Book 23: Endowment (Wakaf)
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature dan reference: classical Arabic books
Contents
- Book 23: Endowment (Waqaf)
- Book 24: Gifts (Hibah)
- Book 25: Things pound (Luqatah)
- Book 26: Foundlings (Laqit)
- Book 27: Job-Work (Ju'alah)
- Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi
كتاب الْوَقْفِ
BOOK 23 .— WAKAF
شَرْطُ الْوَاقِفِ صِحَّةُ عِبَارَتِهِ وَأَهْلِيَّةُ التَّبَرُّعِ.
وَالْمَوْقُوفِ
دَوَامُ الِانْتِفَاعِ بِهِ.
لَا مَطْعُومٌ وَرَيْحَانٌ.
وَيَصِحُّ
وَقْفُ عَقَارٍ وَمَنْقُولٍ وَمُشَاعٌ لَا عَبْدٌ وَثَوْبٌ فِي الذِّمَّةِ.
وَلَا
وَقْفُ حُرِّ نَفْسِهِ.
وَكَذَا مُسْتَوْلَدَةٌ وَكَلْبٌ مُعَلَّمٌ
وَأَحَدُ عَبْدَيْهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ وَقَفَ بِنَاءً أَوْ
غَرْسًا فِي أَرْضٍ مُسْتَأْجَرَةٍ لَهُمَا فَالْأَصَحُّ جَوَازُهُ فَإِنْ وَقَفَ
عَلَى مُعَيَّنٍ وَاحِدٍ أَوْ جَمْعٍ اُشْتُرِطَ إمْكَانُ تَمْلِيكِهِ فَلَا
يَصِحُّ عَلَى جَنِينٍ وَلَا عَلَى الْعَبْدِ لِنَفْسِهِ، فَلَوْ أَطْلَقَ
الْوَقْفَ عَلَيْهِ فَهُوَ وَقْفٌ عَلَى سَيِّدِهِ.
وَلَوْ أَطْلَقَ
الْوَقْفَ عَلَى بَهِيمَةٍ لَغَا، وَقِيلَ هُوَ وَقْفٌ عَلَى مَالِكِهَا
وَيَصِحُّ عَلَى ذِمِّيٍّ لَا مُرْتَدٍّ وَحَرْبِيٍّ وَنَفْسِهِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِنْ وَقَفَ عَلَى جِهَةِ مَعْصِيَةٍ كَعِمَارَةِ
الْكَنَائِسِ فَبَاطِلٌ أَوْ جِهَةِ قُرْبَةٍ كَالْفُقَرَاءِ وَالْعُلَمَاءِ
وَالْمَسَاجِدِ، وَالْمَدَارِسِ صَحَّ أَوْ جِهَةٍ لَا تَظْهَرُ فِيهَا
الْقُرْبَةُ كَالْأَغْنِيَاءِ صَحَّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا يَصِحُّ
إلَّا بِلَفْظٍ.
وَصَرِيحُهُ وَقَفْت كَذَا أَوْ أَرْضِي
مَوْقُوفَةٌ عَلَيْهِ، وَالتَّسْبِيلُ وَالتَّحْبِيسُ صَرِيحَانِ عَلَى
الصَّحِيحِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ تَصَدَّقْت بِكَذَا صَدَقَةً مُحَرَّمَةً أَوْ
مَوْقُوفَةً أَوْ لَا تُبَاعُ وَلَا تُوهَبُ فَصَرِيحٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ،
وَقَوْلُهُ تَصَدَّقْت فَقَطْ لَيْسَ بِصَرِيحٍ وَإِنْ نَوَى إلَّا أَنْ يُضِيفَ
إلَى جِهَةٍ عَامَّةٍ وَيَنْوِيَ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ قَوْلَهُ حَرَّمْتُهُ أَوْ
أَبَّدْتُهُ لَيْسَ بِصَرِيحٍ، وَأَنَّ قَوْلَهُ جَعَلْت الْبُقْعَةَ مَسْجِدًا
تَصِيرُ بِهِ مَسْجِدًا.
وَأَنَّ الْوَقْفَ عَلَى مُعَيَّنٍ
يُشْتَرَطُ فِيهِ قَبُولُهُ.
وَلَوْ رَدَّ بَطَلَ حَقُّهُ شَرَطْنَا
الْقَبُولَ أَمْ لَا.
وَلَوْ قَالَ وَقَفْت هَذَا سَنَةً فَبَاطِلٌ،
وَلَوْ قَالَ وَقَفْت عَلَى أَوْلَادِي أَوْ عَلَى زَيْدٍ ثُمَّ نَسْلِهِ وَلَمْ
يَزِدْ فَالْأَظْهَرُ صِحَّةُ الْوَقْفِ فَإِذَا انْقَرَضَ الْمَذْكُورُ
فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ يَبْقَى وَقْفًا، وَأَنَّ مَصْرِفَهُ أَقْرَبُ النَّاسِ
إلَى الْوَاقِفِ يَوْمَ انْقِرَاضِ الْمَذْكُورِ.
وَلَوْ كَانَ
الْوَقْفُ مُنْقَطِعَ الْأَوَّلِ كَوَقَفْتُهُ عَلَى مَنْ سَيُولَدُ لِي
فَالْمَذْهَبُ بُطْلَانُهُ.
أَوْ مُنْقَطِعَ الْوَسَطِ كَوَقَفْت
عَلَى أَوْلَادِي ثُمَّ رَجُلٍ ثُمَّ الْفُقَرَاءِ، فَالْمَذْهَبُ
صِحَّتُهُ.
وَلَوْ اقْتَصَرَ عَلَى وَقَفْت فَالْأَظْهَرُ
بُطْلَانُهُ.
وَلَا يَجُوزُ تَعْلِيقُهُ كَقَوْلِهِ إذَا جَاءَ
زَيْدٌ فَقَدْ وَقَفْت.
وَلَوْ وَقَفَ بِشَرْطِ الْخِيَارِ بَطَلَ
عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ إذَا وَقَفَ بِشَرْطِ أَنْ
لَا يُؤَجَّرَ اُتُّبِعَ شَرْطُهُ، وَأَنَّهُ إذَا شَرَطَ فِي وَقْفِ الْمَسْجِدِ
اخْتِصَاصَهُ بِطَائِفَةٍ كَالشَّافِعِيَّةِ اُخْتُصَّ كَالْمَدْرَسَةِ
وَالرِّبَاطِ.
وَلَوْ وَقَفَ عَلَى شَخْصَيْنِ ثُمَّ الْفُقَرَاءِ
فَمَاتَ أَحَدُهُمَا فَالْأَصَحُّ الْمَنْصُوصُ أَنَّ نَصِيبَهُ يُصْرَفُ إلَى
الْآخَرِ.
BOOK 23 .— WAKAF
Section
The
founder must be capable of declaring
his wishes, and must be able
to
dispose of his property at his own
will and pleasure, and the fomidation
must be of such a kind that
perpetual use may be made of it.
Thus it
may not consist of
foodstuffs or odoriferous plants, but with
this excep-
tion, it may be either
movable or immovable, or even such
things as are
capable only of
individual possession, but not a slave or
a coat unless
a particular specified one,
nor one’s own person, fnor a slave
enfranchised
on account of maternity, fnor
a trained dog, fnor one of two slaves
without indicating which. fOn the
other hand the validity of a
foundation is admitted that consists
of buildings and plantations on
another’s
land leased for that object.
A
foundation, whether in favour of a certain
particular person, or
of several
individuals all together, has no legal
effect unless the bene-
ficiaries could
legally become proprietors of the goods
given in endow-
ment. Consequently a foundation
cannot be made in favour of a foetus,
or of a slave by personal reference
to him. A foundation in favour of a
slave with no such express reference
is understood as referring to his
master. A foundation in favour of an
animal is null and void, though,
according to some, it is to
the profit of the master in this
case also, fit
results from the
principle already stated that one may
endow in this
way an infidel subject
of a Moslem prince, but not an
apostate, nor an
infidel who is not
the subject of a Moslem prince, nor
one’s self. A
foundation for an
illicit purpose, such as the construction
of a Christian
church or of a synagogue
is null and void. But it is
perfectly legal,
whether it is made
with a pious object, as in favour of
the poor, of
learned men, of a
mosque or of a school ; for whether
it is made with no
manifestly pious
intention, as when in favour of the
rich.
The intention to endow a
foundation should be expressed in explicit
terms, as, for example, “ I make
such and such a thing a wakaf,” or
“
My field shall be a foundation in
favour of so and so.” ffThc phrases,
“ I consecrate,” or “ I devote to such
and such pious use,” are explicit ;
fas are also, “ I make a sacred gift
of such and such a thing,” or “I
make wakaf,” or it cannot
bo sold or given to another.” On the
other hand, the expression
givo ” without anything else cannot be
considered explicit, even if it was
tho intention to found a wakaf ;
except
when in favour not of one or
many individuals, but of a category
of
persons or of the public, when it
is so regarded. fThe phrases, I
make such and such object a sacred
thing,” or I wish it to remain
for
ever as it is,” are not explicit
; but the expression, “ I destine this land
to become a mosque,” is enough to
make of it a place devoted to
religious worship.
j*A foundation in
favour of a particular person is not
complete unless
lie accepts ; an
acceptance which can in no case
follow upon a previous
refusal. A foundation
expressed in the words, “ I make such
and such
a thing wakaf for a year,”
is null and void ; but if the
words used are,
I make it wakaf
in favour of my children,” or
in favour of so-and-so,
and after
him of his descendants,” and nothing
else, the foundation
remains intact, even
after the extinction of the family.
*The usufruct
then goes to the
nearest relative of the founder, upon
the day of tho
extinction of the
beneficiaries designated by him. Our
school regards
as null and void a
foundation made without designating an original
beneficiary capable of enjoying it
immediately, made e.g . in favour of
the child I shall have.” On the
other hand, it recognises the validity
of a wakaf where one of the
intermediary beneficiaries does not exist,
e.g .
where it is said, make a
wakaf in favour of my children ; and
if I have none, then in favour
of a person not designated, and after that
in favour of the poor.
*Thc
law considers null and void a foundation
that has no object.
Nor can it
be made to depend upon a condition,
as make wakaf,
provided Zaid
comes.” fflt is also annulled by an
option. fAs to
other conditions they
should be faithfully executed, as that
the property
immobilised may not be
leased, or that a mosque should be
specially
destined to a particular rite,
such as that of Shafii. In this
last case
members of the school
mentioned alone have a right of enjoyment,
to
the exclusion of all other
believers ; and this rule applies also
to the
foundation of a school or
hostelry, fin the case of a wakaf in
favour of
two persons, and after
them of the poor, the death of
one causes his
share in the usufruct
to fall to the other, and not
to the poor, who profit
from it
only after the death of both. This
doctrine was defended by
Shafii himself.
فصل [في أحكام الوقف اللفظية]
قَوْلُهُ: وَقَفْت عَلَى
أَوْلَادِي وَأَوْلَادِ أَوْلَادِي- يَقْتَضِي التَّسْوِيَةَ بَيْنَ الْكُلِّ
وَكَذَا لَوْ زَادَ مَا تَنَاسَلُوا أَوْ بَطْنًا بَعْدَ بَطْنٍ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ عَلَى أَوْلَادِي ثُمَّ أَوْلَادِ أَوْلَادِي ثُمَّ أَوْلَادِهِمْ مَا
تَنَاسَلُوا، أَوْ عَلَى أَوْلَادِي وَأَوْلَادِ أَوْلَادِي الْأَعْلَى
فَالْأَعْلَى أَوْ الْأَوَّلِ فَالْأَوَّلِ فَهُوَ لِلتَّرْتِيبِ.
وَلَا
يَدْخُلُ أَوْلَادُ الْأَوْلَادِ فِي الْوَقْفِ عَلَى الْأَوْلَادِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ وَيَدْخُلُ أَوْلَادُ الْبَنَاتِ فِي الْوَقْفِ عَلَى الذُّرِّيَّةِ
وَالنَّسْلِ وَالْعَقِبِ وَأَوْلَادِ الْأَوْلَادِ إلَّا أَنْ يَقُولَ عَلَى مَنْ
يَنْتَسِبُ إلَيَّ مِنْهُمْ.
وَلَوْ وَقَفَ عَلَى مَوَالِيهِ وَلَهُ
مُعْتِقٌ وَمُعْتَقٌ قُسِمَ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَقِيلَ يَبْطُلُ، وَالصِّفَةُ
الْمُتَقَدِّمَةُ عَلَى جُمَلٍ مَعْطُوفَةٍ تُعْتَبَرُ فِي الْكُلِّ كَوَقَفْت
عَلَى مُحْتَاجِي أَوْلَادِي وَأَحْفَادِي وَإِخْوَتِي، وَكَذَا الْمُتَأَخِّرَةُ
عَلَيْهَا، وَالِاسْتِثْنَاءُ إذَا عُطِفَ بِوَاوٍ: كَقَوْلِهِ عَلَى
أَوْلَادِي وَأَحْفَادِي وَإِخْوَتِي الْمُحْتَاجِينَ أَوْ إلَّا أَنْ يَفْسُقَ
بَعْضُهُمْ.
SECTION
A wakaf in
favour of my children and
grandchildren,” results in the
usufruct
being divided equally between all the
children and grandchildren
alive on the
day of the foundation, even though
one may have added
“ who are their
descendants,” or “ generation after generation.”
Where,
on the contrary, one has used
the words, “ in favour of my children,
then of my grandchildren, then of
my great-grandchildren who are their
descendants,” or “ in favour of my
children and my grandchildren, the
one
after the other,” or “ the former
first,” there is successive enjoyment
by
the different generations, and the first
are merely fiduciary bene-
ficiaries. fBesides,
tho grandchildren have on their own
account no
claim upon a wakaf made
in favour of “ children ” only ; but,
on the
other hand, grandchildren born
of tho founder’s daughter are included
in the expressions “ posterity,” “
descent,” “ progeny ” ; or “ grand-
children,”
unless one says “ grandchildren bearing my
name. “ A
wakaf in favour of “
persons between whom and myself there are
relations of patronage,” should be
divided into tAVO equal parts, if the
founder is both client and patron ;
but according to some jurists it is
null and void.
An apposition
preceding several Avords, joined to one
another, refers
to all of them ; for
example, in the phrase, “ I make a Avakaf
in favour of
those Avho are
indigent, my children, my grandchildren
and my brothers ”
— brothers and
grandchildren are here jiroclaimed to be
indigent equally
Avith tho children. It
is the same Avith an apposition that
follows, and
Avith a reservation added to
the principal Avords, provided these Avords
are united by the conjunction “ and
” ; thus, “ I make a Avakaf in favour
of
my children and grandchildren and
brothers, Avho are indigent,” or
“ except
such as may be of notorious misconduct.”
فصل [في أحكام الوقف المعنوية]
الْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّ الْمِلْكَ فِي
رَقَبَةِ الْمَوْقُوفِ يَنْتَقِلُ إلَى اللَّهِ تَعَالَى، أَيْ يَنْفَكُّ عَنْ
اخْتِصَاصِ الْآدَمِيِّ، فَلَا يَكُونُ لِلْوَاقِفِ وَلَا لِلْمَوْقُوفِ
عَلَيْهِ.
وَمَنَافِعُهُ مِلْكٌ لِلْمَوْقُوفِ عَلَيْهِ
يَسْتَوْفِيهَا بِنَفْسِهِ وَبِغَيْرِهِ بِإِعَارَةٍ وَإِجَارَةٍ، وَيَمْلِكُ
الْأُجْرَةَ وَفَوَائِدُهُ كَثَمَرَةٍ وَصُوفٍ وَلَبَنٍ، وَكَذَا الْوَلَدُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَالثَّانِي يَكُونُ وَقْفًا وَلَوْ مَاتَتْ الْبَهِيمَةُ اخْتَصَّ
بِجِلْدِهَا وَلَهُ مَهْرُ الْجَارِيَةِ إذَا وُطِئَتْ بِشُبْهَةٍ أَوْ نِكَاحٍ
إنْ صَحَّحْنَاهُ وَهُوَ الْأَصَحُّ.
وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ لَا
يَمْلِكُ قِيمَةَ الْعَبْدِ الْمَوْقُوفِ إذَا أُتْلِفَ بَلْ يُشْتَرَى بِهَا
عَبْدٌ لِيَكُونَ وَقْفًا مَكَانَهُ، فَإِنْ تَعَذَّرَ فَبَعْضُ عَبْدٍ.
وَلَوْ
جَفَّتْ الشَّجَرَةُ لَمْ يَنْقَطِعْ الْوَقْفُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، بَلْ
يُنْتَفَعُ بِهَا جِذْعًا، وَقِيلَ تُبَاعُ، وَالثَّمَنُ كَقِيمَةِ
الْعَبْدِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ جَوَازُ بَيْعِ حُصْرِ الْمَسْجِدِ إذَا
بَلِيَتْ وَجُذُوعِهِ إذَا انْكَسَرَتْ وَلَمْ تَصْلُحْ إلَّا
لِلْإِحْرَاقِ.
وَلَوْ انْهَدَمَ مَسْجِدٌ وَتَعَذَّرَتْ إعَادَتُهُ
لَمْ يُبَعْ بِحَالٍ.
Section
*The OAvnership of the
thing immobilised is transferred to God ;
which means that such object ceases,
for men, to bo subject to the right
of private property, and that it
henceforth belongs neither to the founder
nor to the beneficiary. To the
latter belongs the usufruct alone ; and
he may enjoy it, either personally,
or by an intermediary, e.g. by lending
him tho object immobilised, or by
hiring it out to him. The beneficiary
of a Avakaf is ipso facto the
proprietor of Avhat is obtained from a
lease
of the foundation, or of Avhat
it produces, as fruit, Avool, and
milk, f with-
out forgetting slave-born children
and the young of animals : though
according to another theory these
various offshoots become themselves
Avakaf,
by virtue of the right of increase.
After the death of a dedicated
animal,
tho skin belongs to the beneficiary.
Similarly, he becomes
proprietor of the
doAver paid for a female slave Avith
Avhom a third party
has cohabited, either
by error, or by right of marriage,
fat least Avhere it
is admitted that
a dedicated slave can legally be married.
On the other
hand, according to our
school, the indemnity due by the
murderer of
a dedicated slave does not
belong to the beneficiary, who should
employ
the money in purchasing another
slave, who then becomes dedicated
ipso
facto in the place of the slave
killed ; or, if this be impossible, he
should at least employ the money
in acquiring an undivided share in a
slave.
The dedication of a tree
is not, according to our school,
terminated
by the death of the tree
; for this does not prevent the
continued use of
the wood ; though
according to some authorities, the tree
should in
this case be put up
to auction, and the proceeds employed
in the same
way as the indemnity
due for a slave killed. fThe old
mats and broken
beams of a mosque
may be sold, but only to be
used as firewood. The
ground of a
mosque can in no case be sold,
even though the building
may have
fallen into ruin, and though it be
impossible to reconstruct it.
فصل [في بيان النظر على الوقف وشرطه ووظيفة الناظر]
إنْ شَرَطَ
الْوَاقِفُ النَّظَرَ لِنَفْسِهِ أَوْ غَيْرِهِ اُتُّبِعَ، وَإِلَّا فَالنَّظَرُ
لِلْقَاضِي عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَشَرْطُ النَّاظِرِ الْعَدَالَةُ
وَالْكِفَايَةُ، وَالِاهْتِدَاءُ إلَى التَّصَرُّفِ.
وَوَظِيفَتُهُ
الْعِمَارَةُ وَالْإِجَارَةُ وَتَحْصِيلُ الْغَلَّةِ وَقِسْمَتُهَا فَإِنْ
فَوَّضَ إلَيْهِ بَعْضَ هَذِهِ الْأُمُورِ لَمْ يَتَعَدَّهُ.
وَلِلْوَاقِفِ
عَزْلُ مَنْ وَلَّاهُ، وَنَصْبُ غَيْرِهِ.
إلَّا أَنْ يَشْرِطَ
نَظَرَهُ حَالَ الْوَقْفِ.
وَإِذَا أَجَّرَ النَّاظِرُ فَزَادَتْ
الْأُجْرَةُ فِي الْمُدَّةِ أَوْ ظَهَرَ طَالِبٌ بِالزِّيَادَةِ لَمْ يَنْفَسِخْ
الْعَقْدُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
Section
Where the founder has
reserved to himself the administration of
the
wakaf, or where he has conferred
this duty upon another person, that
disposition must be adhered to ; but
if the founder has made no stipula-
tion with regard to this, the
administration must, according to our school,
be intrusted to the court. The
administrator of a wakaf must be a man
of irreproachable character, fit for
his duties physically and mentally.
The
functions of an administrator consist in
keeping up and leasing the
property
immobilised, and in the collection and
distribution of the
revenues. If the
administration has only been partly
conferred upon
him, he is forbidden
to exceed the limits of his
authority. In all cases
the founder
has the right to dismiss his
administrator and appoint
another, unless
the administrator has been appointed in
the deed of
foundation itself, f A lease,
effected by an administrator, remains good
in spite of a rise in price,
or the fact that another person
offers more
advantageous conditions.
كتاب الْهِبَةِ
BOOK . — GIFTS
التَّمْلِيكُ بِلَا عِوَضٍ هِبَةٌ فَإِنْ مَلَّكَ مُحْتَاجًا لِثَوَابِ
الْآخِرَةِ فَصَدَقَةٌ، فَإِنْ نَقَلَهُ إلَى مَكَانِ الْمَوْهُوبِ لَهُ
إكْرَامًا لَهُ فَهَدِيَّةٌ.
وَشَرْطُ الْهِبَةِ إيجَابٌ وَقَبُولٌ
لَفْظًا.
وَلَا يُشْتَرَطَانِ فِي الْهَدِيَّةِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ،
بَلْ يَكْفِي الْبَعْثُ مِنْ هَذَا وَالْقَبْضُ مِنْ ذَاكَ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ أَعَمَرْتُك هَذِهِ الدَّارَ فَإِذَا مِتَّ فَهِيَ لِوَرَثَتِك فَهِيَ
هِبَةٌ، وَلَوْ اقْتَصَرَ عَلَى أَعَمَرْتُك فَكَذَا فِي الْجَدِيدِ، وَلَوْ
قَالَ فَإِذَا مِتُّ عَادَتْ إلَيَّ فَكَذَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ قَالَ:
أَرْقَبْتُكَ أَوْ جَعَلْتُهَا لَك رُقْبَى: أَيْ إنْ مِتَّ قَبْلِي عَادَتْ
إلَيَّ، وَإِنْ مِتُّ قَبْلَك اسْتَقَرَّتْ لَك فَالْمَذْهَبُ طَرْدُ
الْقَوْلَيْنِ الْجَدِيدِ وَالْقَدِيمِ.
وَمَا جَازَ بَيْعُهُ جَازَ
هِبَتُهُ، وَمَا لَا كَمَجْهُولٍ وَمَغْصُوبٍ وَضَالٍّ فَلَا إلَّا حَبَّتَيْ
حِنْطَةٍ وَنَحْوِهِمَا.
وَهِبَةُ الدَّيْنِ لِلْمَدِينِ إبْرَاءٌ
وَلِغَيْرِهِ بَاطِلَةٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا يُمْلَكُ مَوْهُوبٌ
إلَّا بِقَبْضٍ بِإِذْنِ الْوَاهِبِ.
فَلَوْ مَاتَ أَحَدُهُمَا
بَيْنَ الْهِبَةِ وَالْقَبْضِ قَامَ وَارِثُهُ مَقَامَهُ، وَقِيلَ يَنْفَسِخُ
الْعَقْدُ.
وَيُسَنُّ لِلْوَالِدِ الْعَدْلُ فِي عَطِيَّةِ
أَوْلَادِهِ بِأَنْ يُسَوِّيَ بَيْنَ الذَّكَرِ وَالْأُنْثَى وَقِيلَ كَقِسْمَةِ
الْإِرْثِ.
وَلِلْأَبِ الرُّجُوعُ فِي هِبَةِ وَلَدِهِ وَكَذَا
لِسَائِرِ الْأُصُولِ عَلَى الْمَشْهُورِ.
وَشَرْطُ رُجُوعِهِ
بَقَاءُ الْمَوْهُوبِ فِي سَلْطَنَةِ الْمُتَّهَبِ فَيَمْتَنِعُ بِبَيْعِهِ
وَوَقْفِهِ، لَا بِرَهْنِهِ وَهِبَتِهِ قَبْلَ الْقَبْضِ وَتَعْلِيقِ عِتْقِهِ
وَتَزْوِيجِهَا وَزِرَاعَتِهَا، وَكَذَا الْإِجَارَةُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ
زَالَ مِلْكُهُ وَعَادَ لَمْ يَرْجِعْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ زَادَ
رَجَعَ فِيهِ بِزِيَادَتِهِ الْمُتَّصِلَةِ لَا الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ.
وَيَحْصُلُ
الرُّجُوعُ بِرَجَعْت فِيمَا وَهَبْتُ أَوْ اسْتَرْجَعْتُهُ أَوْ رَدَدْتُهُ إلَى
مِلْكِي أَوْ نَقَضْتُ الْهِبَةَ.
لَا بِبَيْعِهِ وَوَقْفِهِ
وَهِبَتِهِ وَإِعْتَاقِهِ وَوَطْئِهَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا
رُجُوعَ لِغَيْرِ الْأُصُولِ فِي هِبَةٍ مُقَيَّدَةٍ بِنَفْيِ الثَّوَابِ.
وَمَتَى
وَهَبَ مُطْلَقًا فَلَا ثَوَابَ إنْ وَهَبَ لِدُونِهِ، وَكَذَا لِأَعْلَى مِنْهُ
فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلِنَظِيرِهِ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، فَإِنْ وَجَبَ فَهُوَ قِيمَةُ
الْمَوْهُوبِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
فَإِنْ لَمْ يُثِبْهُ فَلَهُ
الرُّجُوعُ، وَلَوْ وَهَبَ بِشَرْطِ ثَوَابٍ مَعْلُومٍ فَالْأَظْهَرُ صِحَّةُ
الْعَقْدِ، وَيَكُونُ بَيْعًا عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، أَوْ مَجْهُولٍ فَالْمَذْهَبُ
بُطْلَانُهُ.
وَلَوْ بَعَثَ هَدِيَّةً فِي ظَرْفٍ فَإِنْ لَمْ
تَجْرِ الْعَادَةُ بِرَدِّهِ كَقَوْصَرَّةِ تَمْرٍ فَهُوَ هَدِيَّةٌ أَيْضًا،
وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَيَحْرُمُ اسْتِعْمَالُهُ إلَّا فِي أَكْلِ الْهَدِيَّةِ مِنْهُ
إنْ اقْتَضَتْهُ الْعَادَةُ.
BOOK . — GIFTS
A gift is a
gratuitous transfer of property. When such
transfer is made
with the intention
of obtaining a recompense in the other
world, it is an
alms ; ffwhen the
gift is brought to the donee to
manifest one’s respect
for him, it
is a present. It is an essential
condition for the validity of a
gift
properly so-called that offer and
acceptance be made in explicit
terms ;
but in the case of a present neither
offer nor acceptance are
strictly
necessary ; it is enough that the
object is brought by the donor
and
taken possession of by the donee. By
saying to some one, “ I want
you to
live in this house of mine, and
that it shall pass to your heirs
after
your death, one makes a gift,
as also by merely saying, “ I want
you to
inhabit it, at least
according to the doctrine adopted by
Shafii in his
second period, or by
saying, “ After your death it will
return to me.
Shafii in his first
period expressed an opinion different from
that adopted
in his second as to
the validity of a gift made in the
following terms, “ I
grant you a life
interest in this house, or “ I make
you a gift of it for
life ;
that is, if you predecease me it
will return to me, but otherwise
it
will be yours irrevocably. Nowadays,
however, in our school, both
of the
imam’s opinions have equal currency.
Anything that may be sold may
be given ; anything that may not
be
sold, as an unknown or usurped
thing, or an escaped animal, cannot
be the subject of a gift. But
in the case of things of very
little value,
such as two grains of
corn, etc., a gift is permissible but
not a sale.
The gift of a debt due
to one, implies the remission of the
debt, if made
to the debtor ; fto
any third person it is null and
void.
As io the ownership of
the thing given, this is transferred
only upon
the donee taking possession
with the consent of the donor, or
if one of
the parties dies between
the giving and the taking possession,
by the
agreement of the hens. Some
jurists, however, consider that under
these circumstances the gift is ipso
facto revoked.
A practice has been
introduced by the Sonna, by which parents,
at any rate when not of
notorious misconduct, may by gift inter
vivos
distribute their property equally
amongst their children, without
distinction
of sex ; others, however, maintain that
the provisions of
the law of the
distribution of property upon succession
cannot be set
aside in this way.
A father **or any ancestor may
revoke a gift made in favour of a
child or other descendant, provided
that the donee has not irrevocably
disposed of the thing received, e.g.
by selling or dedicating it. Revoca-
tion
is not prevented by a disposition leaving
the right of ownership
intact, such
as pledging or gift, at any rate
as long as neither have been
followed by possession, conditional
enfranchisement, giving in marriage
a female
slave, cultivation of a field, or even,
according to our school,
a contract of
hiring. In a case where the donee
first loses the ownership
of the
thing and afterwards recovers it, f the
right of revocation does not
revive ;
and where, in the meanwhile, the
thing given increases, the
revocation
applies only to that part of the
increase which is incorporated
with the
thing itself, not that which has a
separate existence. A
revocation is made
in the following words : — “ I revoke my
gift,” or
“ I claim back the object,”
or “ I wish the thing to become my
pro-
perty again,” or “ I wish to put
an end to my donation ” ; but it
cannot
be effected by mere implication,
by ulterior dispositions affecting the
thing given, such as sale,
immobilisation, gift to another person, en-
franchisement for cohabitation.
In the
case of a gift by which it lias
been expressly stipulated that
there is
to be no remuneration, a right of
revocation belongs only to
ancestors ;
while a gift with regard to which no
stipulation has been
made about the
matter is considered to have been
made without any
prospect of remuneration,
if the donee is in any respect
inferior in social
position to the
donor, and even if he is superior.
Our school goes even
further ; it
accepts the same principle in the
case of a gift between two
persons
of equal position. Where a remuneration is
obligatory, but
none has been specified,
fit consists in the value of the
thing given ;
and the donor has
in these circumstances the right to
revoke the gift,
if the donee
forgets the remuneration. *A donation is
admitted as
valid when made with the
reservation of a known remuneration ; f fa
donation which must, however, be
considered as a sale ; but, according
to
our school a gift made on the
express condition of an unknown
remuneration, is null and void.
In the case of a present made
to some one, the receptacle is con-
sidered to be part of the present,
and, if such is the custom, need
not be
restored, as one does not
return tho basket that has contained
dates.
Otherwise the receptacle remains
with the donor, and tho donee can
only use it as, for example, a
plate for the food given, provided ahvays
custom admits of this.
كتاب اللُّقَطَةِ
BOOK . — THINGS FOUND
يُسْتَحَبُّ الِالْتِقَاطُ لِوَاثِقٍ بِأَمَانَةِ نَفْسِهِ، وَقِيلَ يَجِبُ،
وَلَا يُسْتَحَبُّ لِغَيْرِ وَاثِقٍ، وَيَجُوزُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيُكْرَهُ
لِفَاسِقٍ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَجِبُ الْإِشْهَادُ عَلَى
الِالْتِقَاطِ.
وَأَنَّهُ يَصِحُّ الْتِقَاطُ الْفَاسِقِ
وَالصَّبِيِّ وَالذِّمِّيِّ فِي دَارِ الْإِسْلَامِ، ثُمَّ الْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ
يُنْزَعُ مِنْ الْفَاسِقِ وَيُوضَعُ عِنْدَ عَدْلٍ، وَأَنَّهُ لَا يُعْتَمَدُ
تَعْرِيفُهُ، بَلْ يُضَمُّ إلَيْهِ رَقِيبٌ، وَيَنْزِعُ الْوَلِيُّ لُقَطَةَ
الصَّبِيِّ وَيُعَرِّفُ وَيَتَمَلَّكُهَا لِلصَّبِيِّ إنْ رَأَى ذَلِكَ حَيْثُ
يَجُوزُ الِاقْتِرَاضُ لَهُ، وَيَضْمَنُ الْوَلِيُّ إنْ قَصَّرَ فِي انْتِزَاعِهِ
حَتَّى تَلِفَ فِي يَدِ الصَّبِيِّ.
وَالْأَظْهَرُ بُطْلَانُ
الْتِقَاطِ الْعَبْدِ وَلَا يُعْتَدُّ بِتَعْرِيفِهِ فَلَوْ أَخَذَهُ سَيِّدُهُ
مِنْهُ كَانَ الْتِقَاطًا.
قُلْتُ: الْمَذْهَبُ صِحَّةُ
الْتِقَاطِ الْمُكَاتَبِ كِتَابَةً صَحِيحَةً.
وَمَنْ بَعْضُهُ
حُرٌّ، وَهِيَ لَهُ وَلِسَيِّدِهِ، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ مُهَايَأَةً فَلِصَاحِبِ
النَّوْبَةِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَكَذَا حُكْمُ سَائِرِ النَّادِرِ مِنْ
الْأَكْسَابِ وَالْمُؤَنِ إلَّا أَرْشَ الْجِنَايَةِ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
BOOK . — THINGS FOUND
Section
It
is commendable to pick up what one
finds, if one thinks one can keep
it in safety. Some authorities even
maintain this to be obligatory. If
one has reason to doubt if one
can keep a thing safely, the law neither
recommends the above course, fnor
does it forbid it, except for a person
of notorious misconduct, in which
case it is blamable. According to our
school one is not obliged, on
finding something, to call witnesses to
see
it ; and, strictly speaking, a person
of notorious misconduct, a minor,
or an
infidel subject of a Moslem prince, can
pick a thing up in case of
necessity. *But it should be removed
from the possession of a person
of
notorious misconduct and deposited with
one of irreproachable
character ; and one
should never rely upon a person of
notorious mis-
conduct for announcing the
discovery to the public, even if the
object
found be left in his
possession, which is permissible if the
person in
question is watched by
another. As to a minor it is his
guardian who
should take from him
the thing found, make the public
announcement,
and appropriate it for his
pupil, if ho considers it proper for
him to
undertake the resulting
obligations, i.e. in a case where it
would be other-
wise permissible for him
to borrow money on his behalf. The
guardian
is responsible for a thing found
which he has omitted to take from
his
pupil’s possession, and which has
been accidentally lost. *If a slave
has
picked anything up his action is
null and an announcement made
by him
is void. On the other hand, his
master who takes the thing from
him
is regarded as the person who has
found it and picked it up.
[According to our school a slave
who is undergoing enfranchisement
by
contract can pick up a thing found,
with all the legal consequences,
provided
that the contract cannot be legally
invalidated in any respect.
In the
case of a person who is partially
free, the fact of having found
something affects both him and his
master ; *and if he has only to
serve
his master once in two or
three days, the object is considered
as having
been found by him or
by the master in accordance with
whether it was
or was not a free
day. This last principle is also
applicable to all acci-
dental benefices
or expenses, with the single exception
of an indemnity
due for a crime
which affects solely the person himself
who is partially
enfranchised.]
فصل [في بيان لقط الحيوان وغيره وتعريفها]
الْحَيَوَانُ
الْمَمْلُوكُ الْمُمْتَنِعُ مِنْ صِغَارِ السِّبَاعِ بِقُوَّةٍ؛ كَبَعِيرٍ
وَفَرَسٍ أَوْ بِعَدْوٍ كَأَرْنَبٍ وَظَبْيٍ، أَوْ طَيَرَانٍ كَحَمَامٍ إنْ
وُجِدَ بِمَفَازَةٍ فَلِلْقَاضِي الْتِقَاطُهُ لِلْحِفْظِ وَكَذَا لِغَيْرِهِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ، وَيَحْرُمُ الْتِقَاطُهُ لِتَمَلُّكٍ، وَإِنْ وُجِدَ بِقَرْيَةٍ
فَالْأَصَحُّ جَوَازُ الْتِقَاطِهِ لِلتَّمَلُّكِ، وَمَا لَا يَمْتَنِعُ مِنْهَا
كَشَاةٍ يَجُوزُ الْتِقَاطُهُ لِلتَّمَلُّكِ فِي الْقَرْيَةِ وَالْمَفَازَةِ،
وَيَتَخَيَّرُ آخِذُهُ مِنْ مَفَازَةٍ فَإِنْ شَاءَ عَرَّفَهُ وَتَمَلَّكَهُ أَوْ
بَاعَهُ وَحَفِظَ ثَمَنَهُ وَعَرَّفَهَا ثُمَّ تَمَلَّكَهُ أَوْ أَكَلَهُ
وَغَرِمَ قِيمَتَهُ إنْ ظَهَرَ مَالِكُهُ، فَإِنْ أَخَذَ مِنْ الْعُمْرَانِ
فَلَهُ الْخَصْلَتَانِ الْأُولَيَانِ لَا الثَّالِثَةُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيَجُوزُ
أَنْ يَلْتَقِطَ عَبْدًا لَا يُمَيِّزُ.
وَيَلْتَقِطَ غَيْرَ
الْحَيَوَانِ فَإِنْ كَانَ يَسْرُعُ فَسَادُهُ كَهَرِيسَةٍ فَإِنْ شَاءَ بَاعَهُ
وَعَرَّفَهُ لِيَتَمَلَّكَ ثَمَنَهُ وَإِنْ شَاءَ تَمَلَّكَهُ فِي الْحَالِ
وَأَكَلَهُ، وَقِيلَ إنْ وَجَدَهُ فِي عُمْرَانٍ وَجَبَ الْبَيْعُ، وَإِنْ
أَمْكَنَ بَقَاؤُهُ بِعِلَاجٍ كَرُطَبٍ يَتَجَفَّفُ فَإِنْ كَانَتْ الْغِبْطَةُ
فِي بَيْعِهِ بِيعَ، أَوْ فِي تَجْفِيفِهِ وَتَبَرَّعَ بِهِ الْوَاجِدُ
جَفَّفَهُ، وَإِلَّا بِيعَ بَعْضُهُ لِتَجْفِيفِ الْبَاقِي.
وَمَنْ
أَخَذَ لُقَطَةً لِلْحِفْظِ أَبَدًا فَهِيَ أَمَانَةٌ، فَإِنْ دَفَعَهَا إلَى
الْقَاضِي لَزِمَهُ الْقَبُولُ وَلَمْ يُوجِبْ الْأَكْثَرُونَ التَّعْرِيفَ،
وَالْحَالَةُ هَذِهِ، فَلَوْ قَصَدَ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ خِيَانَةً لَمْ يَصِرْ
ضَامِنًا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ أَخَذَ بِقَصْدِ الْخِيَانَةِ فَضَامِنٌ،
وَلَيْسَ لَهُ بَعْدَهُ أَنْ يُعَرِّفَ وَيَتَمَلَّكَ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَإِنْ
أَخَذَ لِيُعَرِّفَ وَيَتَمَلَّكَ فَأَمَانَةٌ مُدَّةَ التَّعْرِيفِ، وَكَذَا
بَعْدَهَا مَا لَمْ يَخْتَرْ التَّمَلُّكَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَعْرِفُ
جِنْسَهَا وَصِفَتَهَا وَقَدْرَهَا وَعِفَاصَهَا وَوِكَاءَهَا ثُمَّ يُعَرِّفُهَا
فِي الْأَسْوَاقِ وَأَبْوَابِ الْمَسَاجِدِ وَنَحْوِهَا سَنَةً عَلَى الْعَادَةِ
يُعَرِّفُ أَوَّلاً كُلَّ يَوْمٍ طَرَفَيْ النَّهَارِ ثُمَّ كُلَّ يَوْمٍ مَرَّةً
ثُمَّ كُلَّ أُسْبُوعٍ ثُمَّ كُلَّ شَهْرٍ، وَلَا تَكْفِي سَنَةٌ مُتَفَرِّقَةٌ
فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْتُ: الْأَصَحُّ تَكْفِي، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
فصل [في تعريف اللقطة]
وَيَذْكُرُ بَعْضَ أَوْصَافِهَا، وَلَا
يَلْزَمُهُ مُؤْنَةُ التَّعْرِيفِ إنْ أَخَذَ لِحِفْظٍ، بَلْ يُرَتِّبُهَا
الْقَاضِي مِنْ بَيْتِ الْمَالِ أَوْ يَقْتَرِضُ عَلَى الْمَالِكِ.
وَإِنْ
أَخَذَ لِتَمَلُّكٍ لَزِمَتْهُ، وَقِيلَ إنْ لَمْ يَتَمَلَّكْ فَعَلَى
الْمَالِكِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ الْحَقِيرَ لَا يُعَرَّفُ سَنَةً
بَلْ زَمَنًا يُظَنُّ أَنَّ فَاقِدَهُ يُعْرِضُ عَنْهُ غَالِبًا.
Section
Domestic animals that
have nothing to fear from small
carnivores,
either in consequence of their
strength, as in the case of the
horse or the
camel, or of their
fleetnoss, as with the hare and the
gazelle, or because
they can fly,
like the pigeon, can only be seized
in a desert place with
the intention
of keeping them. This seizure can be
effected as well by
the court fas
by any other person. Such animals
when found in such
a place cannot be
seized in order to be appropriated ;
fbut it is quite
lawful to seize
them with this intention when straying
in a village.
Domestic animals such as
ordinarily become the prey of small
carnivores
— sheep, for example — can bo
seized and appropriated wherever found ;
and a person who seizes them in a
desert place can at his choice —
. Make a public announcement, and
at once appropriate them.
. Sell
them, keep the price and appropriate
it after making a public
announcement.
. Kill them and eat the meat ;
acts, however, by which one engages
to pay the value to the owner
upon his presenting himself.
Where,
on the contrary, the animals in
question are found in an
inhabited
place, the choice lies between the
first two of these courses,
fto the
exclusion of the third. One may also
seize a young slave who
has not yet
reached the age of discernment.
As
to inanimate things found, if they
are liable to rapid deterioration,
like
the paste called harisa, one may
either sell them and appropriate
the
price after making the required public
announcement, or take them
at once
and eat them. Others, however, maintain
that sale is obligatory
for a person
who finds things of this sort
forgotten in an inhabited place.
Where,
on the other hand, it is a question
of things that can be preserved
after manipulation, such as fresh
dates that can be dried, one has the
right either to sell them or
to dry them, whichever course is rendered
most advantageous by circumstances ; if,
at any rate, after finding
them, one
is willing to undertake their manipulation
gratuitously.
Otherwise the finder can
sell a part to defray the cost of
manipulation.
A thing picked up with
the sole object of keeping it and
returning
it to the owner becomes a
deposit, which one can get rid of
at any
moment by consigning it to
the care of the court, which must
accept it.
According to the majority
of jurists a public announcement is not
obligatory in these circumstances.
Bad faith supervening after picking
up a thing ^involves no
responsibility,
which arises only from bad faith at
the moment of doing
so. Such bad
faith it is, according to our
school, that prevents a public
announcement
in order to appropriate the thing
subsequently.
Whoever picks a thing up
intending to announce it, and appropriate
it if the owner does not
present himself, keeps the thing as a
deposit,
as long as the public
announcement lasts, fand even until he
declares
his intention to appropriate it.
One should first examine the nature,
quality, quantity, wrappings and
fastenings of the thing found, and
then announce it in the markets,
at the doors of the mosques, etc.,
for a
whole day and according to
custom. This notification should be re-
peated twice a day, ix. morning and
afternoon, then once a day, then
once a
week, and lastly once a month, fwithout
interruption for the
whole year that
is prescribed for notifications. [fAn
interruption in
the year prescribed for
notifications does not render them absolutely
illegal.] In the notification it is
only necessary to give a superficial
description of the thing found. The
expense of the notification does
not
fall upon the finder, who picks a
thing up merely in order to keep it
and give it to the owner. The
court should in such a case defray the
expense, either from the public
treasury, or by borrowing in the owner’s
name. The expense should, on the
other hand, be borne by the finder
if he picks a thing up in
order to appropriate it ; though, according to
some authors, the owner should
recoup him in all cases where the
appropriation for some reason or
other did not take place, f A thing of
small value need not be announced
for a whole year ; it is enough if
the
notification lasts long enough to
give reason to suppose that the loser
has renounced his claim.
فصل [في تملك اللقطة وغرمها وما يتبعها]
إذَا عَرَّفَ سَنَةً لَمْ
يَمْلِكْهَا حَتَّى يَخْتَارَهُ بِلَفْظٍ كَتَمَلَّكْت، وَقِيلَ تَكْفِي
النِّيَّةُ، وَقِيلَ يَمْلِكُ بِمُضِيِّ السَّنَةِ فَإِنْ تَمَلَّكَ فَظَهَرَ
الْمَالِكُ وَاتَّفَقَا عَلَى رَدِّ عَيْنِهَا فَذَاكَ، وَإِنْ أَرَادَهَا
الْمَالِكُ وَأَرَادَ الْمُلْتَقِطُ الْعُدُولَ إلَى بَدَلِهَا أُجِيبَ
الْمَالِكُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِنْ تَلِفَتْ غَرِمَ مِثْلَهَا أَوْ
قِيمَتَهَا يَوْمَ التَّمَلُّكِ، وَإِنْ نَقَصَتْ بِعَيْبٍ فَلَهُ أَخْذُهَا مَعَ
الْأَرْشِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِذَا ادَّعَاهَا رَجُلٌ وَلَمْ
يَصِفْهَا وَلَا بَيِّنَةَ لَمْ تُدْفَعْ إلَيْهِ، وَإِنْ وَصَفَهَا وَظَنَّ
صِدْقَهُ جَازَ الدَّفْعُ إلَيْهِ وَلَا يَجِبُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، فَإِنْ دَفَعَ
فَأَقَامَ آخَرُ بَيِّنَةً بِهَا حُوِّلَتْ إلَيْهِ، فَإِنْ تَلِفَتْ عِنْدَهُ
فَلِصَاحِبِ الْبَيِّنَةِ تَضْمِينُ الْمُلْتَقِطِ، وَالْمَدْفُوعِ إلَيْهِ،
وَالْقَرَارُ عَلَيْهِ.
قُلْت: لَا تَحِلُّ لُقَطَةُ الْحَرَمِ
لِلتَّمَلُّكِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَيَجِبُ تَعْرِيفُهَا قَطْعًا، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
Section
A person who has
notified the finding of a thing for a
whole year, is
not ipso facto its
owner ; he must also express his
intention to appropriate
it, in words
such as, “ I appropriate it.” According to
some, however,
the intention alone is
enough ; while according to others appropriation
takes place ipso facto upon the
expiry of the required year. .In any
case appropriation is merely temporary ;
for if the original owner
presents
himself he can exercise his rights,
under the following
circumstances : —
. The thing found should be
returned him in kind, if the two
interested parties are agreed about it ;
for if the owner insists upon
such
restitution, even though the finder may
prefer to replace the thing
found by
something similar.
. When the thing
found has been accidentally lost, the
finder should
replace it by another
similar object, or pay the value it
had on the day
he appropriated it.
. Where the thing has
deteriorated in the meantime, fthe finder
should restore it to the owner
in the state in which he found
it, and also
pay damage.
If
some one presents himself and claims a
thing found, but can neither
give a
description of it, nor prove he is
the owner, the person who has
found
it has no right to give it
him. If some one comes and is
able to
give a description of the
object but no other proof that ho
is the owner,
the finder may give
it him if he believes him to
be speaking the truth ;
but,
according to our school, restitution is
never obligatory in such a
case.
Where restitution is made on the
sole ground that the claimant
gave a
description of the thing, and the
real owner comes later and proves
his claim, the person to whom
the thing was given may be called as
surety. If in the meanwhile the
thing has been destroyed in possession
of the person who wrongly
represented himself as the owner, the real
owner may proceed either against the
finder or against the person to
whom
ho gave the object found ; though
the former may always recover
from
the latter what he has been obliged
to pay the owner.
[ftObjects found
upon the sacred territory of Mecca,
cannot be
appropriated ; but this does
not affect the obligation to make a public
announcement of their finding.]
كتاب اللَّقِيطِ
BOOK FOUNDLINGS (LAQIT)
الْتِقَاطُ الْمَنْبُوذِ فَرْضُ كِفَايَةٍ، وَيَجِبُ الْإِشْهَادُ عَلَيْهِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ وَإِنَّمَا تَثْبُتُ وِلَايَةُ الِالْتِقَاطِ لِمُكَلَّفٍ حُرٍّ
مُسْلِمٍ عَدْلٍ رَشِيدٍ.
وَلَوْ الْتَقَطَ عَبْدٌ بِغَيْرِ إذْنِ
سَيِّدِهِ اُنْتُزِعَ مِنْهُ، فَإِنْ عَلِمَهُ فَأَقَرَّهُ عِنْدَهُ أَوْ
الْتَقَطَ بِإِذْنِهِ فَالسَّيِّدُ الْمُلْتَقِطُ.
وَلَوْ الْتَقَطَ
صَبِيٌّ أَوْ فَاسِقٌ أَوْ مَحْجُورٌ عَلَيْهِ أَوْ كَافِرٌ مُسْلِمًا اُنْتُزِعَ
مِنْهُ.
وَلَوْ ازْدَحَمَ اثْنَانِ عَلَى أَخْذِهِ جَعَلَهُ
الْحَاكِمُ عِنْدَ مَنْ يَرَاهُ مِنْهُمَا أَوْ مِنْ غَيْرِهِمَا، وَإِنْ سَبَقَ
وَاحِدٌ فَالْتَقَطَهُ مُنِعَ الْآخَرُ مِنْ مُزَاحَمَتِهِ، وَإِنْ الْتَقَطَاهُ
مَعًا وَهُمَا أَهْلٌ، فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ يُقَدَّمُ غَنِيٌّ عَلَى فَقِيرٍ
وَعَدْلٌ عَلَى مَسْتُورٍ.
فَإِنْ اسْتَوَيَا أُقْرِعَ.
وَإِذَا
وَجَدَ بَلَدِيٌّ لَقِيطًا بِبَلَدٍ فَلَيْسَ لَهُ نَقْلُهُ إلَى بَادِيَةٍ،
وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ لَهُ نَقْلَهُ إلَى بَلَدٍ آخَرَ.
وَأَنَّ
لِلْغَرِيبِ إذَا الْتَقَطَ بِبَلَدٍ أَنْ يَنْقُلَهُ إلَى بَلَدِهِ، وَإِنْ
وَجَدَهُ بِبَادِيَةٍ فَلَهُ نَقْلُهُ إلَى بَلَدٍ.
وَإِنْ وَجَدَهُ
بَدَوِيٌّ بِبَلَدٍ فَكَالْحَضَرِيِّ أَوْ بِبَادِيَةٍ أُقِرَّ بِيَدِهِ، وَقِيلَ
إنْ كَانُوا يَنْتَقِلُونَ لِلنُّجْعَةِ لَمْ يُقَرَّ.
وَنَفَقَتُهُ
فِي مَالِهِ الْعَامِّ كَوَقْفٍ عَلَى اللُّقَطَاءِ، أَوْ الْخَاصِّ وَهُوَ مَا
اخْتَصَّ بِهِ كَثِيَابٍ مَلْفُوفَةٍ عَلَيْهِ وَمَفْرُوشَةٍ تَحْتَهُ وَمَا فِي
جَيْبِهِ مِنْ دَرَاهِمَ وَغَيْرِهَا وَمَهْدِهِ وَدَنَانِيرَ مَنْثُورَةٍ
فَوْقَهُ وَتَحْتَهُ.
وَإِنْ وُجِدَ فِي دَارٍ فَهِيَ لَهُ،
وَلَيْسَ لَهُ مَالٌ مَدْفُونٌ تَحْتَهُ وَكَذَا ثِيَابٌ وَأَمْتِعَةٌ
مَوْضُوعَةٌ بِقُرْبِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يُعْرَفْ لَهُ مَالٌ
فَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ يُنْفَقُ عَلَيْهِ مِنْ بَيْتِ الْمَالِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ
يَكُنْ قَامَ الْمُسْلِمُونَ بِكِفَايَتِهِ قَرْضًا، وَفِي قَوْلٍ نَفَقَةً.
وَلِلْمُلْتَقِطِ
الِاسْتِقْلَالُ بِحِفْظِ مَالِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَا يُنْفِقُ عَلَيْهِ مِنْهُ
إلَّا بِإِذْنِ الْقَاضِي قَطْعًا.
Section
Children that have
been abandoned must not be left to
their fate ;
this is an obligation
for which the Moslem community is
collectively
responsible. fThe fact of
finding a child should be established by
witnesses. Authority over a child, in
consequence of finding and taking
care
of it, can be exercised only by
an adult, sane, free Moslem, of
irreproachable character, and of
sufficient intelligence to manage his
own
affairs. Consequently, a slave who takes
charge of a foundling
without his master’s
knowledge, has no right to keep it.
Even if a
slave, after finding a
child, tells his master, and the
latter lets it remain
with him, or
if a master authorises a slave to take
charge of a child ; it
it is not
the slave but the master who must
be regarded as civilly^
responsible for
it. A minor, a person of notorious
misconduct, and one
legally incapable,
cannot legally take charge of a child
they may find ;
and the same
with an infidel in the case of a
Moslem foundling. In all
these cases
the care of the child should be
confided to another person.
If two
individuals dispute possession of a foundling,
the court should
decide which of the
two seems preferable, and, if necessary,
confide the
child to a third ; but
no one can dispute the claim of a
person who has
already taken a child
to his home, fin a case where two
persons, both
of full legal capacity,
jointly find a child, the court should
prefer the
richer to the poorer, and
the one who is notoriously and positively
irreproachable to the one about whom
it can only be said that nothing
is known to his disadvantage. In a
case of complete equality in all
respects chance should decide. A townsman
who finds a child abandoned
in a town,
has no right to take it into
the desert among the nomads ; f but
there is no objection to his
taking it to another town ; nor is
there any
objection to a stranger who
finds a child in a town where he is
temporarily
staying, taking it to the
town where he has his domicile. A stranger
who happens to find a child in
the desert may take it to a town. A
nomad who finds a child in a town
is subject to the same law as a
towns-
man in similar circumstances ; but a
nomad who finds a child in the
desert can keep it and bring
it up at his home ; unless,
according to some
jurists, the tribe
has a habit of changing its place in
search of new
pastures.
The upkeep
of a foundling is defrayed from property
destined to such
children in general,
like wakafs made in their favour, or
from the pro-
perty of the foundling.
This last phrase means the clothes,
etc., in which
he is wrapped, or
upon which he is lain, the drahms
there may be in
his pocket, his
cradle, and the dinars placed above
or below his body.
The law even
considers as the child’s property the
deserted house in
which ho is found,
but not the treasure buried underneath
the place
where he lay, fnor clothes
or other objects placed in the
neighbourhood.
*A wholly destitute foundling
should be brought up at the expense
of
the state ; and, if necessary,
every Moslem is obliged to assist
him, as
by way of loan ; or,
according to one author, as by way
of upkeep.
fA person who finds a
child has the exclusive right to
administer its
property ; but in all
cases the expenses of its upkeep
must be authorised
by the court.
فصل [في الحكم بإسلام اللقيط]
إذَا وُجِدَ لَقِيطٌ بِدَارِ
الْإِسْلَامِ وَفِيهَا أَهْلُ ذِمَّةٍ أَوْ بِدَارٍ فَتَحُوهَا وَأَقَرُّوهَا
بِيَدِ كُفَّارٍ صُلْحًا أَوْ بَعْدَ مِلْكِهَا بِجِزْيَةٍ، وَفِيهَا مُسْلِمٌ
حُكِمَ بِإِسْلَامِ اللَّقِيطِ، وَإِنْ وُجِدَ بِدَارِ كُفَّارٍ فَكَافِرٌ إنْ
لَمْ يَسْكُنْهَا مُسْلِمٌ وَإِنْ سَكَنَهَا مُسْلِمٌ كَأَسِيرٍ وَتَاجِرٍ
فَمُسْلِمٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَمَنْ حُكِمَ بِإِسْلَامِهِ بِالدَّارِ
فَأَقَامَ ذِمِّيٌّ بَيِّنَةً بِنَسَبِهِ لَحِقَهُ وَتَبِعَهُ فِي الْكُفْرِ،
وَإِنْ اقْتَصَرَ عَلَى الدَّعْوَى فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَتْبَعُهُ فِي
الْكُفْرِ، وَيُحْكَمُ بِإِسْلَامِ الصَّبِيِّ بِجِهَتَيْنِ أُخْرَيَيْنِ لَا
تُفْرَضَانِ فِي لَقِيطٍ: إحْدَاهُمَا الْوِلَادَةُ، فَإِذَا كَانَ أَحَدُ
أَبَوَيْهِ مُسْلِمًا وَقْتَ الْعُلُوقِ فَهُوَ مُسْلِمٌ، فَإِنْ بَلَغَ وَوَصَفَ
كُفْرًا فَمُرْتَدٌّ، وَلَوْ عُلِّقَ بَيْنَ كَافِرَيْنِ ثُمَّ أَسْلَمَ
أَحَدُهُمَا حُكِمَ بِإِسْلَامِهِ، فَإِنْ بَلَغَ وَوَصَفَ كُفْرًا فَمُرْتَدٌّ،
وَفِي قَوْلٍ كَافِرٌ أَصْلِيٌّ.
الثَّانِيَةُ إذَا سَبَى مُسْلِمٌ
طِفْلاً تَبِعَ السَّابِيَ فِي الْإِسْلَامِ إنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ مَعَهُ أَحَدُ
أَبَوَيْهِ، وَلَوْ سَبَاهُ ذِمِّيٌّ لَمْ يُحْكَمُ بِإِسْلَامِهِ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا يَصِحُّ إسْلَامُ صَبِيٍّ مُمَيِّزٍ
اسْتِقْلَالاً عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
Section
A child that has been
abandoned is regarded as a Moslem —
. If it is found in a
Moslem country, even though inhabited by
infidel subjects of our Sovereign.
. If it is found in a
country conquered from the infidels, whoso
inhabitants have retained their property
by virtue of a treaty, or
hereditary
possession by right of capitation ;
provided the country is
not entirely
destitute of believers.
. flf it
is found in a country not yet
conquered from the infidels,
but where
there are some Moslems who have come
either as prisoners
of war or for a
commercial object. If, on the other
hand, the country
is inhabited exclusively
by infidels, the child also is
regarded as an
infidel.
The son
of an infidel, declared to be a
Moslem in consequence of the
place
where he is found, becomes none the
less an infidel as soon as his
origin has been proved ; but a mere
contestation of the presumption
established
by law in favour of the Moslem
faith, is not sufficient, accord-
ing to
our school, to cause the child to
be regarded as an infidel.
The
Moslem faith of a minor, in general,
is established in two other
ways
that have no reference to foundlings.
. By the fact of being
born of Moslem parents, even though only
one of them may have been
Moslem at the moment of the child’s
con-
ception. If such a child, after
attaining majority becomes an infidel,
he
must be regarded and punished as an
apostate. Even a child
conceived at a
moment both the father and the
mother were infidel,
becomes Moslem ipso
facto upon the conversion of either
parent during
its minority ; and must
also be considered as an apostate if
proof of
infidelity is given upon
majority. However, one of our jurists con-
siders the child in these circumstances
to be an infidel by origin.
.
By being made a prisoner of war by a
Moslem ; for in that case
the child
follows the religion of the person
that has taken possession of
it,
unless the father and mother were
made prisoners at the same time.
fThe fact of being made a prisoner
of war by an infidel subject of a
Moslem prince constitutes no reason
for considering a child to be a
Moslem. ffAs a general rule, a minor,
even though he may have
attained the
age of discernment cannot become a Moslem
unless at
least one of his parents
is converted to the faith of the
Prophet.
فَصْلٌ [في بيان حرية اللقيط ورقه واستلحاقه وتوابع ذلك]
إذَا
لَمْ يُقِرَّ اللَّقِيطُ بِرِقٍّ فَهُوَ حُرٌّ، إلَّا أَنْ يُقِيمَ أَحَدٌ
بَيِّنَةً بِرِقِّهِ.
وَإِنْ أَقَرَّ بِهِ لِشَخْصٍ فَصَدَّقَهُ
قُبِلَ إنْ لَمْ يَسْبِقْ إقْرَارٌ بِحُرِّيَّةٍ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ لَا
يُشْتَرَطُ أَنْ لَا يَسْبِقَ تَصَرُّفٌ يَقْتَضِي نُفُوذُهُ حُرِّيَّةً كَبَيْعٍ
وَنِكَاحٍ بَلْ يُقْبَلُ إقْرَارُهُ فِي أَصْلِ الرِّقِّ وَأَحْكَامِهِ
الْمُسْتَقْبَلَةِ لَا الْمَاضِيَةِ الْمُضِرَّةِ بِغَيْرِهِ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
فَلَوْ لَزِمَهُ دَيْنٌ فَأَقَرَّ بِرِقٍّ وَفِي
يَدِهِ مَالٌ قُضِيَ مِنْهُ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَى رِقَّهُ مَنْ لَيْسَ
فِي يَدِهِ بِلَا بَيِّنَةٍ لَمْ يُقْبَلْ، وَكَذَا إنْ ادَّعَاهُ الْمُلْتَقِطُ
فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ رَأَيْنَا صَغِيرًا مُمَيِّزًا أَوْ
غَيْرَهُ فِي يَدِ مَنْ يَسْتَرِقُّهُ وَلَمْ يُعْرَفْ اسْتِنَادُهَا إلَى
الِالْتِقَاطِ حُكِمَ لَهُ بِالرِّقِّ، فَإِنْ بَلَغَ وَقَالَ: أَنَا حُرٌّ
لَمْ يُقْبَلْ قَوْلُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ.
وَمَنْ
أَقَامَ بَيِّنَةً بِرِقِّهِ عُمِلَ بِهَا، وَيُشْتَرَطُ أَنْ تَتَعَرَّضَ
الْبَيِّنَةُ لِسَبَبِ الْمِلْكِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَكْفِي مُطْلَقُ الْمِلْكِ.
وَلَوْ
اسْتَلْحَقَ اللَّقِيطَ حُرٌّ مُسْلِمٌ لَحِقَهُ وَصَارَ أَوْلَى بِتَرْبِيَتِهِ،
وَإِنْ اسْتَلْحَقَهُ عَبْدٌ لَحِقَهُ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يُشْتَرَطُ تَصْدِيقُ
سَيِّدِهِ، وَإِنْ اسْتَلْحَقَتْهُ امْرَأَةٌ لَمْ يَلْحَقْهَا فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
أَوْ اثْنَانِ لَمْ يُقَدَّمْ مُسْلِمٌ وَحُرٌّ عَلَى
ذِمِّيٍّ وَعَبْدٍ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ بَيِّنَةٌ عُرِضَ عَلَى الْقَائِفِ
فَيَلْحَقُ مَنْ أَلْحَقَهُ بِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ قَائِفٌ أَوْ تَحَيَّرَ
أَوْ نَفَاهُ عَنْهُمَا أَوْ أَلْحَقَهُ بِهِمَا أُمِرَ بِالِانْتِسَابِ بَعْدَ
بُلُوغِهِ إلَى مَنْ يَمِيلُ طَبْعُهُ إلَيْهِ مِنْهُمَا، وَلَوْ أَقَامَا
بَيِّنَتَيْنِ مُتَعَارِضَتَيْنِ سَقَطَتَا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
Section
If a foundling, upon
his majority, does not himself admit
that he is
a slave, every one must
consider him as free, until another
person has
proved the legal presumption
in the matter to be false. If a
foundling,
upon his majority, admits he
is the slave of a particular person, who
does not deny it, the admission
should be accepted by the court ; unless
the child previously admitted he was
free. However, our school does
not
consider it an obstacle to an
admission of being a slave that a
foundling has already disposed of
his property or person in a manner
only compatible with freedom, e.g.
by entering into a contract of sale
or marriage. In spite of any
dispositions of this nature the child’s
admission of being a slave must be
admitted both as regards his origin
and with reference to his subsequent
actions ; but his previous acts
remain
valid in all cases where such an
admission would prejudice other
persons
who, believing him to be free, have
in good faith entered into
relations
with him. The debts of a foundling
who upon his majority
admits being a
slave are recoverable from anything he
actually possesses.
* Where the status of
slavery of a foundling is maintained in
legal pro-
ceedings by a person wTho has
not the child with him in his
house, the
court can take no notice
of his claim unless he proves the
truth of his
statement. In a case
where the statute of slavery is not
alleged by the
foundling himself but
by the person who finds him, the
court can never
give credit to the
statement of the latter, unless the
fact is established
by sufficient evidence.
A minor, whether or not he has
attained the age of discernment,
kept
by some one as a slave, without it
being known if he is a foundling
or not, should bo regarded as
really the slave of the person employing
him ; fand on his majority he
cannot change his status by merely
declaring himself to bo free. Such a
chango is admissible only upon
legal
proof. And if any one proves that a
certain foundling is a slave
the latter
should be treated as such ; but
before this can be admitted,
not
only must a general right of ownership
be proved, but the cause
must be
shown, only one authority considering the
former alone sufficient.
When a free
Moslem declares a foundling to be his
child, this declara-
tion is enough to
give him a right to bring up the
child in preference to
all other
persons. A similar declaration by a slave
also establishes
filiation ; though one of
our jurists admits it only on
condition of the
master’s approval, f On
the other hand, a declaration of this
kind made
by a woman has not the
same consequences. In a case where two
persons dispute the paternity of a
foundling the law admits no pre-
sumption
in favour of a Moslem over an
infidel subject of a Moslem
prince, nor
of a free man over a slave. In the
absence of other proof
recourse must
be had to a physiognomist to discover
the true father of
the child. The
person indicated by the physiognomist as
the real father
must be so
considered ; but, if there be no
physiognomist, or if the
physiognomist
cannot venture to decide, or declares
that the child is
the child of
neither competitor, or that he finds
traces of filiation with
respect to
both of them, then the child on
his majority must himself
decide to
which of the two persons he inclines
by his character, etc.
*Finally, in a
case where each party succeeds in
legally proving the
truth of his
affirmation of paternity, these proofs
mutually annul
each e ther.
كتاب الْجَعَالَةِ
BOOK . — JOB WORK (JUALAH)
هِيَ كَقَوْلِهِ: مَنْ رَدَّ آبِقِي فَلَهُ كَذَا.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ
صِيغَةٌ تَدُلُّ عَلَى الْعَمَلِ بِعِوَضٍ مُلْتَزَمٍ، فَلَوْ عَمِلَ بِلَا إذْنٍ
أَوْ أَذِنَ لِشَخْصٍ فَعَمِلَ غَيْرُهُ، فَلَا شَيْءَ لَهُ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ أَجْنَبِيٌّ: مَنْ رَدَّ عَبْدَ زَيْدٍ فَلَهُ كَذَا اسْتَحَقَّهُ
الرَّادُّ عَلَى الْأَجْنَبِيِّ، وَإِنْ قَالَ: قَالَ زَيْدٌ: مَنْ رَدَّ
عَبْدِي فَلَهُ كَذَا وَكَانَ كَاذِبًا لَمْ يَسْتَحِقَّ عَلَيْهِ وَلَا عَلَى
زَيْدٍ، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ قَبُولُ الْعَامِلِ وَإِنْ عَيَّنَهُ.
وَتَصِحُّ
عَلَى عَمَلٍ مَجْهُولٍ، وَكَذَا مَعْلُومٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ
كَوْنُ الْجُعْلِ، مَعْلُومًا فَلَوْ قَالَ: مَنْ رَدَّهُ فَلَهُ ثَوْبٌ أَوْ
أُرْضِيهِ فَسَدَ الْعَقْدُ، وَلِلرَّادِّ أُجْرَةُ مِثْلِهِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ مِنْ بَلَدِ كَذَا فَرَدَّهُ مِنْ أَقْرَبَ مِنْهُ فَلَهُ قِسْطُهُ مِنْ
الْجُعْلِ.
وَلَوْ اشْتَرَكَ اثْنَانِ فِي رَدِّهِ اشْتَرَكَا فِي
الْجُعْلِ.
وَلَوْ الْتَزَمَ جُعْلاً لِمُعَيَّنٍ فَشَارَكَهُ
غَيْرُهُ فِي الْعَمَلِ إنْ قَصَدَ إعَانَتَهُ فَلَهُ كُلُّ الْجُعْلِ، وَإِنْ
قَصَدَ الْعَمَلَ لِلْمَالِكِ فَلِلْأَوَّلِ قِسْطُهُ، وَلَا شَيْءَ
لِلْمُشَارِكِ بِحَالٍ، وَلِكُلٍّ مِنْهُمَا الْفَسْخُ قَبْلَ تَمَامِ
الْعَمَلِ.
فَإِنْ فَسَخَ قَبْلَ الشُّرُوعِ أَوْ فَسَخَ الْعَامِلُ
بَعْدَ الشُّرُوعِ فَلَا شَيْءَ لَهُ.
وَإِنْ فَسَخَ الْمَالِكُ
بَعْدَ الشُّرُوعِ فَعَلَيْهِ أُجْرَةُ الْمِثْلِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلِلْمَالِكِ
أَنْ يَزِيدَ وَيَنْقُصَ فِي الْجُعْلِ قَبْلَ الْفَرَاغِ وَفَائِدَتُهُ بَعْدَ
الشُّرُوعِ وُجُوبُ أُجْرَةِ الْمِثْلِ.
وَلَوْ مَاتَ الْآبِقُ فِي
بَعْضِ الطَّرِيقِ أَوْ هَرَبَ فَلَا شَيْءَ لِلْعَامِلِ وَإِذَا رَدَّهُ
فَلَيْسَ لَهُ حَبْسُهُ لِقَبْضِ الْجُعْلِ وَيُصَدَّقُ الْمَالِكُ إذَا أَنْكَرَ
شَرْطَ الْجُعْلِ أَوْ سَعْيَهُ فِي رَدِّهِ.
فَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَا فِي
قَدْرِ الْجُعْلِ تَحَالَفَا.
BOOK . — JOB WORK
This form of
agreement occurs when one says, for
example, “ Whoever
brings me back my
fugitive slave will be rewarded in
such and such a
manner,” or when
one makes use of any other phrase
indicating the
work that is to be
done for some obligatory remuneration. In
con-
sequence one can claim nothing for
doing a piece of work without the
master’s consent, or one that
another person had been employed to do.
A third party may promise a reward
to any one who brings back the
fugitive slave of another person ; but
in that case the person who
undertakes the work can proceed only
against the person who promised
him
the reward. If some one says, “ Zaid
promises a reward of so much
to any
one who brings back his slave,” a
person who brings back the
slave has
no case against the speaker if Zaid
denies it. It is not
necessary that
the offer of a job should be
formally accepted by the
person
undertaking it, even in the case of
something that is to be
delivered to
a particular person.
The contract is
valid if the wrork to be done
is not known, fas well
as where
its extent is ascertained ; provided in
both cases that the
amount of the
remuneration is known. Thus, one may
not say,
“ Whoever brings me back
the slave shall have a coat,” or “ I shall
reward him ” ; although, under these
circumstances, the person under-
taking the
job can still claim, if he succeeds,
reasonable remuneration
for his trouble.
In case of a promise to reward any
one bringing back
a slave from
such and such a place,” the person
who undertakes the job
can claim
only a proportional reward if he linds
the fugitive in some
nearer spot. If
two persons together bring back a slave,
they should
jointly claim the promised
reward ; but if the reward has been
promised
to some particular person and
another assists him in the work, the
person with whom the master made
the contract can alone claim the
entire reward, at least, where the
other shared the work in order to
assist
him. But if the second has
taken part in it for the sake
of the master,
the original contractor
can only claim a reward proportional to
what he
has done, and the other
can claim nothing.
Each of the
contracting parties may cancel the
agreement before the
job is completed
under the following conditions : —
.
Nothing is due to the person
undertaking the job if the cancella-
tion
takes place before the work is begun
; or if the person so undertaking
wishes to cancel the agreement later.
. flf the master wishes to
cancel the agreement after work has been
begun he owes to the other
party reasonable remuneration for what
has
been accomplished.
The master has
the right to increase or diminish
the remuneration
so long as the work
is not finished ; without prejudice,
however, to the
contractor who has
begun it, who in these circumstances
always has a
right to demand
reasonable remuneration instead of accepting
the change
in that promised. The
contractor cannot claim the promised reward,
if, e.g. a slave he has undertaken
to bring back dies on the way
or escapes
again ; nor has he any
right to retain the recovered property
in order
to secure payment of what
is due to him.
The law admits
a presumption in favour of the master
when the latter
denies that a condition,
alleged by the contractor, has been
added to
the promise ; or if he
contends that the contractor has not
been diligent
in bringing back a fugitive.
In case of a dispute upon the
subject of
the amount of the
promised remuneration, both parties should
take an
oath to the truth of
their assertions.[]