accepted as her future
husband ; and, by virtue of the
same principle, a slave emancipated by
reason of maternity and given by
her master as future wife to one of
his young slaves, may no longer
cohabit with the master nor with the
slave if she gives the latter
her breast, at least, if the master
was the cause
of the milk. Moreover,
when a slave with whom her master
has co-
habited gives her breast to a
young girl promised to the master as
his
future wife, he can have carnal
commerce with neither, whether ho or
some other is the cause of the
milk.
When a man has two wives,
one an adult and the other still a
minor,
and the former gives her
breast to the latter, not only is
his marriage
with the child-wife
dissolved, as we have already seen,
but even the
nurse ceases to be
his wife, and commerce with her is
for ever forbidden
him. Where a man
has one adult wife and three child-
wives, and the
adult gives her
breast to the others, coition with
the adult wife is for
ever forbidden
the husband, but that with the
child-wives is prohibited
him only if
he was the cause of the milk,
or if he has at least cohabited
with the wife who has become
their nurse. Where, on the contrary, he
has not yet cohabited with the
adult wife tho following distinctions
should be made : —
. If
she nourishes the children at one
and the same time, giving
them suck
the five required times. In this
case tho marriage with the
young
girls is dissolved, but the husband
may subsequently marry each
one separately.
. If she nourishes them in a
similar manner one after the other.
In this case commerce with them
is not forbidden for ever, but the
marriage with tho first and the
third is dissolved because they have
received tho breast of their
husband’s wife, and the marriage with the
second is dissolved as a consequence
of the suckling of the third. One
authority, however, considers tho marriage
of the second as remaining
intact ;
and the same divergence of opinion
exists where there are two
child-wives
instead of three, suckled successively by
a strange woman.
فصل [في الإقرار والشهادة بالرضاع والاختلاف فيه]
قَالَ:
هِنْدٌ بِنْتِي أَوْ أُخْتِي بِرَضَاعٍ، أَوْ قَالَتْ هُوَ أَخِي حَرُمَ
تَنَاكُحُهُمَا.
وَلَوْ قَالَ زَوْجَانِ: بَيْنَنَا رَضَاعٌ،
مُحَرِّمٌ فُرِّقَ بَيْنَهُمَا وَسَقَطَ الْمُسَمَّى وَوَجَبَ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ إنْ
وَطِئَ وَإِنْ ادَّعَى رَضَاعًا فَأَنْكَرَتْ انْفَسَخَ، وَلَهَا الْمُسَمَّى إنْ
وَطِئَ وَإِلَّا فَنِصْفُهُ، وَإِنْ ادَّعَتْهُ فَأَنْكَرَ صَدَقَ بِيَمِينِهِ
إنْ زُوِّجَتْ بِرِضَاهَا وَإِلَّا فَالْأَصَحُّ تَصْدِيقُهَا وَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ
إنْ وَطِئَ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا شَيْءَ لَهَا وَيُحَلَّفُ مُنْكِرُ رَضَاعٍ عَلَى
نَفْيِ عِلْمِهِ، وَمُدَّعِيهِ عَلَى بَتٍّ، وَيَثْبُتُ بِشَهَادَةِ رَجُلَيْنِ
أَوْ رَجُلٍ وَامْرَأَتَيْنِ، وَبِأَرْبَعِ نِسْوَةٍ، وَالْإِقْرَارُ بِهِ
شَرْطُهُ رَجُلَانِ وَتُقْبَلُ شَهَادَةُ الْمُرْضِعَةِ إنْ لَمْ تَطْلُبْ
أُجْرَةً، وَلَا ذَكَرَتْ فِعْلَهَا، وَكَذَا إنْ ذَكَرَتْ فَقَالَتْ:
أَرْضَعْتُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا يَكْفِي بَيْنَهُمَا
رَضَاعٌ مُحَرِّمٌ، بَلْ يَجِبُ ذِكْرُ وَقْتٍ وَعَدَدٍ وَوُصُولِ اللَّبَنِ
جَوْفَهُ، وَيُعْرَفُ ذَلِكَ بِمُشَاهَدَةِ حُلَبِ وَإِيجَارٍ وَازْدِرَادٍ أَوْ
قَرَائِنَ كَالْتِقَامِ ثَدْيٍ وَمَصِّهِ وَحَرَكَةِ حَلْقِهِ بِتَجَرُّعٍ
وَازْدِرَادٍ بَعْدَ عِلْمِهِ بِأَنَّهَا لَبُونٌ خَاتِمَةٌ: لَوْ شَهِدَ
الشَّاهِدُ بِالرَّضَاعِ وَمَاتَ قَبْلَ تَفْصِيلِ شَهَادَتِهِ تَوَقَّفَ
الْقَاضِي وُجُوبًا فِي أَحَدِ وَجْهَيْنِ هُوَ الْمُتَّجَهُ، وَقَالَ
شَيْخُنَا: إنَّهُ الْأَقْرَبُ، وَالْإِقْرَارُ بِالرَّضَاعِ لَا يُشْتَرَطُ
فِيهِ التَّعَرُّضُ لِلشُّرُوطِ مِنْ الْفَقِيهِ الْمَوْثُوقِ بِمَعْرِفَتِهِ
دُونَ غَيْرِهِ كَمَا اسْتَحْسَنَهُ الرَّافِعِيُّ، وَفَرَّقَ بَيْنَ
الشَّهَادَةِ وَالْإِقْرَارِ بِأَنَّ الْمُقِرَّ يَحْتَاطُ لِنَفْسِهِ فَلَا
يُقِرُّ إلَّا عَنْ تَحْقِيقٍ، وَلَوْ شَهِدَتْ امْرَأَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ أَوْ
اثْنَتَانِ بِالرَّضَاعِ اُسْتُحِبَّ لِلزَّوْجِ أَنْ يُطَلِّقَهَا وَيُكْرَهُ
لَهُ الْمُقَامُ مَعَهَا، وَيُسَنُّ أَنْ يُعْطِيَ الْمُرْضِعَةَ شَيْئًا عِنْدَ
الْفِصَالِ وَالْأُولَى عِنْدَ أَوَانِهِ، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ مَمْلُوكَةً
اُسْتُحِبَّ لِلرَّضِيعِ بَعْدَ كَمَالِهِ أَنْ يُعْتِقَهَا؛ لِأَنَّهَا صَارَتْ
أُمًّا لَهُ، وَلَنْ يُجْزِئَ وَلَدُ وَالِدِهِ إلَّا بِإِعْتَاقِهِ كَمَا وَرَدَ
بِهِ الْخَبَرُ
Section
Where one makes an
admission that a certain person is one’s
daughter,
sister, or brother by fosterage,
one’s marriage with such person is for-
bidden. Where husband and wife declare
that their marriage was
effected in
contravention of the prescriptions relating
to fosterage, this
declaration suffices to
bring about their separation, and causes
the woman
to lose her right to
fixed dower. In these circumstances she
can only
claim proportional dower, at
any rate if the marriage has been
consum-
mated, for otherwise she can claim
nothing. Even if the husband alone
maintains that there exists between
him and his wife some prohibited
relationship by fosterage, the marriage
is dissolved even though the
wife
denies this relationship ; but in this
case she can insist upon payment
of
the full definite dower, if there
has been cohabitation, and otherwise
half.
Where, on the other hand, tho wife
alleges relationship by fosterage
and the
husband denies it, the law presumes
that he is speaking the truth,
provided he takes an oath, and
provided that the wife consented to the
marriage ; ffor if she was given
in marriage without her consent, the
presumption is in her favour. She
can in this latter case claim pro-
portional dower, if there has been
cohabitation ; otherwise she can claim
nothing.
Where an oath is tendered to
the party that denies the relationship
by fosterage it is enough for
him to affirm that he knows nothing
of it ;
but when it is
tendered to the party that asserts
that relationship, lie
must positively
affirm its existence. Relationship by
fosterage is
proved —
. By the
deposition of two male witnesses, or
of one man and two
women, or
of four women.
. By admission ;
but it must be understood that an
admission not
made at the hearing
must be proved by the deposition of
two male
witnesses.
The nurse
herself is admissible as a witness to
relationship by fosterage
— at any rate
where she has not taken a salary for
her services. She
may confine herself
to affirming simply that a relationship by
fosterage
exists, for she may prove a
fact personal to herself from which that
relationship follows, e.g. her giving
the breast to the child in question,
f As to other witnesses, relationship
by fosterage is not sufficiently estab-
lished by a deposition to the effect
that “there exists between the
husband
and wife a prohibited relationship by
fosterage,” but the date
must be
mentioned, the number of times the
nursling was given suck,
and the
fact that the milk penetrated into
the body. This fact is the
direct
consequence of the circumstances that one
has seen the child
sucking, that the
milk was introduced into the mouth
and that the child
swallowed it. It
may also be established by indirect
indications, e.g .
that the child took
the teat in its mouth, that the
lips made a movement
as if sucking,
or that the throat moved either as
if drinking the milk in
gulps or
as if swallowing it with a continuous
movement, supposing it
to be proved
that the woman’s breasts were not dry.
كتاب النَّفَقَاتِ
BOOK 46 .— MAINTENANCE
عَلَى مُوسِرٍ لِزَوْجَتِهِ كُلَّ يَوْمٍ مُدَّا طَعَامٍ، وَمُعْسِرٍ مُدٌّ،
وَمُتَوَسِّطٍ مُدٌّ وَنِصْفٌ، وَالْمُدُّ مِائَةٌ وَثَلَاثَةٌ وَسَبْعُونَ
دِرْهَمًا وَثُلُثُ دِرْهَمٍ.
قُلْت: الْأَصَحُّ مِائَةٌ وَأَحَدٌ
وَسَبْعُونَ وَثَلَاثَةُ أَسْبَاعِ دِرْهَمٍ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَمِسْكِينُ
الزَّكَاةِ مُعْسِرٌ، وَمَنْ فَوْقَهُ إنْ كَانَ لَوْ كُلِّفَ مُدَّيْنِ رَجَعَ
مِسْكِينًا فَمُتَوَسِّطٌ، وَإِلَّا فَمُوسِرٌ.
وَالْوَاجِبُ
غَالِبُ قُوتِ الْبَلَدِ قُلْت: فَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَ وَجَبَ لَائِقٌ بِهِ،
وَيُعْتَبَرُ الْيَسَارُ وَغَيْرُهُ طُلُوعَ الْفَجْرِ وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ،
وَعَلَيْهِ تَمْلِيكُهَا حَبًّا، وَكَذَا طَحْنُهُ وَخَبْزُهُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ طَلَبَ أَحَدُهُمَا بَدَلَ الْحَبِّ لَمْ
يُجْبَرْ الْمُمْتَنِعُ، فَإِنْ اعْتَاضَتْ جَازَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، إلَّا خُبْزًا
أَوْ دَقِيقًا عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ أَكَلْت مَعَهُ عَلَى
الْعَادَةِ سَقَطَتْ نَفَقَتُهَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْت: إلَّا
أَنْ تَكُونَ غَيْرَ رَشِيدَةٍ وَلَمْ يَأْذَنْ وَلِيُّهَا، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
وَيَجِبُ أُدْمُ غَالِبِ الْبَلَدِ كَزَيْتٍ وَسَمْنٍ
وَجُبْنٍ وَتَمْرٍ، وَيَخْتَلِفُ بِالْفُضُولِ، وَيُقَدِّرُهُ قَاضٍ
بِاجْتِهَادِهِ، وَيُفَاوِتُ بَيْنَ مُوسِرٍ وَغَيْرِهِ، وَلَحْمٌ يَلِيقُ
بِيَسَارِهِ وَإِعْسَارِهِ كَعَادَةِ الْبَلَدِ، وَلَوْ كَانَتْ تَأْكُلُ
الْخُبْزَ وَحْدَهُ وَجَبَ الْأُدْمُ.
وَكِسْوَةٌ تَكْفِيهَا،
فَيَجِبُ قَمِيصٌ، وَسَرَاوِيلُ وَخِمَارٌ وَمِكْعَبٌ، وَيَزِيدُ فِي الشِّتَاءِ
جُبَّةً، وَجِنْسُهَا قُطْنٌ، فَإِنْ جَرَتْ عَادَةُ الْبَلَدِ لِمِثْلِهِ
بِكَتَّانٍ أَوْ حَرِيرٍ وَجَبَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَجِبُ مَا
تَقْعُدُ عَلَيْهِ كَزِلِّيَّةٍ أَوْ لِبْدٍ أَوْ حَصِيرٍ، وَكَذَا فِرَاشٌ
لِلنَّوْمِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَمِخَدَّةٌ وَلِحَافٌ فِي الشِّتَاءِ.
وَآلَةُ
تَنْظِيفٍ كَمُشْطٍ، وَدُهْنٍ، وَمَا تُغْسَلُ بِهِ الرَّأْسُ، وَمَرْتَكٍ
وَنَحْوِهِ لِدَفْعِ صُنَانٍ، لَا كُحْلٍ وَخِضَابٍ وَمَا تَزَيَّنُ بِهِ،
وَدَوَاءِ مَرَضٍ، وَأُجْرَةِ طَبِيبٍ وَحَاجِمٍ.
وَلَهَا طَعَامُ
أَيَّامِ الْمَرَضِ وَأُدْمُهَا وَالْأَصَحُّ وُجُوبُ أُجْرَةِ حَمَّامٍ بِحَسَبِ
الْعَادَةِ، وَثَمَنِ مَاءِ غُسْلِ جِمَاعٍ وَنِفَاسٍ، فِي الْأَصَحِّ لَا حَيْضٍ
وَاحْتِلَامٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَهَا وَآلَاتُ أَكْلٍ وَشُرْبٍ
وَطَبْخٍ كَقِدْرٍ وَقَصْعَةٍ وَكُوزٍ وَجَرَّةٍ وَنَحْوِهَا.
وَمَسْكَنٌ
يَلِيقُ بِهَا، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ كَوْنُهُ مِلْكَهُ.
وَعَلَيْهِ
لِمَنْ لَا يَلِيقُ بِهَا خِدْمَةُ نَفْسِهَا إخْدَامُهَا بِحُرَّةٍ أَوْ أَمَةٍ
لَهُ أَوْ مُسْتَأْجَرَةٍ، أَوْ بِالْإِنْفَاقِ عَلَى مَنْ صَحِبَتْهَا مِنْ
حُرَّةٍ أَوْ أَمَةٍ لِخِدْمَةٍ وَسَوَاءٌ فِي هَذَا مُوسِرٌ وَمُعْسِرٌ
وَعَبْدٌ، فَإِنْ أَخْدَمَهَا بِحُرَّةٍ أَوْ أَمَةٍ بِأُجْرَةٍ فَلَيْسَ
عَلَيْهِ غَيْرُهَا أَوْ بِأَمَتِهِ أَنْفَقَ عَلَيْهَا بِالْمِلْكِ أَوْ بِمَنْ
صَحِبَتْهَا لَزِمَهُ نَفَقَتُهَا.
وَجِنْسُ طَعَامِهَا جِنْسُ
طَعَامِ الزَّوْجَةِ، وَهُوَ مُدٌّ عَلَى مُعْسِرٍ وَكَذَا مُتَوَسِّطٌ فِي
الصَّحِيحِ، وَمُوسِرٌ مُدٌّ وَثُلُثٌ وَلَهَا كِسْوَةٌ تَلِيقُ بِحَالِهَا،
وَكَذَا أُدْمٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، لَا آلَةُ تَنْظِيفٍ فَإِنْ كَثُرَ وَسَخٌ
وَتَأَذَّتْ بِقَمْلٍ وَجَبَ أَنْ تُرَفَّهَ.
وَمَنْ تَخْدُمُ
نَفْسَهَا فِي الْعَادَةِ إنْ احْتَاجَتْ إلَى خِدْمَةٍ لِمَرَضٍ أَوْ زَمَانَةٍ
وَجَبَ إخْدَامُهَا، وَلَا إخْدَامَ لِرَقِيقَةٍ، وَفِي الْجَمِيلَةِ
وَجْهٌ.
وَيَجِبُ فِي الْمَسْكَنِ إمْتَاعٌ، وَمَا يُسْتَهْلَكُ
كَطَعَامٍ تَمْلِيكٌ، وَتَتَصَرَّفُ فِيهِ فَلَوْ قَتَّرَتْ بِمَا يَضُرُّهَا
مَنَعَهَا، وَمَا دَامَ نَفْعُهُ كَكِسْوَةٍ وَظُرُوفِ طَعَامٍ وَمُشْطٍ
تَمْلِيكٌ، وَقِيلَ إمْتَاعٌ.
وَتُعْطَى الْكِسْوَةَ أَوَّلَ
شِتَاءٍ وَ صَيْفٍ، فَإِنْ تَلِفَتْ فِيهِ بِلَا تَقْصِيرٍ لَمْ تُبْدَلْ إنْ
قُلْنَا تَمْلِيكٌ، فَإِنْ مَاتَتْ فِيهِ لَمْ تُرَدَّ.
وَلَوْ لَمْ
يَكْسُ مُدَّةً فَدَيْنٌ.
BOOK 46 .— MAINTENANCE
Section
A
man who is quite solvent owes two
model of provisions a day to each
of
his wives, but a man who is
insolvent owes only one, and a man of
moderate means one and a half. A
modd is equivalent to one hundred
and seventy-three dralims and a third,
[fit is equivalent to one hundred
and seventy-one dralims and three-sevenths
of a drahm.]
By “insolvent” is
understood in this connection a man who
has
been admitted amongst those having
right to the charity tax through
poverty or indigence. A husband who
has no such right is regarded as
being of moderate means if he
cannot give his wives two modd a day
without ruining himself or without
thus coming to have a claim to tho
charity tax. Where, on the contrary,
his means permit him to give
two
modd without ruining himself, he is
called quite solvent.
Provisions due
as maintenance are such as form the
principal
nourishment of the majority of
the inhabitants of tho locality. [If
there is no principal nourishment in
general use one must give one’s
wives some suitable nourishment. Solvency,
insolvency, or a condition
of moderate
means must be determined for each
day at dawn.] One
may give one’s
wives provisions either in grain for
in the state of Hour
or bread ;
it being understood, however, that neither
husband nor wifo
can be forced to
give or to receive them except as
grain, unless with then
full consent,
fllie parties may also agree to
substitute other objects
for the
provisions, provided only, according to
our school, that the
grains once
given are not replaced by flour or
bread of the same kind,
f Moreover, a
husband has no need to give
provisions to a wife who comes
and
has her usual meals with him. [Where
a wife is of limited intelli-
gence the
fact of her taking her meals with
him does not free him from
the
obligation of giving her provisions,
unless her curator consents to
this.]
Besides provisions properly so called, one
must give one’s wives
the condiments
in use in the locality, e.g. olive
oil, butter, cheese, and
dates, according
to the season ; but the court when
determining the
quantity and quality of
the condiments should observe a difference
between a solvent and insolvent husband.
As to meat, it is local custom
that determines whether it need only
be given by a husband who is quite
solvent, or whether this obligation
exists also for the insolvent husband ;
condiments, on the other hand, are
due by every husband, even though
his wife receive no nourishment but
bread.
A husband must not only
supply his wife with necessary nourish-
ment, but he must also give her —
. Necessary clothing, that is
to say, a chemise, a pair of drawers, a
veil and a pair of sandals ; and
to this must in winter be added a
cotton
jobba for, if local custom
requires it, a jobba of some other
material,
e.g. linen or silk.
.
Something to sit on, e.g . a carpet, a
piece of felt or a mat ; fand
a bed
to lie on with a pillow, and in
winter a blanket.
. What is
necessary for her toilet, e.g. a comb
and pomade ; what
she requires for
washing her head ; litharge, etc., for
removing the fetid
odour of the body
; but not eye ointments, nor ingredients
for dyeing,
nor what only serves for
beautifying the person.
. Medicines,
when she is sick, and doctor’s and
surgeon’s fees.
She may insist on
having her ordinary nourishment during her
illness,
both the principal nourishment
and the condiments.
. fMoney enough
for the usual bath, as often as
is customary, and
also for the
special bath prescribed after coition and
accouchement ;
but the husband is
not bound to pay for the bath
specially prescribed
for menstruation and
lascivious dreams, as these are impurities
of which
he is not the cause.
. Utensils for eating, drinking,
and preparing food, such as a pot,
a
basin, a vase, a jar, etc.
. A
suitable lodging ; of which the law
does not require the husband
to be
the owner.
. Necessary servants, at
least where the wife is of a social
position
which does not permit her
to dispense with this. The servant
may be
either a free woman, or a
female slave of the husband, or one
he has
hired, or a free or slave
woman brought for the purpose by the
wife
from her father’s house, whom
the husband undertakes to support.
As
to the duty of procuring a servant
for one’s wife, the law makes no
distinction between a solvent and an
insolvent husband, nor even
between a free
man and a slave. If the servant is a
free woman or a slave
woman whose
services the husband has liked, he
is liable merely for the
wages
agreed upon ; but if it is one
of his own female slaves whom he
has given his wife as servant,
he owes her ordinary maintenance by
virtue of his right of ownership. A
servant brought by the wife from
her
father’s house can claim from the
husband the same nourishment as
the
wife, with the exception that she
receives only one modd of
provisions
from tin insolvent husband for one
of moderate means, and one
model and
a third from one quite solvent. Such a
servant can also
insist on the
husband providing her with clothes fund
suitable condi-
ments, but not what is
required for her toilet. On the
other hand, it
is only in case
of repulsive dirtiness, e,g . the presence
of vermin, that
the husband may take
notice of the servant’s toilet and
insist upon her
taking better care
of her person, at his expense. A
wife who in. con-
formity with custom
may dispense with a servant, may claim
one all the
same if necessary, e.g.
in case of sickness either acute or
chronic. A
slave wife can never
claim a servant in ordinary circumstances ;
but in
the case of a female slave
of remarkable beauty jurists are not in
agreement.
A wife must have the
enjoyment of the premises she occupies ;
but
her husband need not transfer
the ownership to her. On the other
hand,
what she receives for her
maintenance becomes her own, in the
case of
things that are consumed by
use, like provisions. She may also dispose
of them as she pleases ; only
if she imposes upon herself privations
that
affect her health, in order to
make a profit out of what her husband
gives her, has he the right to
object. As to things that deteriorate but
are not consumed by usage, such
as clothes, household utensils, or a comb,
these things also become the wife’s
property ; though some authorities
maintain
that the husband is merely bound to
procure her the enjoyment
of them. A
wife may insist upon her husband’s
giving her new clothes
tvTice a year,
i.e. at the beginning of winter and
the beginning of summer ;
and where
it is admitted that she becomes the
owner of the things the
husband is
not bound to replace them in case
of accidental loss. Where
this doctrine
is held, clothing given to a wife is
not returned to the
husband if she
dies during the season for which
such clothing was
intended ; but she
can claim the clothes or their value
even later, if
she docs not receive
them at the prescribed period.
فصل [في موجب المؤن ومسقطاتها]
الْجَدِيدُ أَنَّهَا تَجِبُ
بِالتَّمْكِينِ لَهَا، وَالْمُرَادُ بِالْوُجُوبِ اسْتِحْقَاقُهَا يَوْمًا
بِيَوْمِ كَمَا صَرَّحُوا بِهِ وَلَوْ حَصَلَ التَّمْكِينُ وَقْتَ الْغُرُوبِ
قَالَ الْإِسْنَوِيُّ: فَالْقِيَاسُ وُجُوبُهَا بِالْغُرُوبِ. اهـ.
وَالظَّاهِرُ
كَمَا قَالَ شَيْخُنَا أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ وُجُوبُهَا بِالْقِسْطِ، فَلَوْ حَصَلَ
ذَلِكَ وَقْتَ الظُّهْرِ فَيَنْبَغِي وُجُوبُهَا لِذَلِكَ مِنْ حِينَئِذٍ، وَهَلْ
التَّمْكِينُ سَبَبٌ أَوْ شَرْطٌ؟ فِيهِ وَجْهَانِ: أَوْجَهُهُمَا الثَّانِي،
وَاسْتُثْنِيَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ صُورَتَانِ: إحْدَاهُمَا مَا لَوْ مَنَعَتْ
نَفْسَهَا لِتَسْلِيمِ الْمَهْرِ الْمُعَيَّنِ أَوْ الْحَالِّ فَإِنَّ لَهَا
النَّفَقَةَ مِنْ حِينَئِذٍ، أَمَّا الْمُؤَجَّلُ فَلَيْسَ لَهَا حَبْسُ
نَفْسِهَا لَهُ وَإِنْ حَلَّ خِلَافًا لِلْإِسْنَوِيِّ.
الصُّورَةُ
الثَّانِيَةُ: مَا لَوْ أَرَادَ الزَّوْجُ سَفَرًا طَوِيلاً.
قَالَ
الْبَغَوِيّ فِي فَتَاوِيهِ: لِامْرَأَتِهِ لَا الْعَقْدِ.
فَإِنْ
اخْتَلَفَا فِيهِ صُدِّقَ، فَإِنْ لَمْ تَعْرِضْ عَلَيْهِ مُدَّةً فَلَا نَفَقَةَ
فِيهَا، وَإِنْ عَرَضَتْ وَجَبَتْ مِنْ بُلُوغِ الْخَبَرِ، فَإِنْ غَابَ كَتَبَ
الْحَاكِمُ لِحَاكِمِ بَلَدِهِ لِيُعْلِمَهُ فَيَجِيءَ أَوْ يُوَكِّلَ، فَإِنْ
لَمْ يَفْعَلْ وَمَضَى زَمَنُ وُصُولِهِ فَرَضَهَا الْقَاضِي.
وَالْمُعْتَبَرُ
فِي مَجْنُونَةٍ وَمُرَاهِقَةٍ عَرْضُ وَلِيٍّ.
وَتَسْقُطُ
بِنُشُوزٍ وَلَوْ بِمَنْعِ لَمْسٍ بِلَا عُذْرٍ، وَعَبَالَةُ زَوْجٍ، أَوْ مَرَضٌ
يَضُرُّ مَعَهُ الْوَطْءُ عُذْرٌ، وَالْخُرُوجُ مِنْ بَيْتِهِ بِلَا إذْنٍ
نُشُوزٌ إلَّا أَنْ يُشْرِفَ عَلَى انْهِدَامٍ.
وَسَفَرُهَا
بِإِذْنِهِ مَعَهُ أَوْ لِحَاجَتِهِ لَا يُسْقِطُ وَلِحَاجَتِهَا يَسْقُطُ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ نَشَزَتْ فَغَابَ فَأَطَاعَتْ لَمْ تَجِبْ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ وَطَرِيقُهَا أَنْ يَكْتُبَ الْحَاكِمُ كَمَا سَبَقَ.
وَلَوْ
خَرَجَتْ فِي غَيْبَتِهِ لِزِيَارَةٍ وَنَحْوِهَا لَمْ تَسْقُطْ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ
أَنْ لَا نَفَقَةَ لِصَغِيرَةٍ وَأَنَّهَا تَجِبُ لِكَبِيرَةٍ عَلَى
صَغِيرٍ.
وَإِحْرَامُهَا بِحَجٍّ أَوْ عُمْرَةٍ بِلَا إذْنٍ نُشُوزٌ
إنْ لَمْ يَمْلِكْ تَحْلِيلَهَا، فَإِنْ مَلَكَ فَلَا حَتَّى تَخْرُجَ
فَمُسَافِرَةٌ لِحَاجَتِهَا، أَوْ بِإِذْنٍ فَفِي الْأَصَحِّ لَهَا نَفَقَةٌ مَا
لَمْ تَخْرُجْ.
وَيَمْنَعُهَا صَوْمُ نَفْلٍ فَإِنْ أَبَتْ
فَنَاشِزَةٌ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ قَضَاءَهُ لَا يَتَضَيَّقُ
كَنَفْلٍ فَيَمْنَعُهَا، وَأَنَّهُ لَا مَنْعَ مِنْ تَعْجِيلِ مَكْتُوبَةٍ
أَوَّلَ وَقْتٍ، وَسُنَنٍ رَاتِبَةٍ.
وَتَجِبُ لِرَجْعِيَّةٍ
الْمُؤَنُ إلَّا مُؤْنَةَ تَنَظُّفٍ.
فَلَوْ ظُنَّتْ حَامِلاً
فَأَنْفَقَ فَبَانَتْ حَائِلاً اسْتَرْجَعَ مَا دَفَعَ بَعْدَ عِدَّتِهَا.
وَالْحَائِلُ
الْبَائِنُ بِخُلْعٍ أَوْ ثَلَاثٍ لَا نَفَقَةَ لَهَا وَلَا كِسْوَةَ،
وَيَجِبَانِ لِحَامِلٍ لَهَا، وَفِي قَوْلٍ لِلْحَمْلِ، فَعَلَى الْأَوَّلِ لَا
تَجِبُ لِحَامِلٍ عَنْ شُبْهَةٍ أَوْ نِكَاحٍ فَاسِدٍ.
قُلْت:
وَلَا نَفَقَةَ لِمُعْتَدَّةِ وَفَاةٍ وَإِنْ كَانَتْ حَامِلاً، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
وَنَفَقَةُ الْعِدَّةِ مُقَدَّرَةٌ كَزَمَنٍ النِّكَاحِ،
وَقِيلَ تَجِبُ الْكِفَايَةُ، وَلَا يَجِبُ دَفْعُهَا قَبْلَ ظُهُورِ حَمْلٍ،
فَإِذَا ظَهَرَ وَجَبَ يَوْمًا بِيَوْمٍ، وَقِيلَ حَتَّى تَضَعَ، وَلَا تَسْقُطُ
بِمُضِيِّ الزَّمَانِ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
Section
During his stay hi
Egypt Sliafii adopted the doctrine that a
wife’s
maintenance is obligatory only if
she puts herself at her husband’s dis-
position, and not in virtue of the
contract of marriage. The husband
has a
presumption in favour of his assertions
in any proceedings as to
the putting
of the wife at his disposition.
Consequently, a husband
owes his vfife no
maintenance so long as she refuses
to come to him ; but
owes it
from the moment he hears she is
willing to put heisclf at his
disposition. If the husband is
absent the court should send word to
him Unit his wife wishes to
come to him, through the court at
the place
where the husband is ; and
tho husband should then either return to
receive her, or appoint an agent
to do so and supply her with
the pre-
scribed maintenance. If he does
neither within a reasonable time, the
court may apply his property to
the maintenance of his wife. As to a
wife affected by madness, or one
not yet adult, the curator or guardian
should place her at her husband’s
disposition ; and this has the same
consequence as when an adult or
sane wife places herself at her husband’s
disposition.
A right to maintenance
ceases if tho wife is rebellious to
marital
authority ; even if it be
merely her husband’s touch which she
refuses
to permit without valid excuse.
The law considers, among others, as
valid excuses, giving a wife a right
to refuse herself to her husband, an
excessive development of the genital
organ in the husband, or a malady
of
the wife that would be aggravated by
coition. Leaving the conjugal
domicile
without first asking permission also
constitutes a fact incom-
patible with a wife’s
submission to marital authority, unless
the house
is threatening to fall
down. A journey undertaken with the husband’s
consent, either to accompany him, or
in his interest, does not in any way
interrupt his obligation to maintain
his wife. Only when the journey
is
undertaken in the particular and exclusive
interest of the wife is she
unable
to claim maintenance during her absence,
flf a disobedient
wife returns to her
duty during her husband’s absence on a
journey, she
cannot immediately re-enter
into the enjoyment of her rights. Sho
must plead her cause before the
court, in order that it may communicate
tho fact to the husband in the
manner already explained. A woman
who, in
the absence of her husband, quits
the conjugal domicile, even
without leave,
to go and see her family, etc.,
does not lose her right to
maintenance. An adult who marries a
young girl in her minority is not
bound to supply her with the
prescribed maintenance ; but an adult
woman married to a minor may claim
this, since it is not her fault that
the consummation of the marriage is
deferred.
The entering into a state
of Hiram for the pilgrimage or the
visit
constitutes an act of disobedience
on the part of the wife, if
the husband
has not authorised her
to do so, and if he has not
the right to break the
ihram. Where
he has this right tho woman’s
conduct is not an act of
disobedience, unless she quits the
conjugal domicile, fin the latter
case
she is regarded as having undertaken a
journey in her own interest,
and
must suffer all the consequences, f As
to the wife whose husband
has
permitted her to undertake the ihram , she
cannot claim ordinary
maintenance from the
moment of departure. The husband may
object
to his wife accomplishing a
supererogatory fast, *and if she insists
upon
doing so in spitu of his
forbidding her, she is disobedient. fAs
to a
fast which she is obliged
to undertake late because the legal
time is
elapsed, the husband may
object to his wife’s keeping this as
in the case
of a supererogatory fast,
provided that there is plenty of
time ; but in
no case can he
forbid his wife accomplishing her
obligatory daily prayers
as soon as
the legal hour has come, f And the
same is the case as to those
acts of devotion introduced by the
Sonna, that are accomplished at fixed
hours.
A woman revocably repudiated
may claim during her period of legal
retirement everything that was previously
her due, excepting the
expenses of
her toilet. Where in these circumstances a
woman is
reputed to be pregnant and
her husband consequently maintains her
beyond the period of ordinary
retirement, he may recover what she
has unduly received, if the
pregnancy appears never to have existed.
On the other hand, a woman
irrevocably separated, either by divorce,
or by three repudiations, cannot
claim maintenance, including clothing,
during
her period of legal retirement, unless
she is pregnant, for in this
latter
case she can claim both on her
own account ; or, according to one
authority, by reason of the child
she bears in her womb. Though we
admit with the majority that she
has this right on her own account,
wo
cannot admit a right to maintenance
of a woman who has become
pregnant
by the error of the husband who
thought she was his wife,
or who
had really married her but in an
illegal manner. [A woman
whose marriage
has been dissolved by her husband’s
decease can never
claim maintenance during
the period of her legal retirement
out of the
estate, even if she
is pregnant.]
Maintenance during the
period of legal retirement differs in
no respect
from maintenance during
marriage ; though, according to some autho-
rities, the former consists only of
what is strictly necessary. A woman,
however, cannot claim maintenance on
account of pregnancy before the
existence
of the foetus has been ascertained ;
but in the latter case it
must
be accorded her day by day, or,
according to others at the time of
her accouchement. According to our
school a woman’s right to claim
maintenance is not subject to
limitation, ix. her claim is receivable
even after the expiration of the
period of retirement.
فصل [في حكم الإعسار بمون الزوجة]
أَعْسَرَ بِهَا، فَإِنْ
صَبَرَتْ صَارَتْ دَيْنًا عَلَيْهِ، وَإِلَّا فَلَهَا الْفَسْخُ عَلَى
الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنْ لَا فَسْخَ بِمَنْعِ مُوسِرٍ حَضَرَ
أَوْ غَابَ، وَلَوْ حَضَرَ وَغَابَ مَالُهُ، فَإِنْ كَانَ بِمَسَافَةِ الْقَصْرِ
فَلَهَا الْفَسْخُ وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَيُؤْمَرُ بِالْإِحْضَارِ، وَلَوْ تَبَرَّعَ
رَجُلٌ بِهَا لَمْ يَلْزَمْهَا الْقَبُولُ، وَقُدْرَتُهُ عَلَى الْكَسْبِ
كَالْمَالِ، وَإِنَّمَا يُفْسَخُ بِعَجْزِهِ عَنْ نَفَقَةِ مُعْسِرٍ.
وَالْإِعْسَارُ
بِالْكِسْوَةِ كَهُوَ بِالنَّفَقَةِ، وَكَذَا بِالْأُدْمِ، وَالْمَسْكَنِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْت: الْأَصَحُّ الْمَنْعُ فِي الْأُدْمِ،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَفِي إعْسَارِهِ بِالْمَهْرِ أَقْوَالٌ:
أَظْهَرُهَا تُفْسَخُ قَبْلَ وَطْءٍ لَا بَعْدَهُ، وَلَا فَسْخَ حَتَّى يَثْبُتَ
عِنْدَ قَاضٍ إعْسَارُهُ فَيَفْسَخَهُ أَوْ يَأْذَنَ لَهَا فِيهِ ثُمَّ فِي
قَوْلٍ يُنَجَّزُ الْفَسْخُ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ إمْهَالُهُ ثَلَاثَةَ أَيَّامٍ،
وَلَهَا الْفَسْخُ صَبِيحَةَ الرَّابِعِ إلَّا أَنْ يُسَلِّمَ نَفَقَتَهُ، وَلَوْ
مَضَى يَوْمَانِ بِلَا نَفَقَةٍ وَأَنْفَقَ الثَّالِثَ وَعَجَزَ الرَّابِعَ
بَنَتْ، وَقِيلَ تَسْتَأْنِفُ.
وَلَهَا الْخُرُوجُ زَمَنَ
الْمُهْلَةِ لِتَحْصِيلِ النَّفَقَةِ، وَعَلَيْهَا الرُّجُوعُ لَيْلاً.
وَلَوْ
رَضِيَتْ بِإِعْسَارِهِ أَوْ نَكَحَتْهُ عَالِمَةً بِإِعْسَارِهِ فَلَهَا
الْفَسْخُ بَعْدَهُ، وَلَوْ رَضِيَتْ بِإِعْسَارِهِ بِالْمَهْرِ فَلَا، وَلَا
فَسْخَ لِوَلِيِّ صَغِيرَةٍ وَمَجْنُونَةٍ بِإِعْسَارٍ بِمَهْرٍ وَنَفَقَةٍ.
وَلَوْ
أَعْسَرَ زَوْجُ أَمَةٍ بِالنَّفَقَةِ فَلَهَا الْفَسْخُ، فَإِنْ رَضِيَتْ فَلَا
فَسْخَ لِلسَّيِّدِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَهُ أَنْ يُلْجِئَهَا إلَيْهِ بِأَنْ لَا
يُنْفِقَ عَلَيْهَا وَيَقُولَ: افْسَخِي أَوْ جُوعِي.
Section d
When a husband during his
marriage becomes so insolvent that he
can no longer give the minimum
maintenance prescribed, but his wife
in
spite of this continues to live with
him, the maintenance becomes a
debt
due to her from him and exigible
at any moment. *If she no longer
can bear such an insolvent husband,
she can at once demand the dis-
solution of the marriage, since her
husband no longer fulfils his obliga-
tions; fbut no such claim is
admissible against a solvent husband
refusing
his wife the prescribed maintenance. In
this latter case it
matters little
if the husband be present or absent.
On the other hand,
a claim for
dissolution is admissible if the husband
is present and solvent
but his
property is elsewhere, at a distance so
great as to admit of prayer
being
abridged. If this is not the case
the woman cannot obtain the
dissolution
of the marriage ; but the court
should then order the
husband to
send for the necessary money. A woman
is not obliged to
accept from
another as a gift the maintenance owed
her by her husband.
If a husband
gains enough money by his work to
maintain his
wife, it may be
admitted that he has sufficient substance
to allow
him to discharge his
pecuniary obligations towards her. And a claim
for dissolution of marriage on
account of complete insolvency is not
admissible unless the husband is
incapable of supplying his wife even
with the maintenance due from an
insolvent husband in ordinary cir-
cumstances. A
degree of complete insolvency is
manifested where a
husband is unable
to give not only the provisions that
constitute the
principal nourishment, but
also the clothing, the fcondiments, or the
habitation that the law requires, [f A
claim for dissolution should be
rejected
if it is founded merely upon the
fact that the husband is
unable to
supply condiments.]
* Where a husband is
unable to pay dower, dissolution of
marriage
is admissible, if the claim
is brought by the woman before
cohabitation ;
but not where the
marriage has been consummated ; and, moreover,
the court can pronounce dissolution
only where insolvency has been
duly
established. Where this insolvency is
proved the court must either
pronounce
dissolution of the marriage or authorise
the wife to pronounce
it herself.
*Three days’ respite must, however, first
be allowed. Only
one jurist admits
that dissolution may be pronounced without
allowing
any respite to the husband.
Where, with the majority, a respite of
three
days is insisted upon, the
wife is free to leave on the
morning of the fourth
day, unless
the husband then gives her maintenance
for this day. Where
for two whole
days the wife has not received her
maintenance and the
husband gives it
her only on the third day, and
then omits to do so on
the
fourth, the days of omission are
added together and the woman is
free
on the fifth. Only a few authors
maintain that three consecutive
days’
omission is necessary before the respite
expires. All agree that
during the
respit e enjoyed by the husband the
wife may quit the conjugal
domicile
to get necessary provisions, provided she
returns at night.
A husband cannot
oppose a demand for dissolution of
marriage by
alleging that his wife
has consented to share his pecuniary
embarrass-
ments, or that the marriage was
entered into by her with full knowledge
of the circumstances, for she is
not obliged to do without maintenance
longer than she likes. Where, on
the other hand, it is not the
prescribed
maintenance but the dower that
the husband cannot pay, he may
oppose a demand for dissolution of
marriage by a plea in bar. A demand
for dissolution of marriage cannot
be brought by the guardian of a minor
wife, nor by the curator of a
mad woman, unless a distinction be made
between incapacity to furnish maintenance
and that to pay dower. A
demand
for dissolution may be made by a
free wife or b^r a slave wife,
but
not by a master where the woman
wishes to share her husband’s lot.
A
master may only persuade his female
slave to demand a dissolution
of marriage
indirectly, e.g. by informing her that
he will not maintain
her so long
as she remains the wife of an
insolvent husband, and
that she must
therefore choose between dissolution of
marriage and
starvation.
فصل [في مؤن الأقارب]
يَلْزَمُهُ نَفَقَةُ الْوَالِدِ
وَإِنْ عَلَا، وَالْوَلَدِ وَإِنْ سَفَلَ، وَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَ دِينُهُمَا بِشَرْطِ
يَسَارِ الْمُنْفِقِ بِفَاضِلٍ عَنْ قُوتِهِ وَقُوتِ عِيَالِهِ فِي يَوْمِهِ،
وَيُبَاعُ فِيهَا مَا يُبَاعُ فِي الدَّيْنِ، وَيَلْزَمُ كَسُوبًا كَسْبُهَا فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا تَجِبُ لِمَالِكٍ كِفَايَتَهُ وَلَا
لِمُكْتَسِبِهَا، وَتَجِبُ لِفَقِيرٍ غَيْرِ مُكْتَسِبٍ إنْ كَانَ زَمِنًا أَوْ
صَغِيرًا أَوْ مَجْنُونًا وَإِلَّا فَأَقْوَالٌ أَحْسَنُهَا تَجِبُ، وَالثَّالِثُ
لِأَصْلٍ، لَا فَرْعٍ.
قُلْت: الثَّالِثُ أَظْهَرُ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ، وَهِيَ الْكِفَايَةُ.
وَتَسْقُطُ بِفَوَاتِهَا، وَلَا
تَصِيرُ دَيْنًا عَلَيْهِ إلَّا بِفَرْضِ قَاضٍ، أَوْ إذْنِهِ فِي اقْتِرَاضٍ
لِغَيْبَةٍ أَوْ مَنْعٍ.
وَعَلَيْهَا إرْضَاعُ وَلَدِهَا
اللِّبَأَ.
ثُمَّ بَعْدَهُ إنْ لَمْ يُوجَدْ إلَّا هِيَ أَوْ
أَجْنَبِيَّةٌ وَجَبَ إرْضَاعُهُ، وَإِنْ وُجِدَتَا لَمْ تُجْبَرْ الْأُمُّ،
فَإِنْ رَغِبَتْ وَهِيَ مَنْكُوحَةُ أَبِيهِ فَلَهُ مَنْعُهَا فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْت: الْأَصَحُّ لَيْسَ لَهُ مَنْعُهَا،
وَصَحَّحَهُ الْأَكْثَرُونَ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
فَإِنْ اتَّفَقَا
وَطَلَبَتْ أُجْرَةَ مِثْلٍ أُجِيبَتْ، أَوْ فَوْقَهَا فَلَا.
وَكَذَا
إنْ تَبَرَّعَتْ أَجْنَبِيَّةٌ أَوْ رَضِيَتْ بِأَقَلَّ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَمَنْ
اسْتَوَى فَرْعَاهُ أَنْفَقَا، وَإِلَّا فَالْأَصَحُّ أَقْرَبُهُمَا، فَإِنْ
اسْتَوَى فَبِالْإِرْثِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَالثَّانِي بِالْإِرْثِ ثُمَّ
الْقُرْبِ، وَالْوَارِثَانِ يَسْتَوِيَانِ، أَمْ يُوَزَّعُ بِحَسَبِهِ؟
وَجْهَانِ، وَمَنْ لَهُ أَبَوَانِ فَعَلَى الْأَبِ، وَقِيلَ عَلَيْهِمَا
لِبَالِغٍ، أَوْ أَجْدَادٌ وَجَدَّاتٌ إنْ أَدْلَى بَعْضُهُمْ بِبَعْضٍ
فَالْأَقْرَبُ، وَإِلَّا فَبِالْقُرْبِ، وَقِيلَ الْإِرْثُ، وَقِيلَ بِوِلَايَةِ
الْمَالِ، وَمَنْ لَهُ أَصْلٌ وَفَرْعٌ فَفِي الْأَصَحِّ عَلَى الْفَرْعِ، وَإِنْ
بَعُدَ أَوْ مُحْتَاجُونَ يُقَدِّمُ زَوْجَتَهُ ثُمَّ الْأَقْرَبَ، وَقِيلَ
الْوَارِثَ، وَقِيلَ الْوَلِيُّ.
Section
Ancestors and descendants
should maintain each other mutually
without distinction of sex or
religion, on the sole condition that the
individual against whom the claim is
brought, himself possesses more
than is
necessary for the maintenance of himself
and his household.
One should even
if necessary sell one’s property to
acquit oneself of this
obligation, as
if to pay an ordinary debt ; j*and
in default of property
that can be
realised, one should, if able to do
so, work for this purpose.
Only the
man who has or gains just what
he requires in order to
live is
not bound to maintain his ancestors
or descendants ; though
he should even
then admit them to his house and
his table, in the
case of —
.
A person who has nothing and through
illness cannot work.
. A minor or a
madman.
In all other cases the
duty of maintaining one’s ancestors or
descendants is rigorously obligatory ;
though some authorities do not
admit
this principle, and others admit it
only as to sustenance
due to
ascendants. [*These last-mentioned authorities
are evidently
right.]
Maintenance due
to ancestors or descendants consists only
in what is
strictly necessary, and a
claim for it is limited to the
term for which it
is due ; unless
there is a judgment ordering the
performance of this
duty, or permitting
the claimant to borrow in the case
of the absence
or the refusal of
the opposite party.
A mother should
nourish her child with the milk
which is manifested
immediately after
parturition ; she should even continue to
suckle it
afterwards when no other
nurse can be found but a foreign woman.
Where, on the other hand, one
can procure a nurse in the family, the
mother is not obliged to give
the child her breast, fand the
child’s father
even has the right to
oppose her performing this maternal duty,
[f The
husband’s opposition is inadmissible ;
this at least is the opinion of most
authorities.] Where husband and wife
agree that the suckling shall be
done by the mother herself, she
may require from him a reasonable but
not exorbitant remuneration. *But he
is not obliged to agree to this
demand for reasonable remuneration on
the part of his wife, if a foreign
woman offers to nourish the child
for nothing, or for some inferior
remuneration.
Maintenance is due
from all the descendants together, if
there is
no difference between them ;
but if they are not equal under all
respects fthe obligation is incumbent
on the nearest ; and in case of
equality of degree of relationship,
it exists only for that person who
will
be called to the succession.
Another doctrine, however, tends to con-
sider that a right to the succession
constitutes frima facie the basis of
the obligation to maintain one’s
ancestors, while the degree of relation-
ship is of secondary importance ; and
besides this jurists are not agreed
as to whether the heirs are
jointly responsible for the nourishment, or
only in proportion to their
respective shares.
In the ascendant
line a father is the first who
should maintain his
child ; and it
is only in a secondary degree that
the child can require
maintenance from
its mother ; only a few authors maintain
that father
and mother are equally
responsible, at least towards an adult
child.
In default of father and
mother, it is from one’s nearest
ancestors that
one may claim nourishment,
either those in the same line, or
ancestors
on the father’s and on the
mother’s side. Some jurists, hoAvever, con-
sider maintenance of descendants as a
charge attached to the succession,
while
others consider it as a charge inhering
to the right of guardianship
or
curatorship.
j* A person who has both
ancestoi’S and descendants alive should first
claim maintenance from the latter,
without respect to the distance of
degree of relationship. Where, on
the other hand, one has several
persons dependent upon one, one
should first discharge one’s duty
towards
one’s wife, and then that towards
one’s nearest relative ; or,
according to
some authorities, towards the one who
will be called to the
succession ;
or, according to others, to the one
who would be called to
the duty
of guardian or curator towards oneself.
فصل [في الْحَضَانَةِ]
الْحَضَانَةُ: حِفْظُ مَنْ لَا
يَسْتَقِلُّ وَتَرْبِيَتُهُ.
وَالْإِنَاثُ أَلْيَقُ بِهَا،
وَأَوْلَاهُنَّ أُمٌّ ثُمَّ أُمَّهَاتٌ يُدْلِينَ بِإِنَاثٍ يُقَدَّمُ
أَقْرَبُهُنَّ، وَالْجَدِيدُ تُقَدَّمُ بَعْدَهُنَّ أُمُّ أَبٍ ثُمَّ
أُمَّهَاتُهَا الْمُدْلِيَاتُ بِإِنَاثٍ ثُمَّ أُمُّ أَبِي أَبٍ كَذَلِكَ، ثُمَّ
أُمُّ أَبِي جَدٍّ كَذَلِكَ، وَالْقَدِيمُ الْأَخَوَاتُ وَالْخَالَاتُ
عَلَيْهِنَّ، وَتُقَدَّمُ أُخْتٌ عَلَى خَالَةٍ وَخَالَةٌ عَلَى بِنْتِ أَخٍ
وَأُخْتٍ، وَبِنْتُ أَخٍ وَأُخْتٍ عَلَى عَمَّةٍ، وَأُخْتٌ مِنْ أَبَوَيْنِ عَلَى
أُخْتِ أَحَدِهِمَا، وَالْأَصَحُّ تَقْدِيمُ أُخْتٍ مِنْ أَبٍ عَلَى أُخْتٍ مِنْ
أُمٍّ وَخَالَةٍ وَعَمَّةٍ لِأَبٍ عَلَيْهِمَا لِأُمٍّ، وَسُقُوطُ كُلِّ جَدَّةٍ
لَا تَرِثُ دُونَ أُنْثَى غَيْرِ مَحْرَمٍ كَبِنْتِ خَالَةٍ.
وَتَثْبُتُ
لِكُلِّ ذَكَرٍ مَحْرَمٍ وَارِثٍ عَلَى تَرْتِيبِ الْإِرْثِ، وَكَذَا غَيْرُ
مَحْرَمٍ كَابْنِ عَمٍّ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَلَا تُسَلَّمُ إلَيْهِ مُشْتَهَاةٌ
بَلْ إلَى ثِقَةٍ يُعَيِّنُهَا.
فَإِنْ فُقِدَ الْإِرْثُ
وَالْمَحْرَمِيَّةُ أَوْ الْإِرْثُ فَلَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِنْ
اجْتَمَعَ ذُكُورٌ وَإِنَاثٌ فَالْأُمُّ ثُمَّ أُمَّهَاتُهَا ثُمَّ الْأَبُ،
وَقِيلَ تُقَدَّمُ عَلَيْهِ الْخَالَةُ وَالْأُخْتُ مِنْ الْأُمِّ، وَيُقَدَّمُ
الْأَصْلُ عَلَى الْحَاشِيَةِ، فَإِنْ فُقِدَ فَالْأَصَحُّ الْأَقْرَبُ، وَإِلَّا
فَالْأُنْثَى، وَإِلَّا فَيُقْرَعُ.
وَلَا حَضَانَةَ لِرَقِيقٍ
وَمَجْنُونٍ، وَفَاسِقٍ وَكَافِرٍ عَلَى مُسْلِمٍ وَنَاكِحَةِ غَيْرِ أَبِي
الطِّفْلِ إلَّا عَمَّهُ وَابْنَ عَمِّهِ وَابْنَ أَخِيهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ
كَانَ رَضِيعًا اُشْتُرِطَ أَنْ تُرْضِعَهُ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
فَإِنْ
كَمُلَتْ نَاقِصَةٌ أَوْ طَلُقَتْ مَنْكُوحَةٌ حَضَنَتْ، وَإِنْ غَابَتْ الْأُمُّ
أَوْ امْتَنَعَتْ فَلِلْجَدَّةِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، هَذَا كُلُّهُ فِي غَيْرِ
مُمَيِّزٍ.
وَالْمُمَيِّزُ إنْ افْتَرَقَ أَبَوَاهُ كَانَ عِنْدَ
مَنْ اخْتَارَ مِنْهُمَا، فَإِنْ كَانَ فِي أَحَدِهِمَا جُنُونٌ أَوْ كُفْرٌ أَوْ
رِقٌّ أَوْ فِسْقٌ أَوْ نَكَحَتْ فَالْحَقُّ لِلْآخَرِ، وَيُخَيَّرُ بَيْنَ أُمٍّ
وَجَدٍّ، وَكَذَا أَخٌ أَوْ عَمٌّ أَوْ أَبٌ مَعَ أُخْتٍ أَوْ خَالَةٍ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، فَإِنْ اخْتَارَ أَحَدَهُمَا ثُمَّ الْآخَرَ حُوِّلَ إلَيْهِ، فَإِنْ
اخْتَارَ الْأَبَ ذَكَرٌ لَمْ يَمْنَعْهُ زِيَارَةُ أُمِّهِ وَيَمْنَعُ أُنْثَى،
وَلَا يَمْنَعُهَا دُخُولاً عَلَيْهِمَا زَائِرَةً، وَالزِّيَارَةُ مَرَّةً فِي
أَيَّامٍ، فَإِنْ مَرِضَا فَالْأُمُّ أَوْلَى بِتَمْرِيضِهِمَا فَإِنْ رَضِيَ
بِهِ فِي بَيْتِهِ، وَإِلَّا فَفِي بَيْتِهَا، وَإِنْ اخْتَارَهَا ذَكَرٌ
فَعِنْدَهَا لَيْلاً، وَعِنْدَ الْأَبِ نَهَارًا، وَيُؤَدِّبُهُ وَيُسَلِّمُهُ
لِمَكْتَبٍ أَوْ حِرْفَةٍ، أَوْ أُنْثَى فَعَنَدَهَا لَيْلاً وَنَهَارًا،
وَيَزُورُهَا الْأَبُ عَلَى الْعَادَةِ، وَإِنْ اخْتَارَهُمَا أَقُرِعَ فَإِنْ
لَمْ يَخْتَرْ فَالْأُمُّ أَوْلَى، وَقِيلَ يُقْرَعُ.
وَلَوْ
أَرَادَ أَحَدُهُمَا سَفَرَ حَاجَةٍ كَانَ الْوَلَدُ الْمُمَيِّزُ وَغَيْرُهُ
مَعَ الْمُقِيمِ حَتَّى يَعُودَ، أَوْ سَفَرَ نُقْلَةٍ فَالْأَبُ أَوْلَى
بِشَرْطِ أَمْنِ طَرِيقِهِ وَالْبَلَدِ الْمَقْصُودِ، قِيلَ وَمَسَافَةُ
قَصْرٍ.
وَمَحَارِمُ الْعَصَبَةِ فِي هَذَا كَالْأَبِ، وَكَذَا
ابْنُ عَمٍّ لِذَكَرٍ وَلَا يُعْطَى أُنْثَى، فَإِنْ رَافَقَتْهُ بِنْتُهُ
سُلِّمَ إلَيْهَا.
Section
By the education of a
child is understood —
. Its
supervision for all those matters in
which it could not act for
itself.
. The care given to it,
and the cultivation of its mind.
The first of these occupations
is more particularly a woman’s duty.
It
is confided first of all to the
mother and her female ancestors through
women, in order of proximity. During
his Egyptian period Shafii
embraced the
doctrine that, in default of a mother
and her female
ancestors, through women,
the education goes to the father’s
mother and
her female ancestors through
women, and after that to the grandfather’s
mother and her female ancestors
through women. In his first period,
however, the Imam allowed priority
to sisters, and even to maternal
aunts, over all female ancestors on
the father’s side. In any case a
sister has priority over a maternal
aunt, and the latter over a niece.
A
niece has priority over a paternal aunt, a
full sister over a half sister
on
either side, fa half sister on the
father’s side over a half sister on the
mother’s side, and an aunt who
is half sister on the father’s side
of the
father or mother over one
who is half sister on the mother’s
side of the
father or mother, f An
incapacity to inherit, due to a male
degree of
relationship between two women,
suffices also to exclude female ancestors
from the function of education ; but
incapacity to inherit is not a reason
for the exclusion of other women
whose degree of relationship would be
no obstacle to marriage, e.g. a
daughter of a maternal aunt. In default
of women the education falls to
the charge of all male inheritors within
a prohibited degree, in the order in
which they would be called to the
succession, ffand secondarily it is
confided to every male inheritor of
a
still more distant degree of relationship,
such as the son of a paternal
uncle.
However, a young girl must never be
confided to an inheritor
with whom
marriage is not prohibited and who
shows a liking for her ;
but if
her education falls to his charge,
he must confide her to the care of
some reliable woman chosen by him.
Male relatives, of whatever degree,
who
are not called to the succession,
fare not called to the duty of
educa-
tion ; and in case of claims
by male and female relatives, priority is
accorded to the mother, then to
the female ancestors through women,
and
lastly to the father ; while according
to some authorities even a
maternal
aunt and a half sister on the
mother’s side have priority over
him.
In general the ascendant line has
priority always over a collateral
one ;
where two persons are equally competent
in this respect, priority
belongs to
the nearer ; fif they are of the
same degree the woman has
the
priority ; and if there is no legal
difference the matter should be
decided
by lot.
The education of a child
can never be entrusted to —
. A
slave, a mad man or woman, or a
person of notorious misconduct.
. An
infidel, if the child is a Moslem.
. Its mother, if she has
married again ; unless with its paternal
uncle, cousin on the father’s side,
or son of half brother on the
father’s
side.
ffThe education of a
child implies also the duty of
suckling it or
having it suckled, if
it is not yet weaned. Personal
incapacity to under-
take the duty of
education ceases with its cause ; and
so does incapacity
due to a marriage
or repudiation. In case of the
mother’s absence or
incapacity, her mother
is invested with all her rights.
The rules mentioned in the
present section relate only to a child who
has not yet reached the age of
discernment. If the child has attained
this age it may choose with
which of its parents it prefers to
stay after
their separation, provided
neither the father nor the mother
are mad,
infidel, a slave or of
notorious misconduct, and provided the
mother has
not married again. In any
of these cases the child must remain
with the
other parent. It has the
right to choose, not only between
its father
and mother, but also
between its mother and father’s father
in case of
the predecease of its
father, and also, if there is
occasion for this, between
its brother,
father’s brother and father on the
one side, and its sister,
half
sister, or mother’s sister on the
other. Even if it has once chosen,
there is no objection to its
afterwards choosing the other parent ; and
if
a son chooses his father, this
does not prejudice his right to go
and visit
his mother when he likes.
But a daughter loses this right, when
she has
declared that she prefers to
remain with her father instead of
with her
mother as she would
naturally do. But the father may
never prevent
the mother coming to
see her children of either sex,
provided there is
no more than one
visit on one day. In case of
sickness a mother has by
preference the
right of tending her child of either
sex, and, if necessary, of
having it
taken to her house for that purpose,
if the father refuses to
allow her
to go and stay at his house. A
son who chooses his mother
only
remains with her for the night, but
must pass the day with his father,
in order that the latter may
form his character, send him to
school, and
make him learn a trade.
On the other hand, a daughter must
in these
circumstances remain with her
mother, day and night, without pre-
judice
to the father’s right to come and
see her as often as may be
customary. When a child wants to
live with its father and with its
mother, the matter should be decided
by lot ; and if it refuses to choose
the mother has the preference as
the person to whom the law entrusts
the education in the first place.
Only a few authors require that in this
case the matter should be decided
by lot. If one of the parents
has to
leave on a necessary journey, a
child of either sex must remain with
the
other, until the return of the
former ; but if the journey amounts
to a
change of domicile a father has
a right to take his children with him,
provided the place he is going
to and the way there are safe. Some
authorities also require that the
new domicile must be at a distance
permitting the abridgment of prayer.
In default of the father his
agnates within the prohibited degrees are
invested with his rights ; and so
is the cousin on the father’s side,
in
the case of a boy, though not
in that of a girl. In the latter
case the child
must be intrusted to
the cousin’s daughter, if she lives
with him.
فصل [في مؤنة المماليك وتوابعها]
عَلَيْهِ كِفَايَةُ
رَقِيقِهِ نَفَقَةً، وَكِسْوَةً وَإِنْ كَانَ أَعْمَى زَمِنًا وَمُدَبَّرًا
وَمُسْتَوْلَدَةً مِنْ غَالِبِ قُوتِ رَقِيقِ الْبَلَدِ وَأُدْمِهِمْ
وَكِسْوَتِهِمْ، وَلَا يَكْفِي سِتْرُ الْعَوْرَةِ.
وَسُنَّ أَنْ
يُنَاوِلَهُ مِمَّا يَتَنَعَّمُ بِهِ مِنْ طَعَامٍ وَأُدْمٍ وَكِسْوَةٍ.
وَتَسْقُطُ
بِمُضِيِّ الزَّمَانِ وَيَبِيعُ الْقَاضِي فِيهَا مَالَهُ، فَإِنْ فُقِدَ
الْمَالُ أَمَرَهُ بِبَيْعِهِ أَوْ إعْتَاقِهِ.
وَيُجْبِرُ أَمَتَهُ
عَلَى إرْضَاعِ وَلَدِهَا، وَكَذَا غَيْرُهُ إنْ فَضَلَ عَنْهُ، وَفَطْمِهِ
قَبْلَ حَوْلَيْنِ إنْ لَمْ يَضُرَّهُ، وَإِرْضَاعِهِ بَعْدَهُمَا إنْ لَمْ
يَضُرَّهَا.
وَلِلْحُرَّةِ حَقٌّ فِي التَّرْبِيَةِ، فَلَيْسَ
لِأَحَدِهِمَا فَطْمُهُ قَبْلَ حَوْلَيْنِ وَلَهُمَا إنْ لَمْ يَضُرَّهُ،
وَلِأَحَدِهِمَا بَعْدَ حَوْلَيْنِ، وَلَهُمَا الزِّيَادَةُ.
وَلَا
يُكَلِّفُ رَقِيقَهُ إلَّا عَمَلاً يُطِيقُهُ، وَيَجُوزُ مُخَارَجَتُهُ بِشَرْطِ
رِضَاهُمَا وَهِيَ: خَرَاجٌ يُؤَدِّيهِ كُلَّ يَوْمٍ أَوْ أُسْبُوعٍ،
وَعَلَيْهِ عَلْفُ دَوَابِّهِ، وَسَقْيُهَا، فَإِنْ امْتَنَعَ أُجْبِرَ فِي
الْمَأْكُولِ عَلَى بَيْعٍ أَوْ عَلْفٍ أَوْ ذَبْحٍ، وَفِي غَيْرِهِ عَلَى بَيْعٍ
أَوْ عَلْفٍ وَلَا يَحْلِبُ مَا ضَرَّ وَلَدَهَا وَمَا لَا رُوحَ لَهُ، كَقَنَاةٍ
وَدَارٍ لَا تَجِبُ عِمَارَتُهَا.
Section
A master must give his
slaves the nourishment and clothing of
which
they have need, even if the
slave be blind or sickly, or one
enfranchised
by the terms of a will,
or on account of maternity. Nourishment
includes ordinary provisions given to
slaves in that locality ; and the
same with condiments. As to
clothing, it is enough to give slaves
merely what is sufficient to cover
the shameful parts, but they must be
clothed as local custom requires.
The Sonna has also introduced the
practice of giving them sound
nourishment both in the principal food
and in the condiments, and of
supplying them with clothing suitable for
the climate. A slave cannot afterwards
claim damages for the main-
tenance his
master has neglected to give him,
but he should make a
complaint at
once to the court, which can proceed
immediately to the
sale of the
master’s property and apply the proceeds
to the maintenance
of the slave ;
or, in default of any such property,
may order the sale
or even the
enfranchisement of the slave.
A master
may oblige his female slave to
suckle a child to which she
has
given birth ; and even another’s child,
if she has more milk than is
required to suckle her own. He
may also oblige her, either to wean
her
child before the regular period
of two years provided the weaning is
not
injurious to the nursling’s health,
or to continue suckling it after that
term, provided this is not injurious
to the health of the mother. It is
only a free woman that has rights
as to suckling and education which
she can insist upon as against
her husband. Thus, in case of marriage
between free persons neither of the
parties can cause the child to be
weaned before the expiry of the
prescribed period of two years, except
with the other’s consent ; and this
can only be given on condition that
the child’s health does not suffer
by it. On the other hand, either
paity
may insist upon the child’s
being weaned at the time prescribed
by the
law ; while they may jointly
agree to postpone this until after that
term.
One may not exact from a
slave any labour incompatible with his
strength or aptitudes ; nor can ho
on his part oblige his master to
excuse him from performing any
suitable task. The law admits the
validity of the mokharaja, i.e. an
agreement between a master and his
slave
by which the latter may dispose of
his labour for a daily or weekly
wage to be paid to the former.
One is obliged to maintain
one’s domestic animals, by giving them
necessary fodder and water, and if
this duty is neglected the court may
oblige the master either to sell
the animal or suitably maintain it ; or
kill it, at least if it is
an animal that can be used as
human food, other-
wise the master has
no choice between sale or maintenance.
An animal
must not be milked in
such a way as to injure the young
to which she
has given birth : but
as to inanimate objects, such as an
aqueduct or a
house, the master may
use or abuse them as he pleases,
and no one can
oblige him to
see to their upkeep. []