Book 14: Principal and Agent (Wakalah)
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature dan reference: classical Arabic books
Contents
- Book 14: Principal and Agent (Wakalah)
- Book 15: Admission (Ikrar)
- Book 16: Loan (Aariya)
- Book 17: Usurpation (Ghasb)
- Book 18: Pre-emption (Shuf'ah)
- Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi
كتاب الْوَكَالَةِ
BOOK 14 .— PKINCIPAL AND AGENT (WAKALAH)
شَرْطُ الْمُوَكِّلِ صِحَّةُ مُبَاشَرَتِهِ مَا وَكَّلَ فِيهِ بِمِلْكٍ أَوْ
وِلَايَةٍ.
فَلَا يَصِحُّ تَوْكِيلُ صَبِيٍّ وَلَا مَجْنُونٍ وَلَا
الْمَرْأَةِ وَالْمُحْرِمِ فِي النِّكَاحِ.
وَيَصِحُّ تَوْكِيلُ
الْوَلِيِّ فِي حَقِّ الطِّفْلِ.
وَيُسْتَثْنَى تَوْكِيلُ
الْأَعْمَى فِي الْبَيْعِ وَالشِّرَاءِ فَيَصِحُّ.
وَشَرْطُ
الْوَكِيلِ صِحَّةُ مُبَاشَرَتِهِ التَّصَرُّفَ لِنَفْسِهِ، لَا صَبِيٍّ
وَمَجْنُونٍ وَكَذَا الْمَرْأَةُ وَالْمُحْرِمُ فِي النِّكَاحِ لَكِنْ الصَّحِيحُ
اعْتِمَادُ قَوْلِ صَبِيٍّ فِي الْإِذْنِ فِي دُخُولِ دَارٍ وَإِيصَالِ
هَدِيَّةٍ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ صِحَّةُ تَوْكِيلِ عَبْدٍ فِي قَبُولِ
نِكَاحٍ وَمَنْعُهُ فِي الْإِيجَابِ.
وَشَرْطُ الْمُوَكَّلِ فِيهِ
أَنْ يَمْلِكَهُ الْمُوَكِّلُ: فَلَوْ وَكَّلَ بِبَيْعٍ عَبْدٍ سَيَمْلِكُهُ،
وَطَلَاقِ مَنْ سَيَنْكِحُهَا بَطَلَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَأَنْ
يَكُونَ قَابِلاً لِلنِّيَابَةِ، فَلَا يَصِحُّ فِي عِبَادَةٍ إلَّا الْحَجَّ
وَتَفْرِقَةَ زَكَاةٍ، وَذَبْحَ أُضْحِيَّةٍ، وَلَا فِي شَهَادَةٍ وَإِيلَاءٍ
وَلِعَانٍ وَسَائِرِ الْأَيْمَانِ، وَلَا فِي الظِّهَارِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَصِحُّ
فِي طَرَفَيْ بَيْعٍ، وَهِبَةٍ، وَسَلَمٍ، وَرَهْنٍ، وَنِكَاحٍ، وَطَلَاقٍ،
وَسَائِرِ الْعُقُودِ وَالْفُسُوخِ، وَقَبْضِ الدُّيُونِ وَإِقْبَاضِهَا
وَالدَّعْوَى وَالْجَوَابِ.
وَكَذَا فِي تَمَلُّكِ الْمُبَاحَاتِ
كَالْإِحْيَاءِ وَالِاصْطِيَادِ وَالِاحْتِطَابِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، لَا فِي
الْإِقْرَارِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَصِحُّ فِي اسْتِيفَاءِ عُقُوبَةِ
آدَمِيٍّ كَقِصَاصٍ وَحَدِّ قَذْفٍ، وَقِيل لَا يَجُوزُ إلَّا بِحَضْرَةِ
الْمُوَكِّلِ.
وَلْيَكُنْ الْمُوَكَّلُ فِيهِ مَعْلُومًا مِنْ
بَعْضِ الْوُجُوهِ، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ عِلْمُهُ مِنْ كُلِّ وَجْهٍ، فَلَوْ قَالَ
وَكَّلْتُك فِي كُلِّ قَلِيلٍ وَكَثِيرٍ أَوْ فِي كُلِّ أُمُورِي أَوْ فَوَّضْت
إلَيْك كُلَّ شَيْءٍ لَمْ يَصِحَّ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ فِي بَيْعِ
أَمْوَالِي وَعِتْقِ أَرِقَّائِي صَحَّ.
وَإِنْ وَكَّلَهُ فِي
شِرَاءِ عَبْدٍ وَجَبَ بَيَانُ نَوْعِهِ، أَوْ دَارٍ وَجَبَ بَيَانُ الْمَحَلَّةِ
وَالسِّكَّةِ، لَا قَدْرِ الثَّمَنِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ
مِنْ الْمُوَكِّلِ لَفْظٌ يَقْتَضِي رِضَاهُ كَوَكَّلْتُكَ فِي كَذَا أَوْ
فَوَّضْته إلَيْك أَوْ أَنْتَ وَكِيلِي فِيهِ، فَلَوْ قَالَ بِعْ أَوْ أَعْتِقْ
حَصَلَ الْإِذْنُ وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ الْقَبُولُ لَفْظًا، وَقِيلَ يُشْتَرَطُ
وَقِيلَ يُشْتَرَطُ فِي صِيَغِ الْعُقُودِ كَوَكَّلْتُكَ، دُونَ صِيَغِ الْأَمْرِ
كَبِعْ وَأَعْتِقْ.
وَلَا يَصِحُّ تَعْلِيقُهَا بِشَرْطٍ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
فَإِنْ نَجَّزَهَا، وَشَرَطَ لِلتَّصَرُّفِ شَرْطًا
جَازَ، وَلَوْ قَالَ وَكَّلْتُك وَمَتَى عَزَلْتُك فَأَنْتَ وَكِيلِي صَحَّتْ فِي
الْحَالِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَفِي عَوْدِهِ وَكِيلاً بَعْدَ الْعَزْلِ الْوَجْهَانِ
فِي تَعْلِيقِهَا، وَيَجْرِيَانِ فِي تَعْلِيقِ الْعَزْلِ.
BOOK 14 .— PKINCIPAL AND AGENT (WAKALAH)
Section
For the validity of an
appointment as agent, it is necessary
that the
principal should have the
right to do in person what he
authorises his
agent to do, whether
it concerns his own property, or
something else of
which he has a
right to dispose. Thus a minor, a lunatic,
a woman —
as to marriage — or a person in
a state of ihram , cannot appoint an agent ;
but a guardian may do so on
behalf of his pupil. A blind person,
though
incapable of himself buying or
selling anything because he cannot see it,
may nominate an agent for this
purpose.
An agent must himself be
capable of doing on his own account
what
he is appointed to do for
another. Consequently, neither a minor, nor
a
lunatic, nor — as to marriage — a woman, nor a
person in a state of
ihram , can be
appointed an agent.
There are,
however, certain circumstances in which
one may rely
upon the word of a
minor, e.g. when in the name of
his parents he allows
some ono to
enter the house, or when he brings a
small present from
them. fA slave
may be appointed an agent to receive
a woman in
marriage, but not to give
her away.
The object of an
appointment as agent must be —
.
The property of, or a right acquired
by, the principal. fThus,
for example,
the appointment of an agent to sell
a slave one is about to
purchase, or
to repudiate a woman one is about to
marry, is considered
null and void.
. An act which may be
performed by another person. Conse-
quently,
to appoint an agent to perform one’s
religious duties is unlawful,
with the
exception of the pilgrimage, visit,
distribution of charity and
sacrifice. An
agent may not be appointed to depose
as a witness, take
an oath of
continence, pronounce an anathema or other
oaths for an
injurious comparison. On
the other hand, sale and purchase,
donation,
contract of salam, security,
marriage, repudiation, and in general all
civil conventions may be effected or
revoked through an agent.
Similarly, an
agent may accept what a third party
owes his principal ;
he can fulfil
the latter’s obligations, appear in court
for him either as
plaint iff or
defendant, *and by occupation in his
name acquire possession
of an object
not belonging to any one, as e.g.
by clearing waste iancl, by
hunting,
or by picking up dry wood. A
judicial confession should be
made
personally by the interested party, fand
cannot be made through
an agent ; but
it is permissible to apply by agent
for the application of
a penalty that
may be remitted, as under the law
of talion, or of a penalty
for
defamation. Only a small number of
authorities refuse to allow this
unless
the principal is present.
. Known ;
at least in part, for complete
precision is unnecessary.
Thus, an
appointment as agent in the following
terms is invalid : — I
give
you general authority as my agent in
business, important or other-
wise,” or
“for all my affairs,” or I
intrust my property to you.” On
the
other hand, there is no objection to
an appointment as follows : —
appoint you my agent for the sale
of all my property, and the en-
franchisement of all my slaves.” It
follows also from this principle that
when giving any one power of
attorney to purchase a slave, the kind
must be specified ; or, in the
case of a house, its situation ; but
in f
neither case is it necessary
to mention the price.
The principal
must make use of words that leave
no doubt as to his
consent. Thus,
for example, he should say,
appoint you my agent
for such and
such a business,” or intrust it
to you,” or You will be
my agent ; ” and consent is also
sufficiently expressed by saying, Sell
this for me,” or Enfranchise
such and such a slave.” Eor the validity
of an appointment as agent the
law does not require an express accept-
ance on the part of the agent ;
though some authorities maintain the
contrary opinion, in a case where
the principal has merely indicated the
nature of the contract, as, for
instance, by saying, I appoint you
my
agent.” Where, however, the principal
has disclosed the nature not
of the
contract but of the act, by saying,
e.g . sell ” or enfranchise,”
even these authors do not insist
upon an express acceptance.
fAn
appointment as agent cannot be made
to depend upon a con-
dition ; but there
is no objection to the business
confided to the agent
being made so
to depend. fThe words, appoint
you my agent and
you will be
so again after I have revoked the
appointment,” constitute
a valid power of
attorney for the present, but it
lapses upon revocation,
for there is
then a new appointment depending upon a
condition. fThe
same principle applies to
the cancelling condition ; whether, i.e. the
revocation of the appointment may or
may not be conditional.
فصل [في أحكام الوكالة بعد صحتها]
الْوَكِيلُ بِالْبَيْعِ
مُطْلَقًا لَيْسَ لَهُ الْبَيْعُ بِغَيْرِ نَقْدِ الْبَلَدِ وَلَا بِنَسِيئَةٍ
وَلَا بِغَبْنٍ فَاحِشٍ، وَهُوَ مَا لَا يُحْتَمَلُ غَالِبًا، فَلَوْ بَاعَ عَلَى
أَحَدِ هَذِهِ الْأَنْوَاعِ، وَسَلَّمَ الْمَبِيعَ ضَمِنَ.
فَإِنْ
وَكَّلَهُ لِيَبِيعَ مُؤَجَّلاً وَقَدَّرَ الْأَجَلَ فَذَاكَ.
وَإِنْ
أَطْلَقَ صَحَّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَحُمِلَ عَلَى الْمُتَعَارَفِ فِي مِثْلِهِ
وَلَا يَبِيعُ لِنَفْسِهِ وَوَلَدِهِ الصَّغِيرِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ يَبِيعُ
لِأَبِيهِ وَابْنِهِ الْبَالِغِ.
وَأَنَّ الْوَكِيلَ بِالْبَيْعِ
لَهُ قَبْضُ الثَّمَنِ وَتَسْلِيمُ الْمَبِيعِ، وَلَا يُسَلِّمُهُ حَتَّى
يَقْبِضَ الثَّمَنَ، فَإِنْ خَالَفَ ضَمِنَ.
وَإِذَا وَكَّلَهُ فِي
شِرَاءِ لَا يَشْتَرِي مَعِيبًا، فَإِنْ اشْتَرَاهُ فِي الذِّمَّةِ وَهُوَ
يُسَاوِي مَعَ الْعَيْبِ مَا اشْتَرَاهُ بِهِ وَقَعَ عَنْ الْمُوَكِّلِ إنْ
جَهِلَ الْعَيْبَ، وَإِنْ عَلِمَهُ فَلَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يُسَاوِهْ
لَمْ يَقَعْ عَنْهُ إنْ عَلِمَهُ، وَإِنْ جَهِلَهُ وَقَعَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَإِذَا وَقَعَ لِلْمُوَكِّلِ فَلِكُلٍّ مِنْ الْوَكِيلِ وَالْمُوَكِّلِ
الرَّدُّ.
وَلَيْسَ لِلْوَكِيلِ أَنْ يُوَكِّلَ بِلَا إذْنٍ إنْ
تَأَتَّيْ مِنْهُ مَا وَكَّلَ فِيهِ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَتَأَتَّ لِكَوْنِهِ لَا
يُحْسِنُهُ أَوْ لَا يَلِيقُ بِهِ فَلَهُ التَّوْكِيلُ، وَلَوْ كَثُرَ وَعَجَزَ
عَنْ الْإِثْبَاتِ بِكُلِّهِ، فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ يُوَكِّلُ فِيمَا زَادَ
عَلَى الْمُمْكِنِ.
وَلَوْ أَذِنَ فِي التَّوْكِيلِ وَقَالَ:
وَكِّلْ عَنْ نَفْسِكَ فَفَعَلَ فَالثَّانِي وَكِيلُ الْوَكِيلِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ
أَنَّهُ يَنْعَزِلُ بِعَزْلِهِ وَانْعِزَالِهِ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ
وَكِّلْ عَنِّي فَالثَّانِي وَكِيلُ الْمُوَكِّلِ، وَكَذَا لَوْ أَطْلَقَ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْت: وَفِي هَاتَيْنِ الصُّورَتَيْنِ لَا يَعْزِلُ
أَحَدُهُمَا الْآخَرَ وَلَا يَنْعَزِلُ بِانْعِزَالِهِ.
وَحَيْثُ
جَوَّزْنَا لِلْوَكِيلِ التَّوْكِيلَ يُشْتَرَطُ أَنْ يُوَكِّلَ أَمِينًا إلَّا
أَنْ يُعَيِّنَ الْمُوَكِّلُ غَيْرَهُ، وَلَوْ وَكَّلَ أَمِينًا فَفُسِّقَ لَمْ
يَمْلِكْ الْوَكِيلُ عَزْلَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
An agent appointed to
effect a general sale may accept in
payment of
the price only such coin
as is legally current in the
locality. He may not
sell on credit ;
nor may he allow himself to he
deceived by any obvious
fraud — such a
fraud, that is, as is seldom capable
of deceiving an average
person. In
any case the agent is personally
responsible to the principal
for damage,
when there has been delivery of th©a
goods. If the power
of attorney
specifies that a sale shall be at a
fixed time, the same rule
must be
applied ; fbut it is quite legal to
leave the time to the discretion
of
the agent, who should then guide
himself by what is usually stipulated
as to the time. An agent
appointed to sell a thing cannot buy
it for
himself, nor for a minor of
whom he is the legal guardian ; fbut
there is
no objection to his selling
it to his father or to his
adult child. A power
to sell implies a
power to receive the price and
deliver the goods. A
delivery of the
goods before the receipt of the
price is at the agent’s
risk. An
agent appointed to buy must not
purchase a thing with
redhibitory defects,
except on his own responsibility. If
the object is
worth the price
stipulated, in spite of redhibitory
defects, the purchase
is chargeable to
the principal, if the agent was
unaware of the defects,
fbut not
otherwise. If the thing is not worth
the price paid, the pur-
chase does
not bind the principal, if the agent
knew of the defects. If
he was
not aware of them, the agreement
rests intact, except for the
right
of option, which in these circumstances
the law allows both to
principal and
agent.
An agent, if able to
carry out his instructions, may not
delegate a
third party to do so,
without his principal’s consent ; but if
he is unable
to conclude the affair
through incapacity or on account of
his social
position, such delegation is
quite lawful. It is so also where
there are
many agencies that one
person cannot execute alone ; but in
this case
our school admits delegation
only for that part of his duty
that exceeds
the agent’s power. A power
of delegation accorded by the principal in
explicit terms, such as, “ Choose a
substitute for yourself,” does not
affect
the position of the substitute, who
remains always the agent’s
agent.
^Consequently his authority terminates either
by a revocation
of his appointment by
the agent, or by a revocation of the
latter’s own
appointment. Where, on the
other hand, the principal says to
the agent,
“ Choose me another
person to replace you if you should
require a
substitute,” and the agent
chooses such a substitute, the latter becomes
the direct agent of the principal, f
And it is the same where the
principal
has accorded a faculty of
substitution, without indicating whether the
substitute is to act for him
or for his agent.
[. In all
cases where the substitute acts directly
for the principal,
an agent cannot
revoke his appointment ; nor is his
appointment ipso
facto revoked by the
revocation of the agent’s appointment. On
the
other hand, the agent is equally
independent of the substitute.
. Even
where an agent has a right of
delegation, he can appoint as
substitute
only a person worthy of confidence ;
unless the principal has
indicated some
particular person.
. j*' Where an
agent has made use of his power
to appoint as sub-
stitute a person worthy
of confidence, who is afterwards guilty of
notorious misconduct, he cannot of
his own accord revoke his appoint-
ment.]
فصل [فيما يجب على الوكيل في الوكالة المقيدة]
قَالَ: بِعْ
لِشَخْصٍ مُعَيَّنٍ أَوْ فِي زَمَنٍ أَوْ مَكَان مُعَيَّنٍ تَعَيَّنَ، وَفِي
الْمَكَانِ وَجْهٌ إذَا لَمْ يَتَعَلَّقْ بِهِ غَرَضٌ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ
بِعْ بِمِائَةٍ لَمْ يَبِعْ بِأَقَلَّ، وَلَهُ أَنْ يَزِيدَ إلَّا أَنْ يُصَرِّحَ
بِالنَّهْيِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ اشْتَرِ بِهَذَا الدِّينَارِ شَاةً
وَوَصَفَهَا فَاشْتَرَى بِهِ شَاتَيْنِ بِالصِّفَةِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ تُسَاوِ
وَاحِدَةٌ دِينَارًا لَمْ يَصِحَّ الشِّرَاءُ لِلْمُوَكِّلِ، وَإِنْ سَاوَتْهُ
كُلُّ وَاحِدَةٍ فَالْأَظْهَرُ الصِّحَّةُ، وَحُصُولُ الْمِلْكِ فِيهِمَا
لِلْمُوَكِّلِ.
وَلَوْ أَمَرَهُ بِالشِّرَاءِ بِمُعَيَّنٍ
فَاشْتَرَى فِي الذِّمَّةِ لَمْ يَقَعْ لِلْمُوَكِّلِ وَكَذَا عَكْسُهُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَمَتَى خَالَفَ الْمُوَكِّلَ فِي بَيْعِ مَالِهِ أَوْ
الشِّرَاءِ بِعَيْنِهِ فَتَصَرُّفُهُ بَاطِلٌ.
وَلَوْ اشْتَرَى فِي
الذِّمَّةِ وَلَمْ يُسَمِّ الْمُوَكِّلَ وَقَعَ لِلْوَكِيلِ، وَإِنْ سَمَّاهُ
فَقَالَ الْبَائِعُ، بِعْتُ فَقَالَ اشْتَرَيْت لِفُلَانٍ فَكَذَا فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ قَالَ بِعْت مُوَكِّلَك زَيْدًا فَقَالَ اشْتَرَيْت لَهُ
فَالْمَذْهَبُ بُطْلَانُهُ.
وَيَدُ الْوَكِيلِ يَدُ أَمَانَةٍ،
وَإِنْ كَانَ بِجُعْلٍ فَإِنْ تَعَدَّى ضَمِنَ وَلَا يَنْعَزِلُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَأَحْكَامُ الْعَقْدِ تَتَعَلَّقُ بِالْوَكِيلِ دُونَ
الْمُوَكِّلِ فَيُعْتَبَرُ فِي الرُّؤْيَةِ وَلُزُومِ الْعَقْدِ بِمُفَارَقَةِ
الْمَجْلِسِ وَالتَّقَابُضِ فِي الْمَجْلِسِ حَيْثُ يَشْتَرِطُ الْوَكِيلُ دُونَ
الْمُوَكِّلِ، وَإِذَا اشْتَرَى الْوَكِيلُ طَالَبَهُ الْبَائِعُ بِالثَّمَنِ إنْ
كَانَ دَفَعَهُ إلَيْهِ الْمُوَكِّلُ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا إنْ كَانَ الثَّمَنُ
مُعَيَّنًا، وَإِنْ كَانَ فِي الذِّمَّةِ طَالَبَهُ إنْ أَنْكَرَ وَكَالَتَهُ
أَوْ قَالَ لَا أَعْلَمُهَا، وَإِنْ اعْتَرَفَ بِهَا طَالَبَهُ أَيْضًا فِي
الْأَصَحِّ كَمَا يُطَالِبُ الْمُوَكِّلِ، وَيَكُونُ الْوَكِيلُ كَضَامِنٍ
وَالْمُوَكِّلُ كَأَصِيلٍ، وَإِذَا قَبَضَ الْوَكِيلُ بِالْبَيْعِ الثَّمَنَ
وَتَلِفَ فِي يَدِهِ وَخَرَجَ الْمَبِيعُ مُسْتَحَقًّا رَجَعَ عَلَيْهِ
الْمُشْتَرِي، وَإِنْ اعْتَرَفَ بِوَكَالَتِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، ثُمَّ يَرْجِعُ
الْوَكِيلُ عَلَى الْمُوَكِّلِ قُلْت: وَلِلْمُشْتَرِي الرُّجُوعُ عَلَى
الْمُوَكِّلِ ابْتِدَاءً فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
If in an agent’s
power of attorney there is a formal
injunction to
sell, either to a person
specially mentioned, or at a certain date,
or at
a particular place, the agent
must act in conformity with this clause.
Authorities, however, are not in
complete agreement as to the place,
especially if the agent is unaware
that such place has been indicated
with a particular object. A power of
attorney to sell for “ one hundred
pieces of money ” does not imply
any authority to sell for less ; but
the
sale may be effected at a higher
price, unless expressly forbidden by the
principal.
Where an agent had
been appointed to purchase a shah of a
certain
quality for a dinar received for
that purpose, and he buys for that
price
two shahs of the required
quality, but neither of them is
worth the price,
the principal is
not obliged to confirm the purchase.
*He would be
bound to confirm it,
if each of the two shahs had
the value mentioned,
and in that
case the ownership of the property
would be transferred to
the principal
by the fact of his agent’s taking
possession. Where a
principal instructs an
agent to give some definite object
in exchange
for the goods, and the
latter buys on credit, for vice versd ,
the purchase
has no effect as
against the principal. An agent who
does not conform
to his principal’s
instructions, with regard to the sale
of his property
or an exchange for
some definite object, disposes of the
goods of another
in such a way as
to cause the nullity of the
contract. A purchase
effected by an agent
without naming his principal, and on
his own
responsibility, does not affect
the latter ; *j*and it is the same
where the
vendor says, “ I sell you
this thing,” and the agent answers, “
No, I buy
it for so-and-so.” Finally,
according to our school, an agreement
expressed as follows : — “ I sell this
to your principal Zaid,” to which
the agent answers, “ I buy it for
him,” is null and void.
An
agent is considered as the depositary
of everything intrusted to
him in
virtue of his appointment as agent ; and,
even where he does not
act
gratuitously, he is responsible for loss
or accidental deterioration
only if he
has exceeded his powers. fHowever, an
error of this
sort upon his part
does not of itself involve the
revocation of his
appointment. In all
cases the immediate consequences of a contract
concern only the agent who has
effected it, and not the principal.
Thus the inspection of the goods,
the irrevocableness of ,the contract
upon
the separation of the parties, and
mutual taking possession upon
the spot,
are the affair of the agent, not
of the principal.
The price agreed
upon may be recovered by the vendor
in the follow-
ing ways : —
.
If the price has been left by
the principal to the agent, the vendor
may cite both of them.
.
If this is not so, and the
price consists of some definite object,
the
vendor can cite only the principal.
. If neither of these
suppositions is the case, the vendor
can cite
only the agent ; at any
rate if the principal entirely denies
the agency,
or declares he knows
nothing about it. f Where, on the
other hand, the
appointment is admitted
by all the interested parties, the
vendor may
cite both principal and
agent, even though the price is not
a definite
object. In such a case the
agent is regarded as the principal
debtor, and
the principal as his security.
In case of a legal seizure the
purchaser has a remedy against the
agent
if the latter has received the
price, even though this price may have
been accidentally lost when in his
possession, fand even though he may
have informed the purchaser he was
not acting on his own account.
The
agent may in his turn proceed
against the principal. [fThe pur-
chaser
has also the right to proceed
directly against the principal in
case
of a legal seizure.]
فَصْلٌ [في بيان جواز الوكالة وما تنفسخ به]
الْوَكَالَةُ
جَائِزَةٌ مِنْ الْجَانِبَيْنِ، فَإِذَا عَزَلَهُ الْمُوَكِّلُ فِي حُضُورِهِ
أَوْ قَالَ رَفَعْت الْوَكَالَةَ أَوْ أَبْطَلْتهَا أَوْ أَخْرَجْتُك مِنْهَا
انْعَزَلَ فَإِنْ عَزَلَهُ، وَهُوَ غَائِبٌ انْعَزَلَ فِي الْحَالِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ
لَا حَتَّى يَبْلُغَهُ الْخَبَرُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ عَزَلْت نَفْسِي
أَوْ رَدَدْت الْوَكَالَةَ انْعَزَلَ.
وَيَنْعَزِلُ بِخُرُوجِ
أَحَدِهِمَا عَنْ أَهْلِيَّةِ التَّصَرُّفِ بِمَوْتٍ أَوْ جُنُونٍ، وَكَذَا
إغْمَاءٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَبِخُرُوجِ مَحَلِّ التَّصَرُّفِ عَنْ مِلْكِ
الْمُوَكِّلِ.
وَإِنْكَارُ الْوَكِيلِ الْوَكَالَةَ لِنِسْيَانٍ
أَوْ لِغَرَضٍ فِي الْإِخْفَاءِ لَيْسَ بِعَزْلٍ، فَإِنْ تَعَمَّدَ وَلَا غَرَضَ
انْعَزَلَ.
وَإِذَا اخْتَلَفَا فِي أَصْلِهَا أَوْ صِفَتِهَا بِأَنْ
قَالَ وَكَّلْتنِي فِي الْبَيْعِ نَسِيئَةً أَوْ الشِّرَاءِ بِعِشْرِينَ، فَقَالَ
بَلْ نَقْدًا أَوْ بِعَشَرَةٍ صُدِّقَ الْمُوَكِّلُ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَلَوْ اشْتَرَى
جَارِيَةً بِعِشْرِينَ وَزَعَمَ أَنَّ الْمُوَكِّلَ أَمَرَهُ فَقَالَ بَلْ
بِعَشَرَةٍ وَحَلَفَ، فَإِنْ اشْتَرَى بِعَيْنِ مَالِ الْمُوَكِّلِ وَسَمَّاهُ
فِي الْعَقْدِ وَقَالَ بَعْدَهُ اشْتَرَيْته لِفُلَانٍ وَالْمَالُ لَهُ
وَصَدَّقَهُ الْبَائِعُ فَالْبَيْعُ بَاطِلٌ، وَإِنْ كَذَّبَهُ حَلَفَ عَلَى
نَفْيِ الْعِلْمِ بِالْوَكَالَةِ، وَوَقَعَ الشِّرَاءُ لِلْوَكِيلِ،
وَكَذَا.
إنْ اشْتَرَى فِي الذِّمَّةِ وَلَمْ يُسَمِّ الْمُوَكِّلَ
وَكَذَا إنْ سَمَّاهُ وَكَذَّبَهُ الْبَائِعُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ صَدَّقَهُ
بَطَلَ الشِّرَاءُ، وَحَيْثُ حُكِمَ بِالشِّرَاءِ لِلْوَكِيلِ يُسْتَحَبُّ
لِلْقَاضِي أَنْ يَرْفُقَ بِالْمُوَكِّلِ لِيَقُولَ لِلْوَكِيلِ إنْ كُنْت
أَمَرْتُك بِعِشْرِينَ فَقَدْ بِعْتُكَهَا بِهَا، وَيَقُولُ هُوَ اشْتَرَيْت
لِتَحِلَّ لَهُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ أَتَيْت بِالتَّصَرُّفِ الْمَأْذُونِ
فِيهِ وَأَنْكَرَ الْمُوَكِّلُ صُدِّقَ الْمُوَكِّلُ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ الْوَكِيلُ،
وَقَوْلُ الْوَكِيلِ فِي تَلَفِ الْمَالِ مَقْبُولٌ بِيَمِينِهِ وَكَذَا فِي
الرَّدِّ، وَقِيلَ إنْ كَانَ بِجُعْلٍ فَلَا.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَى
الرَّدَّ عَلَى رَسُولِ الْمُوَكِّلِ وَأَنْكَرَ الرَّسُولُ صُدِّقَ الرَّسُولُ،
وَلَا يَلْزَمُ الْمُوَكِّلَ تَصْدِيقُ الْوَكِيلِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَلَوْ
قَالَ قَبَضْت الثَّمَنَ وَتَلِفَ، وَأَنْكَرَ الْمُوَكِّلُ صُدِّقَ الْمُوَكِّلُ
إنْ كَانَ قَبْلَ تَسْلِيمِ الْمَبِيعِ، وَإِلَّا فَالْوَكِيلُ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ وَكَّلَهُ بِقَضَاءِ دَيْنٍ فَقَالَ قَضَيْته
وَأَنْكَرَ الْمُسْتَحِقُّ صُدِّقَ الْمُسْتَحِقُّ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ
أَنَّهُ لَا يُصَدَّقُ الْوَكِيلُ عَلَى الْمُوَكِّلِ إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ.
وَقَيِّمُ
الْيَتِيمِ إذَا ادَّعَى دَفْعَ الْمَالِ إلَيْهِ بَعْدَ الْبُلُوغِ يَحْتَاجُ
إلَى بَيِّنَةٍ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَيْسَ لِوَكِيلٍ وَلَا مُودِعٍ
أَنْ يَقُولَ بَعْدَ طَلَبِ الْمَالِكِ لَا أَرُدُّ الْمَالَ إلَّا بِإِشْهَادٍ
فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلِلْغَاصِبِ وَمَنْ لَا يُقْبَلُ قَوْلُهُ فِي الرَّدِّ
ذَلِكَ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ رَجُلٌ وَكَّلَنِي الْمُسْتَحِقُّ بِقَبْضِ
مَا لَهُ عِنْدَك مِنْ دَيْنٍ أَوْ عَيْنٍ وَصَدَّقَهُ فَلَهُ دَفْعُهُ إلَيْهِ،
وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَلْزَمُهُ إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ عَلَى وَكَالَتِهِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ أَحَالَنِي عَلَيْك وَصَدَّقَهُ وَجَبَ الدَّفْعُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْت:
وَإِنْ قَالَ أَنَا وَارِثُهُ وَصَدَّقَهُ وَجَبَ الدَّفْعُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
An appointment as
agent may at any moment be revoked
by the
principal ; and the agent on
his part may also at any moment
give it
up. A revocation pronounced in
presence of the agent, as, for example,
in the following words : — “ I cancel
the power of attorney,” or “ I
annul
it,” or “ I release you from it,”
operates as an immediate dis-
missal of
the agent. A revocation in the agent’s
absence has the same
effect, though
one authority maintains that in such a
case the revocation
has no effect
until communicated to the agent. An
agent may give up
his appointment,
as, for example, by saying, “ I resign,”
or “ I return
you your power of
attorney.” The appointment terminates of itself
where either party loses a right to
dispose of his own property, as by
death or loss of reason, for
by temporary loss of consciousness following
upon a fit. It ceases also of
itself when the article which the
principal
has instructed his agent to
dispose of no longer belongs to him.
A mere
disavowal of an agent by his
principal who has forgotten his engagement,
or who wants to conceal his
intentions, does not involve a dismissal ;
but this is certainly involved in a
premeditated disavowal, with no
other
object in view.
In the case of
a dispute as to the essential nature
of an appointment
as agent, e.g.
where the agent maintains that the
principal instructed
him to sell something
on credit, or to buy it for
twenty pieces of money ;
while the
latter contends that it was to be
sold for cash, or bought for
ten
pieces ; the presumption is in favour
of the principal, if he takes
an
oath.
The law considers as null
and void a purchase effected by an agent —
. Of a female slave for the
price of twenty pieces of money ; if
the
agent tells the vendor he has
been instructed to buy at that
price, and
the principal afterwards states
on oath that he said only ten
pieces.
. For a price consisting of
a definite object belonging to the
principal ;
if the agent declared either before
or after the purchase that
it was
not on his own account, but for
another, and the principal after-
wards
disavows this on oath. However, the
nullity in this case occurs
only
where the vendor admits he was
informed of the fact that he was
dealing with an agent ; for if this
is denied by the vendor on oath, the
purchase remains and the agent is
personally responsible for payment.
Tf the
sale is not effected for some
definite object, but on credit, the
principle to be followed is still
the same ; that is to say, the
purchase
is void if the agent has
disclosed his true character to the
vendor and this
is admitted by the
latter ; but the agent is himself
liable if he has not
done so,
for the vendor states on oath he
did not know it. Finally, in
all
cases where the purchase remains
chargeable to the agent, the law
recommends the court to persuade the
principal to give an explanation
of
his disavowal to the agent, e.g . by
saying, “ If I had instructed you
to
purchase this slave for twenty pieces
of money I vrould have resold
her to
you with pleasure for that amount
which seems to me exorbitant ; ”
to
which the agent may reply, “ I buy
her,” with the object of thus
acquiring a female slave with whom
cohabitation is permitted him.
Where
an agent maintains he has not
exceeded his powers, and his
principal
asserts that he has, there is a
presumption in favour of the
latter ;
or, according to one authority, in
favour of the former. There
is
general agreement that an agent’s
declaration must be accepted when
he
affirms upon oath that a certain article
in his possession has been
accidentally
destroyed, or that he has restored
to his principal what
the latter
intrusted to his keeping. Where an
agent does not act
gratuitously, some
authorities are of a different opinion, so
far as con-
cerns restitution. If the
agent maintains that he effected the
restitution
by means of a messenger of
the principal, the messenger’s word is
presumed to be true, and not
that of the agent ; ffand in that
case the
principal is not required
to pronounce upon his attorney’s declaration.
Where an agent contends that he
received the price of a sale and that
it was accidentally lost, and the
principal denies these facts, there is a
presumption in favour of the latter,
so long as the delivery of the goods
has not yet taken place ; after
this our school admits a presumption in
favour of the agent. Where some
one has been instructed to pay a
debt, and says he has done so,
but the creditor denies receiving the
money, the latter has a presumption
in his favour, provided he takes an
oath. An appointment as agent is
never presumed ; consequently an
agent
must always prove his assertions, if
contradicted by his principal,
with the
exception of the special cases mentioned
in which his word is
believed. ffOn
the same principle the administrator of
an orphan’s
property is obliged, if
the fact is contested, to prove that
he has handed
over all that remains
in his hands to his ward upon
his attaining his
majority.
f Neither
an agent nor a depositary can refuse
to hand over to the
owner what
they hold of bis, under the pretext
that such restitution
must take place
in the presence of witnesses, for
their word suffices to
establish this.
But a person holding by usurpation, or
any one enjoying
no legal presumption
in his favour as an agent does,
may refuse restitu-
tion except in the
presence of witnesses.
If a person
asserts that he has been instructed
by some one having
a right to do
so to take possession of property in
possession of a third
party, whether as
payment of a debt or as restitution
of a definite
object, the debtor may
pay the debt or restore the object
to the agent,
if he sees fit
to acknowledge the character he claims.
However, accord-
ing to our school, he
cannot be obliged to pay the debt
or restore the
object to the agent,
unless the latter proves his right
to act as agent.
|On the other
hand, in such a case, if the
claimant states he is acting as
transferee, the restitution or payment
is obligatory, unless the debtor
denies.
[Our school acknowledges a similar obligation
where the
claimant derives his right
from his being an heir, and the
debtor
admits this.]
كتاب الْإِقْرَارِ
BOOK 15 .— ADMISSION
يَصِحُّ مِنْ مُطْلَقِ التَّصَرُّفِ، وَإِقْرَارُ الصَّبِيِّ وَالْمَجْنُونِ
لَاغٍ.
فَإِنْ ادَّعَى الْبُلُوغَ بِالِاحْتِلَامِ مَعَ
الْإِمْكَانِ صُدِّقَ وَلَا يُحَلَّفُ، وَإِنْ ادَّعَاهُ بِالسِّنِّ طُولِبَ
بِبَيِّنَةٍ.
وَالسَّفِيهُ وَالْمُفْلِسُ سَبَقَ حُكْمُ
إقْرَارِهِمَا.
وَيُقْبَلُ إقْرَارُ الرَّقِيقِ بِمُوجِبِ
عُقُوبَةٍ، وَلَوْ أَقَرَّ بِدَيْنِ جِنَايَةٍ لَا تُوجِبُ عُقُوبَةً فَكَذَّبَهُ
السَّيِّدُ تَعَلَّقَ بِذِمَّتِهِ دُونَ رَقَبَتِهِ.
وَإِنْ أَقَرَّ
بِدَيْنِ مُعَامَلَةٍ لَمْ يُقْبَلْ عَلَى السَّيِّدِ إنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ مَأْذُونًا
لَهُ فِي التِّجَارَةِ، وَيُقْبَلُ إنْ كَانَ، وَيُؤَدِّي مِنْ كَسْبِهِ وَمَا
فِي يَدِهِ.
وَيَصِحُّ إقْرَارُ الْمَرِيض مَرَضَ الْمَوْتِ
لِأَجْنَبِيٍّ، وَكَذَا لِوَارِثٍ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ
أَقَرَّ فِي صِحَّتِهِ بِدَيْنٍ، وَفِي مَرَضِهِ لِآخَرَ لَمْ يُقَدَّمْ
الْأَوَّلُ، وَلَوْ أَقَرَّ فِي صِحَّتِهِ أَوْ مَرَضِهِ وَأَقَرَّ وَارِثُهُ
بَعْدَ مَوْتِهِ لِآخَرَ لَمْ يُقَدَّمْ الْأَوَّلُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَا يَصِحُّ
إقْرَارُ مُكْرَهٍ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ فِي الْمُقَرِّ لَهُ أَهْلِيَّةُ
اسْتِحْقَاقِ الْمُقَرِّ بِهِ، فَلَوْ قَالَ لِهَذِهِ الدَّابَّةِ عَلَيَّ كَذَا
فَلَغْوٌ، فَإِنْ قَالَ بِسَبَبِهَا لِمَالِكِهَا وَجَبَ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ لِحَمْلِ هِنْدٍ كَذَا بِإِرْثٍ أَوْ وَصِيَّةٍ لَزِمَهُ، وَإِنْ
أَسْنَدَهُ إلَى جِهَةٍ لَا تُمْكِنُ فِي حَقِّهِ فَلَغْوٌ.
وَإِنْ
أَطْلَقَ صَحَّ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَإِذَا كَذَّبَ الْمُقَرُّ لَهُ
الْمُقِرَّ تُرِكَ الْمَالُ فِي يَدِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَإِنْ رَجَعَ الْمُقِرُّ
فِي حَالِ تَكْذِيبِهِ وَقَالَ غَلِطْتُ قُبِلَ قَوْلُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
BOOK 15 .— ADMISSION
Section
An
admission is valid only when made by
a person who can dispose
freely of
his property. Thus an admission by a
minor or a lunatic is
null and void.
But where an individual, regarded as a
minor, admits
having attained puberty in
consequence of nocturnal pollutions, he must
be believed, without being sworn, if
he has attained an age at which
emission is legally presumed to be
possible. Where, on the other hand,
a
minor says he has reached his
majority, on no other ground than his
having attained the required age of
fifteen, he must prove this circum-
stance. The consequences of an admission
made by an idiot or a bank-
rupt
have already been dealt with. An
admission by a slave, asserting
upon his
part an obligation to undergo a purely
corporal punishment, is
accepted in a
court of justice ; but his admission
relating to an offence
for which a
pecuniary penalty may be imposed, involves
only his own
personal obligation, if
it is contested by liis master. The
slave is bound
to discharge this
obligation upon his enfranchisement, but
the admission
does not render him
liable to seizure. Moreover, a slave’s
admission in
a civil matter is not
accepted at all, if it relates to
his master’s rights or
property, unless
in the case of a slave generally
authorised to trade.
In this latter
case it is accepted, and the slave
must discharge the
resulting obligation,
either out of the profits he has
realised, or out of
the funds
intrusted to him by his master. A
sick person’s admission
upon his deathbed
is valid, according to our school,
whether made in
favour of some third
party or in favour of one of
his heirs. An admission
made before a
last illness enjoys no right of
priority over one made on a
deathbed, if it is a matter of
two admissions about the same thing in
favour of two different persons.
fNor is there any right of priority
where a person, in health or on
his deathbed, makes an admission in
favour of some one ; and after
his death his heir makes an admission
about the same thing in favour
of some one else.
An admission
is of no value if obtained by
violence. The person in
whose favour
an admission is made should be
capable of possessing and
exercising
rights over the thing it refers to.
Thus an admission made in
favour of
an animal is invalid ; but an
obligation would be created by
the
following words : — “ I admit owing such
and such a thing to its
master on
account of that animal,” or “ I admit
owing to the child of
which Hind
is pregnant such and such a thing
which the child will be
able to
claim as inheritance or legacy.” This
admission is equally
invalid if some
cause is assigned that cannot legally
exist ; but it is
valid if the cause
has not been expressed. *j*A denial
on the part of the
person in
whose favour an admission is made,
results in the ownership
of the
property not being transferred. A revocation
of an admission
followed by such
denial must be accepted, if the
admission was an
error, and the
denial is immediately followed by the
revocation.
فصل [في الصيغة]
قَوْلُهُ: لِزَيْدٍ كَذَا صِيغَةُ
إقْرَارٍ.
وَقَوْلُهُ: عَلَيَّ وَفِي ذِمَّتِي لِلدَّيْنِ،
وَمَعِي وَعِنْدِي لِلْعَيْنِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ: لِي عَلَيْك أَلْفٌ فَقَالَ:
زِنْ أَوْ خُذْ أَوْ زِنْهُ أَوْ خُذْهُ أَوْ اخْتِمْ عَلَيْهِ أَوْ اجْعَلْهُ
فِي كِيسَك، فَلَيْسَ بِإِقْرَارٍ، وَلَوْ قَالَ: بَلَى أَوْ نَعَمْ أَوْ
صَدَقْت أَوْ أَبْرَأَتْنِي مِنْهُ أَوْ قَضَيْته أَوْ أَنَا مُقِرٌّ بِهِ فَهُوَ
إقْرَارٌ، وَلَوْ قَالَ: أَنَا مُقِرٌّ أَوْ أَنَا أُقِرُّ بِهِ، فَلَيْسَ
بِإِقْرَارٍ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: أَلَيْسَ لِي عَلَيْك كَذَا فَقَالَ
بَلَى أَوْ نَعَمْ فَإِقْرَارٌ، وَفِي نَعَمْ وَجْهٌ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ: اقْضِ الْأَلْفَ الَّذِي لِي عَلَيْك فَقَالَ: نَعَمْ أَوْ أَقْضِي
غَدًا أَوْ أَمْهِلْنِي يَوْمًا أَوْ حَتَّى أَقْعُدَ أَوْ أَفْتَحَ الْكِيسَ
أَوْ أَجِدَ فَإِقْرَارٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
Section
An admission is
usually made in the following words : — “
Such and
such a thing belongs to
Zaid ; ” and if it is about a debt,
“ I am his
debtor,” or “ I owe it
him.” An admission with regard to
real property
or some definite object
should be made as follows : — “ The
thing belong-
ing to so and so is
with me,” or “ I hold it.” If one
merely says to some
one, “ You owe
me a thousand pieces of money,” and
the other merely
answers, “ Weigh it,” “
Take it then,” “ Weigh the money,” “
Take it,”
“ Put your seal on it,”
or “ Put it in your purse,” this
cannot be con-
sidered as an admission ;
but it does amount to an admission
if he
answers, “ Certainly,” “ Yes,” “ You
are right,” “ You have given me
a
receipt for it,” “ I have paid you,”
or “ I admit it.” The words, “ I
admit,” without adding “ what,” or “ I
will admit my debt,” ix. in the
aorist tense instead of the past,
do not constitute an admission ; but the
words, “ Certainly,” or “ Yes,” in
answer to a question such as, “ Don't
you owe me this sum? ” do so.
However, authorities are not agreed
as
to the answer, “ Yes.” j*There is an
admission also where one says to
some one, “ Pay me the thousand
pieces you owe me,” and he answers,
“ Yes,” or “ I will pay you them
to-morrow,” or “ Let me have a day’s
time,” or “ Let me have time
to sit down,” or “ To open my
purse,” or
“ To look for my key.”
فصل [في شروط المقَرِّ به]
يُشْتَرَطُ فِي الْمُقَرِّ بِهِ أَنْ
لَا يَكُونَ مِلْكًا لِلْمُقِرِّ.
فَلَوْ قَالَ دَارِي أَوْ ثَوْبِي
أَوْ دَيْنِي الَّذِي عَلَى زَيْدٍ لِعَمْرٍو فَهُوَ لَغْوٌ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ هَذَا لِفُلَانٍ، وَكَانَ مِلْكِي إلَى أَنْ أَقْرَرْت بِهِ فَأَوَّلُ
كَلَامِهِ إقْرَارٌ، وَآخِرُهُ لَغْوٌ، وَلْيَكُنْ الْمُقَرُّ بِهِ فِي يَدِ
الْمُقِرِّ لِيُسَلِّمَ بِالْإِقْرَارِ لِلْمُقَرِّ لَهُ.
فَلَوْ
أَقَرَّ وَلَمْ يَكُنْ فِي يَدِهِ ثُمَّ صَارَ عُمِلَ بِمُقْتَضَى الْإِقْرَارِ،
فَلَوْ أَقَرَّ بِحُرِّيَّةِ عَبْدٍ فِي يَدِ غَيْرِهِ ثُمَّ اشْتَرَاهُ حُكِمَ
بِحُرِّيَّتِهِ.
ثُمَّ إنْ كَانَ قَالَ: هُوَ حُرُّ الْأَصْلِ
فَشِرَاؤُهُ افْتِدَاءٌ، وَإِنْ قَالَ: أَعْتَقَهُ فَافْتِدَاءٌ مِنْ جِهَتِهِ،
وَبَيْعٌ مِنْ جِهَةِ الْبَائِعِ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، فَيَثْبُتُ فِيهِ
الْخِيَارَانِ لِلْبَائِعِ فَقَطْ.
وَيَصِحُّ الْإِقْرَارُ
بِالْمَجْهُولِ فَإِذَا قَالَ لَهُ: عَلَيَّ شَيْءٌ قُبِلَ تَفْسِيرُهُ بِكُلِّ
مَا يُتَمَوَّلُ، وَإِنْ قَلَّ، وَلَوْ فَسَّرَهُ بِمَا لَا يُتَمَوَّلُ
لَكِنَّهُ مِنْ جِنْسِهِ كَحَبَّةِ حِنْطَةٍ، أَوْ بِمَا يَحِلُّ اقْتِنَاؤُهُ
كَكَلْبٍ مُعَلَّمٍ، وَسِرْجِينٍ قُبِلَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا
يُقْبَلُ بِمَا لَا يُقْتَنَى كَخِنْزِيرٍ، وَكَلْبٍ لَا نَفْعَ فِيهِ، وَلَا
بِعِيَادَةٍ وَرَدِّ سَلَامٍ.
وَلَوْ أَقَرَّ بِمَالٍ أَوْ مَالٍ
عَظِيمٍ أَوْ كَبِيرٍ أَوْ كَثِيرٍ قُبِلَ تَفْسِيرُهُ بِمَا قَلَّ مِنْهُ،
وَكَذَا بِالْمُسْتَوْلَدَةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، لَا بِكَلْبٍ جِلْدِ مَيْتَةٍ.
وَقَوْلُهُ:
لَهُ كَذَا كَقَوْلِهِ: شَيْءٌ، وَقَوْلُهُ: شَيْءٌ شَيْءٌ أَوْ كَذَا كَذَا
كَمَا لَوْ لَمْ يُكَرِّرْ، وَلَوْ قَالَ شَيْءٌ وَشَيْءٌ أَوْ كَذَا وَكَذَا
وَجَبَ شَيْئَانِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ: كَذَا دِرْهَمًا أَوْ رَفَعَ الدِّرْهَمَ أَوْ
جَرَّهُ لَزِمَهُ دِرْهَمٌ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ لَوْ قَالَ كَذَا وَكَذَا
دِرْهَمًا بِالنَّصْبِ وَجَبَ دِرْهَمَانِ، وَأَنَّهُ لَوْ رَفَعَ أَوْ جَرَّ
فَدِرْهَمٌ، وَلَوْ حَذَفَ الْوَاوَ فَدِرْهَمٌ فِي الْأَحْوَالِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ: أَلْفٌ وَدِرْهَمٌ قُبِلَ تَفْسِيرُ الْأَلْفِ بِغَيْرِ الدَّرَاهِمِ،
وَلَوْ قَالَ: خَمْسَةٌ وَعِشْرُونَ دِرْهَمًا فَالْجَمِيعُ دَرَاهِمُ عَلَى
الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: الدَّرَاهِمُ الَّتِي أَقْرَرْت بِهَا
نَاقِصَةُ الْوَزْنِ، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ دَرَاهِمُ الْبَلَدِ تَامَّةَ الْوَزْنِ
فَالصَّحِيحُ قَبُولُهُ إنْ ذَكَرَهُ مُتَّصِلاً، وَمَنْعُهُ إنْ فَصَلَهُ عَنْ
الْإِقْرَارِ، وَإِنْ كَانَتْ نَاقِصَةً قُبِلَ إنْ وَصَلَهُ وَكَذَا إنْ
فَصَلَهُ فِي النَّصِّ، وَالتَّفْسِيرُ بِالْمَغْشُوشَةِ كَهُوَ
بِالنَّاقِصَةِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ لَهُ عَلَيَّ مِنْ دِرْهَمٍ إلَى
عَشَرَةٍ لَزِمَهُ تِسْعَةٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِنْ قَالَ دِرْهَمٌ
فِي عَشَرَةٍ، فَإِنْ أَرَادَ الْمَعِيَّةَ لَزِمَهُ أَحَدَ عَشَرَ، أَوْ
الْحِسَابَ فَعَشَرَةٌ وَإِلَّا فَدِرْهَمٌ.
Section
An admission must
refer to something not belonging to
the person
making it. Thus, an
admission as to “ my house,” or “ my
coat,” or
in the words, “ My claim
upon Zaid I admit belongs to Ami’,”
is null and
void. In the phrase, “ I
admit such and such a thing now
belongs to
so-and-so, but until I made
this admission it belonged to me,”
the first
part implies an admission,
and the second is considered as
null. And
secondly the thing with
reference to which the admission is
made must
be in the possession of
tbo person making the admission, since
the con-
sequence of the admission is
that he is obliged to deliver the
object.
However, the admission will be
valid even Avhere the thing, at the
moment
of the admission, is not yet
in the possession of the person
making the
admission ; provided he obtains
possession of it before the time fixed
for the delivery.
An admission
that the slave of a third party is
free, renders the
person making it
liable under it, if afterwards ho
obtains possession of
the slave by
purchase. If the admission is to the
effect that the slave
is already
free, the purchase must simply be
considered as a ransom.
But if otherwise,
that is if the admission is merely
of an intention to
enfranchise the
slave of a third party, the purchase
is considered a
ransom only on the
part of the person making the
admission, but an
ordinary purchase on
the part of tho owner, at least
according to our
school. Consequently to
the vendor alone belongs the right
of option,
both that called “ of the
sitting/’ and that which is the
effect of a
special agreement.
An
admission need not refer to a known
object. Thus, if one admits
owing
somebody “ a thing,” the creditor must be
contented with what-
ever the debtor says
he meant, provided only that it is “
a thing ” in
the legal acceptation of
the word, i.e. a thing of some value
and capable
of being owned. fHe
would even have in these circumstances to
content himself with some valueless
thing, if of the same kind as
e.g. a
grain of corn ; or with
an object which, though not capable
of legal
ownership, may be acquired
and possessed, such as a trained dog,
manure,
etc. Only those things of
which tho acquisition and possession are
forbidden, e.g . a pig or an untrained
dog, may bo refused as having no
legal utility. A debtor cannot discharge
an obligation resulting from
any such
admission by performing an act of
mere politeness, e.g . by
visiting his
sick creditor, or returning his salute.
An admission of owing
some one
something “ of value,” “ of high value,” “
of great value,” or
“ of much
value,” involves an obligation merely to
give something not
entirely valueless ; —
ffor instance, even a female slave
enfranchised on
account of maternity ; —
but a dog, or the skin of a dead
animal, would
not suffice. The expression
“ I admit owing him so much,” is
equivalent
to “I admit owing him
something ” ; while the simple repetition of
“ so much,” or “ thing,” in an
admission, have no consequence at all.
If, on the contrary, one says, “ a
thing and a thing,” or “ so much and
so much,” uniting the words by
the conjunction, one owes two distinct
things.
If one says, “ I owe
you such a drahn ,” or “ I owe it
you,” one owes
only a single drahm ; but
one owes two, according to our
school, if
one says, “ such and such
a drahm ,” putting the word “ drahm ” in
the
accusative singular. And according
again to our school, one owes
only a
single “ drahm” when the Avord is in
the nominativo or the
genitive, or
Avhcre the conjunction “ and ” has been
omitted. An
admission expressed as
folloAVS, “ a thousand plus a dralm” may be
explained as though the word “
thousand ” did not refer to dralms , but
to something else. j*fBut “ tAventy-five
dralms” can refer to nothing
but dralms .
f f A modification to tho effect that “
the dralms I admit
are dralms of an
inferior Aveight,” must be accepted ; but
if the dralms
current in the
locality are not debased coin, tho
modification must
immediately folloAV upon
tho admission. Such a modification may be
made later only Avhere the dralms
current in the locality are not of
the
usual Aveight. At least Shafii
so decided. An admission in the Avords,
“ I oAve him from one to ten
dralms ,” finvolves an obligation to pay
nine ; but an admission of “ one
in ten ” means eleven if tho preposition
is used in a conjunctive sense, and
ten if in an arithmetical one ; though
otherwise, i.e. if used in the
ordinary sense, it means only one.
فصل [في بيان أنواع من الإقرار وفي بيان الاستثناء]
قَالَ: لَهُ
عِنْدِي سَيْفٌ فِي غِمْدٍ أَوْ ثَوْبٌ فِي صُنْدُوقٍ لَا يَلْزَمُهُ الظَّرْفُ،
أَوْ غِمْدٌ فِيهِ سَيْفٌ أَوْ صُنْدُوقٌ فِيهِ ثَوْبٌ لَزِمَهُ الظَّرْفُ
وَحْدَهُ، أَوْ عَبْدٌ عَلَى رَأْسِهِ عِمَامَةٌ لَمْ تَلْزَمْهُ الْعِمَامَةُ
عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، أَوْ دَابَّةٌ بِسَرْجِهَا أَوْ ثَوْبٌ مُطَرَّزٌ لَزِمَهُ
الْجَمِيعُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ فِي مِيرَاثِ أَبِي أَلْفٌ فَهُوَ
إقْرَارٌ عَلَى أَبِيهِ بِدَيْنٍ، وَلَوْ قَالَ فِي مِيرَاثِي مِنْ أَبِي أَلْفٌ،
فَهُوَ وَعْدُ هِبَةٍ، وَلَوْ قَالَ لَهُ: عَلَيَّ دِرْهَمٌ دِرْهَمٌ لَزِمَهُ
دِرْهَمٌ.
فَإِنْ قَالَ: وَدِرْهَمٌ لَزِمَهُ دِرْهَمَانِ وَلَوْ
قَالَ: لَهُ دِرْهَمٌ وَدِرْهَمٌ وَدِرْهَمٌ لَزِمَهُ بِالْأَوَّلَيْنِ
دِرْهَمَانِ، وَأَمَّا الثَّالِثُ فَإِنْ أَرَادَ بِهِ تَأْكِيدَ الثَّانِي لَمْ
يَجِبْ بِهِ شَيْءٌ، وَإِنْ نَوَى الِاسْتِئْنَافَ لَزِمَهُ ثَالِثٌ، وَكَذَا إنْ
نَوَى تَأْكِيدَ الْأَوَّلِ أَوْ أَطْلَقَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَمَتَى
أَقَرَّ بِمُبْهَمٍ كَشَيْءٍ وَثَوْبٍ وَطُولِبَ بِالْبَيَانِ فَامْتَنَعَ
فَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّهُ يُحْبَسُ.
وَلَوْ بَيَّنَ وَكَذَّبَهُ
الْمُقَرُّ لَهُ فَلْيُبَيِّنْ وَلْيَدَّعِ، وَالْقَوْلُ قَوْلُ الْمُقِرِّ فِي
نَفْيِهِ.
وَلَوْ أَقَرَّ لَهُ بِأَلْفٍ ثُمَّ أَقَرَّ لَهُ
بِأَلْفٍ فِي يَوْمٍ آخَرَ لَزِمَهُ أَلْفٌ فَقَطْ، وَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَ الْقَدْرُ
دَخَلَ الْأَقَلُّ فِي الْأَكْثَرِ، فَلَوْ وَصَفَهُمَا بِصِفَتَيْنِ
مُخْتَلِفَتَيْنِ أَوْ أَسْنَدَهُمَا إلَى جِهَتَيْنِ أَوْ قَالَ قَبَضْتُ يَوْمَ
السَّبْتِ عَشَرَةً، ثُمَّ قَالَ قَبَضْتُ يَوْمَ الْأَحَدِ عَشَرَةً لَزِمَا،
وَلَوْ قَالَ لَهُ عَلَى أَلْفٌ مِنْ ثَمَنِ خَمْرٍ أَوْ كَلْبٍ أَوْ أَلْفٌ
قَضَيْتُهُ لَزِمَهُ الْأَلْفُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ مِنْ ثَمَنِ عَبْدٍ
لَمْ أَقْبِضْهُ إذَا سَلَّمَهُ سَلَّمْت قُبِلَ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ وَجَعَلَهُ
ثَمَنًا.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: لَهُ عَلَيَّ أَلْفٌ إنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ
لَمْ يَلْزَمْهُ شَيْءٌ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ أَلْفٌ لَا يَلْزَمُ
لَزِمَهُ، وَلَوْ قَالَ: لَهُ عَلَيَّ أَلْفٌ ثُمَّ جَاءَ بِأَلْفٍ وَقَالَ:
أَرَدْتُ بِهِ هَذَا وَهُوَ وَدِيعَةٌ فَقَالَ الْمُقَرُّ لَهُ: لِي عَلَيْك
أَلْفٌ آخَرُ صُدِّقَ الْمُقِرُّ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ بِيَمِينِهِ.
فَإِنْ
كَانَ قَالَ فِي ذِمَّتِي أَوْ دَيْنًا صُدِّقَ الْمُقَرُّ لَهُ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ قُلْت: فَإِذَا قَبِلْنَا التَّفْسِيرَ الْوَدِيعَةِ فَالْأَصَحُّ
أَنَّهَا أَمَانَةٌ فَيُقْبَلُ دَعْوَاهُ التَّلَفَ بَعْدَ الْإِقْرَارِ
وَدَعْوَى الرَّدِّ،، وَإِنْ قَالَ لَهُ عِنْدِي أَوْ مَعِي أَلْفٌ صُدِّقَ فِي
دَعْوَى الْوَدِيعَةِ وَالرَّدِّ وَالتَّلَفِ قَطْعًا، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَوْ
أَقَرَّ بِبَيْعٍ أَوْ هِبَةٍ وَإِقْبَاضٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ كَانَ فَاسِدًا
وَأَقْرَرْت لِظَنِّي الصِّحَّةَ لَمْ يُقْبَلْ وَلَهُ تَحْلِيفُ الْمُقَرِّ لَهُ
فَإِنْ نَكَلَ حَلَفَ الْمُقِرُّ وَبَرِئَ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: هَذِهِ
الدَّارُ لِزَيْدٍ بَلْ لِعَمْرٍو أَوْ غَصَبْتُهَا مِنْ زَيْدٍ بَلْ مِنْ
عَمْرٍو سُلِّمَتْ لِزَيْدٍ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّ الْمُقِرَّ يَغْرَمُ قِيمَتَهَا
لِعَمْرٍو بِالْإِقْرَارِ.
وَيَصِحُّ الِاسْتِثْنَاءُ إنْ اتَّصَلَ
وَلَمْ يَسْتَغْرِقْ.
فَلَوْ قَالَ: لَهُ عَلَيَّ عَشَرَةٌ إلَّا
تِسْعَةً إلَّا ثَمَانِيَةً لَزِمَهُ تِسْعَةٌ.
وَيَصِحُّ مِنْ
غَيْرِ الْجِنْسِ كَأَلْفٍ إلَّا ثَوْبًا، وَيُبَيِّنُ بِثَوْبٍ قِيمَتُهُ دُونَ
أَلْفٍ.
وَمِنْ الْمُعَيَّنِ كَهَذِهِ الدَّارُ لَهُ إلَّا هَذَا
الْبَيْتَ، أَوْ هَذِهِ الدَّرَاهِمُ لَهُ إلَّا ذَا الدِّرْهَمَ، وَفِي
الْمُعَيَّنِ وَجْهٌ شَاذٌّ.
قُلْت: لَوْ قَالَ هَؤُلَاءِ
الْعَبِيدُ لَهُ إلَّا وَاحِدًا قُبِلَ وَرَجَعَ فِي الْبَيَانِ إلَيْهِ، فَإِنْ
مَاتُوا إلَّا وَاحِدًا وَزَعَمَ أَنَّهُ الْمُسْتَثْنَى صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ
عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Suction
An admission of oAving
“ a SAVord in a sheath/’ or “ a coat in a
box/’
does not imply the sheath or
the box ; and similarly an admission of
OAving “ a sheath containing a SAVord,” or
“ a box containing a coat,”
does not
iiwolve the contents. And so too, if
one admits OAving “a
slave Avith a
turban on his head,” ffone is not
supposed to have included
the turban ;
but, on the other hand, one oavcs
everything spoken of
Avhcn the admission
is of “an animal Avith its saddle,”
or “a coat
adorned Avith embroideries.”
The expression “ a thousand pieces
of money in my father’s in-
heritance,”
implies an admission that the estate
is burdened Avith a
debt of this
amount ; but the expression “ a thousand pieces
of money
in the inheritance my
father will leave me” is considered
as a mere promise
of a future donation.
Moreover, if one admits owing any
one “a
drahm” and repeats this last
Avord Avithout saying anything else, one
oavcs a single drahm ; but if one
repeats the Avord “ dralm” and adds
the conjunction “ and,” then one
oavcs tAvo. By saying “ a drahm and
a
drahm and a drahm” one oAves two for
the tAvo first times the Avord is
pronounced. The third has no effect
if used only to confirm the obliga-
tion resulting from the other tAvo.
On the other hand, a third drahm
must be paid in the folloAving
cases : —
. If the third drahm
Avas pronounced with the intention of
creating
a iieAV obligation.
. fit the
third was pronounced with the intention
only of confirming
the admission in
the first.
. flf the third was
pronounced with no special intention.
An admission made in vague
terms, e.g. “something and a coat,”
obliges tho debtor to specify more
precisely tho object of his admission
when required to do so by the
creditor ; ffand should he refuse to do
so the latter may force him to
do so by having him committed to
prison.
When the debtor specifies the
object of the admission in a more precise
manner, but the creditor contends
that this declaration is made in bad
faith, the latter must prove his
allegation, for ho is the plaintiff,
and the
presumption is always in
favour of the defendant. An admission of
“ a thousand ” pieces of money, followed
by a second admission of “ a
thousand ”
pieces, involves the payment of only
one thousand pieces ;
and whero
these two admissions do not refer to
the same sum, the
smaller is ipso
facto included in the greater. On
the other hand, the two
admissions
give rise to two distinct obligations
where the particulars are
not the
same ; or if one first says, “ I
received ten pieces of money on
Saturday,” and then afterwards, “ I
received ten of them on Sunday.”
*An admission constitutes a novation,
or substitution of one obliga-
tion for
another ; consequently the words, “ I owe
him a thousand pieces
of money for
the wine or the dog he sold
me,” or “ I owe him a thousand
pieces
of money I have already paid him,”
result in the person using
them
having to pay the sum admitted.
If one says, “ I owe him such
and such a sum as the price of a
slave
purchased by me, of whom I
have not yet taken possession, and I will
pay him as soon as he has
delivered me this slave,” our school
considers
the sum mentioned as the
price offered for the slave, though
the pay-
ment is not obligatory before
delivery takes place. According to our
school nothing is due upon the
admission of a debt of a thousand pieces
of money under the restriction “ If
God wills ” ; but an admission of
a
debt creates an obligation, even if
it is added that nothing is owing.
On bringing one thousand pieces of
money, after admitting owing this
sum,
and saying, “ Hero they are, as a
deposit,” *one has the presumption
on
one’s side, provided one takes an
oath, where the opposite party con-
tends
having yet another credit of the
same amount ; while on the con-
trary our
school admits a similar presumption in
favour of the creditor,
where the
debtor, on remitting him the amount,
does not use words
implying a deposit,
but speaks to him of “ my
obligation,” or “ my
debt.”
[f Where
it is allowed that one can validly
declare afterwards that the
sum one
admits owing was remitted to the
creditor only as a deposit, it
follows
that from the time of tho original
admission the debtor has a
claim
against the creditor for loss, and
that he can demand restitution
of
what has been, as it were, intrusted
to the latter’s good faith. If one
has used the expression “ six
thousand pieces of money are with me,”
or “ I have them upon me,” one
still has the presumption in one’s favour
if one afterwards maintains that it
was only a deposit, or if one alleges
that the sum mentioned has been
restored or accidentally lost.]
An
admission of a sale or a gift followed
by a taking possession of the
object
does not admit of a subsequent
retractation upon the ground that
the
contract was illegal or the admission
the result of an error. All that
tho debtor can do is to have
an oath administered to the creditor in
whoso favour the admission was made
; and it is only if tho latter
refuses to bo sworn that tho
court may tender the oath to tho
debtor,
who can then free himself
from the debt by taking it. When one
admits “ that a certain house belongs
to Zaid,” and afterwards corrects
oneself
and admits “ that it belongs to Aim
” ; or when one admits that
one has
illegally usurped “ the house of Zaid,”
and subsequently declares
“ that it was
the house of Aim ” ; tho house
should be delivered to
Zaid, *but
Aim can claim the value of it.
An admission may bo accompanied
by all sorts of exceptions, pro-
vided
that the clauses containing them are
pronounced at the same time
as the
admission and do not render it
illusory. Thus if one says, “ I
owe
him ten, less nine less eight pieces
of money,” one owes nine. Such
a
clause of exception may even refer
to a thing of a different kind from
that admitted, for instance, “ I owe a
thousand pieces of money minus
a coat,”
in which case the value of the
coat must always be considered
less
than the sum mentioned. A clause of
exception is also admissible
with
reference to definite objects, i.e. one
may admit, e.g. “ This house
is his,
except this room,” or “ These dralmis
are his, except this drahm .”
However,
with regard to this last class of
objects, jurists are not all in
agreement, though the great majority
adopt the admissibility.
[In saying, “
These slaves belong to so-and-so, except
one,” one makes
a valid admission, but
one should immediately declare which one
is
intended, fflf, in such a case,
all the slaves die except one, and
the
person who made the admission
declares that this was the slave he
intended to except, the presumption
is in his favour, if he confirms on
oath the truth of his words.]
فصل [في الإقرار بالنسب]
أَقَرَّ بِنَسَبٍ إنْ أَلْحَقَهُ
بِنَفْسِهِ اُشْتُرِطَ لِصِحَّتِهِ أَنْ لَا يُكَذِّبَهُ الْحِسُّ وَلَا
الشَّرْعُ، بِأَنْ يَكُونَ مَعْرُوفَ النَّسَبِ مِنْ غَيْرِهِ، وَأَنْ
يُصَدِّقَهُ الْمُسْتَلْحَقُ إنْ كَانَ أَهْلاً لِلتَّصْدِيقِ.
فَإِنْ
كَانَ بَالِغًا فَكَذَّبَهُ لَمْ يَثْبُتْ إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ، وَإِنْ اسْتَلْحَقَ
صَغِيرًا ثَبَتَ، فَلَوْ بَلَغَ وَكَذَّبَهُ لَمْ يَبْطُلْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَصِحُّ
أَنْ يَسْتَلْحِقَ مَيِّتًا صَغِيرًا، وَكَذَا كَبِيرٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَيَرِثُهُ.
وَلَوْ اسْتَلْحَقَ اثْنَانِ بَالِغًا ثَبَتَ لِمَنْ
صَدَّقَهُ وَحُكْمُ الصَّغِيرِ يَأْتِي فِي اللَّقِيطِ إنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ
تَعَالَى.
وَلَوْ قَالَ لِوَلَدِ أَمَتِهِ: هَذَا وَلَدِي ثَبَتَ
نَسَبُهُ، وَلَا يَثْبُتُ الِاسْتِيلَادُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَكَذَا لَوْ قَالَ
وَلَدِي وَلَدْتُهُ فِي مِلْكِي، فَإِنْ قَالَ: عَلِقَتْ بِهِ فِي مِلْكِي
ثَبَتَ الِاسْتِيلَادُ فَإِنْ كَانَتْ فِرَاشًا لَهُ لَحِقَهُ بِالْفِرَاشِ، مِنْ
غَيْرِ اسْتِلْحَاقٍ، وَإِنْ كَانَتْ مُزَوَّجَةً فَالْوَلَدُ لِلزَّوْجِ،
وَاسْتِلْحَاقُ السَّيِّدِ بَاطِلٌ.
وَأَمَّا إذَا أَلْحَقَ
النَّسَبَ بِغَيْرِهِ كَهَذَا أَخِي أَوْ عَمِّي، فَيَثْبُتُ نَسَبُهُ مِنْ
الْمُلْحَقِ بِهِ بِالشُّرُوطِ السَّابِقَةِ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ كَوْنُ الْمُلْحَقِ
بِهِ مَيِّتًا، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ نَفَاهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَيُشْتَرَطُ كَوْنُ الْمُقِرِّ وَارِثًا حَائِزًا، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ
الْمُسْتَلْحَقَ لَا يَرِثُ وَلَا يُشَارِكُ الْمُقِرَّ فِي حِصَّتِهِ، وَأَنَّ
الْبَالِغَ مِنْ الْوَرَثَةِ لَا يَنْفَرِدُ بِالْإِقْرَارِ.
وَأَنَّهُ
لَوْ أَقَرَّ أَحَدُ الْوَارِثَيْنِ وَأَنْكَرَ الْآخَرُ، وَمَاتَ وَلَمْ
يَرِثْهُ إلَّا الْمُقِرُّ ثَبَتَ النَّسَبُ.
وَأَنَّهُ لَوْ
أَقَرَّ ابْنٌ حَائِزٍ بِأُخُوَّةِ مَجْهُولٍ فَأَنْكَرَ الْمَجْهُولُ نَسَبَ
الْمُقِرِّ لَمْ يُؤَثِّرْ فِيهِ، وَيَثْبُتُ أَيْضًا نَسَبُ الْمَجْهُولِ،
وَأَنَّهُ إذَا كَانَ الْوَارِثُ الظَّاهِرُ يَحْجُبُهُ الْمُسْتَلْحَقُ كَأَخٍ
أَقَرَّ بِابْنٍ لِلْمَيِّتِ ثَبَتَ النَّسَبُ وَلَا إرْثَ.
Section
An admission of
paternity is admissible only on condition
that it is
in conformity with law
and common-sense ; thus, one cannot recognise
a child that is notoriously another’s.
The interested person must consent to the
admission if legally capable of doing
so ; thus an admission
does not
establish paternity with regard to an
adult who opposes it,
unless it is
legally proved in some other way. f A
minor legally recog-
nised as a child
cannot annul this by his mere denial
upon majority. It
is permissible to
recognise one’s child after death, or
during minority,
for after attaining
majority ; and this recognition is
sufficient to give
one a claim upon
the estate. Where an adult is
recognised as their
child by two
different persons, the paternity is
established of the one
he accepts as
his father. The consequence of a similar
recognition in
the case of a minor
will be explained in the book about
foundlings. A
declaration on the part
of a master “ that the child of one
of his slaves
is his ” is sufficient
by itself to establish filiation, *but
not to enfranchise
the slave on
account of maternity. The same rule
applies to a declara-
tion as follows : — “
Such and such a slave belonging to
me is the mother
of my child.”
On the other hand, the words, “ She
conceived while
belonging to me,” implies
enfranchisement on account of paternity.
The child of a slave who has
frequently shared her master’s bed, has
no need of special recognition in
order to establish filiation. The child
of a married slave is the child
of the husband ; and in such a case
a
recognition of paternity by the
master would be null and void.
A
recognition of relationship, such as, “ so
and so is my brother,” or
“ my
paternal uncle,” establishes that relationship,
if made under the
conditions just
mentioned, and provided the person whose
paternity
is involved is dead. Such
recognition is permissible feven though the
deceased denied the imputed paternity ;
but in every case it is necessary
that the person making the
declaration should be the deceased’s universal
heir, f A declaration, however, that one
considers a certain individual
as one’s
brother, gives him no claim to any
share in the estate, not even
to a
share in the portion of the person
making the declaration. fAn
adult heir
can never of his own accord
establish filiation between a
third party
and the deceased, if there are other
heirs, minors. If
filiation is admitted
by one of the heirs and denied
by another, it remains
established if
the one denying it dies, leaving no
other heir except the
one who admits
it. fAnd it is established also
where, after the father’s
decease, his
son, universal heir, admits that persons
of unknown descent
are his brothers,
while these persons recognise then own
filiation, but
deny that of the
person who makes the admission, f Lastly,
where the
known heir is excluded
from the succession by a person whoso
relation-
ship he admits, i.e. if e.g . he
admits “ that his deceased brother left a
son,” the admission has reference to
family rights, but gives no claim
to
the succession.
كتاب الْعَارِيَّةِ
BOOK 16 —LOAN
شَرْطُ الْمُعِيرِ صِحَّةُ تَبَرُّعِهِ وَمِلْكُهُ الْمَنْفَعَةَ فَيُعِيرُ
مُسْتَأْجِرٌ لَا مُسْتَعِيرٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَلَهُ أَنْ يَسْتَنِيبَ مَنْ
يَسْتَوْفِي الْمَنْفَعَةَ لَهُ.
وَالْمُسْتَعَارِ كَوْنُهُ
مُنْتَفَعًا بِهِ مَعَ بَقَاءِ عَيْنِهِ.
وَتَجُوزُ إعَارَةُ
جَارِيَةٍ لِخِدْمَةِ امْرَأَةٍ أَوْ مَحْرَمٍ.
وَيُكْرَهُ إعَارَةُ
عَبْدٍ مُسْلِمٍ لِكَافِرٍ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ اشْتِرَاطُ لَفْظٍ
كَأَعَرْتُكَ أَوْ أَعِرْنِي، وَيَكْفِي لَفْظُ أَحَدِهِمَا مَعَ فِعْلِ
الْآخَرِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ: أَعَرْتُكَهُ لِتَعْلِفهُ أَوْ
لِتُعِيرَنِي فَرَسَكَ فَهُوَ إجَارَةٌ فَاسِدَةٌ تُوجِبُ أُجْرَةَ
الْمِثْلِ.
وَمُؤْنَةُ الرَّدِّ عَلَى الْمُسْتَعِيرِ.
فَإِنْ
تَلِفَتْ لَا بِاسْتِعْمَالٍ ضَمِنَهَا، وَإِنْ لَمْ يُفَرِّطْ، وَالْأَصَحُّ
أَنَّهُ لَا يَضْمَنُ مَا يَنْمَحِقُ أَوْ يَنْسَحِقُ بِاسْتِعْمَالٍ،
وَالثَّالِثُ يَضْمَنُ الْمُنْمَحِقَ، وَالْمُسْتَعِيرُ مِنْ مُسْتَأْجِرٍ لَا
يَضْمَنُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ تَلِفَتْ دَابَّتُهُ فِي يَدِ
وَكِيلٍ بَعْثُهُ فِي شُغْلِهِ أَوْ فِي يَدِ مَنْ سَلَّمَهَا إلَيْهِ
لِيُرَوِّضَهَا فَلَا ضَمَانَ، وَلَهُ الِانْتِفَاعُ بِحَسَبِ الْإِذْنِ.
فَإِنْ
أَعَارَهُ لِزِرَاعَةِ حِنْطَةٍ زَرَعَهَا وَمِثْلَهَا إنْ لَمْ يَنْهَهُ، أَوْ
لِشَعِيرٍ لَمْ يَزْرَعْ فَوْقَهُ كَحِنْطَةٍ، وَلَوْ أَطْلَقَ الزِّرَاعَةَ
صَحَّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَيَزْرَعُ مَا شَاءَ وَإِذَا اسْتَعَارَ لِبِنَاءٍ أَوْ
غِرَاسٍ فَلَهُ الزَّرْعُ وَلَا عَكْسَ، وَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَغْرِسُ
مُسْتَعِيرٌ لِبِنَاءٍ وَكَذَا الْعَكْسُ، وَأَنَّهُ لَا تَصِحُّ إعَارَةُ
الْأَرْضِ مُطْلَقَةً، بَلْ يُشْتَرَطُ تَعْيِينُ نَوْعِ الْمَنْفَعَةِ.
BOOK 16 —LOAN
Section
It
is necessary that a lender should be
legally capable of disposing
gratuitously
of his property, and that he should
have a right to convey
the use of
the object lent. Thus a lessee or a
tenant may lend what
they hold as
such, f f but not a borrower. There is,
however, no objection
to the latter
allowing a third party the use of a
thing borrowed, instead
of using it
himself. Things that are not consumed
by use can alone be
the subject
of this contract ; whence it follows that
a female slave may
be lent as a
servant, or to a woman, or to a man
within the prohibited
degrees, but not
to a man who can legally cohabit
with her. It is blam-
able to
lend a Moslem slave to an infidel.
fThe law insists that the
lending should be expressly mentioned,
e.g. by the words, “ I lend you,”
used by the lender, or “ lend me,”
said
by the borrower. It is
sufficient if only one of the two
parties has thus
expressed himself,
provided that the other has shown
his consent by his
conduct. By
saying, “ I lend you my horse on
condition that you
feed it,” or “ on
condition that you lend me yours,”
one does not effect
a loan, but an
irregular contract of hiring, for which a
reasonable pay-
ment should be made.
The cost of restitution of the
thing lent must be borne by the
borrower, who is liable for damage
if it is even partly destroyed, except
by mere usage, even though no
negligence can be imputed to him.
But where, on tho contrary, the
thing lent is lost or damaged merely
by usage, fthe borrower is not
responsible ; though even in this case
some authorities consider that he
is. f A person who borrows something
from
a lessee or a tenant is not responsible
as a borrower, but just as if
he
were himself the tenant or lessee.
Nor would there be any responsi-
bility
where a principal lends his agent an
animal which dies in the
latter’s
possession in consequence of work ordered
by the principal ;
nor where an
animal dies in tho possession of a
trainer, to whom the
owner intrusted
it for the purpose of being trained.
A borrower can use the thing
borrowed only in accordance with tho
agreement. Thus, if a piece of land
has been lent to be sown with corn,
it may be sown also with
similar cereals, unless this has been
expressly
forbidden ; but if it has
been lent to be sown with barley,
it cannot be
sown with a grain like
wheat, which is more prejudicial to
the soil. A
permission to sow in
general is lawful, and gives a borrower
the right to
sow what he likes.
Permission to build or plant implies a
right to sow ;
but not vice
versa. ffPermission to build neither
implies nor is implied
by permission
to plant. ffLastly, it is forbidden
to lend a piece of land
without
stipulating the use to which the
borrower may put it.
فصل [في رد العارية]
لِكُلٍّ مِنْهُمَا رَدُّ الْعَارِيَّةِ مَتَى
شَاءَ إلَّا إذَا أَعَارَ لِدَفْنٍ فَلَا يَرْجِعُ حَتَّى يَنْدَرِسَ أَثَرُ
الْمَدْفُونِ وَإِذَا أَعَارَ لِلْبِنَاءِ أَوْ الْغِرَاسِ وَلَمْ يَذْكُرْ
مُدَّةً ثُمَّ رَجَعَ إنْ كَانَ شَرَطَ الْقَلْعَ مَجَّانًا لَزِمَهُ، وَإِلَّا
فَإِنْ اخْتَارَ الْمُسْتَعِيرُ الْقَلْعَ قَلَعَ، وَلَا يَلْزَمُهُ تَسْوِيَةُ
الْأَرْضِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْتُ: الْأَصَحُّ تَلْزَمُهُ،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَخْتَرْ لَمْ يَقْلَعْ مَجَّانًا، بَلْ
لِلْمُعِيرِ الْخِيَارُ بَيْنَ أَنْ يُبْقِيَهُ بِأُجْرَةٍ أَوْ يَقْلَعَ
وَيَضْمَنَ أَرْشَ النَّقْصِ، قِيلَ أَوْ يَتَمَلَّكَهُ بِقِيمَتِهِ.
فَإِنْ
لَمْ يَخْتَرْ لَمْ يَقْلَعْ مَجَّانًا إنْ بَذَلَ الْمُسْتَعِيرُ الْأُجْرَةَ
وَكَذَا إنْ لَمْ يَبْذُلْهَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، ثُمَّ قِيلَ يَبِيعُ الْحَاكِمُ
الْأَرْضَ وَمَا فِيهَا وَيَقْسِمُ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ يُعْرِضُ
عَنْهُمَا حَتَّى يَخْتَارَا شَيْئًا، وَلِلْمُعِيرِ دُخُولُهَا وَالِانْتِفَاعُ
بِهَا، وَلَا يَدْخُلُهَا الْمُسْتَعِيرُ بِغَيْرِ إذْنٍ لِلتَّفَرُّجِ،
وَيَجُوزُ لِلسَّقْيِ وَالْإِصْلَاحِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلِكُلٍّ بَيْعُ مِلْكِهِ،
وَقِيلَ لَيْسَ لِلْمُسْتَعِيرِ بَيْعُهُ لِثَالِثٍ.
وَالْعَارِيَّةُ
الْمُؤَقَّتَةُ كَالْمُطْلَقَةِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ لَهُ الْقَلْعُ فِيهَا مَجَّانًا
إذَا رَجَعَ.
وَإِذَا أَعَارَهُ لِزِرَاعَةٍ وَرَجَعَ قَبْلَ
إدْرَاكِ الزَّرْعِ، فَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّ عَلَيْهِ الْإِبْقَاءَ إلَى الْحَصَادِ،
وَأَنَّ لَهُ الْأُجْرَةَ، فَلَوْ عَيَّنَ مُدَّةً وَلَمْ يُدْرَكْ فِيهَا
لِتَقْصِيرِهِ بِتَأْخِيرِ الزِّرَاعَةِ قَلَعَ مَجَّانًا.
وَلَوْ
حَمَلَ السَّيْلُ بَذْرًا إلَى أَرْضِهِ فَنَبَتَ فَهُوَ لِصَاحِبِ الْبَذْرِ
وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ يُجْبَرُ عَلَى قَلْعِهِ.
وَلَوْ رَكِبَ
دَابَّةً وَقَالَ لِمَالِكِهَا أَعَرْتنِيهَا فَقَالَ بَلْ أَجَرْتُكهَا، أَوْ
اخْتَلَفَ مَالِكُ الْأَرْضِ وَزَارِعُهَا كَذَلِكَ فَالْمُصَدَّقُ الْمَالِكُ
عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَكَذَا لَوْ قَالَ: أَعَرْتَنِي.
وَقَالَ
بَلْ غَصَبْتَ مِنِّي، فَإِنْ تَلِفَتْ الْعَيْنُ فَقَدْ اتَّفَقَا عَلَى
الضَّمَانِ، لَكِنَّ الْأَصَحَّ أَنَّ الْعَارِيَّةَ تُضْمَنُ بِقِيمَةِ يَوْمِ
التَّلَفِ، لَا بِأَقْصَى الْقِيَمِ وَلَا بِيَوْمِ الْقَبْضِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ مَا
يَدَّعِيهِ الْمَالِكُ أَكْثَرَ حَلَفَ لِلزِّيَادَةِ.
Section
The lender has the
right to demand back, and the
borrower to
return, the article lent,
whenever they please, even where one
of them
had stipulated for a definite
period. To this rule there is one
exception ;
where a piece of land
has been lent for the interment of a
corpse, it
cannot be taken back
until the remains have been duly buried.
Where the owner takes back a
piece of land lent for building purposes
or for sowing, with no time of
restitution mentioned, the borrower is
obliged to demolish the buildings or
uproot the crop only if this lias
been specially stipulated. In default
of such stipulation the borrower
cannot
be obliged to do so ; and if
he does so of his own free
will, fhe
need not level the ground.
[*Le veiling is obligatory under these
circumstances.]
Where the borrower
refuses to demolish buildings or uproot
crops
without compensation, the owner
cannot force him to do so, but may
choose one of two courses. He
can either leave them on the land,
charging the borrower a rent ; or
himself carry out the demolition or
uprooting, compensating the borrower for
the loss of his buildings or
his
crop. Some authorities maintain that the
owner of the land can
also
appropriate the buildings and crops,
paying their value to the
borrower.
If the owner has not declared, on
taking back his land,
whether he
prefers to retain the buildings or
crops, paying compensation
to the
borrower, or whether he prefers to
have them removed, he cannot
have
them removed later without paying
compensation. This rule
applies just as
well where the borrower pays the
compensation of which
we have spoken,
as a rent, fas where he does not
pay it. And some
authors maintain
that if the owner refuses to decide,
the court should
sell the land with
everything built or sown on it, and
pay the owner and
borrower their
proper share out of the proceeds ;
fbut the majority are
of opinion
that the court should not interfere
until both parties have
declared then*
wishes with regard to the buildings
and the crops. During
this period,
however, the owner may visit and
utilise his land, while the
borrower
may not visit it without the owner’s
permission, merely for the
sake of
amusement, fthough he cannot be prevented
from going there
at any time to
water the crop or repair the
buildings. Both lender and
borrower retain
their right to sell what belongs to
them ; though,
according to some jurists,
the borrower can only sell his crop
or buildings
to the owner of the
land. A loan, in which a definite time
of restitution
is specified, is subject
to the same rules as regards
demolition and up-
rooting as the loan
for an indefinite period with which
we have just
dealt. Only one
authority maintains the contrary opinion,
i.e. that in
these circumstances the
borrower is not liable for any
indemnity if, upon
the restitution of
the land, he wishes to demolish or
uproot what he has
built or sown.
ffAn owner who has lent his land
with the avowed
object of having it
cultivated by the borrower, without
stipulating for
any particular time of
restitution, should always, when taking
back the
crops, leave* them standing
until the next harvest, ffln this case,
however, he can charge a rent for
the whole period that may elapse
between the restitution and the
harvest. Where, on the other hand,
the owner has stipulated for a
specified time of restitution, and the
harvest does not occur before this,
the borrower should uproot his crop
on the expiry of the term, at
any rate if the delay is caused
by his own
fault, if e.g. he
did not sow the field at the
usual time. Where a torrent
has carried
away the crop on to another’s seed
field, the crop belongs to
the
original owner, fbut he must remove
it upon the first notification.
Where a person mounts a horse and
says to the owner, “ You have
lent
it me,” and the owner replies, “ No,
I have hired it to you,” as well
as in a similar dispute between the
owner of a field and the sower, our
school admits a presumption in the
owner’s favour. A similar pre-
sumption is
admitted by our school in the
owner’s favour where the
possessor of
something says, “ You lent it me,”
and the owner answers,
“ No, you
usurped it.” Whatever may be the
result of the proceedings
whenever in
these circumstances the thing in dispute
is destroyed before
restitution, the
holder is always responsible, either as
borrower or as
usurper ; fwith this
difference, that a loan involves responsibility
only
for the value of tho thing
when lost, and not for the maximum
value
it may have reached during the
period of possession, nor for its value
on the day upon which possession
was taken of it. Where an owner
claims, on account of usurpation, a
higher value than the thing had on
the day it was lost, he must
take an oath as to the surplus
value.
كتاب الْغَصْبِ
BOOK 17 .— USURPATION
هُوَ: الِاسْتِيلَاءُ عَلَى حَقِّ الْغَيْرِ عُدْوَانًا.
فَلَوْ
رَكِبَ دَابَّةً أَوْ جَلَسَ عَلَى فِرَاشٍ فَغَاصِبٌ وَإِنْ لَمْ يُنْقَلْ.
وَلَوْ
دَخَلَ دَارِهِ وَأَزْعَجَهُ عَنْهَا أَوْ أَزْعَجَهُ وَقَهَرَهُ عَلَى الدَّارِ
وَلَمْ يَدْخُلْ فَغَاصِبٌ، وَفِي الثَّانِيَةِ وَجْهٌ وَاهٍ.
وَلَوْ
سَكَنَ بَيْتًا وَمَنَعَ الْمَالِكَ مِنْهُ دُونَ بَاقِي الدَّارِ فَغَاصِبٌ
لِلْبَيْتِ فَقَطْ، وَلَوْ دَخَلَ بِقَصْدِ الِاسْتِيلَاءِ وَلَيْسَ الْمَالِكُ
فِيهَا فَغَاصِبٌ، وَإِنْ كَانَ وَلَمْ يُزْعِجْهُ فَغَاصِبٌ لِنِصْفِ الدَّارِ
إلَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ ضَعِيفًا لَا يُعَدُّ مُسْتَوْلِيًا عَلَى صَاحِبِ
الدَّارِ.
وَعَلَى الْغَاصِبِ الرَّدُّ.
فَإِنْ تَلِفَ
عِنْدَهُ ضَمِنَهُ.
وَلَوْ أَتْلَفَ مَالاً فِي يَدِ مَالِكِهِ
ضَمِنَهُ.
وَلَوْ فَتَحَ رَأْسَ زِقٍّ مَطْرُوحٍ عَلَى الْأَرْضِ
فَخَرَجَ مَا فِيهِ بِالْفَتْحِ، أَوْ مَنْصُوبٍ فَسَقَطَ بِالْفَتْحِ وَخَرَجَ
مَا فِيهِ ضَمِنَ، وَإِنْ سَقَطَ بِعَارِضِ رِيحٍ لَمْ يَضْمَنْ.
وَلَوْ
فَتَحَ قَفَصًا عَنْ طَائِرٍ وَهَيَّجَهُ فَطَارَ ضَمِنَهُ، وَإِنْ اقْتَصَرَ
عَلَى الْفَتْحِ فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ إذَا طَارَ فِي الْحَالِ ضَمِنَ، وَإِنْ
وَقَفَ ثُمَّ طَارَ فَلَا.
وَالْأَيْدِي الْمُتَرَتِّبَةُ عَلَى
يَدِ الْغَاصِبِ أَيْدِي ضَمَانٍ وَإِنْ جَهِلَ صَاحِبُهَا الْغَصْبَ، ثُمَّ إنْ
عَلِمَ فَكَغَاصِبٍ مِنْ غَاصِبٍ فَيَسْتَقِرُّ عَلَيْهِ ضَمَانُ مَا تَلِفَ
عِنْدَهُ، وَكَذَا إنْ جَهِلَ وَكَانَتْ يَدُهُ فِي أَصْلِهَا يَدَ ضَمَانٍ
كَالْعَارِيَّةِ، وَإِنْ كَانَتْ يَدَ أَمَانَةٍ كَوَدِيعَةٍ فَالْقَرَارُ عَلَى
الْغَاصِبِ، وَمَتَى أَتْلَفَ الْآخِذُ مِنْ الْغَاصِبِ مُسْتَقِلًّا بِهِ
فَالْقَرَارُ عَلَيْهِ مُطْلَقًا.
وَإِنْ حَمَلَهُ الْغَاصِبُ
عَلَيْهِ بِأَنْ قَدَّمَ لَهُ طَعَامًا مَغْصُوبًا ضِيَافَةً فَأَكَلَهُ فَكَذَا
فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَعَلَى هَذَا لَوْ قَدَّمَهُ لِمَالِكِهِ فَأَكَلَهُ بَرِئَ
الْغَاصِبُ.
BOOK 17 .— USURPATION
Section
Usurpation
includes all acts of encroachment, in
bad faith, upon the
rights of
another. Thus the following categories of
persons must be
considered usurpers : —
. One who mounts another’s
beast, or sits upon another’s carpet,
even without moving it.
. One
who enters a house and drives out
the owner ; or without
entering himself
prevents the owner from entering. This
last precept
has been contested, though
not strongly.
. A tenant who
prevents the owner of a house from
entering his
room, though leaving him
in the peaceable possession of the
rest. This
act, however, constitutes a
usurpation of the room only, not of
the whole
house.
. One who
enters a house intending to take
possession of it, even
though the
owner may not be there at the
moment. If the owner is
there, and
is not driven out, the fact of
entering in this way amounts
to a
usurpation of half the house. Where,
however, the person entering
is physically
weaker than the owner, the act does
not imply a usur-
pation.
A usurper
should immediately restore an object he
has taken pos-
session of. He is
responsible for any injury, even if
accidental, that
may happen to it
while detained by him, in the same
way as if he had
caused the
loss of an object in some one’s
lawful possession. Thus a
person who
opens a sack lying on the ground, so
that the contents
escape ; or opens
one placed upright, so that it falls
down and the
contents escape in this
way ; is in either case liable for
damage. If,
however, in the latter
case, the sack does not fall down
in consequence
of being opened, but
the loss is caused by the wind
or some other for-
tuitous cause, such
as an earthquake, he is not liable.
A person who
opens a bird cage and
then shakes it to make the animal
fly out, is re-
sponsible ; but if
he merely opens the cage *he is
responsible only when
the bird flies
away at once, and not when it
remains some time inside
the open cage.
A person who derives possession from
a usurper is responsible for
the
accidental loss of what he thus
holds, even if unaware of the usur-
pation ; with this distinction, however,
that if he knew of it he must
be considered as having usurped the
thing from the original usurper,
and
to be just as responsible as he
is ; while if he was ignorant of the
illegal manner in which it was
come by, his responsibility is of
the same
degree only where the cause
of his possession implies such responsibility.
Therefore responsibility for accidental
loss is admitted, where the third
party has obtained the object from
the usurper byway of loan, but not
where it has been obtained as a
deposit. But when a person who has
received something from a usurper causes
its loss exclusively through
his own
fault, the responsibility rests upon him
in all cases, even though
the
usurper may have pressed him to take
possession of it. Thus the
responsibility
is admitted of *an individual who is
hungry and oats
of a plate passed
him by a usurper ; and, carrying this
principle further,
the usurper’s responsibility
ceases if he passes the plate to
the owner
and the latter eats it.
فصل [في بيان حكم الغصب]
تُضْمَنُ نَفْسُ الرَّقِيقِ بِقِيمَتِهِ
تَلِفَ أَوْ أُتْلِفَ تَحْتَ يَدٍ عَادِيَةٍ، وَأَبْعَاضُهُ الَّتِي لَا
يَتَقَدَّرُ أَرْشُهَا مِنْ الْحُرِّ بِمَا نَقَصَ مِنْ قِيمَتِهِ، وَكَذَا
الْمُقَدَّرَةُ إنْ تَلِفَتْ، وَإِنْ أُتْلِفَتْ فَكَذَا فِي الْقَدِيمِ، وَعَلَى
الْجَدِيدِ تَتَقَدَّرُ مِنْ الرَّقِيقِ، وَالْقِيمَةُ فِيهِ كَالدِّيَةِ فِي
الْحُرِّ، فَفِي يَدِهِ نِصْفُ قِيمَتِهِ، وَسَائِرُ الْحَيَوَانِ بِالْقِيمَةِ،
وَغَيْرُهُ مِثْلِيٌّ وَمُتَقَوِّمٌ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ الْمِثْلِيَّ مَا
حَصَرَهُ كَيْلٌ أَوْ وَزْنٌ وَجَازَ السَّلَمُ فِيهِ، كَمَاءٍ وَتُرَابٍ
وَنُحَاسٍ وَتِبْرٍ وَمِسْكٍ وَكَافُورٍ وَقُطْنٍ وَعِنَبٍ وَدَقِيقٍ، لَا
غَالِيَةٍ وَمَعْجُونٍ فَيُضْمَنُ الْمِثْلِيُّ بِمِثْلِهِ تَلِفَ أَوْ أُتْلِفَ،
فَإِنْ تَعَذَّرَ فَالْقِيمَةُ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ الْمُعْتَبَرَ أَقْصَى
قِيَمِهِ مِنْ وَقْتِ الْغَصْبِ إلَى تَعَذُّرِ الْمِثْلِ.
وَلَوْ
نَقَلَ الْمَغْصُوبُ الْمِثْلِيَّ إلَى بَلَدٍ آخَرَ فَلِلْمَالِكِ أَنْ
يُكَلِّفَهُ رَدَّهُ وَأَنْ يُطَالِبَهُ بِالْقِيمَةِ فِي الْحَالِ، فَإِذَا
رَدَّهُ رَدَّهَا، فَإِنْ تَلِفَ فِي الْبَلَدِ الْمَنْقُولِ إلَيْهِ طَالَبَهُ
بِالْمِثْلِ فِي أَيِّ الْبَلَدَيْنِ شَاءَ، فَإِنْ فَقَدَ الْمِثْلَ غَرَّمَهُ
قِيمَةَ أَكْثَرِ الْبَلَدَيْنِ قِيمَةً.
وَلَوْ ظَفِرَ
بِالْغَاصِبِ فِي غَيْرِ بَلَدِ التَّلَفِ فَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّهُ إنْ كَانَ لَا
مُؤْنَةَ لِنَقْلِهِ كَالنَّقْدِ فَلَهُ مُطَالَبَتُهُ بِالْمِثْلِ وَإِلَّا
فَلَا مُطَالَبَةَ بِالْمِثْلِ بَلْ يُغَرِّمُهُ قِيمَةَ بَلَدِ التَّلَفِ،
وَأَمَّا الْمُتَقَوِّمُ فَيُضْمَنُ بِأَقْصَى قِيَمِهِ مِنْ الْغَصْبِ، إلَى
التَّلَفِ، وَفِي الْإِتْلَافِ بِلَا غَصْبٍ بِقِيمَةِ يَوْمِ التَّلَفِ.
فَإِنْ
جَنَى وَتَلِفَ بِسِرَايَةٍ فَالْوَاجِبُ الْأَقْصَى أَيْضًا، وَلَا تُضْمَنُ
الْخَمْرُ وَلَا تُرَاقُ عَلَى ذِمِّيٍّ إلَّا أَنْ يُظْهِرَ شُرْبَهَا أَوْ
بَيْعَهَا، وَتُرَدُّ عَلَيْهِ إنْ بَقِيَتْ الْعَيْنُ وَكَذَا الْمُحْتَرَمَةُ
إذَا غُصِبَتْ مِنْ مُسْلِمٍ.
وَالْأَصْنَامُ وَآلَاتُ الْمَلَاهِي
لَا يَجِبُ فِي إبْطَالِهَا شَيْءٌ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهَا لَا تُكْسَرُ
الْكَسْرَ الْفَاحِشَ، بَلْ تُفْصَلُ لِتَعُودَ كَمَا قَبْلَ التَّأْلِيفِ،
فَإِنْ عَجَزَ الْمُنْكِرُ عَنْ رِعَايَةِ هَذَا الْحَدِّ لِمَنْعِ صَاحِبِ
الْمُنْكَرِ أَبْطَلَهُ كَيْفَ تَيَسَّرَ، وَتُضْمَنُ مَنْفَعَةُ الدَّارِ
وَالْعَبْدِ وَنَحْوِهِمَا بِالتَّفْوِيتِ وَالْفَوَاتِ فِي يَدٍ عَادِيَةٍ.
وَلَا
تُضْمَنُ مَنْفَعَةُ الْبُضْعِ إلَّا بِتَفْوِيتٍ، وَكَذَا مَنْفَعَةُ بَدَنِ
الْحُرِّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِذَا نَقَصَ الْمَغْصُوبُ بِغَيْرِ
اسْتِعْمَالٍ وَجَبَ الْأَرْشُ مَعَ الْأُجْرَةِ، وَكَذَا لَوْ نَقَصَ بِهِ
بِأَنْ بَلِيَ الثَّوْبُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
Section
The responsibility of a
usurper, in the matter of the life
of a slave,
can never exceed the
value of the individual at the
moment of death,
without distinguishing
between death caused by the usurper,
and acci-
dental death. Injuries, not
involving payment of a legal indemnity
in
the case of a free man, are
compensated for by payment of the
diminution in the slave’s value. No
attention is paid to whether these
injuries have been caused by
circumstances not under human control,
or
whether they are intentional, at least
according to Shafii’s original
opinion. On
the other hand, according to the
opinion adopted by
Shafii during his
stay in Egypt, compensation for the
intentional
injuring of a slave, in such a
way as to be liable to the
payment of a
legal indemnity, is
subject to the laws that regulate
the “ price of blood ”
for a free
man, though this compensation should be
estimated according
to the value of
the individual. Thus, for example, for
the loss of one
hand, half the
slave’s value should be paid, just
as in the case of a free
man
half the “ price of blood ; ” without
taking into consideration
whether or not
the value of the slave has undergone
a similar diminution.
Compensation due for
domestic animals consists, according to
circumstances in payment of the
value of the animal or a sum amounting
to its diminution in value. As
to other things liability differs according
as they are or are not sold
by measure or weight, and consequently can
or cannot have an advance paid
on them. fSuch are water, sand,
copper, precious metals in an
unrefined state, musk, camphor, cotton,
grapes, flour, but not the perfume
called ghatiyct, nor the medicine
called
majun . Compensation for the loss of
articles such as these
consists in
restitution of similar things, whether the
loss was intentional
or fortuitous ; only
if they cannot be procured is
payment of the value
permissible. fThis
value is always fixed at the maximum
from the
moment of usurpation until
the time when the impossibility of
procuring
an equivalent was perceived. If
the measurable things usurped have
been
taken to another town, the owner may
still demand restitution ;
he can
even insist upon the value being
paid immediately, until the
usurped
articles are brought back ; but on
their arrival the price pro-
visionally
paid must be returned. When the
measurable articles have
been destroyed at
the place they were taken to, the
owner can claim an
equivalent in
either place ; and if there are no
equivalents at the place
where the
demand is made, the usurper is
liable for their value at the
place
where they are the dearer, However,
an owner who meets a
usurper at a
place other than that of the loss,
can only claim restitution
of similar
things there, if they do not involve
expense for transport,
as in the
case of coin. If this is not
the case he cannot claim at this
place the restitution of similar
things, but the usurper owes him simply
their value at the place where
they were lost. Finally, as to things
not sold by weight or measure,
the usurper always owes their maximum
value in the period between the
day of usurpation and that of loss ;
while in the case of intentional
destruction of things not so sold
and not
usurped, the responsible person
is liable only for the value ascertained
on the day of the crime. To
this rule only one exception is
admitted ;
when a slave or a domestic
animal is wounded, and death ensues
without
its being possible to attribute
it directly to the wound, there is
due the
maximum value between the
day of the crime and the day
of death.
A loss of usurped wine
involves no liability. It is unlawful
to transfer
usurped wine to an
infidel subject of a Moslem prince, unless
he has
manifested an intention of
drinking it immediately or selling it.
How-
ever, as long as the usurped
wine still exists, its restitution is
obligatory,
and this last rule even
applies to juice of the grape not
destined to fer-
mentation, where this
juice has been usurped to the
owner’s prejudice,
if he is a Moslem.
The same rule applies aEo to idols
and to instru-
ments of gaming or
music, which one should break before
returning,
without incurring any liability.
fHowever, if the owner asks the holder
of these things for their return,
they should not be all at once
rudely
shattered ; but the different parts
should be detached so as to return
to their original condition, and it
is only where the owner himself has
rendered this impossible, that they
may be destroyed in a more rapid
manner.
In case of loss, either by
his own fault or by accident, the
usurper
should not only compensate the
proprietor up to the value of the
thing,
but owes him in addition an
indemnity for the use he has made
of it,
at least in the case of
something the owner could have leased
out in the
meantime, such as a
horse, a slave, and so on. In the
case of a female
slave, the usurper
owes this indemnity only if he has
cohabited with
her, and that she has
died as a consequence of this, fit
is the same with
services rendered
by a free man, during the period of
usurpation. If it
is not a question
of the loss of the thing usurped,
but of its deterioration,
not caused
by the usurper’s usage, the latter,
on restoring it is still
liable for
damage, plus an indemnity by way of
rent for the use he has
made
or might have made of it. This
principle must be applied also
when
the deterioration has been brought about
by the usurper, e.g .
where a usurped
coat has been worn.
فَصْلٌ [في اختلاف المالك والغاصب]
ادَّعَى تَلَفَهُ وَأَنْكَرَ
الْمَالِكُ صُدِّقَ الْغَاصِبُ بِيَمِينِهِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
فَإِذَا
حَلَفَ غَرَّمَهُ الْمَالِكُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ اخْتَلَفَا فِي قِيمَتِهِ
أَوْ فِي الثِّيَابِ الَّتِي عَلَى الْعَبْدِ الْمَغْصُوبِ أَوْ فِي عَيْبٍ
خُلُقِيٍّ صُدِّقَ الْغَاصِبُ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَفِي عَيْبٍ حَادِثٍ يُصَدَّقُ
الْمَالِكُ بِيَمِينِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ رَدَّهُ نَاقِصَ الْقِيمَةِ لَمْ
يَلْزَمْهُ شَيْءٍ.
وَلَوْ غَصَبَ ثَوْبًا قِيمَتُهُ عَشَرَةٌ
فَصَارَتْ بِالرُّخْصِ دِرْهَمًا ثُمَّ لَبِسَهُ فَصَارَتْ نِصْفَ دِرْهَمٍ
فَرَدَّهُ لَزِمَهُ خَمْسَةٌ، وَهِيَ قِسْطُ التَّالِفِ مِنْ أَقْصَى
الْقِيَمِ.
قُلْتُ: وَلَوْ غَصَبَ خُفَّيْنِ قِيمَتُهُمَا
عَشَرَةٌ فَتَلِفَ أَحَدُهُمَا وَرَدَّ الْآخَرَ وَقِيمَتُهُ دِرْهَمَانِ أَوْ
أُتْلِفَ أَحَدُهُمَا غَصْبًا أَوْ فِي يَدِ مَالِكِهِ لَزِمَهُ ثَمَانِيَةٌ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَوْ حَدَثَ نَقْصٌ يَسْرِي
إلَى التَّلَفِ بِأَنْ جَعَلَ الْحِنْطَةَ هَرِيسَةً فَكَالتَّالِفِ، وَفِي
قَوْلٍ يَرُدُّهُ مَعَ أَرْشِ النَّقْصِ وَلَوْ جَنَى الْمَغْصُوبُ فَتَعَلَّقَ
بِرَقَبَتِهِ مَالٌ لَزِمَ الْغَاصِبَ تَخْلِيصُهُ بِالْأَقَلِّ مِنْ قِيمَتِهِ
وَالْمَالِ، فَإِنْ تَلِفَ فِي يَدِهِ غَرَّمَهُ الْمَالِكُ، وَلِلْمَجْنِيِّ
عَلَيْهِ تَغْرِيمُهُ وَأَنْ يَتَعَلَّقَ بِمَا أَخَذَهُ الْمَالِكُ ثُمَّ
يَرْجِعُ الْمَالِكُ عَلَى الْغَاصِبِ، وَلَوْ رَدَّ الْعَبْدَ إلَى الْمَالِك
فَبِيعَ فِي الْجِنَايَةِ رَجَعَ الْمَالِكُ بِمَا أَخَذَهُ الْمَجْنِيُّ
عَلَيْهِ عَلَى الْغَاصِبِ.
وَلَوْ غَصَبَ أَرْضًا فَنَقَلَ
تُرَابَهَا أَجْبَرَهُ الْمَالِكُ عَلَى رَدِّهِ أَوْ رَدِّ مِثْلِهِ وَإِعَادَةِ
الْأَرْضِ كَمَا كَانَتْ، وَلِلنَّاقِلِ الرَّدُّ وَإِنْ لَمْ يُطَالِبْهُ
الْمَالِكُ إنْ كَانَ لَهُ فِيهِ غَرَضٌ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا يَرُدُّهُ بِلَا إذْنٍ
فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيُقَاسُ بِمَا ذَكَرْنَا حَفْرُ الْبِئْرِ وَطَمِّهَا، وَإِذَا
أَعَادَ الْأَرْضَ كَمَا كَانَتْ وَلَمْ يَبْقَ نَقْصٌ فَلَا أَرْشَ لَكِنْ
عَلَيْهِ أُجْرَةُ الْمِثْلِ لِمُدَّةِ الْإِعَادَةِ، وَإِنْ بَقِيَ نَقْصٌ
وَجَبَ أَرْشُهُ مَعَهَا وَلَوْ غَصَبَ زَيْتًا وَنَحْوَهُ وَأَغْلَاهُ
فَنَقَصَتْ عَيْنُهُ دُونَ قِيمَتِهِ، رَدَّهُ وَلَزِمَهُ مِثْلُ الذَّاهِبِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ وَإِنْ نَقَصَتْ الْقِيمَةُ فَقَطْ لَزِمَهُ الْأَرْشُ، وَإِنْ
نَقَصَتَا غَرِمَ الذَّاهِبُ وَرَدَّ الْبَاقِيَ مَعَ أَرْشِهِ إنْ كَانَ نَقْصُ
الْقِيمَةِ أَكْثَرُ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ السِّمَنَ لَا يَجْبُرُ
نَقْصَ هُزَالٍ قَبْلَهُ، وَأَنَّ تَذَكُّرَ صَنْعَةٍ نَسِيَهَا يَجْبُرُ
النِّسْيَانَ، وَتَعَلُّمُ صَنْعَةٍ لَا يَجْبُرُ نِسْيَانَ أُخْرَى
قَطْعًا.
وَلَوْ غَصَبَ عَصِيرًا فَتَخَمَّرَ ثُمَّ تَخَلَّلَ
فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ الْخَلَّ لِلْمَالِكِ وَعَلَى الْغَاصِبِ الْأَرْشُ إنْ كَانَ
الْخَلُّ أَنْقَصَ قِيمَةً.
وَلَوْ غَصَبَ خَمْرًا فَتَخَلَّلَتْ
أَوْ جِلْدَ مَيْتَةٍ فَدَبَغَهُ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ الْخَلَّ وَالْجِلْدَ
لِلْمَغْصُوبِ مِنْهُ.
Section
ff A usurper who declares
that the thing in dispute has been
lost,
has a presumption in his favour ;
provided he takes an oath to that
effect,
if the statement is contested
by the owner, fin this case the
owner
must be contented to claim
damage, according to the principles enun-
ciated in the preceding section. The
same presumption is established
in the
favour of a usurper, on oath, if
contested by the owner, as to the
value of the article, as to
the clothes worn by a usurped slave,
and as
to the latter’s natural
defects ; but, on the other hand,
the owner enjoys
a presumption in his
favour, if he maintains on oath the
existence of
accidental defects in the
slave.
A usurper who restores something
in dispute at a moment when its
price has gone down, owes nothing
by way of damage for this diminution
in value. Thus when one has
usurped, e.g . a coat of the original value
of ten drahms that has gone
down to one drahm , and has besides worn
the coat until it is no longer
worth more than half a drahm , one must
pay back five drahms as damage,
having regard to the rule that requires
payment of the maximum value.
[j*The usurper of a pair of
shoes worth ten drahms , one of which is
accidentally lost, so that he can
restore only the other worth alone not
more than two drahms , owes eight
drahms as damage. This sum is
due
also where the loss is not
accidental, but caused after usurpation,
or while in the owner’s possession.]
Deterioration of such sort as
to lead to total loss, e.g . the use
of
cheese to make liarisa, is
legally regarded as the same. A single
author
maintains that even in that
case the thing usurped should be restored
as it is, together with an
indemnity for the deterioration. Where a
usurped slave commits a crime punishable
by a fine for which his person
may
be seized, the usurper is liable up
to the full value of the slave or
of the sum due, whichever is
the more advantageous for him, without
prejudice to his liability towards
the owner, in case of the slave’s
death.
Under these circumstances the
injured party has none the less the
right
to proceed by seizure against
the usurper. Should he prefer to take
similar action against the owner,
and recoup himself out of -what the
latter has received from the usurper
as damage, the owner can take
fresh
proceedings against the usurper to recover
what he has had to pay
the
injured party. Similarly the owner has a
claim against the usurper
where, after
the return of the slave, he has
had to put him up for sale,
in
order to pay what was due for
an offence committed during the
period
of usurpation.
The usurper of a
field, who has removed earth from
it, must restore
it as it was
at first. He must return the earth,
or other earth of the same
quality.
The restitution of the earth that
has been removed is obliga-
tory, even
without any demand from the owner,
if it would be profitable
to him.
fOtherwise the usurper must wait for
the owner’s permission.
The same
principles must be followed if the
usurper has dug a well, or
filled up
one that already existed. If the
field has been re-established
by the
usurper in its original condition, and
no permanent deterioration
has been caused
to it, damage cannot be claimed from
the usurper,
who is liable merely
for reasonable compensation as rent, for
the time
employed in removing all
traces of the usurpation. On the
other hand,
in the case of a
permanent deterioration caused by removal
of earth,
the usurper owes damage in
addition.
j*A usurper of olive oil,
etc., who has boiled the liquid so
that part
has evaporated without the
total value being diminished, must, all
the
same, in case of restitution,
compensate the owner for the amount lost.
In the case where the value of
the oil has diminished in consequence of
the operation, without diminution in
quantity, the usurper still owes
damage.
Diminution in quantity accompanied by a
diminution in
the value of the
remainder renders it obligatory to
compensate the owner
for what has
evaporated, and return him the rest
with damages, if the
diminution in
value is ever so little greater than
that caused by the
diminution in
quantity alone. fStoutness acquired by a
slave during
usurpation cannot be held
to compensate for a previous leanness during
the same period ; but if a slave
who, during usurpation, has lost know-
ledge of his profession or trade, is
in a condition to take to it again,
the owner cannot claim damage for
this. The fact that the slave has
learnt a new trade or profession
with the usurper does not in any way
affect the latter’s liability for
knowledge lost.
|If usurped must ferments and then
changes into vinegar, the
vinegar must
be returned to the owner with
damages, when the value
of the
vinegar is less than that of the
must. fWhen impure things, that
consequently cannot be claimed back,
such as wine that changes to
vinegar, or the skin of an
animal that has died a natural death
and is
afterwards tanned, have been
usurped, the wine or tanned skin, although
it has lost its impurity owing
to the usurper, nevertheless belongs to
the person from whom it was usurped.
فصل [فيما يطرأ على المغصوب من زيادة ووطء وانتقال]
زِيَادَةُ
الْمَغْصُوبِ إنْ كَانَتْ أَثَرًا مَحْضًا؛ كَقَصَّارَةٍ فَلَا شَيْءَ
لِلْغَاصِبِ بِسَبَبِهَا، وَلِلْمَالِكِ تَكْلِيفُهُ رَدَّهُ كَمَا كَانَ إنْ
أَمْكَنَ، وَأَرْشَ النَّقْصِ.
وَإِنْ كَانَتْ عَيْنًا كَبِنَاءٍ
وَغِرَاسٍ كُلِّفَ الْقَلْعَ.
وَإِنْ صَبَغَ الثَّوْبَ بِصَبْغِهِ
وَأَمْكَنَ فَصْلُهُ أُجْبِرَ عَلَيْهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يُمْكِنْ
فَإِنْ لَمْ تَزِدْ قِيمَتُهُ فَلَا شَيْءَ لِلْغَاصِبِ فِيهِ، وَإِنْ نَقَصَتْ
لَزِمَهُ الْأَرْشُ وَإِنْ زَادَتْ اشْتَرَكَا فِيهِ.
وَلَوْ خَلَطَ
الْمَغْصُوبَ بِغَيْرِهِ وَأَمْكَنَ التَّمْيِيزُ لَزِمَهُ، وَإِنْ شَقَّ فَإِنْ
تَعَذَّرَ فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ كَالتَّالِفِ فَلَهُ تَغْرِيمُهُ، وَلِلْغَاصِبِ
أَنْ يُعْطِيَهُ مِنْ غَيْرِ الْمَخْلُوطِ.
وَلَوْ غَصَبَ خَشَبَةً
وَبَنَى عَلَيْهَا أُخْرِجَتْ، وَلَوْ أَدْرَجَهَا فِي سَفِينَةٍ فَكَذَلِكَ
إلَّا أَنْ يَخَافَ تَلَفَ نَفْسٍ أَوْ مَالٍ مَعْصُومَيْنِ.
وَلَوْ
وَطِئَ الْمَغْصُوبَةَ عَالِمًا بِالتَّحْرِيمِ، حُدَّ، وَإِنْ جَهِلَ فَلَا
حَدَّ، وَفِي الْحَالَيْنِ يَجِبُ الْمَهْرُ إلَّا أَنْ تُطَاوِعَهُ فَلَا يَجِبُ
عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَعَلَيْهَا الْحَدُّ إنْ عَلِمَتْ وَوَطْءُ الْمُشْتَرِي مِنْ
الْغَاصِبِ كَوَطْئِهِ فِي الْحَدِّ وَالْمَهْرِ، فَإِنْ غَرِمَهُ لَمْ يَرْجِعْ
بِهِ عَلَى الْغَاصِبِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَإِنْ أَحْبَلَ عَالِمًا بِالتَّحْرِيمِ
فَالْوَلَدُ رَقِيقٌ غَيْرُ نَسِيبٍ، وَإِنْ جَهِلَ فَحُرٌّ نَسِيبٌ، وَعَلَيْهِ
قِيمَتُهُ يَوْمَ الِانْفِصَالِ، وَيَرْجِعُ بِهَا الْمُشْتَرِي عَلَى الْغَاصِبِ
وَلَوْ تَلِفَ الْمَغْصُوبُ عِنْدَ الْمُشْتَرِي وَغَرِمَهُ لَمْ يَرْجِعْ بِهِ،
وَكَذَا لَوْ تَعَيَّبَ عِنْدَهُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلَا يَرْجِعُ بِغُرْمِ
مَنْفَعَةٍ اسْتَوْفَاهَا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ وَيَرْجِعُ بِغُرْمِ مَا تَلِفَ
عِنْدَهُ وَبِأَرْشِ نَقْصِ بِنَائِهِ وَغِرَاسِهِ إذَا نَقَصَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَكُلُّ مَا لَوْ غَرِمَهُ الْمُشْتَرِي رَجَعَ بِهِ وَلَوْ غَرِمَهُ الْغَاصِبُ
لَمْ يَرْجِعْ بِهِ عَلَى الْمُشْتَرِي، وَمَا لَا فَيَرْجِعُ.
قُلْتُ:
وَكُلُّ مَنْ انْبَنَتْ يَدُهُ عَلَى يَدِ الْغَاصِبِ فَكَالْمُشْتَرِي،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
No increase in the
value of a usurped article, consisting in
simple
amelioration, such as the cleaning
of a coat, goes to the profit of the
usurper ; and the owner may even
insist upon his restoring the thing
to its original state, if this
is possible, together with any damages
that
may be due. Where, on the
contrary, the increase in the value of
the thing has a separate existence,
such as a building or a plantation,
the
usurper should in all cases restore
the land to its original condition,
f A
person who dyes a piece of usurped
cloth with his own dye, may be
obliged to remove this dye if
it is possible. If it is impossible,
and the
value of the cloth has
not been increased by the addition,
the usurper
can claim nothing, but
damages may be claimed from him if
there is
ground for this. Where, on
the other hand, the dyeing has increased
the value of the cloth, owner
and usurper become its co-proprietors.
If a thing usurped has been
mixed with something else belonging
to
the usurper, it should be separated
from it if possible. If this separa-
tion is impossible our school considers
the thing as destroyed, that is to
say the owner can claim from
the usurper either a return of the value
or something of the same kind
not so mixed. Thus a beam that has
been usurped and used in building
must be removed, even if it has been
used in building a ship. The claim,
however, cannot be immediately
complied
with, if made at a moment when the
removal of the beam
would cause
danger to the persons or goods
confided to the captain’s
care.
Cohabitation knowingly practised with a
usurped female slave
renders the usurper
liable to the penalty for fornication ;
but not if
unknowingly. In both
cases, however, the usurper owes dower,
unless
the cohabitation was accomplished
with the woman’s full consent.
In
this latter case ffnothing is owing,
and the woman is liable to be
dealt with severely, if she has
knowingly committed the crime. Co-
habitation
with a female slave purchased from a
usurper, has the same
consequences, so
far as the purchaser is concerned,
both as regards the
penalty and the
dower, as if the usurper himself had
been guilty of it.
The purchaser has
no claim against the usurper for
payment of the dower.
When a usurper,
or some one who has purchased from
him a female
slave, renders her pregnant,
knowing that she was forbidden him, her
child becomes the slave of the
owner without regard to paternity ; but
if it was done unknowingly, the
child is free, and considered to be
the
father’s legitimate offspring. In this
case, however, the father owes
to
the mother’s owner the value of the
child at the time of its birth.
Where, under these circumstances,
the child’s father buys the mother
in good faith from the usurper,
he has a claim against him ; although,
in general, the purchaser of
anything usurped has no claim against
the usurper, if the article is
destroyed in his possession in a manner
which renders him directly responsible
towards the owrner. *The same
principle
is followed in the case where the
article has not been destroyed,
but
has only deteriorated. *Neither has the
purchaser any claim
against the usurper
for payment of the indemnity due to
the owner
for his usage of the
article ; fbut such claim is admitted
for damages
paid to the owner,
whether for accidental loss or for
injury caused,
e.g. to a piece of
land by demolition of buildings or
uprooting of crops,
if there was
ground for such damages. A usurper wrho
has paid damages
for a purchaser can
never claim them from him ; even in
a case where the
latter could have
claimed them from the former ; but
he may do so if
the damage was
incurred by the purchaser’s own fault.
[Every person wrho derives his
possession from that of the usurper,
is subject to the same rules
as have now been shown to apply
to the first
purchaser of a usurped
object.]
كتاب الشُّفْعَةِ
BOOK 18 .— PRE-EMPTION
لَا تَثْبُتُ فِي مَنْقُولٍ، بَلْ فِي أَرْضٍ وَمَا فِيهَا مِنْ بِنَاءٍ وَشَجَرٍ
تَبَعًا وَكَذَا ثَمَرٌ لَمْ يُؤَبَّرْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَا شُفْعَةَ فِي
حُجْرَةٍ بُنِيَتْ عَلَى سَقْفٍ غَيْرِ مُشْتَرَكٍ وَكَذَا مُشْتَرَكٌ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَكُلُّ مَا لَوْ قُسِمَ بَطَلَتْ مَنْفَعَتُهُ الْمَقْصُودَةُ
كَحَمَّامٍ وَرَحًى لَا شُفْعَةَ فِيهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا
شُفْعَةَ إلَّا لِشَرِيكٍ.
وَلَوْ بَاعَ دَارًا وَلَهُ شَرِيكٌ فِي
مَمَرِّهَا فَلَا شُفْعَةَ لَهُ فِيهَا، وَالصَّحِيحُ ثُبُوتُهَا فِي الْمَمَرِّ
إنْ كَانَ لِلْمُشْتَرِي طَرِيقٌ آخَرُ إلَى الدَّارِ، أَوْ أَمْكَنَ فَتْحُ باب
إلَى شَارِعٍ وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَإِنَّمَا تَثْبُتُ فِيمَا مُلِكَ
بِمُعَاوَضَةٍ مِلْكًا لَازِمًا مُتَأَخِّرًا عَنْ مِلْكِ الشَّفِيعِ كَمَبِيعٍ
وَمَهْرٍ وَعِوَضِ خُلْعٍ وَصُلْحِ دَمٍ، وَنُجُومٍ وَأُجْرَةٍ وَرَأْسِ مَالِ
سَلَمٍ.
وَلَوْ شُرِطَ فِي الْبَيْعِ الْخِيَارُ لَهُمَا أَوْ
لِلْبَائِعِ لَمْ يُؤْخَذْ بِالشُّفْعَةِ حَتَّى يَنْقَطِعَ الْخِيَارُ، وَإِنْ
شُرِطَ لِلْمُشْتَرِي وَحْدَهُ فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ يُؤْخَذُ إنْ قُلْنَا:
الْمِلْكُ لِلْمُشْتَرِي وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَلَوْ وَجَدَ
الْمُشْتَرِي بِالشِّقْصِ عَيْبًا وَأَرَادَ رَدَّهُ بِالْعَيْبِ وَأَرَادَ
الشَّفِيعُ أَخْذَهُ، وَيَرْضَى بِالْعَيْبِ فَالْأَظْهَرُ إجَابَةُ
الشَّفِيعِ.
وَلَوْ اشْتَرَى اثْنَانِ دَارًا أَوْ بَعْضَهَا فَلَا
شُفْعَةَ لِأَحَدِهِمَا عَلَى الْآخَرِ.
وَلَوْ كَانَ لِلْمُشْتَرِي
شِرْكٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ الشَّرِيكَ لَا يَأْخُذُ كُلَّ
الْمَبِيعِ بَلْ حِصَّتَهُ.
وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ فِي التَّمَلُّكِ
بِالشُّفْعَةِ حُكْمُ حَاكِمٍ وَلَا إحْضَارُ الثَّمَنِ وَلَا حُضُورُ
الْمُشْتَرِي، وَيُشْتَرَطُ لَفْظٌ مِنْ الشَّفِيعِ كَتَمَلَّكْت أَوْ أَخَذْت
بِالشُّفْعَةِ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ مَعَ ذَلِكَ إمَّا تَسْلِيمُ الْعِوَضِ إلَى
الْمُشْتَرِي فَإِذَا تَسَلَّمَهُ أَوْ أَلْزَمَهُ الْقَاضِي التَّسَلُّمَ مَلَكَ
الشَّفِيعُ الشِّقْصَ، وَإِمَّا رِضَى الْمُشْتَرِي بِكَوْنِ الْعِوَضِ فِي
ذِمَّتِهِ، وَإِمَّا قَضَاءُ الْقَاضِي لَهُ بِالشُّفْعَةِ إذَا حَضَرَ
مَجْلِسَهُ وَأَثْبَتَ حَقَّهُ فَيَمْلِكُ بِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَا
يَتَمَلَّكُ شِقْصًا لَمْ يَرَهُ الشَّفِيعُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
BOOK 18 .— PRE-EMPTION
Section
This
right does not exist in reference to
movable property, but only
with regard
to land and what is naturally
included in it, like buildings
and
trees, fand fruit not artificially
fertilised. There is no right of
pre-emption in the caso of a liojra
supported on a roof, feven a roof
held
in common ; fnor in the case of
anything that cannot be divided
without
lowering the value, such as a batli
or a mill.
Eight of pre-emption
exists only in favour of a co-proprietor
of the
immovable property sold. Thus,
where there are two houses belonging
to two different persons, both
houses having a common outlet to the
public road, neither of the two
proprietors can, in case of sale, exercise
a right of pre-emption with regard
to the other’s house, on the ground
of common ownership of the outlet.
ffHe cannot even exercise a right
of
pre-emption with regard to the common
outlet, unless the purchaser
has another
at his disposition, or can open a
door upon the public way.
There is a
right to pre-emption only in the
case of transfer of ownership
for a
consideration and irrevocably, and the
transfer must be later
than the
acquisition of the pre-emptor’s rights.
Consequently pre-
emption is admissible in
the following cases : transfer by sale,
dower,
compensatory price, compromise in
the matter of a crime, periodical
payment,
rent, advance. From these principles ensue
the following
conclusions : —
.
When, in a sale, a right of option
has been stipulated, either by the
two contracting parties, or by the
vendor alone, a co-proprietor cannot
exercise
his right of pre-emption before the
expiry of the optional time.
Where,
on the other hand, the purchaser
alone has reserved a right of
option,
*the right of pre-emption can be
immediately exercised, at least
when it
is admitted that in these circumstances
the ownership is acquir ed
by the
purchaser at the moment of the contract.
. *When the purchaser, on
perceiving that the thing bought has
redhibitory defects, wishes to return
it to the vendor, while the pre-
emptor wishes to accept the thing
and waive the redhibition, the latter
may exercise his right independently
of the rupture of the original sale.
. If two persons jointly buy a
house, wholly or in part, neither can
dispossess his co-proprietor by way
of pre-emption.
. *If a piece of
land belongs to three co-proprietors, and
the first
sells his share to the
second, the third cannot, by exercising
his right
of pre-emption, acquire the
whole of the part sold, but only
in propor-
tion to his original share.
In pre-emption the transfer of
ownership is effected without any
adjudication on the part of the
court ; the price need not be brought ;
and the presence of the original
purchaser is unnecessary. All that is
required is the verbal declaration
of the pre-emptor, such as, “ I appro-
priate the whole of the land/’ or, “
I take possession by right of pre-
emption.In order that the pre-emption
should have full effect, the
law
requires also that the price of the
re-purchase should be delivered
to the
purchaser. On making this delivery of
his own accord, or in
consequence of
an injunction, the pre-emptor becomes
proprietor of
the portion he wants.
It is, however, also permissible that
the purchaser
may consent to allow
credit to the pre-emptor for the
amount of the
re-purchase, and that
it be pronounced by the court. In
both cases
delivery of the price of
repurchase is unnecessary in order that
the
ownership of the property claimed
should be transferred, although, in
the
latter case, that ownership can only
pass to the pre-emptor on
condition
that he is present at the sitting,
and shows that his claim is
well
founded. And finally, according to our
school, ownership of a
portion of an
immovable property that the pre-emptor has
not yet seen
is never transferred*
فَصْلٌ [في بيان بدل الشقص الذي يؤخذ به والاختلاف في قدر الثمن]
إذَا
اشْتَرَى بِمِثْلِيٍّ أَخَذَهُ الشَّفِيعُ بِمِثْلِهِ، أَوْ بِمُتَقَوِّمٍ
فَبِقِيمَتِهِ يَوْمَ الْبَيْعِ، وَقِيلَ يَوْمَ اسْتِقْرَارِهِ بِانْقِطَاعِ
الْخِيَارِ، أَوْ بِمُؤَجَّلٍ فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ مُخَيَّرٌ بَيْنَ أَنْ
يُعَجِّلَ وَيَأْخُذَ فِي الْحَالِ أَوْ يَصْبِرَ إلَى الْمَحَلِّ يَأْخُذُ
وَلَوْ بِيعَ شِقْصٌ وَغَيْرُهُ أَخَذَهُ بِحِصَّتِهِ مِنْ الْقِيمَةِ،
وَيُؤْخَذُ الْمَمْهُورُ بِمَهْرِ مِثْلِهَا وَكَذَا عِوَضُ الْخُلْعِ، وَلَوْ
اشْتَرَى بِجُزَافٍ وَتَلِفَ امْتَنَعَ الْأَخْذُ.
فَإِنْ عَيَّنَ
الشَّفِيعُ قَدْرًا وَقَالَ الْمُشْتَرِي: لَمْ يَكُنْ مَعْلُومَ الْقَدْرِ
حَلَفَ عَلَى نَفْيِ الْعِلْمِ، وَإِنْ ادَّعَى عِلْمَهُ وَلَمْ يُعَيِّنْ
قَدْرًا لَمْ تُسْمَعْ دَعْوَاهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِذَا ظَهَرَ
الثَّمَنُ مُسْتَحَقًّا فَإِنْ كَانَ مُعَيَّنًا بَطَلَ الْبَيْعُ وَالشُّفْعَةُ،
وَلَا أَبْدَلَ وَبَقِيَا؛ وَإِنْ دَفَعَ الشَّفِيعُ مُسْتَحَقًّا لَمْ تَبْطُلْ
شُفْعَتُهُ إنْ جَهِلَ؛ وَكَذَا إنْ عَلِمَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ؛ وَتَصَرُّفُ
الْمُشْتَرِي فِي الشِّقْصِ كَبَيْعٍ وَوَقْفٍ وَإِجَارَةٍ صَحِيحٌ،
وَلِلشَّفِيعِ نَقْضُ مَا لَا شُفْعَةَ فِيهِ كَالْوَقْفِ، وَأَخَذَهُ،
وَيَتَخَيَّرُ فِيمَا فِيهِ شُفْعَةٌ كَبَيْعٍ بَيْنَ أَنْ يَأْخُذَهُ
بِالْبَيْعِ الثَّانِي أَوْ يَنْقُضَهُ أَوْ يَأْخُذَ بِالْأَوَّلِ.
وَلَوْ
اخْتَلَفَ الْمُشْتَرِي وَالشَّفِيعُ فِي قَدْرِ الثَّمَنِ صُدِّقَ الْمُشْتَرِي
وَكَذَا لَوْ أَنْكَرَ الشِّرَاءَ أَوْ كَوْنَ الطَّالِبِ شَرِيكًا، فَإِنْ
اعْتَرَفَ الشَّرِيكُ بِالْبَيْعِ فَالْأَصَحُّ ثُبُوتُ الشُّفْعَةِ، وَيُسَلَّمُ
الثَّمَنُ إلَى الْبَائِعِ إنْ لَمْ يَعْتَرِفْ بِقَبْضِهِ وَإِنْ اعْتَرَفَ
فَهَلْ يُتْرَكُ فِي يَدِ الشَّفِيعِ أَمْ يَأْخُذُهُ الْقَاضِي وَيَحْفَظُهُ؟
فِيهِ خِلَافٌ سَبَقَ فِي الْإِقْرَارِ نَظِيرُهُ.
وَلَوْ
اسْتَحَقَّ الشُّفْعَةَ جَمْعٌ أَخَذُوا عَلَى قَدْرِ الْحِصَصِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ
عَلَى الرُّءُوسِ، وَلَوْ بَاعَ أَحَدُ الشَّرِيكَيْنِ نِصْفَ حِصَّتِهِ لِرَجُلٍ
ثُمَّ بَاقِيَهَا لِآخَرَ فَالشُّفْعَةُ فِي النِّصْفِ الْأَوَّلِ لِلشَّرِيكِ
الْقَدِيمِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ إنْ عَفَا عَنْ النِّصْفِ الْأَوَّلِ شَارَكَهُ
الْمُشْتَرِي الْأَوَّلُ فِي النِّصْفِ الثَّانِي، وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَالْأَصَحُّ
أَنَّهُ لَوْ عَفَا أَحَدُ شَفِيعَيْنِ سَقَطَ حَقُّهُ، وَتَخَيَّرَ الْآخَرُ
بَيْنَ أَخْذِ الْجَمِيعِ وَتَرْكِهِ، وَلَيْسَ لَهُ الِاقْتِصَارُ عَلَى
حِصَّتِهِ، وَأَنَّ الْوَاحِدَ إذَا أَسْقَطَ بَعْضَ حَقِّهِ سَقَطَ
كُلُّهُ.
وَلَوْ حَضَرَ أَحَدُ شَفِيعَيْنِ فَلَهُ أَخْذُ
الْجَمِيعِ فِي الْحَالِ فَإِذَا حَضَرَ الْغَائِبُ شَارَكَهُ، وَالْأَصَحُّ
أَنَّ لَهُ تَأْخِيرَ الْأَخْذِ إلَى قُدُومِ الْغَائِبِ.
وَلَوْ
اشْتَرَيَا شِقْصًا فَلِلشَّفِيعِ أَخْذُ نَصِيبِهِمَا وَنَصِيبِ أَحَدِهِمَا،
وَلَوْ اشْتَرَى وَاحِدٌ مِنْ اثْنَيْنِ فَلَهُ أَخْذُ حِصَّةِ أَحَدِ
الْبَائِعَيْنِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّ الشُّفْعَةَ عَلَى
الْفَوْرِ، فَإِذَا عَلِمَ الشَّفِيعُ بِالْبَيْعِ فَلْيُبَادِرْ عَلَى
الْعَادَةِ فَإِنْ كَانَ مَرِيضًا أَوْ غَائِبًا عَنْ بَلَدِ الْمُشْتَرِي أَوْ
خَائِفًا مِنْ عَدُوٍّ فَلْيُوَكِّلْ إنْ قَدَرَ، وَإِلَّا فَلْيُشْهِدْ عَلَى
الطَّلَبِ، فَإِنْ تَرَكَ الْمَقْدُورَ عَلَيْهِ مِنْهُمَا بَطَلَ حَقُّهُ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
فَلَوْ كَانَ فِي صَلَاةٍ أَوْ حَمَّامٍ أَوْ طَعَامٍ
فَلَهُ الْإِتْمَامُ، وَلَوْ أَخَّرَ وَقَالَ لَمْ أُصَدِّقْ الْمُخْبِرَ لَمْ
يُعْذَرْ إنْ أَخْبَرَهُ عَدْلَانِ، وَكَذَا ثِقَةٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيُعْذَرُ
إنْ أَخْبَرَهُ مَنْ لَا يُقْبَلُ خَبَرُهُ.
وَلَوْ أُخْبِرَ
بِالْبَيْعِ بِأَلْفٍ فَتَرَكَ فَبَانَ بِخَمْسِمِائَةٍ بَقِيَ حَقُّهُ، وَإِنْ
بَانَ بِأَكْثَرَ بَطَلَ، وَلَوْ لَقِيَ الْمُشْتَرِي فَسَلَّمَ عَلَيْهِ، أَوْ
قَالَ بَارَكَ اللَّهُ فِي صَفْقَتِك لَمْ يَبْطُلْ، وَفِي الدُّعَاءِ
وَجْهٌ.
وَلَوْ بَاعَ الشَّفِيعُ حِصَّتَهُ جَاهِلاً بِالشُّفْعَةِ
فَالْأَصَحُّ بُطْلَانُهَا.
Section
As to the compensation
due to the purchaser by the pre-emptor,
the law admits the following
distinctions : —
. When the purchase
has been effected for a price consisting
in
things sold by measure or weight,
the pre-emptor should indemnify
the
purchaser with similar things.
.
When the purchaser has given in
exchange something not sold
in this
way, the pre-emptor should return him
the value, i.e. the value
the thing
had on the day of sale, or
according to others its value on the
day the right of option expired,
and on which consequently the sale
became irrevocable.
. *Whon the
purchase has been effected on credit,
the pre-emptor
can at his choice
either pay at once and take
possession of the immovable
property, or
he can wait until the term has
expired and do so then.
In the
case of a combined sale of a portion
of an immovable and of
some other
object, the pre-emptor can exercise his
right all the same,
provided that he
pays what may he considered the
price of his portion,
in proportion
to the total value of the sale.
A portion of an immovable property
transferred as dower is subject
to a
right of pre-emption on the part of
a co-proprietor, for a price
valued according
to the proportional dower the woman
in question
could claim ; and the same
rule is observed with regard to a transfer
as compensatory price in case of
divorce. When the sale of an immovable
property subject to pre-emption takes
place for a contract price, and this
latter is accidentally lost, the
owner cannot exercise his right of pre-
emption. Where, under these circumstances,
the co-proprietor indicates
the exact
amount which has been paid in this
way for the property,
while the
purchaser declares he knows nothing of
it, the latter should
confirm his
ignorance on oath, and the claim is
dismissed. fNeither
can it be entertained,
where the co-proprietor maintains before
the court
that the purchaser really
knows how much he lias paid, without
any
further indication on his part
as to the exact amount.
A subsequent
judicial seizure of what the original
purchaser has
given by way of price,
nullifies both sale and pre-emption, at
least where
the price is some
definite thing liable to seizure.
Otherwise the things
given as price
may be replaced, and both the sale
and the pre-emption
hold good. A right
of pre-emption remains unaffected by a
seizure of
what the pre-emptor has
given the purchaser in compensation, whether
this is a consequence of the
pre-emptor’s ignorance, for whether he
knew of the danger. A disposal of
the purchased property by the
purchaser,
by way of sale, wahaf, lease, etc.,
is not ipso facto annulled
by a
subsequent pre-emption, but the pre-emptor
can demand the
cancellation of a disposal
which, like wahaf , would render illusory a
right of repurchase. In the case,
however, of a disposal on the part of
the purchaser, which, like a sale,
admits of subsequent pre-emption,
the
person in whose favour this right
originally existed may at his choice
either exercise it with regard to
the second sale, or demand the
cancellation of that one, and
exercise his right with regard to
the former.
In case of dispute
between purchaser and pre-emptor upon the
subject of the price, the
presumption is in favour of the
purchaser’s
statement ; and the same is
the case where the latter denies the
pur-
chase or the status of co-proprietor
upon which the plaintiff bases his
right of repurchase. fThis presumption,
however, is destroyed, and
the repurchase
takes effect, if in these circumstances
the co-proprietor
who has sold maintains
the purchase denied by the purchaser.
And it
is to this co-proprietor that
the pre-emptor then owes the compensation
originally due to the purchaser,
unless the co -proprietor admits having
already received the price. If he
does admit it, in spite of the
purchaser’s
denial ; authorities are not agreed
as to whether the compensation
should
bo left in the hands of the
co-proprietor pre-emptor, or whether
the
court should seize and keep it for
whoever finally establishes his
claim to
it. This controversy is the same as
that we have spoken of,
about a
confession that is denied by the
person in whose favour it is
made.
Where several co-proprietors have a
joint right of pre-emption, they
should
exercise it in proportion to then’
respective shares ; though,
according to
one jurist, they should do it by
heads. When one co-
proprietor sells the
half of his share in a property, and
then the second
half to another
person, it is understood that the
right of pre-emption
with regard to
the first half belongs to the other
of the original co-
proprietors ; but
if the latter waives his right, the
purchaser who has
become owner of
the first half, shares with him a
right of pre-emption
with regard to
the second half. j*A renunciation on
the part of one of
the two
co-proprietors possessing a joint right of
pre-emption, prevents
him from making any
later claim ; the other co-proprietor should
then
decide, either to exercise his
right upon the whole of the property
put
up for sale, or to renounce
his part also. Thus he may not
merely
exercise his right in proportion
to his own share ; but the repurchase
being indivisible, even a partial
renunciation by one of the parties results
in a devolution of the full and
entire right of pre-emption to the other.
When, of two persons having right
to pre-emption, only one is present,
he can at once exercise the
right in its entirety, on condition
of allowing
the other to participate
in it upon his return ; fthough he
may instead
postpone the repurchase until
his co-proprietor’s arrival. If two
persons have bought in common a
share in immovable property, the
pre-emptor can exercise his right
either against the two together or
against one of them ; |but where two
of the co-proprietors have sold
then’
respective shares to a single person, the
pre-emptor should exercise
his right
separately with regard to what has
been sold by each of his
co -proprietors.
*A right of pre-emption should
be exercised without delay, and the
person having this right should
speedily declare his wishes in the matter,
in conformity with custom as soon
as he has learnt of the sale.
If that
is impossible through sickness
or absence or fear of enemies, he
should
appoint an agent to act for
him, or, if he cannot find one,
call witnesses
and announce in their
presence his intention of exercising his
right of
pre-emption. The right of
pre-emption lapses fif no agent is
appointed,
or no intention expressed
before witnesses, where this might have
been
done ; but a person at prayer,
at the bath, or at a meal can
postpone
his declaration until he has
finished. A prolonged delay involves the
loss of the right of pre-emption,
even although the pre-emptor declares
that
he did not believe the person who
brought the news of the sale,
at
any rate if it was brought him
by two persons of irreproachable
character, for even by a single
person worthy of confidence. He is
permitted to disbelieve in the truth
of the news of the sale only where
it is brought him by persons
whose deposition would not be accepted
in a court of law. However, if
the co-proprietor learns that the sale
has taken place, e.g. for a thousand
pieces of money, in consequence of
which price he renounces his right
of pre-emption ; his right remains
intact,
in spite of his renunciation, if it
subsequently transpires that the
sale was
concluded for five hundred only ; though,
on the contrary, it
remains irrevocably
lost if it afterwards appears to
have been concluded
for more than a
thousand. Neither is there any loss
of the right of pre-
emption where the*
pre-emptor, meeting the purchaser after learning
of the sale, salutes him, saying, “
Peace be with you,” or “ God bless
you
in the acquisition you have
made.” However, all authorities are not
in agreement as to the consequences
of an exclamation which, like the
latter, contains an invocation of
the name of God.
fThere is no
right of pre-emption, if, after a sale
by one of the co-
proprietors, the
other, who is thus entitled to
appropriate the entire
property, has
himself sold his share also to a
third party, even though
this sale
was effected in ignorance of the other.
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