Book 11: Pledge or Security (Rahn)
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature dan reference: classical Arabic books
Contents
- Book 11: Pledge or Security (Rahn)
- Book 12: Bankruptcy, etc (Taflis)
- Chapter I Bankruptcy
- Chapter II Incapacity of lunatics, minors, and spendthrifts
- Chapter III Compromise, and right of way
- Chapter IV Transference of debts
- Chapter V Guaranty
- Book 13: Partnership (Shirkah)
- Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi
كتاب الرَّهْنِ
BOOK 11 .— PLEDGE OF SECURITY
لَا يَصِحُّ إلَّا بِإِيجَابٍ وَقَبُولٍ فَإِنْ شُرِطَ فِيهِ مُقْتَضَاهُ
كَتَقَدُّمِ الْمُرْتَهِنِ بِهِ أَوْ مَصْلَحَةٌ لِلْعَقْدِ كَالْإِشْهَادِ أَوْ
مَا لَا غَرَضَ فِيهِ صَحَّ الْعَقْدُ.
وَإِنْ شُرِطَ مَا يَضُرُّ
الْمُرْتَهِنَ بَطَلَ الرَّهْنُ، وَإِنْ نَفَعَ الْمُرْتَهِنَ وَضَرَّ الرَّاهِنَ
كَشَرْطِ مَنْفَعَتِهِ لِلْمُرْتَهِنِ بَطَلَ الشَّرْطُ، وَكَذَا: الرَّهْنُ
فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ شُرِطَ أَنْ تَحْدُثَ زَوَائِدُهُ
مَرْهُونَةً فَالْأَظْهَرُ فَسَادُ الشَّرْطِ، وَأَنَّهُ مَتَى فَسَدَ فَسَدَ
الْعَقْدُ.
وَشَرْطُ الْعَاقِدِ كَوْنُهُ مُطْلَقَ التَّصَرُّفِ
فَلَا يَرْهَنُ الْوَلِيُّ مَالَ الصَّبِيِّ وَالْمَجْنُونِ، وَلَا يَرْتَهِنُ
لَهُمَا إلَّا لِضَرُورَةٍ أَوْ غِبْطَةٍ ظَاهِرَةٍ.
وَشَرْطُ
الرَّهْنِ كَوْنُهُ عَيْنًا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَصِحُّ رَهْنُ
الْمُشَاعِ وَالْأُمِّ دُونَ وَلَدِهَا وَعَكْسُهُ، وَعِنْدَ الْحَاجَةِ
يُبَاعَانِ وَيُوَزَّعُ الثَّمَنُ وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنْ تُقَوَّمَ الْأُمُّ
وَحْدَهَا ثُمَّ مَعَ الْوَلَدِ فَالزَّائِدُ قِيمَتُهُ.
وَرَهْنُ
الْجَانِي وَالْمُرْتَدِّ كَبَيْعِهِمَا.
وَرَهْنُ الْمُدَبَّرِ
وَالْمُعَلَّقِ عِتْقُهُ بِصِفَةٍ يُمْكِنُ سَبْقُهَا حُلُولَ الدَّيْنِ بَاطِلٌ
عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ رَهَنَ مَا يَسْرُعُ فَسَادُهُ فَإِنْ
أَمْكَنَ تَجْفِيفُهُ كَرُطَبٍ فَعَلَ، وَإِلَّا رَهَنَهُ بِدَيْنٍ حَالٍّ أَوْ
مُؤَجَّلٍ يَحِلُّ قَبْلَ فَسَادِهِ أَوْ شَرَطَ بَيْعَهُ وَجَعَلَ الثَّمَنَ
رَهْنًا صَحَّ، وَيُبَاعُ عِنْدَ خَوْفِ فَسَادِهِ وَيَكُونُ ثَمَنُهُ رَهْنًا،
وَإِنْ شَرَطَ مَنْعَ بَيْعِهِ لَمْ يَصِحَّ.
وَإِنْ أَطْلَقَ
فَسَدَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يُعْلَمْ هَلْ يَفْسُدُ قَبْلَ الْأَجَلِ
صَحَّ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَإِنْ رَهَنَ مَا لَا يَسْرُعُ فَسَادُهُ
فَطَرَأَ مَا عَرَّضَهُ لِلْفَسَادِ كَحِنْطَةٍ ابْتَلَّتْ لَمْ يَنْفَسِخْ
الرَّهْنُ بِحَالٍ.
وَيَجُوزُ أَنْ يَسْتَعِيرَ شَيْئًا
لِيَرْهَنَهُ، وَهُوَ فِي قَوْلٍ عَارِيَّةٌ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ ضَمَانُ
دَيْنٍ فِي رَقَبَةِ ذَلِكَ الشَّيْءِ فَيُشْتَرَطُ ذِكْرُ جِنْسِ الدَّيْنِ
وَقَدْرِهِ وَصِفَتِهِ، وَكَذَا الْمَرْهُونُ عِنْدَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَلَوْ
تَلِفَ فِي يَدِ الْمُرْتَهِنِ فَلَا ضَمَانَ وَلَا رُجُوعَ لِلْمَالِكِ بَعْدَ
قَبْضِ الْمُرْتَهِنِ، فَإِذَا حَلَّ الدَّيْنُ أَوْ كَانَ حَالًّا رُوجِعَ
الْمَالِكُ لِلْبَيْعِ.
وَيُبَاعُ إنْ لَمْ يَقْضِ الدَّيْنَ ثُمَّ
يَرْجِعُ الْمَالِكُ بِمَا بِيعَ بِهِ.
BOOK 11 .— PLEDGE OF SECURITY
Section
Security cannot
be legally given except by mutual
consent of the
parties interested, i.e .
by offer and acceptance. There may
be added a
stipulation, of the very
essence of the contract, to the
effect that the
creditor shall have a
right of preference on the sale of
the thing pledged ;
or a stipulation
tending to strengthen the contract, as,
e.g. that it should
bo concluded in
the presence of witness ; or even a
stipulation without
any reasonable object.
But a stipulation that would prevent the
creditor
exercising his right would
nullify the contract. A stipulation profiting
the creditor to the detriment of
the debtor, e.g . allowing the former
exclusive and unlimited use of the
article, is null, *and consequently
nullifies the contract. *A stipulation
that all increase in the thing shall
remain pledged with him is unlawful,
and causes the illegality, but not
the nullity of the contract. The
contracting parties must have the
free
disposition of then property ; consequently
the goods of a minor
or a lunatic
cannot be given in security by the
guardian or curator,
except in case
of absolute necessity or obvious
advantage. It is only on
the same
condition that a guardian or curator may
stipulate a pledging
of property in order
to secure the payment of debts due
to the persons
in their charge, for
under ordinary circumstances these debts
should be
recovered as soon as possible.
j*The thing given as security
should be something definite and pre-
cise. An undivided share in something
owned in common by several
persons
may be given in security ; or even a
slave without her child, or,
vice versa ,
the child without its mother, although
in these cases a sale
would be
unlawful, and consequently in case of
an execution sale mother
and child
must be put up to auction together.
In this latter case the
proceeds are
divided between creditor and debtor in
proportion to the
value of the
mother and of the child. First the
mother alone is put up
to auction,
and then both together ; the difference
gives the value of
the child. The
pledging of a slave guilty of a crime,
or of an apostate
slave, is subject
to the same rules as their sale.
The pledging of a slave
to bo
enfranchised under the provisions of a
will, and that of a slave
whoso
enfranchisement may become obligatory before
the satisfaction
of the debt, are
void, according to our school.
Li
the case of pledging of things
liable to rapid deterioration that
may
be preserved in a dry state, like
dates, drying must be resorted to.
If this is impossible, giving such
produce in security is only lawful
in the
case of a debt due
immediately, or due before deterioration
is likely to
commence. Otherwise the
contract may be effected only on the
express
condition that the thing shall
be sold and the proceeds of the
sale remain
pledged ; and even then
the sale may only take place at
the moment it
is feared deterioration
will begin. The proceeds thus remain
pledged,
instead of the thing itself. A
stipulation tending to exclude the right
to sell under these circumstances
nullifies the security, in the same way
as an omission to stipulate with
regard to the sale and the price,
at least
when it is known that
deterioration will occur before the due
date. *If
this fact is not known,
the absence of such a clause does
not invalidate
the contract. If something
has been pledged which, though not
naturally liable to rapid deterioration,
is accidentally exposed to such
an
occurrence, as for instance wheat that
has become damp, the security
remains
valid, in spite of the accident.
It is lawful to borrow a thing
in order to pledge it, a proceeding
which one authority regards as
coming under the same rules as a gratui-
tous loan, *but most consider as a
real security. In any case one must
mention the nature, amount, and
details of the bond and of the other
sureties ; and if the thing lent
is accidentally lost when in the
creditor’s
possession he is not liable
for it. The owner of an article
borrowed in
this way cannot claim to
have it back once it is in the
creditor’s pos-
session. On the expiry of
the term allowed for payment, or, if
the
contract admits of it, at once,
the owner must, on the creditor’s demand,
sell the article lent, if the
debtor has not yet paid. The owner
of the
article can then, of courso,
seize the debtor’s goods and recover the
amount of the sale.
فصل [في شروط المرهون به ولزوم الرهن]
شَرْطُ الْمَرْهُونِ بِهِ
كَوْنُهُ دَيْنًا ثَابِتًا لَازِمًا.
فَلَا يَصِحُّ بِالْعَيْنِ
الْمَغْصُوبَةِ وَالْمُسْتَعَارَةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَا بِمَا
سَيُقْرِضُهُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: أَقْرَضْتُك هَذِهِ الدَّرَاهِمَ
وَارْتَهَنْتُ بِهَا عَبْدَكَ فَقَالَ اقْتَرَضْتُ وَرَهَنْتُ أَوْ قَالَ
بِعْتُكَهُ بِكَذَا وَارْتَهَنْتُ الثَّوْبَ بِهِ فَقَالَ اشْتَرَيْتُ وَرَهَنْتُ
صَحَّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَا يَصِحُّ بِنُجُومِ الْكِتَابَةِ وَلَا بِجَعْلِ
الْجَعَالَةِ قَبْلَ الْفَرَاغِ، وَقِيلَ يَجُوزُ بَعْدَ الشُّرُوعِ.
وَيَجُوزُ
بِالثَّمَنِ فِي مُدَّةِ الْخِيَارِ.
وَبِالدَّيْنِ رَهْنٌ بَعْدَ
رَهْنٍ، وَلَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَرْهَنَهُ الْمَرْهُونَ عِنْدَهُ بِدَيْنٍ آخَرَ فِي
الْجَدِيدِ.
وَلَا يَلْزَمُ إلَّا بِقَبْضِهِ مِمَّنْ يَصِحُّ
عَقْدُهُ وَتَجْرِي فِيهِ النِّيَابَةُ لَكِنْ لَا يَسْتَنِيبُ الرَّاهِنَ وَلَا
عَبْدَهُ، وَفِي الْمَأْذُونِ لَهُ وَجْهٌ، وَيَسْتَنِيبُ مُكَاتَبَهُ وَلَوْ
رَهَنَ وَدِيعَةً عِنْدَ مُودِعٍ أَوْ مَغْصُوبًا عِنْدَ غَاصِبٍ لَمْ يَلْزَمْ
مَا لَمْ يَمْضِ زَمَنُ إمْكَانِ قَبْضِهِ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ اشْتِرَاطُ إذْنِهِ فِي
قَبْضِهِ وَلَا يُبَرِّئُهُ ارْتِهَانُهُ عَنْ الْغَصْبِ، وَيُبَرِّئُهُ
الْإِيدَاعُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَحْصُلُ الرُّجُوعُ عَنْ الرَّهْنِ
قَبْلَ الْقَبْضِ بِتَصَرُّفٍ يُزِيلُ الْمِلْكَ كَهِبَةٍ مَقْبُوضَةٍ وَبِرَهْنٍ
مَقْبُوضٍ وَكِتَابَةٍ وَكَذَا تَدْبِيرُهُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ وَبِإِحْبَالِهَا،
لَا الْوَطْءِ وَالتَّزْوِيجِ.
وَلَوْ مَاتَ الْعَاقِدُ قَبْلَ
الْقَبْضِ أَوْ جُنَّ أَوْ تَخَمَّرَ الْعَصِيرُ أَوْ أَبَقَ الْعَبْدُ، لَمْ
يَبْطُلْ الرَّهْنُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَيْسَ لِلرَّاهِنِ
الْمُقْبِضِ تَصَرُّفٌ يُزِيلُ الْمِلْكَ، لَكِنْ فِي إعْتَاقِهِ أَقْوَالٌ
أَظْهَرُهَا يَنْفُذُ مِنْ الْمُوسِرِ وَيَغْرَمُ قِيمَتَهُ يَوْمَ عِتْقِهِ
رَهْنًا، وَإِذَا لَمْ نُنَفِّذْهُ فَانْفَكَّ لَمْ نُنَفِّذْهُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ عَلَّقَهُ بِصِفَةٍ فَوُجِدَتْ وَهُوَ رَهْنٌ
فَكَالْإِعْتَاقِ، أَوْ بَعْدَهُ نَفَذَ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَا
رَهْنُهُ لِغَيْرِهِ، وَلَا التَّزْوِيجُ.
وَلَا الْإِجَارَةُ إنْ
كَانَ الدَّيْنُ حَالًّا أَوْ يَحِلُّ قَبْلَهَا، وَلَا الْوَطْءُ، فَإِنْ وَطِئَ
فَالْوَلَدُ حُرٌّ، وَفِي نُفُوذِ الِاسْتِيلَادِ أَقْوَالُ الْإِعْتَاقِ، فَإِنْ
لَمْ نُنَفِّذْهُ فَانْفَكَّ نَفَذَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَلَوْ مَاتَتْ
بِالْوِلَادَةِ غَرِمَ قِيمَتَهَا رَهْنًا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَهُ كُلُّ
انْتِفَاعٍ لَا يَنْقُصُهُ كَالرُّكُوبِ وَالسُّكْنَى، لَا الْبِنَاءُ
وَالْغِرَاسُ، فَإِنْ فَعَلَ لَمْ يَقْلَعْ قَبْلَ الْأَجَلِ وَبَعْدَهُ إنْ لَمْ
تَفِ الْأَرْضُ بِالدَّيْنِ وَزَادَتْ بِهِ.
ثُمَّ أَمْكَنَ
الِانْتِفَاعُ بِغَيْرِ اسْتِرْدَادٍ لَمْ يَسْتَرِدَّ وَإِلَّا
فَيَسْتَرِدُّ.
وَيُشْهِدُ إنْ اتَّهَمَهُ وَلَهُ بِإِذْنِ
الْمُرْتَهِنِ مَا مَنَعْنَاهُ.
وَلَهُ الرُّجُوعُ قَبْلَ تَصَرُّفِ
الرَّاهِنِ، فَإِنْ تَصَرَّفَ جَاهِلاً بِرُجُوعِهِ فَكَتَصَرُّفِ وَكِيلٍ جَهِلَ
عَزْلَهُ.
وَلَوْ أَذِنَ فِي بَيْعِهِ لِيُعَجِّلَ الْمُؤَجِّلَ
مِنْ ثَمَنِهِ لَمْ يَصِحَّ الْبَيْعُ.
وَكَذَا لَوْ شَرَطَ رَهْنَ
الثَّمَنِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
Section 1
Security may be given
only for a definite, obligatory debt. Conse-
quently it is not permitted to a
person who desires in that way to
secure
the execution of some real
obligation, such as the restitution of
some
object unlawfully usurped or borrowed
; or to secure some future debt,
such as the repayment of a sum
of money he intends to lend some
one.
Security is given in the
following words : — “ I lend you these
pieces of
money, provided you pledge
me your slave.” To this offer the
answer
is, “ I accept the loan, and
grant you the security asked for.”
Or the
offer may bo made thus, “ I
sell you this article for so much,
provided
tlio coat is pledged to
mo/’ and the answer, buy the
article, and
grant you the security
asked for.” One may not secure by a
pledge the
periodical payments resulting
from an enfranchisement by contract,
nor
the price stipulated for contract work
before it is finished, or, accord-
ing
to others before it is begun,
becauso these are not as yet
definite and
obligatory debts. On the
other hand, security may lawfully bo given
for the payment of the price
of a thing sold during the period of
tho
right of option. The payment of
a debt may be secured by two pledges
oven when successive ; but according
to tho doctrine adopted by Shafii
in
Egypt, one may not pledge with a
creditor an article already pledged
him
for another debt.
Tho security
becomes irrevocable only when tho creditor
has taken
possession of tho object
pledged. Possession may, however, be taken
by the creditor’s agent. The
creditor may not appoint the debtor or
his slave as his agent for
this purpose. Authorities are not agreed
as
to whether ho may so appoint
tho debtor’s generally authorised slavo ;
but ho may certainly appoint tho
slave undergoing gradual enfranchise-
ment. Tho
pledging of an article already in
possession of the creditor,
either as
deposit or because illegally usurped,
becomes irrevocable only
from tho moment
when he could have taken possession
of it, if he had
not had it
already. *And in such a case the law
requires that tho
debtor should declare
that the change in the nature of
the possession
has taken place with
his full consent. Subsequent pledging can
never
relieve a creditor from the
consequences of any usurpation of which
he may have been guilty ; but
he is freed from them ipso facto
if the
owner entrusts the article to
his care as a deposit. The security
is ipso
facto revoked if the debtor
disposes of the thing pledged, before the
creditor has taken possession, in a
way which causes him to lose tho
ownership of it, e.g. if he
gives it away, or pledges it to
some ono else,
provided it is
effectively taken possession of. The same
consequence is
recognised by law if,
before possession has been taken, the
debtor begins
tho contractual enfranchisement
of his slave, *or provides for his
freedom
in his will, or if a female
slave is rendered pregnant by him ;
but not if
he merely cohabits with
her, or gives her in marriage to
some one else.
fNeither is security
nullified by death, nor by lunacy,
of one of the
contracting parties,
before possession has been taken ; nor by
a liquid
that has been pledged becoming
fermented ; nor by the flight of a
pledged slave.
After the creditor
has taken possession, tho debtor can
no longer
dispose of the pledged
object, so as to loso tho ownership
of it. As to
the validity of
an enfranchisement authorities aro not
agreed. *As a
rule it is considered
valid in the case of a solvent
debtor, who should in
that ease
pledge tlio value of the slave at
the moment of enfranchisement.
But if
the debtor is insolvent, and consequently
unable to executo the
intended
enfranchisement fthe slave is not thereby
freed, oven though
afterwards redeemed.
The pledging of a slave who is to
be enfranchised
at a certain date, or
who has been conditionally enfranchised is
lawful ;
and the expiry of the term,
or the fulfilling of tho condition,
before the
due date of tho security,
has the same effect as a simple and
voluntary
enfranchisement. If tho term
does not expire, or the condition is
not
fulfilled, until after that date,
ffthe enfranchisement takes place ipso
facto ,
whether tho master is solvent or not.
After the creditor has taken
possession, tho debtor can no longer —
. Pledge the thing to another
person.
. .Give a pledged female
slave in marriage.
. Lend tho
thing pledged ; at least where the
debt is duo at once,
or at a
term expiring before the loan.
.
Cohabit with a pledged female slave. A
contravention of this
precept involves the
consequence that a child born of this
cohabitation
is considered free. Upon the
quostion whether tho mother becomes
free
by this maternity there is the same
difference of opinion as with
regard
to tho simple, voluntary enfranchisement
of a pledged slave.
fBut it is
agreed that in these circumstances a
female slavo is ipso facto
enfranchised
by reason of her maternity, upon the
expiry of tho due
date of the
security, even if tho debtor is insolvent
; and that the
latter is bound to
pledge the value of the slave, if
she dies in childbirth.
A debtor
remains owner of a pledged article, and
can make what
use of it he
likes, provided he does not diminish
its value. He may ride
a pledged
beast, or live in a house he has
given in security. On the other
hand, he may not build on or
cultivate pledged land ; but if he has
already done these unlawful acts, he
is not obliged to root up what has
been planted, or take down the
buildings either before or after the debt
has become due, unless in the
latter case the value of the ground
with
the plantations or constructions on
it is insufficient to pay tho debt,
and the value of the land will
be increased by their removal. When it
is possible for the debtor to
use the thing pledged, without its being
actually in his charge, it should
remain in the creditor’s possession ; but
if this is impossible it should
be intrusted into the charge of the
debtor,
if he demands it, to be
held on sufferance. The creditor has
the right
to have this restitution
effected beforo witnesses, if ho has
reason to
doubt the debtor’s honesty.
A creditor may always allow a debtor
to dispose of a pledged article,
even
in a manner not otherwise permitted by
law ; but this authorisation
may be
revoked at any time before the
debtor has made use of it. If
under these circumstances a debtor has
disposed of a pledged article,
not knowing
that the authorisation has been revoked,
he is in the same
position as
an agent who has acted in ignorance
of the revocation of his
appointment.
But a creditor cannot give a debtor
permission to sell
a pledged article
before the debt is due, whether this
is done in order so
to obtain
an earlier payment, or on the
understanding that the proceeds
will be
pledged instead of the article itself.
فصل [فيما يترتب على لزوم الرهن]
إذَا لَزِمَ الرَّهْنُ فَالْيَدُ
فِيهِ لِلْمُرْتَهِنِ وَلَا تُزَالُ إلَّا لِلِانْتِفَاعِ كَمَا سَبَقَ وَلَوْ
شَرَطَا وَضْعَهُ عِنْدَ عَدْلٍ جَازَ، أَوْ عِنْدَ اثْنَيْنِ وَنَصَّا عَلَى
اجْتِمَاعِهِمَا عَلَى حِفْظِهِ أَوْ الِانْفِرَادِ بِهِ فَذَاكَ.
وَإِنْ
أَطْلَقَا فَلَيْسَ لِأَحَدِهِمَا الِانْفِرَادُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
مَاتَ الْعَدْلُ أَوْ فَسَقَ جَعَلَاهُ حَيْثُ يَتَّفِقَانِ، وَإِنْ تَشَاحَّا
وَضَعَهُ الْحَاكِمُ عِنْدَ عَدْلٍ.
وَيَسْتَحِقُّ بَيْعَ
الْمَرْهُونِ عِنْدَ الْحَاجَةِ، وَيُقَدَّمُ الْمُرْتَهِنُ بِثَمَنِهِ
وَيَبِيعُهُ الرَّاهِنُ أَوْ وَكِيلُهُ بِإِذْنِ الْمُرْتَهِنِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ
يَأْذَنْ قَالَ لَهُ الْحَاكِمُ تَأْذَنُ أَوْ تُبْرِئُ، وَلَوْ طَلَبَ
الْمُرْتَهِنُ بَيْعَهُ فَأَبَى الرَّاهِنُ أَلْزَمَهُ الْقَاضِي قَضَاءَ
الدَّيْنِ أَوْ بَيْعَهُ، فَإِنْ أَصَرَّ بَاعَهُ الْحَاكِمُ.
وَلَوْ
بَاعَهُ الْمُرْتَهِنُ بِإِذْنِ الرَّاهِنِ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ إنْ بَاعَ
بِحَضْرَتِهِ صَحَّ وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَلَوْ شُرِطَ أَنْ يَبِيعَهُ
الْعَدْلُ جَازَ، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ مُرَاجَعَةُ الرَّاهِنِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
فَإِذَا بَاعَ فَالثَّمَنُ عِنْدَهُ مِنْ ضَمَانِ الرَّاهِنِ حَتَّى يَقْبِضُهُ
الْمُرْتَهِنُ.
وَلَوْ تَلِفَ ثَمَنُهُ فِي يَدِ الْعَدْلِ ثُمَّ
اسْتَحَقَّ الْمَرْهُونُ فَإِنْ شَاءَ الْمُشْتَرِي رَجَعَ عَلَى الْعَدْلِ،
وَإِنْ شَاءَ عَلَى الرَّاهِنِ وَالْقَرَارُ عَلَيْهِ.
وَلَا
يَبِيعُ الْعَدْلُ إلَّا بِثَمَنِ مِثْلِهِ حَالًّا مِنْ نَقْدِ بَلَدِهِ، فَإِنْ
زَادَ رَاغِبٌ قَبْلَ انْقِضَاءِ الْخِيَارِ فَلْيَفْسَخْ وَلْيَبِعْهُ.
وَمُؤْنَةُ
الْمَرْهُونِ عَلَى الرَّاهِنِ، وَيُجْبَرُ عَلَيْهَا لِحَقِّ الْمُرْتَهِنِ
عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَا يُمْنَعُ الرَّاهِنِ مِنْ مَصْلَحَةِ
الْمَرْهُونِ كَفَصْدٍ وَحِجَامَةٍ، وَهُوَ أَمَانَةٌ فِي يَدَ الْمُرْتَهِنَ،
وَلَا يَسْقُطُ بِتَلَفِهِ شَيْءٌ مِنْ دَيْنِهِ.
وَحُكْمُ فَاسِدِ
الْعُقُودِ حُكْمُ صَحِيحِهَا فِي الضَّمَانِ.
وَلَوْ شَرَطَ كَوْنَ
الْمَرْهُونِ مَبِيعًا لَهُ عِنْدَ الْحُلُولِ فَسَدَ، وَهُوَ قَبْلَ الْمَحِلِّ
أَمَانَةٌ.
وَيُصَدَّقُ الْمُرْتَهِنُ فِي دَعْوَى التَّلَفِ
بِيَمِينِهِ، وَلَا يُصَدَّقُ فِي الرَّدِّ عِنْدَ الْأَكْثَرِينَ.
وَلَوْ
وَطِئَ الْمُرْتَهِنُ الْمَرْهُونَةَ بِلَا شُبْهَةٍ فَزَانٍ، وَلَا يُقْبَلُ
قَوْلُهُ جَهِلْتُ تَحْرِيمَهُ إلَّا أَنْ يَقْرُبَ إسْلَامُهُ أَوْ يَنْشَأَ
بِبَادِيَةٍ بَعِيدَةٍ عَنْ الْعُلَمَاءِ وَإِنْ وَطِئَ بِإِذْنِ الرَّاهِنِ
قُبِلَ دَعْوَاهُ جَهْلَ التَّحْرِيمِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ فَلَا حَدَّ، وَيَجِبُ
الْمَهْرُ إنْ أَكْرَهَهَا، وَالْوَلَدُ حُرٌّ نَسِيبٌ، وَعَلَيْهِ قِيمَتُهُ
لِلرَّاهِنِ.
وَلَوْ أَتْلَفَ الْمَرْهُونَ وَقَبَضَ بَدَلَهُ صَارَ
رَهْنًا، وَالْخَصْمُ فِي الْبَدَلِ الرَّاهِنُ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يُخَاصِمْ لَمْ
يُخَاصِمْ الْمُرْتَهِنُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
فَلَوْ وَجَبَ قِصَاصٌ
اقْتَصَّ الرَّاهِنُ وَفَاتَ الرَّهْنُ، فَإِنْ وَجَبَ الْمَالُ بِعَفْوِهِ أَوْ
بِجِنَايَةِ خَطَإٍ لَمْ يَصِحَّ عَفْوُهُ عَنْهُ وَلَا إبْرَاءُ الْمُرْتَهِنِ
الْجَانِي وَلَا يَسْرِي الرَّهْنُ إلَى زِيَادَتِهِ الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ كَثَمَرَةٍ
وَوَلَدٍ، فَلَوْ رَهَنَ حَامِلاً وَحَلَّ الْأَجَلُ وَهِيَ حَامِلٌ بِيعَتْ،
وَإِنْ وَلَدَتْهُ بِيعَ مَعَهَا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ حَامِلاً
عِنْدَ الْبَيْعِ الرَّهْنِ فَالْوَلَدُ لَيْسَ بِرَهْنٍ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
Section 2
When the security has
become irrevocable by possession having been
taken, the creditor has a right to
keep the article pledged, without
prejudice to what has been said
in the preceding section, as to the
use
which the debtor can make of
it. The parties may if they like
agree
to intrust the article to the
care of a third jierson of irreiiroachable
character ; or to two such persons,
at the same time stipulating for a
joint or separate performance of
their duties by the depositaries, fit
nothing has been stipulated with
regard to this, neither can do anything
in the matter alone. If a depositary
is dead, or has ceased, by notorious
misconduct, to be worthy of
confidence, the contracting parties can
deposit the article where they
please ; or if they cannot agree
about it,
the court may order its
sequestration.
A creditor may insist on
the sale of a pledged article if the
debt has
not been paid by the
due date ; and he is entitled to
payment out of the
proceeds, in
preference to any other person. The
sale is effected by the
debtor or
his agent, but never without tho
creditor’s previous authorisa-
tion. If the
creditor refuses the required authorisation
the court will
notify him that in
default of his authorisation the debtor
will be released
from his obligation.
When, on the other hand, it is
the creditor who
claims either the
payment of tho debt or the sale
of tho article, and the
debtor
refuses, the court will order the
latter to fulfil his obligation or
sell the article, and if he
persists in his refusal after this
order, the court
may itself proceed
with the sale without the debtor’s
concurrence.
fBut the creditor can never
effect the sale in the absence of
the debtor
even with his consent.
When it has been agreed that the
sale shall be
effected by a depositary,
the latter may if necessary proceed
with it
without the debtor’s concurrence,
keeping tho proceeds as depositary,
i.e.
at the debtor’s risk, until tho
creditor has taken possession. In
case
of a legal seizure of tho article
pledged and sold in this way by a
depositary the purchaser may cite as
guarantee either the depositary
or the
debtor, who is in any case
ultimately liable towards the de-
positary.
This citation as guarantee is admissible
even if tho proceeds
of the sale
are accidentally lost when in charge
of the depositary. A
depositary may
sell a pledged article only at a
reasonable price, and for
cash, in
locally current coin. If after the
sale, but before the expiry
of the
time of option, another person bids
more, the first bargain should
be
cancelled and the thing sold to the
highest bidder.
A debtor must provide
for the up-keep of a thing pledged,
and a
creditor has a right to have
this enforced by the court. On the
other
hand, a creditor may not prevent a
debtor from improving or repairing
the
article ; for example a debtor may have
his pledged slave bled ; for
the
property is his, and he has only
intrusted it to the creditor as a
deposit.
The loss of a pledged
object does not affect the debt ; and as
to the responsibility of the
creditor, it does not matter whether the
security is valid or not, for
in any case it is a deposit
intrusted to
his care.
It is
illegal to stipulate that the thing
pledged shall be considered as
sold
to the creditor upon the expiry -of
the term allowed for payment of
the
debt. Such stipulation renders illegal
both security and sale.
A thing
pledged remains on deposit until the
due date ; consequently
there is a
presumption in favour of the creditor’s
statement on oath in
any proceeding
against him for loss of the article
; but not, according to
most authorities,
if it is a question of the
restitution of a pledge.
A creditor who
intentionally cohabits with a female slave
pledged to
him, is guilty of the
crime of fornication ; and the excuse
cannot be
admitted by the court that
he was ignorant of the prohibition
of inter-
course with such person, unless
he has recently become a Muhammadan,
or
was brought up in the country far
from the society of men acquainted
with the law. tHe may allege
as an excuse that the debtor gave
him
permission ; and in this special
case, though not guilty of fornication,
he is liable to the slave for
dower, if he forced her to
cohabitation, and
the child is his,
and free from its birth. And,
finally, he owes the debtor
the
value of the child as damage.
When a pledged article is lost
by the fault of a third person, and
the
creditor receives from that person
another article in its place, it is
regarded as the thing pledged. Any
proceeding against the individual
in
question to oblige him to replace
the original pledge, must be taken
by the debtor, flf he declines
to make good his right in the
matter,
the creditor can do nothing
as against the third person. Similarly,
if a
pledged slave is assassinated
by a third person, the debtor alone can
claim an application of the lex
talionis ; but the contract of security is
cancelled ipso facto. But if, on
the other hand, there is only occasion
for inflicting a pecuniary penalty, either
because the debtor has pardoned
his
slave’s assassin, or because the homicide
was not intentional, neither
debtor nor
creditor can of their own initiative
remit the penalty.
The security
given does not extend to increase
from the thing pledged,
if this
increase consists of what has individual
existence, like the fruit
of trees,
the young of animals, or the
children of slaves. However, if an
animal with young or a pregnant
slave has been given in security, and
the pregnancy continues until the
debt falls due, *beast and slave must
be sold as they are, with
their offspring, if already born. *Where
the
pregnancy does not occur until
after the security has been given, though
it may exist at the moment of
sale, the mother alone is pledged,
and the
creditor has no claim to
the offspring.
فصل [في جناية المرهون]
جَنَى الْمَرْهُونُ قُدِّمَ الْمَجْنِيُّ
عَلَيْهِ.
فَإِنْ اقْتَصَّ أَوْ بِيعَ لَهُ بَطَلَ الرَّهْنُ،
وَإِنْ جَنَى عَلَى سَيِّدِهِ فَاقْتَصَّ بَطَلَ.
وَإِنْ عُفِيَ
عَلَى مَالٍ لَمْ يَثْبُتْ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ فَيَبْقَى رَهْنًا.
وَإِنْ
قَتَلَ مَرْهُونًا لِسَيِّدِهِ عِنْدَ آخَرَ فَاقْتَصَّ بَطَلَ الرَّهْنَانِ،
وَإِنْ وَجَبَ مَالٌ تَعَلَّقَ بِهِ حَقُّ مُرْتَهِنِ الْقَتِيلِ، فَيُبَاعُ
وَثَمَنُهُ رَهْنٌ، وَقِيلَ يَصِيرُ رَهْنًا.
فَإِنْ كَانَا
مَرْهُونَيْنِ عِنْدَ شَخْصٍ بِدَيْنٍ وَاحِدٍ نَقَصَتْ الْوَثِيقَةُ، أَوْ
بِدَيْنَيْنِ وَفِي نَقْلِ الْوَثِيقَةِ غَرَضٌ نُقِلَتْ.
وَلَوْ
تَلِفَ مَرْهُونٌ بِآفَةٍ بَطَلَ.
وَيَنْفَكُّ بِفَسْخِ
الْمُرْتَهِنِ وَبِالْبَرَاءَةِ مِنْ الدَّيْنِ، فَإِنْ بَقِيَ شَيْءٌ مِنْهُ
لَمْ يَنْفَكَّ شَيْءٌ مِنْ الرَّهْنِ.
وَلَوْ رَهَنَ نِصْفَ عَبْدٍ
بِدَيْنٍ وَنِصْفَهُ بِآخَرَ فَبَرِئَ مِنْ أَحَدِهِمَا انْفَكَّ قِسْطُهُ،
وَلَوْ رَهَنَاهُ فَبَرِئَ أَحَدُهُمَا انْفَكَّ نَصِيبُهُ.
Section 3
When a pledged slave
commits a crime involving a penalty under the
law of talion, the rights of
the injured party have the first
preference,
and the security is cancelled
by the capital penalty, or by a
legal sale
of the slave to recover
the price of blood. The capital
penalty has the
effect of cancelling
the security, both if imposed at the
instance of the
debtor as owner of
the slave, or at that of a third
party ; ffbut where
the debtor, not a
third party, claims, from whatever motive,
only a
pecuniary penalty, then the
security is unaffected, and the slave
remains
pledged as if nothing had
happened. When a slave pledged by his
master kills another pledged to the
same master, both securities are
cancelled
by the execution of the criminal ;
but when there is ground
only for a
pecuniary penalty, the master of the
delinquent can claim
this amount in
place of the dead slave pledged to
him. The culpable
slave must then be
sold, in spite of the security, and
the proceeds
remain pledged, by law,
with the master in place of the
dead slave.
According to others, however,
a sale is unnecessary, and the slave who
has committed the crime, replaces
ipso facto the dead slave. If murderer
and victim were both of them
slaves pledged to the same creditor
for a
single debt, he must resign
himself to this diminution in his
security.
If the two individuals were
pledged for two distinct debts, he may
transfer to the remaining slave the
debt for which the securit}- has been
lost to him, if he has good
reason to do so.
A security is
cancelled by the accidental loss of
the thing pledged.
The article itself
is released by a renunciation on the
part of the creditor,
or by the
remission of the debt. As a security
is indivisible, the article
remains
pledged as long as the debt is
not either remitted or paid in
full.
On the other hand, when half the
share in a slave is pledged for
one
debt, and the other half for a
second debt, a remission of one of them
releases the half share. A slave
owned jointly by two masters and
pledged by them, is proportionately
released by a remission granted to
one
only.
فصل [في الاختلاف في الرهن وما يتعلق به]
اخْتَلَفَا فِي
الرَّهْنِ أَوْ قَدْرِهِ صُدِّقَ الرَّاهِنُ بِيَمِينِهِ إنْ كَانَ رَهْنَ
تَبَرُّعٍ.
وَإِنْ شُرِطَ فِي بَيْعٍ تَحَالَفَا.
وَلَوْ
ادَّعَى أَنَّهُمَا رَهَنَاهُ عَبْدَهُمَا بِمِائَةٍ وَصَدَّقَهُ أَحَدُهُمَا
فَنَصِيبُ الْمُصَدِّقِ رَهْنٌ بِخَمْسِينَ، وَالْقَوْلُ فِي نَصِيبِ الثَّانِي
قَوْلُهُ: بِيَمِينِهِ، وَتُقْبَلُ شَهَادَةُ الْمُصَدِّقِ عَلَيْهِ.
وَلَوْ
اخْتَلَفَا فِي قَبْضِهِ فَإِنْ كَانَ فِي يَدِ الرَّاهِنِ أَوْ فِي يَدِ
الْمُرْتَهِنِ، وَقَالَ الرَّاهِنُ غَصَبَتْهُ صُدِّقَ الرَّاهِنُ بِيَمِينِهِ
وَكَذَا إنْ قَالَ: أَقْبَضْتُهُ عَنْ جِهَةٍ أُخْرَى فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
أَقَرَّ بِقَبْضِهِ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَمْ يَكُنْ إقْرَارِي عَنْ حَقِيقَةٍ فَلَهُ
تَحْلِيفُهُ، وَقِيلَ لَا يُحَلِّفُهُ إلَّا أَنْ يَذْكُرَ لِإِقْرَارِهِ
تَأْوِيلاً كَقَوْلِهِ أَشْهَدْتُ عَلَى رَسْمِ الْقَبَالَةِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ
أَحَدُهُمَا جَنَى الْمَرْهُونُ وَأَنْكَرَ الْآخَرُ صُدِّقَ الْمُنْكِرُ
بِيَمِينِهِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ الرَّاهِنُ جَنَى قَبْلَ الْقَبْضِ
فَالْأَظْهَرُ تَصْدِيقُ الْمُرْتَهِنِ بِيَمِينِهِ فِي إنْكَارِهِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ
أَنَّهُ إذَا حَلَفَ غَرِمَ الرَّاهِنُ لِلْمَجْنِيِّ عَلَيْهِ، وَأَنَّهُ
يَغْرَمُ الْأَقَلَّ مِنْ قِيمَةِ الْعَبْدِ وَأَرْشِ الْجِنَايَةِ، وَأَنَّهُ
لَوْ نَكَلَ الْمُرْتَهِنُ رُدَّتْ الْيَمِينُ عَلَى الْمَجْنِيِّ عَلَيْهِ لَا
عَلَى الرَّاهِنِ، فَإِذَا حَلَفَ بِيعَ فِي الْجِنَايَةِ.
وَلَوْ
أَذِنَ فِي بَيْعِ الْمَرْهُونِ فَبِيعَ وَرَجَعَ عَنْ الْإِذْنِ وَقَالَ
رَجَعْتُ قَبْلَ الْبَيْعِ وَقَالَ الرَّاهِنُ بَعْدَهُ فَالْأَصَحُّ تَصْدِيقُ
الْمُرْتَهِنِ، وَمَنْ عَلَيْهِ أَلْفَانِ بِأَحَدِهِمَا رَهْنٌ فَأَدَّى أَلْفًا
وَقَالَ أَدَّيْتُهُ عَنْ أَلْفِ الرَّهْنِ صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَإِنْ لَمْ
يَنْوِ شَيْئًا جَعَلَهُ عَمَّا شَاءَ، وَقِيلَ يُقَسَّطُ.
Section
In all disputes
between debtor and creditor about anything
pledged,
or about the quantity of
it, the presumption is in favour of
the former’s
assertion, if substantiated
on oath ; provided that it is not a
security
which the debtor was obliged
to effect. For if, e.g. in a sale,
one of the
parties has stipulated
that the other shall pledge him
something in order
to insure the due
execution of the contract, both parties
must take an
oath. If in any
proceeding brought against two persons who
together
pledged a slave of whom they
were joint owners, for a debt of a hundred
pieces of money, one admits the
fact and the other denies it, the
slave
is considered to have been
pledged only on the part of the
owner who
admits, i.e. for fifty
pieces ; while the other owner has
the advantage
of a presumption in his
favour, provided he substantiates his
denial on
oath. This presumption, however,
like any other, can be legally dis-
proved, and the owner who admits may
even be called as a witness to
this
effect, in order to show the falsity
of his partner’s assertions.
In any
proceeding with regard to the taking
possession of the thing
pledged, the
following distinctions must be observed : —
. The article is in the
debtor’s possession ; or it is in
the creditor’s,
but the debtor says
he usurped it. In both these cases
the law admits
a presumption in favour
of the debtor, on oath ; fand it
is the same if
he states that
he delivered it to the creditor, but
not as a pledge.
. The debtor,
having admitted that the creditor took
possession of
the article as a pledge,
withdraws this admission as being untrue.
In
this case the debtor may only
insist that an oath be administered
to the
creditor ; though other jurists
maintain that he cannot even do this,
and that the claim of the
creditor should be at once allowed,
unless the
debtor can give some
adequate explanation of his previous admission.
Proof on his part that this
admission had been based on false
documents,
would be regarded as a
satisfactory explanation.
If one of
the two contracting parties alleges that a
pledged slave is
guilty of a crime,
and the other denies it, the
presumption is in favour
of the
latter, on oath. Even if the debtor
declares that the crime was
committed
before possession was taken, *the law
still admits a presump-
tion in favour of
the creditor’s denial on oath. fBut
in these circum-
stances the oath of
the creditor does not in any way
affect the debtor’s
obligation towards the
injured party. This obligation consists,
at the
debtor’s choice, either in
the value of the slave or in
the indemnity due
for the crime,
whichever is most advantageous for him.
If in such a
case the creditor
should refuse to be sworn, the court
should administer
the oath to the
injured party, not to the debtor
himself ; and after the
oath has
been taken the slave should be sold
for the damage, but not
to reimburse
the creditor to whom he was pledged.
And lastly, if the
creditor has
consented to the sale of a pledged
slave who is guilty of a
crime
but afterwards asserts that he withdrew
his consent before the
sale took
place, while the debtor alleges he
did not do this until after the
sale, fthe presumption is in favour
of the creditor.
When a debtor owes
two debts, each of a thousand pieces
of money,
one only being secured by
a pledge, he may declare, when paying one
thousand pieces, that he is thereby
clearing off the most onerous debt,
and the law will presume that
this is the truth. If he has
omitted to
make this declaration at
the time of payment, he may do
so afterwards ;
though some authorities
maintain that in this case the
security is pro-
portionally distributed.
فصل [في تعلق الدين بالتركة]
مَنْ مَاتَ وَعَلَيْهِ دَيْنٌ
تَعَلَّقَ بِتَرِكَتِهِ تَعَلُّقَهُ بِالْمَرْهُونِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ كَتَعَلُّقِ
الْأَرْشِ بِالْجَانِي، فَعَلَى الْأَظْهَرِ يَسْتَوِي الدَّيْنُ الْمُسْتَغْرِقُ
وَغَيْرُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ تَصَرَّفَ الْوَارِثُ وَلَا
دَيْنَ ظَاهِرٌ فَظَهَرَ دَيْنٌ بِرَدِّ مَبِيعٍ بِعَيْبٍ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ
لَا يَتَبَيَّنُ فَسَادُ تَصَرُّفِهِ لَكِنَّ إنْ لَمْ يَقْضِ الدَّيْنَ فَسَخَ،
وَلَا خِلَافَ أَنَّ لِلْوَارِثِ إمْسَاكَ عَيْنِ التَّرِكَةِ وَقَضَاءَ
الدَّيْنِ مِنْ مَالِهِ، وَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّ تَعَلُّقَ الدَّيْنِ بِالتَّرِكَةِ
لَا يَمْنَعُ الْإِرْثَ فَلَا يَتَعَلَّقُ بِزَوَائِدِ التَّرِكَةِ كَكَسْبٍ
وَنِتَاجٍ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
At the death of a
debtor his debts must be paid, so
far as the amount
of his assets
allow, the latter being regarded as
the joint security of the
creditors.
Only one author maintains that the
estate can be seized for
debt in
the same way as the person of a
slave for the pecuniary conse-
quences of
a crime committed by him. *The estate
is distributed
amongst the creditors in
proportion to their claims, unless there
is some
legitimate cause for preference,
which is in any case independent of
the
amount due. fWhere the heir has
disposed of the estate, without there
appearing to be any debt, and a
properly authenticated debt is subse-
quently
established, as e.g . by the redhibition
of some article sold ; the
dispositions
made by the inheritor are not ipso
facto nullified, but they
must be
revoked, if there is no other way
of paying the debt. It is
undisputed
that the inheritor can keep the
estate and pay the debts
from his
own means. The obligation to pay the
debts so far as the estate
will
allow, does not in any way affect
the rights of the inheritor ; and
the profits of the estate, of a
separate character, such as those realised
from the labour of slaves or
from births subsequent to the opening of
the succession, belong to tho
inheritor, and cannot be included when
determining the amount seizable for
the payment of the debts.
كتاب التَّفْلِيسِ
BOOK 12 .— BANKRUPTCY, ETC.
مَنْ عَلَيْهِ دُيُونٌ حَالَّةٌ زَائِدَةٌ عَلَى مَالِهِ يُحْجَرُ عَلَيْهِ
بِسُؤَالِ الْغُرَمَاءِ وَلَا حَجْرَ بِالْمُؤَجَّلِ، وَإِذَا حُجِرَ بِحَالٍّ
لَمْ يَحِلَّ الْمُؤَجَّلُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلَوْ كَانَتْ الدُّيُونُ بِقَدْرِ
الْمَالِ فَإِنْ كَانَ كَسُوبًا يُنْفِقُ مِنْ كَسْبِهِ فَلَا حَجْرَ، وَإِنْ
لَمْ يَكُنْ كَسُوبًا وَكَانَتْ نَفَقَتُهُ مِنْ مَالِهِ فَكَذَا فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا يُحْجَرُ بِغَيْرِ طَلَبٍ فَلَوْ طَلَبَ
بَعْضُهُمْ وَدَيْنُهُ قَدْرٌ يُحْجَرُ بِهِ حُجِرَ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَيُحْجَرُ
بِطَلَبِ الْمُفْلِسِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
فَإِذَا حُجِرَ تَعَلَّقَ
حَقُّ الْغُرَمَاءِ بِمَالِهِ.
وَأَشْهَدَ عَلَى حَجْرِهِ
لِيُحَذِّرَ.
وَلَوْ بَاعَ أَوْ وَهَبَ أَوْ أَعْتَقَ فَفِي قَوْلٍ
يُوقِفُ تَصَرُّفَهُ، فَإِنْ فَضَلَ ذَلِكَ عَنْ الدَّيْنِ نَفَذَ وَإِلَّا
لَغَا، وَالْأَظْهَرُ بُطْلَانُهُ فَلَوْ بَاعَ مَالَهُ لِغُرَمَائِهِ
بِدَيْنِهِمْ بَطَلَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ بَاعَ سَلَمًا أَوْ اشْتَرَى فِي
الذِّمَّةِ فَالصَّحِيحُ صِحَّتُهُ وَيَثْبُتُ فِي ذِمَّتِهِ.
وَيَصِحُّ
نِكَاحُهُ وَطَلَاقُهُ وَخُلْعُهُ وَاقْتِصَاصُهُ وَإِسْقَاطُهُ، وَلَوْ أَقَرَّ
بِعَيْنٍ أَوْ دَيْنٍ وَجَبَ قَبْلَ الْحَجْرِ فَالْأَظْهَرُ قَبُولُهُ فِي حَقِّ
الْغُرَمَاءِ، وَإِنْ أَسْنَدَ وُجُوبَهُ إلَى مَا بَعْدَ الْحَجْرِ
بِمُعَامَلَةٍ، أَوْ مُطْلَقًا لَمْ يُقْبَلْ فِي حَقِّهِمْ، وَإِنْ قَالَ عَنْ
جِنَايَةٍ قُبِلَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَهُ أَنْ يَرُدَّ بِالْعَيْبِ
مَا كَانَ اشْتَرَاهُ إنْ كَانَتْ الْغِبْطَةُ فِي الرَّدِّ، وَالْأَصَحُّ
تَعَدِّي الْحَجْرَ إلَى مَا حَدَثَ بَعْدَهُ بِالِاصْطِيَادِ وَالْوَصِيَّةِ
وَالشِّرَاءِ إنْ صَحَّحْنَاهُ، وَأَنَّهُ لَيْسَ لِبَائِعِهِ أَنْ يَفْسَخَ،
وَيَتَعَلَّقَ بِعَيْنِ مَتَاعِهِ إنْ عَلِمَ الْحَالَ، وَإِنْ جَهِلَ فَلَهُ
ذَلِكَ، وَأَنَّهُ إذَا لَمْ يُمْكِنْ التَّعَلُّقُ بِهَا لَا يُزَاحِمُ
الْغُرَمَاءَ بِالثَّمَنِ.
BOOK 12 .— BANKRUPTCY, ETC.
CHAPTER I.— BANKRUPTCY
Section
A person whose debts
exceed the value of his property
should be declared
bankrupt, upon the
demand of his creditors, but bankruptcy
should
never be declared on account
of debts not yet duo. *A declaration
of
bankruptcy for debts due does not
render other debts not yet due
claimable before the due date. If a
person’s debts are counterbalanced
by his
property, and he can also gain a
livelihood by his labour, there is
no ground for a declaration of
bankruptcy. fThis is so also if he
cannot
work, and consequently his support
is a charge upon his assets. A
bankruptcy is not declared on the
initiative of the court, but as has
been said on the demand of the
creditors. If all the creditors do not
support the application, the total
of the debts due to the petitioning
creditors, taken together, should amount
to a sum sufficient to authorise
the
declaration. f Proceedings in bankruptcy may
also be begun upon
the demand of
the debtor.
An immediate consequence
of bankruptcy is that the debtor becomes
ipso facto dispossessed of the
administration of his property ; while the
court should in the presence of
witnesses explain to him the measures
taken with regard to the matter,
so that he may abstain from any
further disposition of his property.
Only one jurist maintains that a
sale, donation, or enfranchisement made
by a bankrupt should remain
suspended
until it becomes clear whether these
dispositions can be
maintained without
prejudicing the payment of the debts.
If this is
the case they should
be regarded as valid, according to
this jurist, but
not otherwise. *n
the other hand, most authorities maintain
the nullity
of these arrangements, for
the same reason as for all others, f
A declared
bankrupt cannot 'transfer his
property to his creditors, in order
to free
himself from his obligations,
without the permission of the court ;
ffthough there is no objection to
his taking an advance on goods he
promises to deliver by a certain
date, nor to his making a purchase and
stipulating for a delay in payment.
These future obligations are on his
own personal responsibility, and have
nothing in common with his
property
that has been seized. Bankruptcy also
leaves intact purely
personal rights, such
as legal capacity to marry, repudiate
or divorce a
wife, claim an
application of the law of talion, or
grant a pardon in
accordance with it.
An admission made by a bankrupt,
concerning a
right or obligation that
has become effective before the bankruptcy,
*binds the creditors ; but they are
not obliged to take into consideration
an admission regarding obligations that
become effective only at a later
or
indeterminate date, funless it has
reference to a crime. A bankrupt
can of
his own accord return goods he has
just bought, on account of
redhibitory
defects, if such redhibition profits the
estate. fBut he is
prohibited from
dealing with anything he may obtain
afterwards ;
either by hunting, or
by a testamentary disposition, or by purchase —
at
least when it is admitted that
this last contract is not absolutely null
when effected by a bankrupt. fThe
bankruptcy of a purchaser does
not give a
vendor the right to cancel a bargain,
if he has knowingly
entered into it ;
he cannot even claim the goods back
; otherwise, both
cancellation and reclamation
are permitted him. flf the law forbids
this reclamation on the part of
the vendor, neither can he prove as
creditor for the amount of the
price.
فصل [فيما يفعل في مال المحجور عليه بالفلس من بيع وقسمة وغيرهما]
يُبَادِرُ
الْقَاضِي بَعْدَ الْحَجْرِ بِبَيْعِ مَالِهِ وَقَسْمِهِ بَيْنَ الْغُرَمَاءِ،
وَيُقَدِّمُ مَا يَخَافُ فَسَادَهُ، ثُمَّ الْحَيَوَانَ ثُمَّ الْمَنْقُولَ ثُمَّ
الْعَقَارَ: وَلْيَبِعْ بِحَضْرَةِ الْمُفْلِسِ وَغُرَمَائِهِ: كُلَّ شَيْءٍ
فِي سُوقِهِ بِثَمَنِ مِثْلِهِ حَالًّا مِنْ نَقْدِ الْبَلَدِ.
ثُمَّ
إنْ كَانَ الدَّيْنُ غَيْرَ جِنْسِ النَّقْدِ وَلَمْ يَرْضَ الْغَرِيمُ إلَّا
بِجِنْسِ حَقِّهِ اشْتَرَى، وَإِنْ رَضِيَ جَازَ صَرْفُ النَّقْدِ إلَيْهِ إلَّا
فِي السَّلَمِ.
وَلَا يُسَلِّمُ مَبِيعًا قَبْلَ قَبْضِ ثَمَنِهِ
وَمَا قَبَضَهُ قَسَمَهُ بَيْنَ الْغُرَمَاءِ إلَّا أَنْ يَعْسُرَ لِقِلَّتِهِ
فَيُؤَخِّرُهُ لِيَجْتَمِعَ، وَلَا يُكَلَّفُونَ بَيِّنَةً بِأَنْ لَا غَرِيمَ
غَيْرُهُمْ.
فَلَوْ قَسَمَ فَظَهَرَ غَرِيمٌ شَارَكَ بِالْحِصَّةِ،
وَقِيلَ تُنْقَضُ الْقِسْمَةُ، وَلَوْ خَرَجَ شَيْءٌ بَاعَهُ قَبْلَ الْحَجْرِ
مُسْتَحَقًّا وَالثَّمَنُ تَالِفٌ فَكَدَيْنٍ ظَهَرَ.
وَإِنْ
اُسْتُحِقَّ شَيْءٌ بَاعَهُ الْحَاكِمُ قُدِّمَ الْمُشْتَرِي بِالثَّمَنِ، وَفِي
قَوْلٍ يُحَاصُّ الْغُرَمَاءُ.
وَيُنْفِقُ عَلَى مَنْ عَلَيْهِ
نَفَقَتُهُ حَتَّى يَقْسِمَ مَالَهُ إلَّا أَنْ يَسْتَغْنِيَ بِكَسْبٍ، وَيُبَاعُ
مَسْكَنُهُ وَخَادِمُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَإِنْ احْتَاجَ إلَى خَادِمٍ
لِزَمَانَتِهِ وَمَنْصِبِهِ وَيُتْرَكُ لَهُ دَسْتُ ثَوْبٍ يَلِيقُ بِهِ وَهُوَ
قَمِيصٌ وَسَرَاوِيلُ وَعِمَامَةٌ وَمِكْعَبٌ وَيُزَادُ فِي الشِّتَاءِ جُبَّةً،
وَيُتْرَكُ لَهُ قُوتُ يَوْمِ الْقِسْمَةِ لِمَنْ عَلَيْهِ نَفَقَتُهُ.
وَلَيْسَ
عَلَيْهِ بَعْدَ الْقِسْمَةِ أَنْ يَكْتَسِبَ أَوْ يُؤَجِّرَ نَفْسَهُ
لِبَقِيَّةِ الدَّيْنِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ وُجُوبُ إجَارَةِ أُمِّ
وَلَدِهِ وَالْأَرْضِ الْمَوْقُوفَةِ عَلَيْهِ.
وَإِذَا ادَّعَى
أَنَّهُ مُعْسِرٌ أَوْ قَسَمَ مَالَهُ بَيْنَ غُرَمَائِهِ وَزَعَمَ أَنَّهُ لَا
يَمْلِكُ غَيْرَهُ وَأَنْكَرُوا فَإِنْ لَزِمَهُ الدَّيْنُ فِي مُعَامَلَةِ مَالٍ
كَشِرَاءٍ أَوْ قَرْضٍ فَعَلَيْهِ الْبَيِّنَةُ.
وَإِلَّا
فَيُصَدَّقُ بِيَمِينِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَتُقْبَلُ بَيِّنَةُ
الْإِعْسَارِ فِي الْحَالِ، وَشَرْطُ شَاهِدٍ خِبْرَةُ بَاطِنِهِ، وَلْيَقُلْ
هُوَ مُعْسِرٌ، وَلَا يُمَحِّضُ النَّفْيَ كَقَوْلِهِ لَا يَمْلِكُ شَيْئًا،
وَإِذَا ثَبَتَ إعْسَارُهُ لَمْ يَجُزْ حَبْسُهُ وَلَا مُلَازَمَتُهُ بَلْ
يُمْهَلُ حَتَّى يُوسِرَ.
وَالْغَرِيبُ الْعَاجِزُ عَنْ بَيِّنَةِ
الْإِعْسَارِ يُوَكِّلُ الْقَاضِي بِهِ مَنْ يَبْحَثُ عَنْ حَالِهِ، فَإِذَا
غَلَبَ عَلَى ظَنِّهِ إعْسَارُهُ شَهِدَ بِهِ.
Section
After the declaration
of bankruptcy the court should hasten
to sell
the bankrupt’s property and
distribute the proceeds amongst the
creditors. First of all are sold
things liable to deteriorate, then slaves
and domestic animals, then other
movable property, and lastly im-
movable
property. The sale takes place in
presence of the bankrupt
and the
creditors, each object being sold at
the market where such things
are
usually sold ; and nothing can bo
sold except at a reasonable juice,
payable
immediately, in locally current coin. A
creditor who has
stipulated for some
particular article is not obliged to
take coin, and if
such article is
not among the assets it must be
purchased to satisfy him.
If, on the
contrary, the creditor does not insist
on the very thing stipu-
lated for,
the debt can be paid in coin ;
except in the case of a contract
of
salam , for this contract does not admit
of any similar conversion,
even by
consent of the parties interested. The
court, when proceeding
to the sale
of the bankrupt’s property, should never
deliver it before
receiving the price ;
and money coming from the sales and
recoveries
should be immediately divided
amongst the creditors, unless the sums
are so small as to make this
impossible. In the latter case distribution
may be deferred until the amount
in hand has been increased by the
sale of other objects, or the
recovery of other debts due to the
estate.
In order to proceed to this
distribution, the law does not require
that
the creditors present must prove
that there are no others ; but a creditor
who only presents himself after a
distribution retains all his rights to
his share in what remains of
the assets. According to some authorities
the previous distribution should in
such a case be annulled.
If the
bankrupt sold an article before the
declaration, and this article
is subject
to legal seizure by a third party,
while the price paid has been
already spent, the purchaser can
only prove like an ordinary creditor ;
but if the article has been
sold by the court after the
declaration of
bankruptcy, a seizure gives
the purchaser the right to claim
back the
price as a privileged creditor.
Only one authority maintains that a
purchaser can never enjoy this privilege.
The support of persons dependent
upon the bankrupt is a charge
upon
the assets until the distribution is
finished, unless the bankrupt
is himself
capable of supporting them by his
labour. fRut all the pro-
perty of
the bankrupt must be realised. It is
even necessary to sell his
house and
any slave who may be working as
his servant, without any
regard to
the state of his health or to
the rank he occupies in society.
All
that should be left him is a bundle
of clothes sufficient for decency,
i.e . a
shirt, a pair of trousers, a turban and a
pair of slippers ; to which
in
winter should be added a cloak. There
is also exempted from sale
the food
necessary for the nourishment of the
bankrupt and his family
until the
distribution is over.
After the
final distribution the bankrupt need not
work or hire out
his services as
domestic servant or workman, in order
to pay what
remains of his debts ;
fbut his creditors may oblige him to
put out to
service his female slave
enfranchised by reason of maternity, and
to
lease out property realised in
her favour. A bankrupt who says he is
in a state of absolute insolvency,
or who after the distribution of his
property declares he has no more
at all, must, if this is denied
on the part
of the creditors, prove
the truth of his assertion ; at
least this is so in the
case
of commercial debts, like those arising
from a purchase or a loan,
fin all
other cases the law allows a presumption
in his favour, provided
he substantiates
his declaration on oath. Proof of
absolute insolvency
can be furnished at
any time ; but the witnesses called
to establish it
must have an
accurate knowledge of the private life
of the bankrupt.
They must declare
positively and expressly that the bankrupt
is
“absolutely insolvent.” A merely negative
deposition, e.g. that the
bankrupt
“possesses nothing,” is not enough. When
the bankrupt’s
insolvency is established
in this way the creditors have no
right to
demand bodily restraint, nor
that the bankrupt be adjudged personally
as a pledge ; they must wait until
he has collected sufficient money to
pay his debts. In the case of
a stranger whose financial position is
accurately known to nobody, and who
consequently cannot prove his
“ absolute
insolvency,” the court should appoint some
one to examine
the state of his
affairs, and this expert should then
appear as a witness
if he thinks the
evidence of absolute insolvency to be
conclusive.
فصل [في رجوع المعامل للمفلس عليه بما عامله به ولم يقبض عوضه]
مَنْ
بَاعَ وَلَمْ يَقْبِضْ الثَّمَنَ حَتَّى حُجِرَ عَلَى الْمُشْتَرِي بِالْفَلَسِ
فَلَهُ فَسْخُ الْبَيْعِ وَاسْتِرْدَادُ الْمَبِيعِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ
خِيَارَهُ عَلَى الْفَوْرِ، وَأَنَّهُ لَا يَحْصُلُ الْفَسْخُ بِالْوَطْءِ
وَالْإِعْتَاقِ وَالْبَيْعِ.
وَلَهُ الرُّجُوعُ فِي سَائِرِ
الْمُعَاوَضَاتِ كَالْبَيْعِ وَلَهُ شُرُوطٌ: مِنْهَا كَوْنُ الثَّمَنِ
حَالًّا، وَأَنْ يَتَعَذَّرَ حُصُولُهُ بِالْإِفْلَاسِ فَلَوْ امْتَنَعَ مِنْ
دَفْعِ الثَّمَنِ مَعَ يَسَارِهِ أَوْ هَرَبَ فَلَا فَسْخَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ الْغُرَمَاءُ لَا تَفْسَخْ وَنُقَدِّمُك بِالثَّمَنِ فَلَهُ
الْفَسْخُ.
وَكَوْنُ الْمَبِيعِ بَاقِيًا فِي مِلْكِ الْمُشْتَرِي،
فَلَوْ فَاتَ أَوْ كَاتَبَ الْعَبْدَ فَلَا رُجُوعَ.
وَلَا يَمْنَعُ
التَّزْوِيجَ.
وَلَوْ تَعَيَّبَ بِآفَةٍ أَخَذَهُ نَاقِصًا، أَوْ
ضَارَبَ بِالثَّمَنِ أَوْ بِجِنَايَةِ أَجْنَبِيٍّ أَوْ الْبَائِعِ فَلَهُ
أَخْذُهُ، وَيُضَارِبُ مِنْ ثَمَنِهِ بِنِسْبَةِ نَقْصِ الْقِيمَةِ، وَجِنَايَةِ
الْمُشْتَرِي كَآفَةٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ تَلِفَ أَحَدُ الْعَبْدَيْنِ ثُمَّ
أَفْلَسَ أَخَذَ الْبَاقِي وَضَارَبَ بِحِصَّةِ التَّالِفِ فَلَوْ كَانَ قَبَضَ
بَعْضَ الثَّمَنِ رَجَعَ فِي الْجَدِيدِ فَإِنْ تَسَاوَتْ قِيمَتُهُمَا وَقَبَضَ
نِصْفَ الثَّمَنِ أَخَذَ الْبَاقِيَ بِبَاقِي الثَّمَنِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَأْخُذُ
نِصْفَهُ بِنِصْفِ بَاقِي الثَّمَنِ وَيُضَارِبُ بِنِصْفِهِ.
وَلَوْ
زَادَ الْمَبِيعُ زِيَادَةً مُتَّصِلَةً كَسِمَنٍ وَصَنْعَةٍ فَازَ الْبَائِعُ
بِهَا، وَالْمُنْفَصِلَةُ كَالثَّمَرَةِ، وَالْوَلَدِ لِلْمُشْتَرِي، وَيَرْجِعُ
الْبَائِعُ فِي الْأَصْلِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ الْوَلَدُ صَغِيرًا وَبَذَلَ الْبَائِعُ
قِيمَتَهُ أَخَذَهُ مَعَ أُمِّهِ، وَإِلَّا فَيُبَاعَانِ، وَتُصْرَفُ إلَيْهِ
حِصَّةُ الْأُمِّ، وَقِيلَ لَا رُجُوعَ، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ حَامِلاً عِنْدَ
الرُّجُوعِ دُونَ الْبَيْعِ أَوْ عَكْسُهُ فَالْأَصَحُّ تَعَدِّي الرُّجُوعِ إلَى
الْوَلَدِ، وَاسْتِتَارِ الثَّمَرِ بِكِمَامِهِ وَظُهُورِهِ بِالتَّأْبِيرِ
قَرِيبٌ مِنْ اسْتِتَارِ الْجَنِينِ وَانْفِصَالِهِ وَأَوْلَى بِتَعَدِّي
الرُّجُوعِ وَلَوْ غَرَسَ الْأَرْضَ أَوْ بَنَى فَإِنْ اتَّفَقَ الْغُرَمَاءُ
وَالْمُفْلِسُ عَلَى تَفْرِيغِهَا فَعَلُوا وَأَخَذَهَا، وَإِنْ امْتَنَعُوا لَمْ
يُجْبَرُوا، بَلْ لَهُ أَنْ يَرْجِعَ وَيَمْتَلِكَ الْغِرَاسَ وَالْبِنَاءَ
بِقِيمَتِهِ، وَلَهُ أَنْ يَقْلَعَ وَيَضْمَنَ أَرْشَ النَّقْصِ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ
أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ لَهُ أَنْ يَرْجِعَ فِيهَا، وَيَبْقَى الْغِرَاسُ وَالْبِنَاءُ
لِلْمُفْلِسِ، وَلَوْ كَانَ الْمَبِيعُ حِنْطَةً فَخَلَطَهَا بِمِثْلِهَا أَوْ
دُونِهَا فَلَهُ أَخْذُ قَدْرِ الْمَبِيعِ مِنْ الْمَخْلُوطِ، أَوْ بِأَجْوَدَ
فَلَا رُجُوعَ فِي الْمَخْلُوطِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلَوْ طَحَنَهَا أَوْ قَصَّرَ
الثَّوْبَ فَإِنْ لَمْ تَزِدْ الْقِيمَةُ رَجَعَ، وَلَا شَيْءَ لِلْمُفْلِسِ،
وَإِنْ زَادَتْ فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ يُبَاعُ، وَلِلْمُفْلِسِ مِنْ ثَمَنِهِ
بِنِسْبَةِ مَا زَادَ.
وَلَوْ صَبَغَهُ بِصِبْغَةٍ فَإِنْ زَادَتْ
الْقِيمَةُ قَدْرَ قِيمَةِ الصِّبْغِ رَجَعَ، وَالْمُفْلِسُ شَرِيكٌ بِالصَّبْغِ
أَوْ أَقَلَّ فَالنَّقْصُ عَلَى الصَّبْغِ، أَوْ أَكْثَرَ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ
الزِّيَادَةَ لِلْمُفْلِسِ وَلَوْ اشْتَرَى مِنْهُ الصَّبْغَ وَالثَّوْبَ
وَرَجَعَ فِيهِمَا إلَّا أَنْ لَا تَزِيدَ قِيمَتُهُمَا عَلَى قِيمَةِ الثَّوْبِ
فَيَكُونَ فَاقِدًا لِلصَّبْغِ، وَلَوْ اشْتَرَاهُمَا مِنْ اثْنَيْنِ فَإِنْ لَمْ
تَزِدْ قِيمَتُهُ مَصْبُوغًا عَلَى قِيمَةِ الثَّوْبِ فَصَاحِبُ الصِّبْغِ
فَاقِدٌ، وَإِنْ زَادَتْ بِقَدْرِ قِيمَةِ الصِّبْغِ اشْتَرَكَا، وَإِنْ زَادَتْ
عَلَى قِيمَتِهِمَا فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ الْمُفْلِسَ شَرِيكٌ لَهُمَا
بِالزِّيَادَةِ.
Section
A vendor can, in case
of bankruptcy, break the contract and
claim
back goods the price of which
has not yet been paid him. fThis
right
must be exercised without delay,
for the reclamation is not admissible
as soon as the bankrupt has
disposed of the thing bought, either by
cohabitation in the case of a female
slave, or by enfranchisement, or by
sale. This right of reclamation is
not confined to a sale properly so
called, but extends to all contracts
involving the transfer of property for
an equivalent. It is, however,
admitted only under the three following
conditions : —
. That the time
for payment has fallen due.
.
That payment cannot be obtained on
account of the bankruptcjr ;
ffor there
is no ground of reclamation where
the bankrupt’s property
is sufficient to
meet all his engagements, but he
nevertheless refuses to
pay ; or where
payment cannot be obtained because the
debtor, though
solvent, has absconded. On
the other hand, the vendor may not
be
deprived of his right to
cancellation and reclamation if the creditors
wish to keep the goods at the
price agreed upon between him and the
bankrupt.
. That the bankrupt
purchaser is still the owner of the
property ; for
there is no right of
reclamation if he is no longer its
owner, or if he has
entered into a
contract of enfranchisement with a purchased
slave. On
the other hand, the right
of reclamation is not affected by
the fact that
a bankrupt has given
in marriage a purchased slave.
If
the goods have been accidentally damaged,
the vendor has the
choice of either
taking it back as it is, or
claiming, for the payment of
the
price, his share of the assets, like
any other creditor. If the deterio-
ration
in value is due to him or to a
third person, he may choose between
the property as it is, or a
claim as ordinary creditor for the amount
agreed upon, minus the deterioration, f
Deterioration due to the
bankrupt
purchaser is regarded as accidental, so
far as reclamation is
concerned.
In
the case of a sale of two slaves,
one of whom dies after the pur-
chaser has taken possession, and the
purchaser then goes bankrupt, the
slave
still living may be claimed back,
and for the dead slave the vendor
may claim his share in the
assets as an ordinary creditor. According
to
the opinion of Sliafii in his
second period, the right of reclamation hi
this case is not invalidated by
the fact that a part of the price
has
already been paid to the vendor.
So that if the two slaves were
of the
same value, and the vendor
has already received half the total price
agreed, he may still claim back
the living slave for the amount
still due.
Only one jurist maintains
that he must in such a case keep
the part
payment already received, and
claim his share of the assets, for
the
other half, as an ordinary creditor.
When the property has undergone
an increase inseparable from it,
as
in the case of an animal that
has become fat, or a slave that has
learnt a trade, the vendor profits
by its reclamation ; but when the
increase has an individual existence,
like the fruit of trees or the young
of animals, the purchaser keeps it,
and the vendor can reclaim only the
original thing and nothing more. In
the case of a slave’s child, an
increase separable by nature but not
by law, the vendor may claim it
along with the mother, on paying
its price ; or if this is not
convenient,
both must be sold, and
the price fetched by the mother paid
to the
vendor. According to others,
however, reclamation is altogether in-
admissible in such a case. If a slave
is pregnant at the time of reclama-
tion, but not at the time of
sale, or vice versa , f the vendor’s right
extends
both to mother and child.
The fruit of the date palm hidden
in its
envelope, or that already
formed by means of fecundation is
subject to
nearly the same rule as
the embryo hidden in its mother’s
womb and the
child just born, i.e .
it is better to include it in
the reclamation. In the
matter of
the reclamation of a piece of ground
which has been sown or
built upon
by the bankrupt, he, the vendor and
the creditors may by
common agreement
proceed to pluck up the shoots or
remove the
buildings if they think
fit. The ground is then returned to
the vendor
in its primitive condition.
But if the creditors or the bankrupt
object
to this uprooting or removal,
the vendor has no right to enforce
it, but
must receive back the land
with the crops or buildings on it.
Thus he
only has a choice between
two courses : either to appropriate crops
and
buildings on paying their value,
or to uproot or remove them at his
own risk, and deliver them to
the bankrupt, plus damage, if any. *In
no case can the vendor claim
back the land, even if he abandons
to the
bankrupt crops and buildings.
If the property consists, for
example, of corn that the bankrupt
has mixed with other corn of
the same or an inferior quality, the
vendor
can claim back the same
quantity of the mixture ; *but if on
the con-
trary the bankrupt has added
corn of a better quality, reclamation is
inadmissible. Corn ground by the
bankrupt, or a coat cleaned by him,
without in either case any increase
in value, are subject to reclamation,
and the vendor need pay nothing
extra lor the work done. *But if the
value is increased, the corn or
the coat should bo sold, and a part
of
the price proportionate to the
increase in value should be returned to
the bankrupt.
Whcro the bankrupt
has stained the cloth purchased in
some dye
belonging to him the three
following eases are to be distinguished :
—
. The value of the cloth
is increased by exactly the value of
the dye.
In this case the bankrupt
becomes part owner of the cloth, for
the amount
of the value of the dye.
. The increase in valuo is
less than the price of the dye.
In this
case the bankrupt cannot
profit by more than the increase in
value of
the cloth.
. The
increase in value is greater than
the price of the dye sold by
itself, fin this ease the bankrupt
takes the wholo of the increase.
Where the bankrupt has purchased
from one and the same person
both
cloth and dye, the vendor reclaims
simply both, unless the value
of the
cloth, after manipulation, exceeds the
value it had previously.
In this
latter case reclamation is impossible, and
the vendor can claim
his share in
the distribution of the bankrupt’s
effects, like any other
creditor.
Where cloth and dye have been
purchased from two different persons,
the
law admits three distinctions —
.
The value of the dyed cloth does
not exceed the previous value
when
undyed. In this case the vendor of
the dye loses his right of
reclamation.
. The value of the dyed
cloth exactly equals the sum of the
values
of cloth and dye. In this
ease the two vendors should jointly
reclaim
the cloth, and become
co-proprietors of it.
. The value
of the dyed cloth is greater than
the sum of the values
of cloth
and dye. fin this ease the bankrupt
takes the whole of the
increase in
value.
باب الْحَجْرِ
CHAPTER II.— INCAPACITY OF LUNATICS, MINORS, AND SPENDTHRIFTS
مِنْهُ حَجْرُ الْمُفْلِسِ لِحَقِّ الْغُرَمَاءِ، وَالرَّاهِنِ لِلْمُرْتَهِنِ،
وَالْمَرِيضِ لِلْوَرَثَةِ، وَالْعَبْدِ لِسَيِّدِهِ، وَالْمُرْتَدِّ
لِلْمُسْلِمِينَ، وَلَهَا أَبْوَابٌ: وَمَقْصُودُ الْبَابِ حَجْرُ الْمَجْنُونِ
وَالصَّبِيِّ وَالْمُبَذِّرِ، فَبِالْجُنُونِ تَنْسَلِبُ الْوِلَايَاتُ،
وَاعْتِبَارُ الْأَقْوَالِ، وَيَرْتَفِعُ بِالْإِفَاقَةِ، وَحَجْرُ الصَّبِيِّ
يَرْتَفِعُ بِبُلُوغِهِ رَشِيدًا، وَالْبُلُوغُ بِاسْتِكْمَالِ خَمْسَ عَشْرَةَ
سَنَةً، أَوْ خُرُوجِ الْمَنِيِّ، وَوَقْتُ إمْكَانِهِ اسْتِكْمَالُ تِسْعَ
سِنِينَ، وَنَبَاتُ الْعَانَةِ يَقْتَضِي الْحُكْمَ بِبُلُوغِ وَلَدِ الْكَافِرِ
لَا الْمُسْلِمِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَتَزِيدُ الْمَرْأَةَ حَيْضًا وَحَبَلاً
وَالرُّشْدُ صَلَاحُ الدِّينِ وَالْمَالِ فَلَا يَفْعَلُ مُحَرَّمًا يُبْطِلُ
الْعَدَالَةَ.
وَلَا يُبَذِّرُ بِأَنْ يُضَيِّعَ الْمَالَ
بِاحْتِمَالِ غَبْنٍ فَاحِشٍ فِي الْمُعَامَلَةِ أَوْ رَمْيِهِ فِي بَحْرٍ أَوْ
إنْفَاقِهِ فِي مُحَرَّمٍ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ صَرْفَهُ فِي الصَّدَقَةِ،
وَوُجُوهِ الْخَيْرِ وَالْمَطَاعِمِ وَالْمَلَابِسِ الَّتِي لَا تَلِيقُ
بِحَالِهِ لَيْسَ بِتَبْذِيرٍ.
وَيُخْتَبَرُ رُشْدُ الصَّبِيِّ
وَيَخْتَلِفُ بِالْمَرَاتِبِ فَيُخْتَبَرُ وَلَدُ التَّاجِرِ بِالْبَيْعِ
وَالشِّرَاءِ وَالْمُمَاكَسَةِ فِيهِمَا، وَوَلَدُ الزُّرَّاعِ بِالزِّرَاعَةِ
وَالنَّفَقَةِ عَلَى الْقَوَامِ بِهَا، وَالْمُحْتَرِفُ بِمَا يَتَعَلَّقُ
بِحِرْفَتِهِ، وَالْمَرْأَةُ بِمَا يَتَعَلَّقُ بِالْغَزْلِ وَالْقُطْنِ،
وَصَوْنِ الْأَطْعِمَةِ عَنْ الْهِرَّةِ وَنَحْوِهَا، يُشْتَرَطُ تَكَرُّرِ
الِاخْتِبَارِ مَرَّتَيْنِ أَوْ أَكْثَرَ، وَوَقْتُهُ قَبْلَ الْبُلُوغِ، وَقِيلَ
بَعْدَهُ فَعَلَى الْأَوَّلِ الْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا يَصِحُّ عَقْدُهُ، بَلْ
يُمْتَحَنُ فِي الْمُمَاكَسَةِ، فَإِذَا أَرَادَ الْعَقْدَ عَقَدَ
الْوَلِيُّ.
فَلَوْ بَلَغَ غَيْرَ رَشِيدٍ دَامَ الْحَجْرُ، وَإِنْ
بَلَغَ رَشِيدًا انْفَكَّ بِنَفْسِ الْبُلُوغِ وَأُعْطِيَ مَالَهُ، وَقِيلَ
يُشْتَرَطُ فَكُّ الْقَاضِي، فَلَوْ بَذَّرَ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ حُجِرَ عَلَيْهِ،
وَقِيلَ يَعُودُ الْحَجْرُ بِلَا إعَادَةٍ.
وَلَوْ فُسِّقَ لَمْ
يُحْجَرْ عَلَيْهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَمَنْ حُجِرَ عَلَيْهِ لِسَفَهٍ طَرَأَ،
فَوَلِيُّهُ الْقَاضِي، وَقِيلَ وَلِيُّهُ فِي الصِّغَرِ وَلَوْ طَرَأَ جُنُونٌ
فَوَلِيُّهُ وَلِيُّهُ فِي الصِّغَرِ، وَقِيلَ الْقَاضِي، وَلَا يَصِحُّ مِنْ
الْمَحْجُورِ عَلَيْهِ لِسَفَهٍ بَيْعٌ وَلَا شِرَاءٌ وَلَا إعْتَاقٌ وَهِبَةٌ
وَنِكَاحٌ بِغَيْرِ إذْنِ وَلِيِّهِ، فَلَوْ اشْتَرَى أَوْ اقْتَرَضَ وَقَبَضَ
وَتَلِفَ الْمَأْخُوذُ فِي يَدِهِ أَوْ أَتْلَفَهُ فَلَا ضَمَانَ فِي الْحَالِ،
وَلَا بَعْدَ فَكِّ الْحَجْرِ سَوَاءٌ عَلِمَ مِنْ عَامِلِهِ أَوْ جَهِلَ،
وَيَصِحُّ بِإِذْنِ الْوَلِيِّ نِكَاحُهُ، لَا التَّصَرُّفُ الْمَالِيُّ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَا يَصِحُّ إقْرَارُهُ بِدَيْنٍ قَبْلَ الْحَجْرِ أَوْ بَعْدَهُ،
وَكَذَا بِإِتْلَافِ الْمَالِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَيَصِحُّ بِالْحَدِّ
وَالْقِصَاصِ، وَطَلَاقُهُ وَخُلْعُهُ وَظِهَارُهُ وَنَفْيُهُ النَّسَبَ
بِلِعَانٍ، وَحُكْمُهُ فِي الْعِبَادَةِ كَالرَّشِيدِ لَكِنْ لَا يُفَرِّقُ
الزَّكَاةَ بِنَفْسِهِ، وَإِذَا أَحْرَمَ بِحَجِّ فَرْضٍ أَعْطَى الْوَلِيُّ
كِفَايَتَهُ لِثِقَةٍ يُنْفِقُ عَلَيْهِ فِي طَرِيقِهِ، وَإِنْ أَحْرَمَ
بِتَطَوُّعٍ وَزَادَتْ مُؤْنَةُ سَفَرِهِ عَنْ نَفَقَتِهِ الْمَعْهُودَةِ
فَلِلْوَلِيِّ مَنْعُهُ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ كَمُحْصَرٍ فَيَتَحَلَّلُ
قُلْت: وَيَتَحَلَّلُ بِالصَّوْمِ إنْ قُلْنَا لِدَمِ الْإِحْصَارِ بَدَلٌ،
لِأَنَّهُ مَمْنُوعٌ مِنْ الْمَالِ، وَلَوْ كَانَ لَهُ فِي طَرِيقِهِ كَسْبٌ
قَدْرَ زِيَادَةِ الْمُؤْنَةِ لَمْ يَجُزْ مَنْعُهُ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
CHAPTER II.— INCAPACITY OF LUNATICS,
MINORS, AND SPENDTHRIFTS
Section
Tiie incapacity
of a bankrupt in relation to his
creditors ; that of a
debtor with
regard to an article pledged by him
; that of a sick person
who may not
deprive his legitimate heirs, by
tostamentary disposition,
of more than a
third of his property ; that of a slave
whose property
belongs to his muster ;
and that of an apostate, whoso goods
aro con-
fiscated for the benefit of
Moslems ; all theso will be found
treated of
in those parts of my
work dealing with these special classes
of individuals.
Here it remains for
me to speak of the incapacity of
lunatics, minors, and
spendthrifts.
A
person in a state of lunacy is
incapable of administering his pro-
perty,
and not responsible for what he
says. His incapacity ceases
with its
cause. The incapacity of a minor ceases
at puberty only if
his intelligence
is then sufficiently developed to allow
of his being
intrusted with the
administration of his property. The age
of puberty
is fixed by law for
both sexes at fifteen years completed,
unless in the
case of a boy
nocturnal pollutions have already manifested
themselves.
But whatever may be the
physical development of the body, a child
is
never considered to have reached
puberty before the age of nine. When
tho hairs of the pubis begin
to grow it is a sign of puberty
in the case of
an infidel child f
but not in that of a Moslem. As
to gilds, menstrues and
pregnancy are
also signs of puberty.
The
intelligence of a minor is considered to
be sufficiently developed
for him to
manage his property, under the following
circumstances : —
. When he is
able to perform his religious duties
properly.
. AVlien he behaves
himself reasonably in his affairs.
.
When ho abstains from everything
incompatible with an irre-
proachable character.
. When ho is not a spendthrift ;
i.e. he does not waste his substance
by allowing himself to be deceived
in commerce by obvious frauds, by
throwing his money into the sea,
or by ruining himself in illicit
pleasures.
fOn the other hand, prodigality
does not include expenditure on charity
or good works, nor even exorbitant
expense on the table or the toilet.
The degree of intelligence of a
minor should be estimated in different
ways, according to the different
categories of persons. Thus the son of
a merchant should be examined with
regard to purchase and sale or his
aptitude at a bargain ; the son of a
farmer should undergo inquiry as
to
his knowledge of cultivation and the
proper employment of labour
for that
purpose ; and the son of an artisan
should give proof that he
understands
his trade ; while a girl should show
herself apt in all that
has to
do with spinning and cotton and the
best way of protecting food
from the
cat, etc. This examination should bo
undergone at least
twice ; according to
some before the minor has reached
the age of
puberty, and according to
others after. fSome insist upon a previous
examination, maintaining that engagements
entered into by a minor
before puberty
are invalid. fBut according to these
authors, the pupil
should be given,
before his majority, an opportunity to
prove the
development of his intelligence,
for example, by making a bargain ;
though the guardian and not the
pupil is the person who must actually
conclude it.
The minor who,
having attained tho age of puberty,
has an in-
telligence insufficiently developed
to be entrusted with the management
of his property, remains in a state
of incapacity ; otherwise his inca-
pacity
ceases ipso facto on his attaining
his majority. His property
is then
intrusted to him ; though others maintain
that the court should
in all cases
decree the cessation of tho guardianship.
A person who,
immediately upon attaining
his majority, begins to waste his
substance,
should be formally declared
incapable ; only a few jurists maintain that
incapacity recommences ipso facto under
guardianship as before.
fA person
who has attained majority cannot be
pronounced
incapable owing to notorious
misconduct.
An adult afflicted with
idiocy should be placed under the
care of the
court, or according to
others under that of the- person who
would be his
guardian if he were a
minor. This difference of opinion is
also mani-
fested with regard to an
adult who is mad. A person in a
state of
incapacity through idiocy can
neither sell, buy, nor enfranchise slaves,
nor make a donation, nor marry
Avithout the consent of his curator. If
he buys or borrows anything, and
if after delivery it is lost Avhen
in his
possession, he is not
responsible either during or after his
incapacity,
Avhether his condition was or
Avas not knoAvn to the injured
party. He
may marry Avith the
consent of his curator, fbut under
no circumstances
may he meddle Avith
the management of his property or
admit the
existence of debts contracted
before or since his incapacity. Neither is
his admission of any value *as
to any damage caused by him ; but
it is
taken into consideration if it
relates to an offence punishable by a
definite penalty or under the law
of talion. He can, moreover, repudiate
or divorce his Avife, pronounce an
injurious assimilation with regard to
her,
or disavow a child by means of
anathema. As to religious practices
an
idiot is subject to the same law
as other believers ; but he cannot
personally take part in the
distribution of Avhat he oAves in
charity ;
and if he Avishes to
perform an obligatory pilgrimage, the
curator should
intrust to some reliable
person Avhat is required for his
maintenance on
the journey. Moreover, the
curator may forbid his undertaking a
voluntary pilgrimage, if the expense
Avould exceed his ordinary main-
tenance,
even if he has already begun it ;
and as our school considers
the
idiot as a person prevented from
continuing his act of devotion, his
ihram ceases ipso facto.
[If
it is admitted that the expiatory
sacrifice due in these circum-
stances may
laAvfully be replaced, the idiot should
fast instead of
sacrificing a shah or
giving food to the poor, as he
is incapable of
disposing of his
property. However, if lie is able to
gain on the way
what is enough
to cover tho extra expense of a
voluntary pilgrimage,
his curator is not
legally entitled to prohibit this act
of devotion.]
فصل [فيمن يلي الصبي مع بيان كيفية تصرفه في ماله]
وَلِيُّ
الصَّبِيِّ أَبُوهُ ثُمَّ جَدُّهُ ثُمَّ وَصِيُّهُمَا ثُمَّ الْقَاضِي، وَلَا
تَلِي الْأُمُّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَتَصَرَّفُ الْوَلِيُّ
بِالْمَصْلَحَةِ، وَيَبْنِي دُورَهُ بِالطِّينِ وَالْآجُرِّ لَا اللَّبِنِ
وَالْجِصِّ.
وَلَا يَبِيعُ عَقَارَهُ إلَّا لِحَاجَةٍ أَوْ غِبْطَةٍ
ظَاهِرَةٍ.
وَلَهُ بَيْعُ مَالِهِ بِعَرْضٍ وَنَسِيئَةٍ
لِلْمَصْلَحَةِ، وَإِذَا بَاعَ نَسِيئَةً أَشْهَدَ وَارْتَهَنَ بِهِ، وَيَأْخُذُ
لَهُ بِالشُّفْعَةِ أَوْ يَتْرُكُ بِحَسَبِ الْمَصْلَحَةِ، وَيُزَكِّي مَالَهُ،
وَيُنْفِقُ عَلَيْهِ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ.
فَإِذَا ادَّعَى بَعْدَ
بُلُوغِهِ عَلَى الْأَبِ وَالْجَدِّ بَيْعًا بِلَا مَصْلَحَةٍ صُدِّقَا
بِالْيَمِينِ، وَإِنْ ادَّعَاهُ عَلَى الْوَصِيِّ وَالْأَمِينِ صُدِّقَ هُوَ
بِيَمِينِهِ.
Section
A father is the
guardian of his children during then’
minority. In
default of the father
the guardianship reverts to the father’s
father, and
then to a testamentary
executor appointed for that purpose by the
father or father’s father, and as a
last resort to the court, which, however,
may depute some reliable person as
administrator. *j*A mother can
nover be
guardian in her own right, but the
father or father’s father
may so
appoint her by will.
A guardian
should manage the affairs of a minor
like a good father.
Thus ho should
in building use clay and bricks
baked in a furnace, not
bricks dried
in the sun or plaster. He will
not sell immovable property,
unless it
is absolutely necessary or the advantage
is obvious ; but he
may alienate
movable property, even by exchange or
on credit, if his
ward’s interest
requires it. In tho case of a sale
on credit, however, he
should always
have the transaction certified by
witnesses, and stipulate
for security. As
to a right of pre-emption, he should
exercise it or not
as his ward’s
interest requires. He may pay what
is due by the minor
as legal
alms ; and should furnish him with
what is necessary to enable
him to
live decently.
When a ward, after
attaining majority, makes a claim against his
father or father’s father, alleging
that the latter has not acted as a
good
father of a family with respect
to the sale of his property, the
guardian
has a presumption in his favour
if he takes an oath ; but if
the claim is
against a testamentary
executor or an administrator appointed by
the
court, the presumption is in
favour of the ward.
باب الصُّلْحِ
CHAPTER III.— COMPROMISE, AND RIGHT OF WAY
وَهُوَ قِسْمَانِ: أَحَدُهُمَا يَجْرِي بَيْنَ الْمُتَدَاعِيَيْنِ، وَهُوَ
نَوْعَانِ: أَحَدُهُمَا صُلْحٌ عَلَى إقْرَارٍ، فَإِنْ جَرَى عَلَى عَيْنٍ
غَيْرِ الْمُدَّعَاةِ فَهُوَ بَيْعٌ بِلَفْظِ الصُّلْحِ تَثْبُتُ فِيهِ
أَحْكَامُهُ كَالشُّفْعَةِ وَالرَّدِّ بِالْعَيْبِ وَمَنْعِ تَصَرُّفِهِ قَبْلَ
قَبْضِهِ، وَاشْتِرَاطِ التَّقَابُضِ إنْ اتَّفَقَا فِي عِلَّةِ الرِّبَا، أَوْ
عَلَى مَنْفَعَةٍ فَإِجَارَةٌ تَثْبُتُ أَحْكَامُهَا، أَوْ عَلَى بَعْضِ
الْعَيْنِ الْمُدَّعَاةِ فَهِبَةٌ لِبَعْضِهَا لِصَاحِبِ الْيَدِ فَتَثْبُتُ
أَحْكَامُهَا، وَلَا يَصِحُّ بِلَفْظِ الْبَيْعِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ صِحَّتُهُ
بِلَفْظِ الصُّلْحِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ مِنْ غَيْرِ سَبْقِ خُصُومَةٍ
صَالِحْنِي عَنْ دَارِك بِكَذَا فَالْأَصَحُّ بُطْلَانُهُ.
وَلَوْ
صَالَحَ مِنْ دَيْنٍ عَلَى عَيْنٍ صَحَّ.
فَإِنْ تَوَافَقَا فِي
عِلَّةِ الرِّبَا اُشْتُرِطَ قَبْضُ الْعِوَضِ فِي الْمَجْلِسِ، وَإِلَّا فَإِنْ
كَانَ الْعِوَضُ عَيْنًا لَمْ يُشْتَرَطْ قَبْضُهُ فِي الْمَجْلِسِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، أَوْ دَيْنًا اُشْتُرِطَ تَعْيِينُهُ فِي الْمَجْلِسِ، وَفِي
قَبْضِهِ الْوَجْهَانِ، وَإِنْ صَالَحَ مِنْ دَيْنٍ عَلَى بَعْضِهِ فَهُوَ
إبْرَاءٌ عَنْ بَاقِيهِ، وَيَصِحُّ بِلَفْظِ الْإِبْرَاءِ وَالْحَطِّ
وَنَحْوِهِمَا.
وَبِلَفْظِ الصُّلْحِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ
صَالَحَ مِنْ حَالٍّ عَلَى مُؤَجَّلٍ مِثْلِهِ أَوْ عَكَسَ لَغَا، فَإِنْ عَجَّلَ
الْمُؤَجَّلَ صَحَّ الْأَدَاءُ.
وَلَوْ صَالَحَ مِنْ عَشَرَةٍ
حَالَّةٍ عَلَى خَمْسَةٍ مُؤَجَّلَةٍ بَرِئَ مِنْ خَمْسَةٍ وَبَقِيَتْ خَمْسَةٌ
حَالَّةٌ، وَلَوْ عَكَسَ لَغَا.
النَّوْعُ الثَّانِي: الصُّلْحُ
عَلَى الْإِنْكَارِ، فَيَبْطُلُ إنْ جَرَى عَلَى نَفْسِ الْمُدَّعِي.
وَكَذَا
إنْ جَرَى عَلَى بَعْضِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَقَوْلُهُ: صَالِحْنِي
عَلَى الدَّارِ الَّتِي تَدَّعِيهَا لَيْسَ إقْرَارًا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
الْقِسْمُ
الثَّانِي: يَجْرِي بَيْنَ الْمُدَّعِي وَالْأَجْنَبِيِّ: فَإِنْ قَالَ،
وَكَّلَنِي الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ فِي الصُّلْحِ وَهُوَ مُقِرٌّ لَك صَحَّ.
وَلَوْ
صَالَحَ لِنَفْسِهِ وَالْحَالَةُ هَذِهِ صَحَّ وَكَأَنَّهُ اشْتَرَاهُ، وَإِنْ
كَانَ مُنْكَرًا وَقَالَ الْأَجْنَبِيُّ هُوَ مُبْطِلٌ فِي إنْكَارِهِ فَهُوَ
شِرَاءُ مَغْصُوبٍ فَيُفَرَّقُ بَيْنَ قُدْرَتِهِ عَلَى انْتِزَاعِهِ
وَعَدَمِهَا، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَقُلْ هُوَ مُبْطِلٌ لَغَا الصُّلْحُ.
CHAPTER III.— COMPROMISE, AND RIGHT OF WAY
Section
Compromises are
of two kinds ; the first, those come
to between two
litigants, is itself
divided into two kinds —
. A
compromise about an obligation admitted by
the other party,
or legally established
in some other way. When in these
circumstances
there is a consent to accept
an object not claimed in the place
of one
claimed, this consent is
regarded as similar to a sale, though
the word
“ compromise ” may have been
used ; and consequently there must bo
observed all the rules of a sale,
such as the right of pre-emption, redhibi-
tion for defects, prohibition from
disposing of the article before taking
possession, and the necessity of
mutually taking possession, if both arc
capable of giving rise to illicit
gain. When one consents to accept,
instead of the thing claimed, the
use of something else, this consent has
the effect of a contract of hiring,
of which all the particulars must bo
exactly observed. And lastly, if one
consents to accept only a part of
what one might claim, this consent
is regarded as a true donation,
subject
to the law ordinarily governing such
kinds of contract. But hi
all these
cases fthe word “ compromise ” and not
tho word “sale”
must be employed.
Moreover, if one says to some one, “
Give me such
and such a thing by
way of compromise instead of your
house,” fthis
proposal has no legal
effect unless there has already been
some dispute
about the house. There
is, however, no objection to replace a
debt in
this way by some definite
object. If, in these circumstances, it
is on
both sides a question of
things giving rise to illicit gain, a
mutual taking
possession must take place
at once ; ^otherwise this is not
necessary,
at least if what is given
in exchange for the article originally
due is
something definite. If, on
the other hand, one debt is
substituted for
another, the latter must
be immediately converted into some definite
object ; though we have seen that
authorities are not agreed as to
taking possession in such a case.
When compromising in such a way
that
one accepts the part payment of a
debt, one really grants a remission
as
to what is left ; and in this case
one may make use of the word
“remission ” or “ diminution,” just as
well as of the word “ compromise.”
A
permission granted to the debtor to
pay in a certain time what is
due
immediately, or vice versa, is quite
invalid ; but this does not
prevent
the debtor being able, with the
exceptions mentioned, to
anticipate payment
of a debt due at a certain time. On
the other
hand, one may accept, by
way of compromise, five pieces of
money paid
at once, instead of ten
paid by a certain date ; for in this
case it is not
the same sum
that the debtor has to pay, these
five pieces paid at once
dispensing
him from paying the rest. But the
inverse compromise to
this is not
permissible, that is, one may not
stipulate for ten pieces at a
certain date instead of five immediately.
. A compromise about an obligation
not established by an admission
or
in any other Avay. Such a compromise
is invalid when the denial of
the
opposite party relates to the obligation
itself, feven partially, f A
phrase such
as “ I propose to compromise upon the
subject of tho house
you are
claiming,” cannot be regarded as an
admission.
The second kind of
compromises consists of those concluded between
the plaintiff and a third party. Now
it is a perfectly lawful compromise
when
some third party declares to the
plaintiff, “ The defendant admits
his
obligation and has authorised me to
come to a compromise with you.”
An
agent has also power to compromise,
in these circumstances, on his
own
account, for then it is as if
there had been on his part a preliminary
purchase of the thing in dispute.
When the defendant’s agent declares
that
tho latter totally denies the claim,
the compromise between the
plaintiff and
the agent upon the subject of
litigation has tho samo effect
as
tho purchase of something unlawfully
usurped ; that is to say the
agent
has concluded of his own accord a
compromise whoso validity
depends upon
whether tho plaintiff can have the
thing delivered him.
A compromise is in
any caso invalid if tho defendant
denies the obligation,
and his agent
has not communicated'this circumstance to
the plaintiff.
فصل [في التزاحم على الحقوق المشتركة]
الطَّرِيقُ النَّافِذُ لَا
يُتَصَرَّفُ فِيهِ بِمَا يَضُرُّ الْمَارَّةَ.
وَلَا يُشْرَعُ فِيهِ
جَنَاحٌ وَلَا سَابَاطٌ يَضُرُّهُمْ، بَلْ يُشْتَرَطُ ارْتِفَاعُهُ بِحَيْثُ
يَمُرُّ تَحْتَهُ مُنْتَصِبًا، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَمَرَّ الْفُرْسَانِ وَالْقَوَافِلِ
فَلْيَرْفَعْهُ بِحَيْثُ يَمُرُّ تَحْتَهُ الْمَحْمِلُ عَلَى الْبَعِيرِ مَعَ
أَخْشَابِ الْمِظَلَّةِ.
وَيَحْرُمُ الصُّلْحُ عَلَى إشْرَاعِ
الْجَنَاحِ.
وَأَنْ يَبْنِيَ فِي الطَّرِيقِ دَكَّةً، أَوْ يَغْرِسَ
شَجَرَةً، وَقِيلَ: إنْ لَمْ يَضُرَّ جَازَ.
وَغَيْرُ النَّافِذِ
يَحْرُمُ الْإِشْرَاعُ إلَيْهِ لِغَيْرِ أَهْلِهِ.
وَكَذَا لِبَعْضِ
أَهْلِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ إلَّا بِرِضَا الْبَاقِينَ، وَأَهْلُهُ مَنْ نَفَذَ باب
دَارِهِ إلَيْهِ، لَا مَنْ لَاصَقَهُ جِدَارُهُ، وَهَلْ الِاسْتِحْقَاقُ فِي
كُلِّهَا لِكُلِّهِمْ أَمْ تَخْتَصُّ شِرْكَةُ كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ بِمَا بَيْنَ رَأْسِ
الدَّرْبِ وَبَابِ دَارِهِ؟ وَجْهَانِ أَصَحُّهُمَا الثَّانِي.
وَلَيْسَ
لِغَيْرِهِمْ فَتْحُ باب إلَيْهِ لِلِاسْتِطْرَاقِ، وَلَهُ فَتْحُهُ إذَا
سَمَّرَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَمَنْ لَهُ فِيهِ باب فَفَتَحَ آخَرَ أَبْعَدَ مِنْ
رَأْسِ الدَّرْبِ فَلِشُرَكَائِهِ مَنْعُهُ، فَإِنْ كَانَ أَقْرَبَ إلَى رَأْسِهِ
وَلَمْ يَسُدَّ الْبَابَ الْقَدِيمَ فَكَذَلِكَ، وَإِنْ سَدَّهُ فَلَا
مَنْعَ.
وَمَنْ لَهُ دَارَانِ تَفْتَحَانِ إلَى دَرْبَيْنِ
مَسْدُودَيْنِ، أَوْ مَسْدُودٍ، وَشَارِعٍ فَفَتَحَ بَابًا بَيْنَهُمَا لَمْ
يُمْنَعْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَحَيْثُ مُنِعَ فَتْحُ الْبَابِ فَصَالَحَهُ أَهْلُ
الدَّرْبِ بِمَالٍ صَحَّ.
وَيَجُوزُ فَتْحُ الْكَوَّاتِ،
وَالْجِدَارُ بَيْنَ مَالِكَيْنِ قَدْ يَخْتَصُّ بِهِ أَحَدُهُمَا، وَقَدْ
يَشْتَرِكَانِ فِيهِ فَالْمُخْتَصُّ لَيْسَ لِلْآخَرِ وَضْعُ الْجُذُوعِ عَلَيْهِ
بِغَيْرِ إذْنٍ فِي الْجَدِيدِ، وَلَا يُجْبَرُ الْمَالِكُ، فَلَوْ رَضِيَ بِلَا
عِوَضٍ فَهُوَ إعَارَةٌ وَلَهُ الرُّجُوعُ قَبْلَ الْبِنَاءِ عَلَيْهِ، وَكَذَا
بَعْدَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَفَائِدَةُ الرُّجُوعِ تَخْيِيرُهُ بَيْنَ أَنْ
يُبْقِيَهُ بِأُجْرَةٍ أَوْ يَقْلَعَ وَيَغْرَمَ أَرْشَ نَقْصِهِ وَقِيلَ
فَائِدَتُهُ طَلَبُ الْأُجْرَةِ فَقَطْ، وَلَوْ: رَضِيَ بِوَضْعِ الْجُذُوعِ
وَالْبِنَاءِ عَلَيْهَا بِعِوَضٍ فَإِنْ أَجَّرَ رَأْسَ الْجِدَارِ لِلْبِنَاءِ
فَهُوَ إجَارَةٌ وَإِنْ قَالَ بِعْته لِلْبِنَاءِ عَلَيْهِ أَوْ بِعْته حَقَّ
الْبِنَاءِ عَلَيْهِ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ هَذَا الْعَقْدَ فِيهِ شَوْبُ بَيْعٍ
وَإِجَارَةٍ.
فَإِذَا بَنَى فَلَيْسَ لِمَالِكِ الْجِدَارِ نَقْضُهُ
بِحَالٍ.
وَلَوْ انْهَدَمَ الْجِدَارُ فَأَعَادَهُ مَالِكُهُ
فَلِلْمُشْتَرِي إعَادَةُ الْبِنَاءِ.
وَسَوَاءٌ كَانَ الْإِذْنُ
بِعِوَضٍ أَوْ بِغَيْرِهِ يُشْتَرَطُ بَيَانُ قَدْرِ الْمَوْضِعِ الْمَبْنِيِّ
عَلَيْهِ طُولاً وَعَرْضًا، وَسَمْكِ الْجُدْرَانِ وَكَيْفِيَّتِهَا
وَكَيْفِيَّةِ السَّقْفِ الْمَحْمُولِ عَلَيْهَا.
وَلَوْ أَذِنَ فِي
الْبِنَاءِ عَلَى أَرْضِهِ كَفَى بَيَانُ قَدْرِ مَحَلِّ الْبِنَاءِ، وَأَمَّا
الْجِدَارُ الْمُشْتَرَكُ فَلَيْسَ لِأَحَدِهِمَا وَضْعُ جُذُوعِهِ عَلَيْهِ
بِغَيْرِ إذْنٍ فِي الْجَدِيدِ، وَلَيْسَ لَهُ أَنْ يَتِدَ فِيهِ وَتَدًا أَوْ
يَفْتَحَ كُوَّةً إلَّا بِإِذْنِهِ، وَلَهُ أَنْ يَسْتَنِدَ إلَيْهِ وَيُسْنِدَ
مَتَاعًا لَا يَضُرُّ، وَلَهُ ذَلِكَ فِي جِدَارِ الْأَجْنَبِيِّ لَيْسَ لَهُ
إجْبَارُ شَرِيكِهِ عَلَى الْعِمَارَةِ فِي الْجَدِيدِ.
فَإِنْ
أَرَادَ إعَادَةَ مُنْهَدِمٍ بِآلَةٍ لِنَفْسِهِ لَمْ يُمْنَعْ، وَيَكُونُ
الْمُعَادُ مِلْكَهُ يَضَعُ عَلَيْهِ مَا شَاءَ وَيَنْقُضُهُ إذَا شَاءَ، وَلَوْ
قَالَ الْآخَرُ لَا تَنْقُضْهُ وَأَغْرَمُ لَك حِصَّتِي لَمْ يَلْزَمْهُ
إجَابَتُهُ، وَإِنْ أَرَادَ إعَادَتَهُ بِنَقْضِهِ الْمُشْتَرَكَ فَلِلْآخَرِ
مَنْعُهُ، وَلَوْ تَعَاوَنَا عَلَى إعَادَتِهِ بِنَقْضِهِ عَادَ مُشْتَرَكًا
كَمَا كَانَ، وَلَوْ انْفَرَدَ أَحَدُهُمَا وَشَرَطَ لَهُ الْآخَرُ زِيَادَةً
جَازَ وَكَانَتْ فِي مُقَابَلَةِ عَمَلِهِ فِي نَصِيبِ الْآخَرِ.
وَيَجُوزُ
أَنْ يُصَالِحَ عَلَى إجْرَاءِ الْمَاءِ وَإِلْقَاءِ الثَّلْجِ فِي مِلْكِهِ
عَلَى مَالٍ.
وَلَوْ تَنَازَعَا جِدَارًا بَيْنَ مِلْكَيْهِمَا
فَإِنْ اتَّصَلَ بِبِنَاءِ أَحَدِهِمَا بِحَيْثُ يَعْلَمُ أَنَّهُمَا بَنَيَا
مَعًا فَلَهُ الْيَدُ وَإِلَّا فَلَهُمَا، فَإِنْ أَقَامَ أَحَدُهُمَا بَيِّنَةً
قُضِيَ لَهُ، وَإِلَّا حَلَفَا، فَإِنْ حَلَفَا أَوْ نَكَلَا جُعِلَ بَيْنَهُمَا،
وَإِنْ حَلَفَ أَحَدُهُمَا قُضِيَ لَهُ وَلَوْ كَانَ لِأَحَدِهِمَا عَلَيْهِ
جُذُوعٌ لَمْ يُرَجَّحْ، وَالسَّقْفُ بَيْنَ عُلْوِهِ وَسُفْلِ غَيْرِهِ
كَجِدَارٍ بَيْنَ مِلْكَيْنِ فَيُنْظَرُ أَيُمْكِنُ إحْدَاثُهُ بَعْدَ الْعُلْوِ
فَيَكُونُ فِي يَدِهِمَا، أَوْ لَا فَلِصَاحِبِ السُّفْلِ.
Section
It is forbidden to
make use of a public way, serving as
communication
between two places, in such
a manner as to obstruct tho passage.
Thus it
is forbidden to construct at
ono’s house a balcony opening upon tho
road, or to make a covered passago
between two houses ; though both
are
lawful if at such a height as to
allow of a man standing upright to
pass underneath If it bo a road
along which riders and caravans
habitually
pass, tho balcony or the roof of
the covered passage must bo
of
sufficient height to allow of the
free passage underneath of a camel
carrying a litter, including the baldachin
and its supports. It is
forbidden —
() To compromise upon the
subject of these rights, relating to any
public way ; or
() to
construct a bench upon the public road,
or plant a tree on it.
According to
other authorities, however, this precept
does not include
benches or trees
that do not in any way obstruct
the free passage of tho
road.
If it be a question, not of a
public road, but of a blind alley, access
to it is forbidden to persons
not living there ; fand even these should
obtain the previous permission of
their neighbours. By a person living
there
is understood the occupant of a house
with a door in the blind
alley, but
not a person whose house merely adjoins
it with a bare wall.
fEach inhabitant
of the blind alley has a right to
that part of it only
comprised
between the corner of tho public
road and his house door.
The
inhabitants alone have tho right to
make doors leading into tho
blind
alley, for entrance and exit ; ^persons
who have only a bare wall
on it
may not pierce this wall, unless
they carefully nail up any door
they
may make there. An inhabitant whose
house already has one
door opening
on the blind alley, may not make
another further from the
corner of
the road, without his neighbour’s consent.
Even if it is nearer
the corner
the new door may not lawfully be
made without the knowledge
of the
neighbours, unless at the same time
the old one is shut up ; in
this latter case no one has
any right to object, f Nor have the
neighbours
any right to object if
the owner of two houses proposes to
make a door of
communication between the
two, whether the doors of these houses
open on to two different blind
alleys, or whether one opens into a blind
alley and the other into the
street. In all cases where neighbour’s
wish
to oppose the opening of
another door, they may compromise for a
sum
of money. Every householder has a
right to make new windows opening
on
to a blind alley, in order to get
more light.
A wall between two
properties is cither a party -wall or not.
If it is
not a party-wall, the
neighbour may not place beams against
it without
the knowledge of the
owner, at least, according to what
was admitted
by Shafii in his second
period ; nor can he force the owner
to allow him
to do so. If the
owner permits him to do so without
payment, it is as
if he had
lent him the use of the wall ; and
he may at any time withdraw
this
permission, without being liable for
damage, feven though the
neighbour may
have already begun his intended
construction. If the
owner withdraws his
permission, he may at his choice
either permit the
building for a
consideration, or he may insist upon
its demolition, and
claim damages for
any injury done to the wall. Some
authorities,
however, maintain that the
owner may only claim compensation under
these circumstances, and cannot insist
upon demolition. If, on the other
hand, it is for a consideration that
the owner has granted permission to
rest upon the wall beams supporting
some construction, e.g. if he has
rented out for this purpose the
use of the top of the wall, he
must keep
to the articles of the
contract of letting, flf the following
expressions
have been used : — “ I sell
you the top of my wall to
support your
building,” or “ I sell you
the right to build upon it,” it
is a sale combined
with a contract of
letting ; and the owner, once the
construction has
begun, has no longer
under any circumstances the right to
demolish the
wall. Even if the wall
falls down and the owner rebuilds
it, a neighbour
who has bought aright
of construction upon the original wall
can exercise
his right upon the wall
newly erected. It is necessary that
the portion
of the wall concerned
should be specified by mentioning both
length and
width, whether the permission
has been granted for a consideration or
not. There should also be indicated
the nature and the height of the
walls of the building it is
intended to build upon the wall in
question,
and the nature of the roof
with which it is to be covered. When
permission is asked to build on
another’s land, it is sufficient to
indicate
the area of the proposed
building.
As to a party-wall, according
to the theory adopted by Shafii in
his
second period, neither of the
part-owners has a right to rest beams
on it
without the other’s consent ;
nor to fix a bolt in it, nor
open a window,
except on the same
condition. Each part-owner may, however, support
things against it, or open a shop
for goods, so long as the wall
is not
damaged. Such acts are lawful
also in the case of a wall which
is not a
party-wall. A part-owner may
not oblige his neighbour to contribute
to the repairing of a party-wall, at
least according to the opinion adopted
by Shafii in his second period ;
but if the wall falls into ruin,
he may
rebuild it at his own
cost and his own profit. In this
case he obtains
exclusive possession of
it, and may dispose of it as
he pleases, either by
making it
serve as a foundation for other buildings,
or by demolishing it ;
and if the
neighbour should then object to its
demolition, and offer to
pay his
share in the expense of rebuilding
and up-keep, he cannot be
forced to
agree to this proposal. Where, however,
one of two part-
owners of a
party-wall fallen into ruin wishes to
rebuild it with the
debris to which
both have equal right, the other may
object to this ;
but if they
help each other and build it
together their joint rights in the
party-wall become as before. It is
permissible for one of the part-
owners to grant to the other
who alone undertakes to rebuild it, a
larger
share in the party-wall than
he had before ; for in that case
these
increased rights are considered as
being the reward of his labour.
One may grant to one’s
neighbour, for a consideration, the right to
deflect a course of water, or to
throw snow, upon property of which one
is the owner.
When two
proprietors dispute about the ownership of
a wall between
their properties, and the
buildings belonging to one of them
are so closely
fixed in to the
wall, that both must have been
constructed at the same
time, he is
regarded as the owner of the wall ;
otherwise they must be
looked upon
as joint owners. Consequently the wall
must be adjudged
in this case to
that party who is able to prove
his ownership ; and if
neither can
do this, the court should administer
an oath to both of them.
If
both, or neither, substantiate then
statements on oath, the wall
should
be declared a party-wall ; but if one only
does so, the wall should
be adjudged
to him. The circumstance that one of
two neighbours has
rested beams on a
disputed wall, cannot of itself add
weight to his claim.
The flooring
between two storeys of a house belonging
to different
persons is subject to
the same law as a wall between two
properties. It is
necessary to consider
if the floor can have been made
after the construc-
tion of the upper
storey. If this is the case, it
is presumed that the
floor is, so
to speak, a partj'-floor ; but if it
is not so established, the
floor is
presumed to belong to the proprietor
of the lower story.
باب الْحَوَالَةِ
CHAPTER IV.— TRANSFERENCE OF DEBTS
يُشْتَرَطُ لَهَا رِضَا الْمُحِيلِ وَالْمُحْتَالِ، لَا الْمُحَالِ عَلَيْهِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا تَصِحُّ عَلَى مَنْ لَا دَيْنَ عَلَيْهِ، وَقِيلَ
تَصِحُّ بِرِضَاهُ وَتَصِحُّ بِالدَّيْنِ اللَّازِمِ، عَلَيْهِ، وَالْمِثْلِيِّ
وَكَذَا الْمُتَقَوِّمُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَبِالثَّمَنِ فِي مُدَّةِ الْخِيَارِ،
وَعَلَيْهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ صِحَّةُ حَوَالَةِ
الْمُكَاتَبِ سَيِّدَهُ بِالنُّجُومِ دُونَ حَوَالَةِ السَّيِّدِ عَلَيْهِ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ
الْعِلْمُ بِمَا يُحَالُ بِهِ وَعَلَيْهِ قَدْرًا وَصِفَةً وَفِي قَوْلٍ تَصِحُّ
بِإِبِلِ الدِّيَةِ وَعَلَيْهَا، وَيُشْتَرَطُ تَسَاوِيهِمَا جِنْسًا وَقَدْرًا،
وَكَذَا حُلُولاً وَأَجَلاً، وَصِحَّةً وَكَسْرًا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَبْرَأُ
بِالْحَوَالَةِ الْمُحِيلُ عَنْ دَيْنِ الْمُحْتَالِ، وَالْمُحَالُ عَلَيْهِ عَنْ
دَيْنِ الْمُحِيلِ، وَيَتَحَوَّلُ حَقُّ الْمُحْتَالِ إلَى ذِمَّةِ الْمُحَالِ
عَلَيْهِ، فَإِنْ تَعَذَّرَ بِفَلَسٍ أَوْ جَحْدٍ وَحَلِفٍ وَنَحْوِهِمَا: لَمْ
يَرْجِعْ عَلَى الْمُحِيلِ فَلَوْ كَانَ مُفْلِسًا عِنْدَ الْحَوَالَةِ
وَجَهِلَهُ الْمُحْتَالُ فَلَا رُجُوعَ لَهُ، وَقِيلَ لَهُ الرُّجُوعُ إنْ شُرِطَ
يَسَارُهُ.
وَلَوْ أَحَالَ الْمُشْتَرِي بِالثَّمَنِ فَرَدَّ
الْمَبِيعَ بِعَيْبٍ بَطَلَتْ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، أَوْ الْبَائِعَ بِالثَّمَنِ
فَوُجِدَ الرَّدُّ لَمْ تَبْطُلْ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ بَاعَ
عَبْدًا وَأَحَالَ بِثَمَنِهِ ثُمَّ اتَّفَقَ الْمُتَبَايِعَانِ وَالْمُحْتَالُ
عَلَى حُرِّيَّتِهِ، أَوْ ثَبَتَتْ بِبَيِّنَةٍ بَطَلَتْ الْحَوَالَةُ.
وَإِنْ
كَذَّبَهُمَا الْمُحْتَالُ وَلَا بَيِّنَةَ حَلَّفَاهُ عَلَى نَفْيِ الْعِلْمِ
ثُمَّ يَأْخُذُ الْمَالَ مِنْ الْمُشْتَرِي.
وَلَوْ قَالَ
الْمُسْتَحَقُّ عَلَيْهِ وَكَّلْتُك لِتَقْبِضَ لِي، وَقَالَ الْمُسْتَحَقُّ،
أَحَلْتنِي، أَوْ قَالَ أَرَدْت بِقَوْلِي أَحَلْتُك الْوَكَالَةَ، وَقَالَ
الْمُسْتَحِقُّ بَلْ أَرَدْت الْحَوَالَةَ صُدِّقَ الْمُسْتَحَقُّ عَلَيْهِ
بِيَمِينِهِ، وَفِي الصُّورَةِ الثَّانِيَةِ وَجْهٌ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ
أَحَلْتُك فَقَالَ وَكَّلْتَنِي صُدِّقَ الثَّانِي بِيَمِينِهِ.
CHAPTER IV.— TRANSFERENCE OF DEBTS
Fon
the validity of a transference the law
requires the consent of the
transferrer
and of the transferee, fbut not that
of the debtor. A person
who owes
nothing, however, cannot be made the
subject of such a trans-
ference ; though
some authorities maintain that this is
possible, with
the consent of the
person in question. A debt transferred
must be
obligatory. It can refer to
things sold by weight or measure for
otherwise. It is lawful to transfer
the price of a sale during the period
of option, either by the purchaser
designating to the vendor a third
person
who will pay him the price agreed
upon, for by the vendor
designating a
third person to whom the purchaser
should pay the
money. A slave undergoing
enfranchisement by contract may designate
to his master another person who
will make him the periodic payments ;
though the master may not transfer
to any other person his claim upon
the slave for these same payments.
The amount and nature of a
transferred debt should be known, as
in the case of the original debt.
Only one jurist admits the legality
of a transference of camels due as
the price of blood, both on
the part of the claimant and of
the debtor.
A debt extinguished by
transference must be of the same
nature and
amount as the transfer ;
fthe due date of both must be
the same ; fand
they must both refer
to the same coin or goods.
A
debtor who pays his creditor by
transferring him a claim, is
thereby free
of the debt ; and the person whose
liability is transferred
is at the
same time freed as regards his first
creditor, while becoming
responsible towards
the transferee. Consequently, the transferee
cannot
proceed against the transferrer,
even if he meets with difficulty on
account of the bankruptcy of the
other party, or by reason of his
denial
confirmed on oath. Even if
the latter is already a bankrupt at the
moment of the transference, without
the knowledge of the transferee,
the
latter has still no claim against
the transferrer ; though other
authorities
allow him this remedy if the
transfer was on the express
condition
of the debtor’s solvency.
A transfer
by a purchaser, as to the price
agreed upon, *is annulled
by a restitution
on account of redhibitory defects ; but,
according to
our school, a similar
transfer by the vendor stands good,
even though
the goods are subsequently
returned him on account of such defects.
A transfer with regard to the price
of a slave sold is also null, if the
interested parties, i.e . the vendor,
purchaser, and transferee, are agreed
that
it is really a free man they have
disposed of by mistake, or if one of
the parties proves this in court.
When, in such circumstances, the
transferee alone denies to the slave
the liberty admitted by the vendor
and purchaser, the latter have the
right to insist upon the transferee
confirming upon oath his ignorance
of the liberty of the person in
question ; and it is only after
taking this oath that the transferee can
claim from the purchaser payment of
the price transferred.
In case of a
dispute between two persons, one of
whom contends that
he appointed the
other his agent to take possession
of something due by
a third party,
while the other maintains that the
debt was transferred
to him and he
acted not as agent but as
transferee, or if the case turns
upon the question whether the word “
cede ” used by the parties implies
a
mandate or a transfer, the one who
asserts the fact of an appointment
as agent has a presumption in his
favour, if his statement is confirmed
on oath. All authorities, however,
are not agreed in admitting this
presumption in the latter case, i.e .
where the dispute is about the meaning
of the word “ cede.” If one of
the parties in litigation maintains that
he transferred his claim to the
other, while the latter asserts that
he was
merely authorised to receive
the sum due, the law presumes that
this
latter statement is the truth,
if confirmed on oath.
باب الضَّمَانِ
CHAPTER V.— GUARANTY
شَرْطُ الضَّامِنِ: الرُّشْدُ، وَضَمَانُ مَحْجُورٍ عَلَيْهِ بِفَلَسٍ
كَشِرَائِهِ.
وَضَمَانُ عَبْدٍ بِغَيْرِ إذْنِ سَيِّدِهِ بَاطِلٌ
فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيَصِحُّ بِإِذْنِهِ، فَإِنْ عَيَّنَ لِلْأَدَاءِ كَسْبَهُ أَوْ
غَيْرَهُ قَضَى مِنْهُ.
وَإِلَّا فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ إنْ كَانَ
مَأْذُونًا لَهُ فِي التِّجَارَةِ تَعَلَّقَ بِمَا فِي يَدِهِ وَمَا يَكْسِبُهُ
بَعْدَ الْإِذْنِ، وَإِلَّا فَبِمَا يَكْسِبُهُ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ
اشْتِرَاطُ مَعْرِفَةِ الْمَضْمُونِ لَهُ، وَأَنَّهُ لَا يُشْتَرَطُ قَبُولُهُ
وَرِضَاهُ، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ رِضَا الْمَضْمُونِ عَنْهُ قَطْعًا، وَلَا
مَعْرِفَتُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ فِي الْمَضْمُونِ
كَوْنُهُ ثَابِتًا.
وَصَحَّحَ الْقَدِيمُ ضَمَانَ مَا سَيَجِبُ،
وَالْمَذْهَبُ صِحَّةُ ضَمَانِ الدَّرَكِ بَعْدَ قَبْضِ الثَّمَنِ وَهُوَ أَنْ
يَضْمَنَ لِلْمُشْتَرِي الثَّمَنَ إنْ خَرَجَ الْمَبِيعُ مُسْتَحَقًّا أَوْ
مَعِيبًا أَوْ نَاقِصًا لِنَقْصِ الصَّنْجَةِ.
وَكَوْنُهُ لَازِمًا،
لَا كَنُجُومِ كِتَابَةٍ.
وَيَصِحُّ ضَمَانُهُ الثَّمَنَ فِي
مُدَّةِ الْخِيَارِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَضَمَانُ الْجُعْلِ
كَالرَّهْنِ بِهِ.
وَكَوْنُهُ مَعْلُومًا فِي الْجَدِيدِ.
وَالْإِبْرَاءُ
مِنْ الْمَجْهُولِ بَاطِلٌ فِي الْجَدِيدِ إلَّا مِنْ إبِلِ الدِّيَةِ، وَيَصِحُّ
ضَمَانُهَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: ضَمِنْت مَا لَك عَلَى
زَيْدٍ مِنْ دِرْهَمٍ إلَى عَشَرَةٍ فَالْأَصَحُّ صِحَّتُهُ، وَأَنَّهُ يَكُونُ
ضَامِنًا لِعَشَرَةٍ.
قُلْتُ: الْأَصَحُّ لِتِسْعَةٍ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
CHAPTER V.— GUARANTY
Section
A
person who is incapable of managing
his affairs cannot be a surety.
A
guarantee on the part of a bankrupt
has the same effect as a purchase
by
him ; tand that on the part of a
slave without his master’s
authorisation
is considered void. If a master has
authorised his slave
to go surety,
indicating as guarantee what the slave
gains by his labour,
or some other
thing, it is the property indicated
which is liable to seizure ;
f other
wise the following rule must be
observed. In the case of a
generally
authorised slave, everything he actually
possesses and every-
thing he has gained
after his authorisation may be seized ;
but in the
case of a slave not
authorised to trade, the profits of
his labour are alono
liable, fit is
necessary that the surety should know
the creditor, but
the latter need
not accept or even subsequently approve
him. It is
generally agreed that one
may go surety for a person without
his consent ;
fone need not even
know him.
A guaranty can only be
given for a debt, which must be —
. Certain ; though in his
first period Shafii accepted the validity
of
a guarantee on a future obligation. Our
school also admits a guarantee
as to
the indirect consequences of a sale, even
after payment of the
price ; i.e . one
can go .surety to the purchaser for
the return of the price
paid by
him, in case of a legal seizure,
redhibition or deterioration.
.
Obligatory. One may not go surety
for the periodic payments
arising out
of an enfranchisement by contract ; fbut
one may do so for
payment due
by reason of a contract of sale,
even during the con-
tinuance of a right
of option. A guaranty relating to the
payment of
a contractor is regulated by
the same principles as a security with
refer-
ence to a similar obligation.
.
Known. This, at any rate, is what
Shafii decided in his Egyptian
period,
when he also gave it as his
opinion that the remission of an
unknown debt is null, unless it
is a case of camels due as price
of blood,
fin which latter case he
also admits the validity of a guaranty.
*j*An
agreement in the following terms : —
“ I go surety for so-and-so’s debt
up
to an amount of from one to
ten dralims is not regarded as a guarantee
for an unknown debt, and one
is then liable for the maximum, [fin
such a case one is responsible for a
maximum of nine clrahms.]
فصل [في كفالة البدن]
الْمَذْهَبُ صِحَّةُ كَفَالَةِ
الْبَدَنِ.
فَإِنْ كَفَلَ بَدَنَ مَنْ عَلَيْهِ مَالٌ لَمْ
يُشْتَرَطْ الْعِلْمُ بِقَدْرِهِ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ كَوْنُهُ مِمَّا يَصِحُّ
ضَمَانُهُ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ صِحَّتُهَا بِبَدَنِ مَنْ عَلَيْهِ عُقُوبَةٌ
لِآدَمِيٍّ كَقِصَاصٍ وَحَدِّ قَذْفٍ، وَمَنْعُهَا فِي حُدُودِ اللَّهِ
تَعَالَى.
وَتَصِحُّ بِبَدَنِ صَبِيٍّ وَمَجْنُونٍ وَمَحْبُوسٍ
وَغَائِبٍ وَمَيِّتٍ لِيُحْضِرَهُ فَيَشْهَدَ عَلَى صُورَتِهِ.
ثُمَّ
إنْ عَيَّنَ مَكَان التَّسْلِيمِ تَعَيَّنَ وَإِلَّا فَمَكَانُهَا، وَيَبْرَأُ
الْكَفِيلُ بِتَسْلِيمِهِ فِي مَكَانِ التَّسْلِيمِ بِلَا حَائِلٍ كَمُتَغَلِّبٍ،
وَبِأَنْ يَحْضُرَ الْمَكْفُولُ بِهِ وَيَقُولَ سَلَّمْت نَفْسِي عَنْ جِهَةِ
الْكَفِيلِ، وَلَا يَكْفِي مُجَرَّدُ حُضُورِهِ.
فَإِنْ غَابَ لَمْ
يَلْزَمْ الْكَفِيلَ إحْضَارُهُ إنْ جَهِلَ مَكَانَهُ، وَإِلَّا فَيَلْزَمُهُ،
وَيُمْهَلُ مُدَّةَ ذَهَابٍ وَإِيَابٍ.
فَإِنْ مَضَتْ وَلَمْ
يُحْضِرْهُ حُبِسَ، وَقِيلَ: إنْ غَابَ إلَى مَسَافَةِ الْقَصْرِ لَمْ
يَلْزَمْهُ إحْضَارُهُ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ إذَا مَاتَ وَدُفِنَ لَا يُطَالَبُ
الْكَفِيلُ بِالْمَالِ.
وَأَنَّهُ لَوْ شَرَطَ فِي الْكَفَالَةِ
أَنَّهُ يَغْرَمُ الْمَالَ إنْ فَاتَ التَّسْلِيمُ بَطَلَتْ.
وَأَنَّهَا
لَا تَصِحُّ بِغَيْرِ رِضَا الْمَكْفُولِ.
Section
Our school admits the
validity of personal security. One can go
surety for the person of a debtor
without knowing the amount of the
debt. In every other case personal
security can only be given where an
ordinary guarantee can also be
given. Our school admits personal
security
even for a person liable to a penalty
depending upon the will
of the
injured party as under the law of
talion, or liable to punishment
for
defamation ; but a third party can never
go bail for the person of
a criminal
liable to a definite punishment, i.e . one
that cannot be
remitted. One may go
bail for the person of a minor, a
lunatic, a man
in prison, an absent
person and even a dead man.
In
this last case it is necessary to
produce the corpse, for its identity
to be established by witnesses ; but
in other cases a personal bail has
for its effect that one has
undertaken to bring the debtor alive
to the
place where he has to
pay his debt, at least if such
place has been pre-
viously indicated, or
if not to the place where the
guarantee was given.
The guarantee has
been fulfilled once the debtor is
brought to the place,
so that the
creditor is able to seize his
person. It has been fulfilled also
if the debtor presents himself of
his own accord and places himself at
the disposition of his creditor, in
order to fulfil his engagement ; but a
mere appearance of the debtor is
not enough, unless he declares he comes
to answer to his bail. When
one has become bail for a debtor, who
subsequently absconds, and nobody knows
where he is, there is no
longer
need to produce him ; and the
guarantor, even if he has already
made inquiry as to the debtor’s
whereabouts, may still insist on a delay
necessary to enable him to go
and look for the debtor and procure
his
return. When this is over, the
guarantor may be imprisoned, unless
he
brings the debtor. Some jurists maintain,
however, that hi these
circumstances the
guarantor can never be obliged to
bring the debtor, if
the latter has
gone away as far as will permit
of an abridgment of
prayer, f If a
debtor is already dead and buried at
the moment when a
guaranty was given
for his person, the guarantor is not
responsible for
the payment of the debt ;
and personal security is hi such a
case null
and void, even if a clause
has been added to the effect that
the guarantor
shall be liable for
the payment of the debt, where the
burial of the debtor
prevents his
being brought. fAnd, finally, personal
security is-not valid
without the debtor’s
consent.
فصل [في صيغتي الضَّمَانِ وَالْكَفَالَةِ]
يُشْتَرَطُ فِي
الضَّمَانِ وَالْكَفَالَةِ لَفْظٌ يُشْعِرُ بِالْتِزَامٍ؛ كَضَمِنْتُ دَيْنَك
عَلَيْهِ أَوْ تَحَمَّلْته أَوْ تَقَلَّدْته أَوْ تَكَفَّلْت بِبَدَنِهِ، أَوْ
أَنَا بِالْمَالِ أَوْ بِإِحْضَارِ الشَّخْصِ ضَامِنٌ أَوْ كَفِيلٌ أَوْ زَعِيمٌ
أَوْ حَمِيلٌ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: أُؤَدِّي الْمَالَ أَوْ أُحْضِرُ
الشَّخْصَ فَهُوَ وَعْدٌ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا يَجُوزُ تَعْلِيقُهُمَا
بِشَرْطٍ وَلَا تَوْقِيتُ الْكَفَالَةِ.
وَلَوْ نَجَّزَهَا وَشَرَطَ
تَأْخِيرَ الْإِحْضَارِ شَهْرًا جَازَ، وَأَنَّهُ يَصِحُّ ضَمَانُ الْحَالِّ
مُؤَجَّلاً أَجَلاً مَعْلُومًا.
وَأَنَّهُ يَصِحُّ ضَمَانُ
الْمُؤَجَّلِ حَالًّا، وَأَنَّهُ لَا يَلْزَمُهُ التَّعْجِيلُ.
وَلِلْمُسْتَحِقِّ
مُطَالَبَةُ الضَّامِنِ وَالْأَصِيلِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا
يَصِحُّ بِشَرْطِ بَرَاءَةِ الْأَصِيلِ.
وَلَوْ أَبْرَأَ الْأَصِيلَ
بَرِئَ الضَّامِنُ، وَلَا عَكْسَ.
وَلَوْ مَاتَ أَحَدُهُمَا حَلَّ
عَلَيْهِ دُونَ الْآخَرِ.
وَإِذَا طَالَبَ الْمُسْتَحِقُّ
الضَّامِنَ فَلَهُ مُطَالَبَةُ الْأَصِيلِ بِتَخْلِيصِهِ بِالْأَدَاءِ إنْ ضَمِنَ
بِإِذْنِهِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا يُطَالِبُهُ قَبْلَ أَنْ يُطَالَبَ.
وَلِلضَّامِنِ
الرُّجُوعُ عَلَى الْأَصِيلِ إنْ وُجِدَ إذْنُهُ فِي الضَّمَانِ وَالْأَدَاءِ،
وَإِنْ انْتَفَى فِيهِمَا فَلَا، وَإِنْ أَذِنَ فِي الضَّمَانِ فَقَطْ رَجَعَ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَا عَكْسَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ أَدَّى مُكَسَّرًا عَنْ صِحَاحٍ
أَوْ صَالَحَ عَنْ مِائَةٍ بِثَوْبٍ قِيمَتُهُ خَمْسُونَ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ
لَا يَرْجِعُ إلَّا بِمَا غَرِمَ وَمَنْ أَدَّى دَيْنَ غَيْرِهِ بِلَا ضَمَانٍ
وَلَا إذْنٍ فَلَا رُجُوعَ، وَإِنْ أَذِنَ بِشَرْطِ الرُّجُوعِ رَجَعَ، وَكَذَا
إنْ أَذِنَ مُطْلَقًا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ مُصَالَحَتَهُ عَلَى
غَيْرِ جِنْسِ الدَّيْنِ لَا تَمْنَعُ الرُّجُوعَ.
ثُمَّ إنَّمَا
يَرْجِعُ الضَّامِنُ وَالْمُؤَدِّي إذَا أَشْهَدَ بِالْأَدَاءِ رَجُلَيْنِ أَوْ
رَجُلاً وَامْرَأَتَيْنِ، وَكَذَا رَجُلٌ لِيَحْلِفَ مَعَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
فَإِنْ
لَمْ يُشْهِدْ فَلَا رُجُوعَ إنْ أَدَّى فِي غَيْبَةِ الْأَصِيلِ وَكَذَّبَهُ،
وَكَذَا إنْ صَدَّقَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ فَإِنْ صَدَّقَهُ الْمَضْمُونُ لَهُ أَوْ
أَدَّى بِحَضْرَةِ الْأَصِيلِ رَجَعَ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
Section
Eor the validity
of a guaranty, ordinary or personal, such
words
must be used as clearly
indicate the obligation undertaken, as “ I go
bail for what so-and-so owes you,”
or “ I take his debt on myself,” or
“ I undertake it,” or “ I answer for
his person,” or “ I become bail,
security,
guarantor, responsible for bringing you
the debtor ; and if I
do not
bring him, I will pay for him.” But
if, on the other hand, one
says, “ I
will pay the money or bring the
debtor,” it is a mere promise
and
not a personal guaranty, f Guaranty, whether
ordinary or personal,
cannot be made
conditional ; nor may the exact moment of
the debtor’s
appearance be lawfully
specified. But it may be stipulated
that the
debtor shall be brought
immediately, or that he shall not be
brought
before the end of the month.
One may also guarantee payment by a
certain time of a debt due
immediately, as well as the immediate pay-
ment of a debt due on a certain
date. fThe guarantor need never pay
off a debt before the date agreed
upon between him and the creditor.
A
creditor may at his choice seize
either the guarantor or the original
debtor. fHe cannot accept the
security on condition that the principal
debtor shall be free from seizure.
The guaranty ceases with the
principal
debt, and consequently the guarantor is
released by a remission
of the original
debtor. On the other hand, a release
of the guarantor
does not affect the
obligation of the original debtor. Upon
the death of
the principal debtor,
or of the guarantor, the death is
recoverable from
the goods of the
deceased ; but the position of the
survivor is unaffected.
A guarantor, on
proceedings being taken against him, may
cite the
original debtor, and force
him to discharge his debt to the
creditor,
unless he has gone security
without the debtor’s knowledge ; butf the
guarantor cannot proceed against the
original debtor, before the creditor
claims payment. A guarantor who pays,
without reference to the
debtor, may
still suo the latter if guaranty and
payment Avere effected
Avith his consent.
But if the debtor disapproved those,
the guarantor
has no remedy against
him. fTho debtor’s consent to the guaranty
renders him liable to the guarantor
; but not his mere consent to pay-
ment by the latter, flf a guarantor
has persuaded a creditor to accept
debased
money instead of the good pieces duo
by the debtor, or a coat
Avorth
fifty pieces instead of one hundred
pieces, he can claim from the
debtor
no inoro than ho has actually paid.
If ono discharges another’s
obligation Avithout his knoAvledgo and
Avithout any guaranty, one is not
substituted for the creditor so as
to be
able to proceed against the
debtor ; but the debtor’s consent to
payment
by a third party not a guarantor
involves this substitution, Avhether or
not such a right has been expressly
reserved. fThis right of substitution
remains intact, even Avhere the
creditor and the third party convert the
debt into another of a different nature.
The laAV requires that before
proceedings are taken, either under a
guaranty or by right of
substitution, that payment took place in
presence
of tAvo male Avitnesses, or
of ono male and tAvo female
Avitnesses ; or
e\Ten of a single male
Avitness — but in this last case the
guarantor or
substitute should take an
oath. If there are no Avitnesses,
the payment
made by the guarantor or
the substitute, in the absence of
the debtor,
gives him no right to
proceed, whether there is for is not
a rejoinder on
his part. Our school,
hoAvever, admits such right to proceed,
even
Avithout Avitnesses, Avhero payment
is substantiated by a declaration of
the
creditor, or Avhere it has taken
place in presence of the original
debtor.
كتاب الشركة
BOOK 13.— PARTNERSHIP
هِيَ أَنْوَاعُ شَرِكَةِ الْأَبْدَانِ كَشَرِكَةِ الْحَمَّالِينَ، وَسَائِرِ
الْمُحْتَرِفَةِ لِيَكُونَ بَيْنَهُمَا كَسْبُهُمَا مُتَسَاوِيًا أَوْ
مُتَفَاوِتًا مَعَ اتِّفَاقِ الصَّنْعَةِ أَوْ اخْتِلَافِهَا.
وَشَرِكَةُ
الْمُفَاوَضَةِ لِيَكُونَ بَيْنَهُمَا كَسْبُهُمَا وَعَلَيْهِمَا مَا يَعْرِضُ
مِنْ غُرْمٍ.
وَشَرِكَةُ الْوُجُوهِ بِأَنْ يَشْتَرِكَ
الْوَجِيهَانِ لِيَبْتَاعَ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا بِمُؤَجَّلٍ لَهُمَا، فَإِذَا
بَاعَا كَانَ الْفَاضِلُ عَنْ الْأَثْمَانِ بَيْنَهُمَا وَهَذِهِ الْأَنْوَاعُ
بَاطِلَةٌ.
وَشَرِكَةُ الْعِنَانِ صَحِيحَةٌ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ
فِيهَا لَفْظٌ يَدُلُّ عَلَى الْإِذْنِ فِي التَّصَرُّفِ فَلَوْ اقْتَصَرَا عَلَى
اشْتَرَكْنَا لَمْ يَكْفِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ:.
وَفِيهِمَا
أَهْلِيَّةُ التَّوْكِيلِ وَالتَّوَكُّلِ.
وَتَصِحُّ فِي كُلِّ
مِثْلِيٍّ دُونَ الْمُتَقَوِّمِ، وَقِيلَ تَخْتَصُّ بِالنَّقْدِ
الْمَضْرُوبِ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ خَلْطُ الْمَالَيْنِ بِحَيْثُ لَا
يَتَمَيَّزَانِ، وَلَا يَكْفِي الْخَلْطُ مَعَ اخْتِلَافِ جِنْسٍ، أَوْ صِفَةٍ
كَصِحَاحٍ وَمُكَسَّرَةٍ هَذَا إذَا أَخْرَجَا مَالَيْنِ وَعَقَدَا، فَإِنْ
مَلَكَا مُشْتَرَكًا بِإِرْثٍ وَشِرَاءٍ وَغَيْرِهِمَا وَأَذِنَ كُلٌّ لِلْآخَرِ
فِي التِّجَارَةِ فِيهِ تَمَّتْ الشَّرِكَةُ، وَالْحِيلَةُ فِي الشَّرِكَةِ فِي
الْعُرُوضِ أَنْ يَبِيعَ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ بَعْضَ عَرْضِهِ بِبَعْضِ عَرْضِ الْآخَرِ
وَيَأْذَنَ لَهُ فِي التَّصَرُّفِ.
وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ تَسَاوِي
قَدْرِ الْمَالَيْنِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا يُشْتَرَطُ الْعِلْمُ
بِقَدْرِهِمَا عِنْدَ الْعَقْدِ.
وَيَتَسَلَّطُ كُلٌّ مِنْهُمَا
عَلَى التَّصَرُّفِ بِلَا ضَرَرٍ فَلَا يَبِيعُ نَسِيئَةً وَلَا بِغَيْرِ نَقْدِ
الْبَلَدِ وَلَا بِغَبْنٍ فَاحِشٍ وَلَا يُسَافِرُ بِهِ وَلَا يُبْعِضُهُ
بِغَيْرِ إذْنٍ.
وَلِكُلٍّ فَسْخُهُ مَتَى شَاءَ، وَيَنْعَزِلَانِ
عَنْ التَّصَرُّفِ بِفَسْخِهِمَا، فَإِنْ قَالَ أَحَدُهُمَا عَزَلْتُك أَوْ لَا
تَتَصَرَّفْ فِي نَصِيبِي لَمْ يَنْعَزِلْ الْعَازِلُ.
وَتَنْفَسِخُ
بِمَوْتِ أَحَدِهِمَا وَبِجُنُونِهِ وَبِإِغْمَائِهِ.
وَالرِّبْحُ
وَالْخُسْرَانُ عَلَى قَدْرِ الْمَالَيْنِ تَسَاوَيَا فِي الْعَمَلِ أَوْ
تَفَاوَتَا، فَإِنْ شَرَطَا خِلَافَهُ فَسَدَ الْعَقْدُ فَيَرْجِعُ كُلٌّ عَلَى
الْآخَرِ بِأُجْرَةِ عَمَلِهِ فِي مَالِهِ، وَتَنْفُذُ التَّصَرُّفَاتُ،
وَالرِّبْحُ عَلَى قَدْرِ الْمَالَيْنِ، وَيَدُ الشَّرِيكِ يَدُ أَمَانَةٍ،
فَيُقْبَلُ قَوْلُهُ فِي الرَّدِّ.
وَالْخُسْرَانِ وَالتَّلَفِ
فَإِنْ ادَّعَاهُ بِسَبَبٍ ظَاهِرٍ طُولِبَ بِبَيِّنَةٍ بِالسَّبَبِ، ثُمَّ
يُصَدَّقُ فِي التَّلَفِ بِهِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ مَنْ فِي يَدِهِ
الْمَالُ هُوَ لِي، وَقَالَ الْآخَرُ مُشْتَرَكٌ أَوْ بِالْعَكْسِ صُدِّقَ
صَاحِبُ الْيَدِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ اقْتَسَمْنَا وَصَارَ لِي صُدِّقَ
الْمُنْكِرُ.
وَلَوْ اشْتَرَى وَقَالَ اشْتَرَيْته لِلشَّرِكَةِ
أَوْ لِنَفْسِي وَكَذَّبَهُ الْآخَر صُدِّقَ الْمُشْتَرِي.
BOOK .— PARTNERSHIP
Pour kinds of
partnerships are to bo distinguished —
. Personal (slier kat-al-abdan), a
contract by virtue of which some
persons unite for tho exercise of
their trade or profession, as a partner-
ship of two or more porters or
workmen so that their profit is held
in
common and divided amongst them.
Such a partnership does not
require equal
contribution, nor that the partners should
all have tho
same trade.
.
Universal (slierkat-al-mofawada), in which tho
profit gained by
each partner is
held in common by all, and all
aro jointly responsible
for the debts
of each.
. Commercial, in
participation (sherka-al-wujuh), in which two
persons, well known as merchants,
each buy goods as if for himself,
under
particular conditions as to time
of payment ; the goods being then sold
in common and tho profits divided
between the two.
All these three
kinds of partnership are null and void.
. Particular (sherka-al-inan), which
alone is permitted, provided
that the
share of each partner is expressly
indicated. fThus a partner-
ship of this
kind cannot exist where there is
merely an agreement to
combine and
nothing more. No particular partnership
can take place
except between persons
capable of appointing or being appointed
an
agent.
The share capital must
consist of things sold by measure or
weight,
and not otherwise. Some jurists
even maintain that these contributions
must consist in gold or silver
coin. All agree that the shares must
be
mixed together so as to be
indistinguishable. This cannot take place
unless the contributions are of the
same nature and quality. Thus one
partner cannot bring good coin and
another debased. These rules,
however,
apply only to the common stock
collected to form a conven-
tional partnership ;
for if two persons obtain anything
as undivided
property in some other
way, as by inheritance, sale, etc.,
and allow each
other unrestricted right
to trade with it, this is a
perfectly legitimate
partnership, without,
however, there being any combination of
funds
subscribed, and without there being
any question of things sold by
measure or weight. It follows
therefore that the rule that the
funds of
a partnership must consist of
things sold by measure or weight can
be
eluded by a mutual and partial
exchange of the things contributed,
combined with an authorisation to
dispose of them at pleasure. The
law
does not insist that the share
contributed by each partner shall be
equal
; fnor even that the exact amount
must be known at the time of
the contract of partnership.
No
partner may dispose of the common
funds, except in a reasonable
manner. Thus
he cannot of his own accord sell
either on credit or for
any coin
not legally current in the place ;
and he is personally responsible
if
he allows himself to be deceived by
any obvious fraud. Neither can
he
take with him on a journey partnership
funds ; nor send them to a
commission agent, without the permission
of the other partners.
Each partner
has a right to terminate the contract
of partnership at
any moment ; but can
then no longer disposo of the common
funds.
This rule, however, must be
understood in the sense that if one
partner
says to another, “ I release you
from our contract,” or “ You can no
longer dispose of my share in
the common funds,” he is not himself
released from his obligations towards
the partnership. A partnership
terminates upon
the death, lunacy, or disappearance of
one of the
partners.
Profit and
loss must be shared in proportion to
the contribution of
each partner, without
regard to the value of the labour
of each. Any
stipulation to the
contrary would involve the illegality of
the contract.
But in these circumstances
the partners retain a right of action
against
each other for any salary
that may be due for their respective
services,
and what dispositions they may
have made with regard to the common
funds remain intact. And any profit
made or loss incurred, before the
legality of the contract was called
in question, must be shared in propor-
tion to the capital contributed.
Each partner is considered as
the depositary of the common funds
intrusted to him ; which implies that
his word is presumed to be true
as to restitution, deterioration or
accidental loss of such property. If
he alleges some visible cause of
tho loss, he need only prove that
the
accident took place, his word
being enough to show the accident did
also cause the loss of the
object in dispute. If ono partner
possesses
something he says is his,
while another says it belongs to the
partnership
or vice versa , the presumption
is in favour of the person in
possession ;
but if he asserts that
the thing belongs to him in
consequence of a division
amongst the
partners, the presumption is in favour
of the party that
denies this fact.
And finally there is a presumption in
favour of a
partner who asserts that
a thing was purchased, either for the
partner-
ship or on his oavii account,
against any other partner who maintains
the contrary.[]