Book 47: Crimes against the Person (Jirah)

6/13/2024

Book 47: Crimes against the Person (Jirah)

Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature dan reference: classical Arabic

Contents

Book 47: Crimes against the Person (Jirah)

Chapter I General provisions
Chapter II Punishment under the law of talion, and the persons who can demand its application

Book 48: Price of Blood (Diya)

Chapter I General provisions
Chapter II Obligation to pay the price of blood ; the aakila ; and expiation

Book 49: Procedure in Cases of Crimes against the Person (Dawa)
Book 50: Rebels (Bughat)
Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi

كتاب الْجِرَاحِ

BOOK 47 .— CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

الْفِعْلُ الْمُزْهِقُ ثَلَاثَةٌ‏:‏ عَمْدٌ، وَخَطَأٌ، وَشِبْهُ عَمْدٍ‏.‏

وَلَا قِصَاصَ إلَّا فِي الْعَمْدِ، وَهُوَ قَصْدُ الْفِعْلِ وَالشَّخْصِ بِمَا يَقْتُلْ غَالِبًا‏:‏ جَارِحٌ أَوْ مُثَقَّلٌ، إنْ فُقِدَ قَصْدُ أَحَدِهِمَا بِأَنْ وَقَعَ عَلَيْهِ فَمَاتَ، أَوْ رَمَى شَجَرَةً فَأَصَابَهُ فَخَطَأٌ، وَإِنْ قَصَدَهُمَا بِمَا لَا يَقْتُلُ غَالِبًا فَشِبْهُ عَمْدٍ، وَمِنْهُ الضَّرْبُ بِسَوْطٍ أَوْ عَصًا‏.‏

فَلَوْ غَرَزَ إبْرَةً بِمَقْتَلٍ فَعَمْدٌ وَكَذَا بِغَيْرِهِ إنْ تَوَرَّمَ وَتَأَلَّمَ حَتَّى مَاتَ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَظْهَرْ أَثَرٌ وَمَاتَ فِي الْحَالِ فَشِبْهُ عَمْدٍ، وَقِيلَ عَمْدٌ، وَقِيلَ لَا شَيْءَ، وَلَوْ غَرَزَ فِيمَا لَا يُؤْلِمُ كَجَلْدَةِ عَقِبٍ فَلَا شَيْءَ بِحَالٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ حَبَسَهُ وَمَنَعَهُ الطَّعَامَ وَالشَّرَابَ وَالطَّلَبَ حَتَّى مَاتَ، فَإِنْ مَضَتْ مُدَّةٌ يَمُوتُ مِثْلُهُ فِيهَا غَالِبًا جُوعًا أَوْ عَطَشًا فَعَمْدٌ وَإِلَّا فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ بِهِ جُوعٌ وَعَطَشٌ سَابِقٌ فَشِبْهُ عَمْدٍ وَإِنْ كَانَ بَعْضُ جُوعٍ وَعَطَشٍ، وَعَلِمَ الْحَابِسُ الْحَالَ فَعَمْدٌ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

وَيَجِبُ الْقِصَاصُ بِالسَّبَبِ، فَلَوْ شَهِدَا بِقِصَاصٍ فَقُتِلَ ثُمَّ رَجَعَا وَقَالَا تَعَمَّدْنَا لَزِمَهُمَا الْقِصَاصُ إلَّا أَنْ يَعْتَرِفَ الْوَلِيُّ بِعِلْمِهِ بِكَذِبِهِمَا‏.‏

وَلَوْ ضَيَّفَ بِمَسْمُومٍ صَبِيًّا أَوْ مَجْنُونًا فَمَاتَ وَجَبَ الْقِصَاصُ، أَوْ بَالِغًا عَاقِلاً وَلَمْ يَعْلَمْ حَالَ الطَّعَامِ فَدِيَةٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ قِصَاصٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ لَا شَيْءَ، وَلَوْ دَسَّ سُمًّا فِي طَعَامِ شَخْصٍ الْغَالِبُ أَكْلُهُ مِنْهُ فَأَكَلَهُ جَاهِلاً فَعَلَى الْأَقْوَالِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ تَرَكَ الْمَجْرُوحُ عِلَاجَ جُرْحٍ مُهْلِكٍ فَمَاتَ وَجَبَ الْقِصَاصُ، وَلَوْ أَلْقَاهُ فِي مَاءٍ لَا يُعَدُّ مُغَرِّقًا كَمُنْبَسِطٍ فَمَكَثَ فِيهِ مُضْطَجِعًا حَتَّى هَلَكَ فَهَدَرٌ، أَوْ مُغْرِقٍ لَا يَخْلُصُ مِنْهُ إلَّا بِسِبَاحَةٍ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يُحْسِنْهَا أَوْ كَانَ مَكْتُوفًا أَوْ زَمِنًا فَعَمْدٌ، وَإِنْ مَنَعَ عَارِضٌ كَرِيحٍ وَمَوْجٍ فَشِبْهُ عَمْدٍ، وَإِنْ أَمْكَنَتْهُ فَتَرَكَهَا فَلَا دِيَةَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، أَوْ فِي نَارٍ يُمْكِنُ الْخَلَاصُ مِنْهَا فَمَكَثَ فِيهَا فَفِي الدِّيَةِ الْقَوْلَانِ، وَلَا قِصَاصَ فِي الصُّورَتَيْنِ، وَفِي النَّارِ وَجْهٌ‏.‏

وَلَا قِصَاصَ فِي الصُّورَتَيْنِ وَفِي النَّارِ وَجْهٌ وَلَوْ أَمْسَكَهُ فَقَتَلَهُ آخَرُ أَوْ حَفَرَ بِئْرًا فَرَدَاهُ فِيهَا آخَرُ، أَوْ أَلْقَاهُ مِنْ شَاهِقٍ فَتَلَقَّاهُ آخَرُ فَقَدَّهُ، فَالْقِصَاصُ عَلَى الْقَاتِلِ وَالْمُرْدِي وَالْقَادِّ فَقَطْ، وَلَوْ أَلْقَاهُ فِي مَاءٍ مُغْرِقٍ فَالْتَقَمَهُ حُوتٌ وَجَبَ الْقِصَاصُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، أَوْ غَيْرِ مُغْرِقٍ فَلَا‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَكْرَهَهُ عَلَى قَتْلٍ فَعَلَيْهِ الْقِصَاصُ، وَكَذَا عَلَى الْمُكْرَهِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ فَإِنْ وَجَبَتْ الدِّيَةُ وُزِّعَتْ، فَإِنْ كَافَأَهُ أَحَدُهُمَا فَقَطْ فَالْقِصَاصُ عَلَيْهِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَكْرَهَ بَالِغٌ مُرَاهِقًا فَعَلَى الْبَالِغِ الْقِصَاصُ إنْ قُلْنَا‏:‏ عَمْدُ الصَّبِيِّ‏:‏ عَمْدٌ، وَهُوَ الْأَظْهَرُ، وَلَوْ أَكْرَهَ عَلَى رَمْيِ شَاخِصٍ عَلِمَ الْمُكْرِهَ أَنَّهُ رَجُلٌ وَظَنَّهُ الْمُكْرَهُ صَيْدًا فَالْأَصَحُّ وُجُوبُ الْقِصَاصِ عَلَى الْمُكْرِهِ، أَوْ عَلَى رَمْيِ صَيْدٍ فَأَصَابَ رَجُلاً فَلَا قِصَاصَ عَلَى أَحَدٍ أَوْ عَلَى صُعُودِ شَجَرَةٍ فَزَلَقَ فَمَاتَ فَشِبْهُ عَمْدٍ، وَقِيلَ عَمْدٌ، أَوْ عَلَى قَتْلِ نَفْسِهِ فَلَا قِصَاصَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَالَ‏:‏ اُقْتُلْنِي وَإِلَّا قَتَلْتُك فَقَتَلَهُ فَالْمَذْهَبُ لَا قِصَاصَ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ لَا دِيَةَ، وَلَوْ قَالَ‏:‏ اُقْتُلْ زَيْدًا أَوْ عَمْرًا فَلَيْسَ بِإِكْرَاهٍ‏.‏

BOOK 47 .— CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

CHAPTER I.— GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section

Homicide is of three categories; it may be premeditated, involuntary,
or voluntary; only premeditated homicide involves a penalty under
the law of talion. Premeditation in homicide consists in the intention
of attacking the person of a particular individual with a cutting, piercing,
or blunt instrument, capable in ordinary circumstances of causing death.
Where, on the other hand, there is no intention of committing a crime,
or a crime against a particular individual, there is involuntary
homicide, e.g . if one falls upon a person one knows to be underneath and
kills that person, or if one wants to shoot at a tree and the projectile
strikes some one. Voluntary homicide is intentionally attacking a
particular individual with an instrument that under ordinary circum-
stances does not cause death, e.g. striking him with a whip or a stick.
Thus premeditated homicide will include the act of introducing a needle
into any part of the body if there ensues so painful a wound as to cause
the death of the victim ; but it is only voluntary homicide where the
prick is in some part of body where a wound is not mortal, and has
left no visible trace, though death is caused. Other authorities, however,
admit premeditation in these circumstances ; still others consider that
such an act incurs no penalty at all, and all jurists agree in this where
death has been caused by thrusting a needle, e.g., into the callosity of
the heel, i.e. a place where there is no sensation.

The fact of having confined a person, and not only withheld necessary
food and drink, but also prevented their being obtained by that person,
so that death results, is premeditated homicide. It is understood that
this confinement must have lasted long enough to be able in ordinary
circumstances to cause death from inanition. It is only voluntary
homicide if death occurs earlier than this, unless the victim had been
deprived of food and drink before being confined, and the criminal
was aware of this circumstance. In this case there is premeditated
homicide all the same ; *but not where the criminal did not know that
the person confined had already previously been deprived of food and
drink.

The law of talion is applied not only to the immediate authors of a
premeditated homicide, but also to the moral and distant authors.
Thus, for example, if two witnesses by their testimony cause an innocent
person to be condemned to death, and afterwards declare that they
intentionally gave false evidence, they also should be put to death ;
unless the representative of the person put to death declares that he
knew the testimony was false, before the penalty had been pronounced.

A person who receives into his house a minor, or a madman, and
offers him poisoned food, so that death results, incurs a penalty under
the law of talion ; but where a sane adult tastes of a dish whose contents
are unknown to him, the guilty person is simply liable for the price of
blood, in consequence of his neglect to remove this dangerous dish.
In this case there is only voluntary homicide ; though, according to one
authority there is also premeditation and consequently the law of talion
applies. On the other hand, another jurist has maintained that in this
case there is no punishable crime, as the stranger takes the dish of his
own accord. A similar controversy exists as to the nature of the act
of poisoning dishes belonging to another, of which he is in the habit of
partaking, and which he does in fact unsuspectingly eat, so that death
ensues. One is still punishable under the law of talion though the
injured person neglects to have a mortal wound one has given him
attended to, at least if he dies in consequence.

Death caused by drowning admits of the following distinctions : —

. Where the water into which the victim is thrown is so shallow
that it cannot be considered likely to drown a man. If the victim rests
lying on his side until he is drowned, this is not punishable, as it is the
victim himself who has killed himself.

. Where the water is so deep that escape is only possible by swim-
ming, the following cases must be distinguished : —

(a) it is premeditated homicide, if the victim cannot swim, or is
prevented from doing so by being pinioned or by some chronic malady
such as paralysis.

(b) it is voluntary homicide if the victim is prevented from saving
himself by swimming owing to some accidental circumstance, such as
wind or waves ;

(c) *tlie act is not a crime at all, and the guilty person is not even
liable to the price of blood, if the victim could have saved himself, but
voluntarily abstained from doing so.

Authorities are not agreed as to whether the act of throwing some
one into the fire, admits of similar distinctions ; or whether this act
should not always be regarded, as premeditated homicide, where death
has ensued.

When one kills a person whom another has seized, or throws him
into a well which another has dug ; or when one throws him down from
a height, and another waits underneath to cut him in two, there is no
complicity ; and each individual is separately liable, under the law of
talion, for killing, throwing down, or cutting in two the victim. * Where,
on the other hand, one throws some one into the water in a place where
under ordinary circumstances he could be drowned, but he is instead
devoured by a fish, one is liable to the law of talion, though not the
immediate cause of his death. If the water was not deep enough to
drown the victim under ordinary circumstances, but he has nevertheless
been devoured by a fish, the guilty person is not liable to punishment.

Premeditated homicide, committed under coercion by violence
renders liable under the law of talion not only the person who exercised
the coercion *but also the person who allowed himself to be intimidated ;
for the law regards them as accomplices. In case of homicide that is not
premeditated they should jointly pay the price of blood, if this is
required ; and if one of them is not liable to the law of talion by reason
of social superiority to the victim, the other must undergo it none the
less. Only where the violence is irresistible, e.g. used by an adult to
a minor, the former alone is amenable to the law of talion ; and this is
admitted even by those authorities who in general allow that pre-
meditation may exist in the case of a minor. Moreover, where one forces
some one to shoot at a distant object one knows to be a man but the other
thinks is game one incurs a penalty under the law of talion as the im-
mediate cause ; but that other who has done the material act cannot
be considered as an author of the homicide. The law of talion cannot
be applied to any one where a hunter, obliged to shoot at game, by
misfortune hits a man ; nor where some one, obliged to climb a tree,
falls, causing death. In the latter case, however, there is voluntary
homicide, and according to some jurists, it is premeditated. A person
who forces some one to commit suicide is *not punishable under the law
of talion ; nor, according to our school, if he kills some one who said to
him, “ Kill me, or I will kill you.’’ In this latter case there is no ground
either for a claim for the price of blood. On the other hand, where one
person says to another, “ Kill either Zaid or Amr, or I will kill you,”
there is no violence in the legal sense, and the person is punishable if he
commits the homicide.

فصل ‏[‏في اجتماع مباشرتين‏]‏

وُجِدَ مِنْ شَخْصَيْنِ مَعًا فِعْلَانِ مُزْهِقَانِ مُذَفِّفَانِ كَحَزٍّ وَقَدٍّ، أَوْ لَا كَقَطْعِ عُضْوَيْنِ فَقَاتِلَانِ وَإِنْ أَنْهَاهُ رَجُلٌ إلَى حَرَكَةِ مَذْبُوحٍ‏:‏ بِأَنْ لَمْ يَبْقَ إبْصَارٌ، وَنُطْقٌ وَحَرَكَةُ اخْتِيَارٍ‏.‏

ثُمَّ جَنَى آخَرُ فَالْأَوَّلُ قَاتِلٌ، وَيُعَزَّرُ الثَّانِي، وَإِنْ جَنَى الثَّانِي قَبْلَ الْإِنْهَاءِ إلَيْهَا فَإِنْ ذَفَّفَ كَحَزٍّ بَعْدَ جُرْحٍ فَالثَّانِي قَاتِلٌ، وَعَلَى الْأَوَّلِ قِصَاصُ الْعُضْوِ أَوْ مَالٌ بِحَسَبِ الْحَالِ، وَإِلَّا فَقَاتِلَانِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَتَلَ مَرِيضًا فِي النَّزْعِ وَعَيْشُهُ عَيْشُ مَذْبُوحٍ وَجَبَ الْقِصَاصُ‏.‏

Section

Where two persons together attack and kill another, they are accom-
plices in premeditated homicide, and are both punishable under the law
of talion. This rule applies first of all to the case where both criminals
deal the victim an immediately mortal blow, c.g. if one cuts off liis head,
aiul the other cuts him in two ; but it is just the same if each deals him
a blow that causes a grave but not immediately mortal wound, e.g . if
each cuts off a limb. If one of two persons attacks another and leaves
him for dead, i.e . unable to see or speak or communicate by signs, and
the other gives him a wound that finishes him, the former alone is
punishable under the law of talion, the other incurring only a correction
at the discretion of the court. When, on the other hand, it is the fonner
who merely deals the wound, and the second attacks the victim and
leaves him for dead, the latter is considered guilty of premeditated
homicide if the wound dealt by him is one immediately mortal, i.e . if
he has cut off a wounded person’s head. Under these circumstances
the person who deals the first blow is punishable for that wound only,
i.e . he is liable either under the law of talion or to a pecuniary penalty.

The premeditated homicide of a sick person at the point of death is
punishable under the law of talion, although he has already lost
consciousness.

فصل ‏[‏في شروط القود‏]‏

قَتَلَ مُسْلِمًا ظَنَّ كُفْرَهُ بِدَارِ الْحَرْبِ لَا قِصَاصَ، وَكَذَا لَا دِيَةَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، أَوْ بِدَارِ الْإِسْلَامِ وَجَبَا، وَفِي الْقِصَاصِ قَوْلٌ‏.‏

أَوْ مَنْ عَهِدَهُ مُرْتَدًّا أَوْ ذِمِّيًّا أَوْ عَبْدًا أَوْ ظَنَّهُ قَاتِلَ أَبِيهِ فَبَانَ خِلَافُهُ فَالْمَذْهَبُ وُجُوبُ الْقِصَاصِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ ضَرَبَ مَرِيضًا جَهِلَ مَرَضَهُ ضَرْبًا يَقْتُلُ الْمَرِيضَ وَجَبَ الْقِصَاصُ، وَقِيلَ لَا‏.‏

وَيُشْتَرَطُ لِوُجُوبِ الْقِصَاصِ فِي الْقَتِيلِ إسْلَامٌ أَوْ أَمَانٌ، فَيُهْدَرُ الْحَرْبِيُّ وَالْمُرْتَدُّ، وَمَنْ عَلَيْهِ قِصَاصٌ كَغَيْرِهِ‏.‏

وَالزَّانِي الْمُحْصَنُ إنْ قَتَلَهُ ذِمِّيٌّ قُتِلَ أَوْ مُسْلِمٌ فَلَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَفِي الْقَاتِلِ بُلُوغٌ وَعَقْلٌ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ وُجُوبُهُ عَلَى السَّكْرَانِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ‏:‏ كُنْت يَوْمَ الْقَتْلِ صَبِيًّا أَوْ مَجْنُونًا صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ إنْ أَمْكَنَ الصِّبَا وَعُهِدَ الْجُنُونُ، وَلَوْ قَالَ‏:‏ أَنَا صَبِيٌّ فَلَا قِصَاصَ وَلَا يُحَلَّفُ، وَلَا قِصَاصَ عَلَى حَرْبِيٍّ‏.‏

وَيَجِبُ عَلَى الْمَعْصُومِ وَالْمُرْتَدِّ‏.‏

وَمُكَافَأَةٌ، فَلَا يُقْتَلُ مُسْلِمٌ بِذِمِّيٍّ، وَيُقْتَلُ ذِمِّيٌّ بِهِ وَبِذِمِّيٍّ، وَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَتْ مِلَّتُهُمَا، فَلَوْ أَسْلَمَ الْقَاتِلُ لَمْ يَسْقُطْ الْقِصَاصُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ جَرَحَ ذِمِّيٌّ ذِمِّيًّا وَأَسْلَمَ الْجَارِحُ ثُمَّ مَاتَ الْمَجْرُوحُ فَكَذَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَفِي الصُّورَتَيْنِ إنَّمَا يَقْتَصُّ الْإِمَامُ بِطَلَبِ الْوَارِثِ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ قَتْلُ مُرْتَدٍّ بِذِمِّيٍّ وَبِمُرْتَدٍّ، لَا ذِمِّيٍّ بِمُرْتَدٍّ وَلَا يُقْتَلُ حُرٌّ بِمَنْ فِيهِ رِقٌّ‏.‏

وَيُقْتَلُ قِنٌّ وَمُدَبَّرٌ وَمُكَاتَبٌ وَأُمُّ وَلَدٍ بَعْضُهُمْ بِبَعْضٍ، وَلَوْ قَتَلَ عَبْدٌ عَبْدًا ثُمَّ عَتَقَ الْقَاتِلُ، أَوْ عَتَقَ بَيْنَ الْجُرْحِ فَكَحُدُوثِ الْإِسْلَامِ، وَمَنْ بَعْضُهُ حُرٌّ لَوْ قَتَلَ مِثْلَهُ لَا قِصَاصَ، وَقِيلَ إنْ لَمْ تَزِدْ حُرِّيَّةُ الْقَاتِلِ وَجَبَ، وَلَا قِصَاصَ بَيْنَ عَبْدٍ مُسْلِمٍ وَحُرٍّ ذِمِّيٍّ‏.‏

وَلَا بِقَتْلِ وَلَدٍ وَإِنْ سَفَلَ، وَلَا لَهُ، وَيُقْتَلُ بِوَالِدَيْهِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ تَدَاعَيَا مَجْهُولاً فَقَتَلَهُ أَحَدُهُمَا، فَإِنْ أَلْحَقَهُ الْقَائِفُ بِالْآخَرِ اقْتَصَّ وَإِلَّا فَلَا‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَتَلَ أَحَدُ أَخَوَيْنِ الْأَبَ، وَالْآخَرُ الْأُمَّ مَعًا فَلِكُلٍّ قِصَاصٌ، وَيُقَدَّمُ بِقُرْعَةٍ، فَإِنْ اقْتَصَّ بِهَا، أَوْ مُبَادِرًا فَلِوَارِثِ الْمُقْتَصِّ مِنْهُ قَتْلُ الْمُقْتَصِّ إنْ لَمْ نُوَرِّثْ قَاتَلَا بِحَقٍّ، وَكَذَا إنْ قَتَلَا مُرَتَّبًا وَلَا زَوْجِيَّةَ، وَإِلَّا فَعَلَى الثَّانِي فَقَطْ‏.‏

وَيُقْتَلُ الْجَمْعُ بِوَاحِدٍ، وَلِلْوَلِيِّ الْعَفْوُ عَنْ بَعْضِهِمْ عَلَى حِصَّتِهِ مِنْ الدِّيَةِ بِاعْتِبَارِ الرُّءُوسِ‏.‏

وَلَا يُقْتَلُ شَرِيكُ مُخْطِئٍ وَشِبْهِ عَمْدٍ‏.‏

وَيُقْتَلُ شَرِيكُ الْأَبِ، وَعَبْدٌ شَارَكَ حُرًّا فِي عَبْدٍ، وَذِمِّيٌّ شَارَكَ مُسْلِمًا فِي ذِمِّيٍّ، وَكَذَا شَرِيكُ حَرْبِيٍّ، وَقَاطِعٌ قِصَاصًا أَوْ حَدًّا، وَشَرِيكُ النَّفْسِ، وَدَافِعُ الصَّائِلِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلَوْ جَرَحَهُ جُرْحَيْنِ عَمْدًا أَوْ خَطَأً وَمَاتَ بِهِمَا، أَوْ جَرَحَ حَرْبِيًّا أَوْ مُرْتَدًّا ثُمَّ أَسْلَمَ وَجَرَحَهُ ثَانِيًا فَمَاتَ لَمْ يُقْتَلْ‏.‏

وَلَوْ دَاوَى جُرْحَهُ بِسُمٍّ مُذَفِّفٍ فَلَا قِصَاصَ عَلَى جَارِحِهِ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَقْتُلْ السُّمُّ غَالِبًا فَشِبْهُ عَمْدٍ، وَإِنْ قَتَلَ غَالِبًا وَعَلِمَ فَشَرِيكُ جَارِحِ نَفْسِهِ، وَقِيلَ شَرِيكُ مُخْطِئٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ ضَرَبُوهُ بِسِيَاطٍ فَقَتَلُوهُ، وَضَرْبُ كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ غَيْرُ قَاتِلٍ فَفِي الْقِصَاصِ عَلَيْهِمْ أَوْجُهٌ‏:‏ أَصَحُّهَا يَجِبُ إنْ تَوَاطَئُوا‏.‏

وَمَنْ قَتَلَ جَمْعًا مُرَتَّبًا قُتِلَ بِأَوَّلِهِمْ، أَوْ مَعًا فَبِالْقُرْعَةِ، وَلِلْبَاقِينَ الدِّيَاتُ‏.‏

قُلْت‏:‏ فَلَوْ قَتَلَهُ غَيْرُ الْأَوَّلِ عَصَى وَوَقَعَ قِصَاصًا، وَلِلْأَوَّلِ دِيَةٌ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ‏.‏

Section

When one kills a Moslem in an enemy’s country, under the belief
that he is an infidel not subject to Moslem authority, one is liable neither
to a penalty under the law of talion *nor to payment of the price of blood ;
but when this act occurs in the territory of a believing ruler, the one or
the other is applicable according to circumstances ; though one authority
calls in question the applicability of the law of talion. On the other
hand, our school admits a recourse to the law of talion in a case of pre-
meditated homicide committed against some one designated as an
apostate by public notoriety, or an infidel subject of a Moslem ruler, or
a slave, or a reputed parricide, if it appears later that the person killed
had not the legal character rendering inadmissible an application of the
law of talion. It is in accordance with the same principles that a person
is liable to the law of talion who strikes a sick person of whose dangerous
state he was not aware, but who dies immediately, though in ordinary
circumstances the blow would not have been mortal. This, however,
is denied by some authorities.

To render applicable the law of talion it is legally necessary —

. That the deceased was a Moslem, or an infidel enjoying our pro-
tection, on some ground or other. An infidel not subject to a Moslem
ruler, and an apostate, are proscribed, and may be killed with impunity ;
but the premeditated murder of a condemned criminal by any one other
than the representative of the murdered man, the magistrate or the
executioner is punishable like any other murder. As to a person guilty
o! the crime of fornication, if he is mohsan and consequently punishable
with lapidation, his premeditated murder by an inlidel sul>ject of a
Moslem prince involves an application of the law of talion ; fbut this is
not so if he is killed by a Moslem.

. That the criminal is a sane adult. Drunkenness is not considered
an excuse by our school. If the guilty person alleges as an excuse his
minority or madness on the day of the crime, this assertion is presumed
by law to be true, upon the double condition that the criminal takes an
oath to that effect, and that his real age is not incompatible with his
statement, or that his madness is of public notoriety. In a case where
the guilty person declares in court that he has not yet attained his
majority, his assertion is sufficient even though not on oath, provided a
presumption is admitted in favour of the truth of his statement. An
inlidel not subject to Moslem authority is not liable to a penalty under
the law of talion, as he is already proscribed by virtue of his belief ; but
religion is not a cause of impunity for an apostate, nor for an infidel in
any way under our protection.

. That the criminal is not of a social position superior to that of the
victim. Thus a Moslem cannot be put to death for killing an infidel,
even though the latter may be the subject of a Moslem prince ; but an
infidel who kills a Moslem or an infidel is liable to the law of talion, even
though the two infidels are not of the same religion, or the criminal
embraces the faith after committing the crime. This rule must also
be observed in a case where the infidel in question, having merely
wounded another, is immediately converted, and the victim dies of his
wounds. But in both these cases the conversion of the criminal has
this consequence th.A neither the Sovereign nor his delegate the judge
can of their own initiative pronounce a penalty under the law of talion,
but must wait until the representative of the victim claims its applica-
tion. *An apostate is to be put to death for killing an infidel subject
of a Moslem prince or another apostate ; but not an infidel subject of a
Moslem prince for killing an apostate, nor a free man for killing a slave,
even though the latter be partially enfranchised. A slave, a slave
enfranchised by testament, a slave undergoing enfranchisement by
contract, and a female slave enfranchised by reason of maternity, are
all equal in this respect . But a slave enfranchised after killing another,
or in the interval between the wounding and death of the victim, follows
the rule as to the conversion of an infidel criminal ; while the death
penalty is never applicable to a slave partially enfranchised who kills
another, provided, according to some authorities, that he is free to a
greater degree than his victim. By virtue of the same principles the
law of talion is inapplicable to a premeditated homicido committed
against a Moslem slave by a free iiilidel subject of a Moslem prince, or
vice versa ; and also to an infanticide, i,e. a premeditated homicide
against one’s child or other descendant ; but it is applicable to parricide,
i-e. the premeditated murder of one’s ancestor. The premeditated
murder by one of two parties of the person whose paternity they dispute
is punishable under t lie law of talion if the paternity is adjudged to the
other party, even if this is done upon the export testimony of a physi-
ognomist, but not if the paternity is adjudged to the party who has
committed the crime.

Where one of two brothers commits the premeditated murder of his
father and the other of his mother, the following cases must be dis-
tinguished : —

. If the two homicides are committed at the same time, each of the
two criminals may claim in court the punishment of the other for killing
an ancestor whom he represents ; and which of the two is to bring the
first accusation must be chosen by lot. When one of the guilty brothers
has thus been put to death on the demand of the other, whether the
latter has been so designated by lot, or whether he presented himself
first of his own accord, it is the representative of the brother that has
been executed who should demand an application of the death penalty
against the other ; at least where one admits that the faculty of repre-
senting the victim by virtue of the right of succession is lost as well by
the fact of rightful as of unjust killing.

. If the two homicides are committed one after the other, a case
which again admits of two distinctions —

(a) If the marriage between father and mother was dissolved before
the first homicide, the first criminal must begin by demanding the
execution of the other, after which the representative of the latter must
demand the execution of the former, without any drawing of lots.

(b) If the marriage between the father and the mother still existed
intact at the time of the first homicide, it is only the brother who has
just committed the second homicide who is put to death upon the
demand of the other.

Where several individuals have concurred in the homicide of another
they are all punishable under the law of talion, if it is applicable ; but
the representative of the victim may remit the capital punishment for
some of the criminals, and content himself with the price of blood from
them, in proportion to the number of criminals wiiose execution he has
claimed. An accomplice in a case of homicide camiot be punished with
death, if the principal acted without premeditation and committed only
a voluntary or involuntary homicido ; but the accomplice of a father
in the premeditated murder of one of his children should be put to death
in spite of the principal’s impunity. Similarly, a slave who is the
accomplice of a free man in the premeditated homicide of a slave, or an
infidel subject of a Moslem prince who is the accomplice of a Moslem in
the premeditated homicide of an infidel like himself, must none the less
undergo the death penalty, though the free man and the Moslem are
not liable to it, by reason of their respective personal qualities. *The
same principle requires an application of the law of talion in the following
cases of complicity : —

. With an infidel not subject to Moslem authority, who has com-
mitted premeditated homicide, though we have just seen that a demand
for an application of the law of talion cannot be brought against such
infidel.

. With an executioner or other person who carries out a sentence
under the law of talion, or some definitely prescribed penalty, when this
consists only in the loss of a bodily member or in a wound ; e.g. if a person
gives the criminal another wound after he has suffered the penalty,
which together with the first causes his death.

. With a suicide, e.g. by giving a wound to some one who has already
wounded himself intentionally, but who dies only because of receiving
the second as well.

. With a person on whose part the act constitutes only legitimate
self-defence.

On the contrary, the law of talion is not applicable in the following
cases : —

. Where one gives the victim two wounds of which one is pre-
meditated and the other involuntary, death resulting from the two
combined.

. Where one wounds an infidel not subject to Moslem authority or
an apostate, who then becomes converted ; and after this one gives
him another wound which in conjunction with the first is fatal.

. Where one gives a wound that is not mortal to a person who applies
to it an immediately fatal poison. Where the person in question has,
in these circumstances, applied to the wound a substance that does
not usually cause death, but appears to be fatal in this instance, the
causer of the wound is guilty only of voluntary homicide. Where,
however, the substance, though not in the category of immediately fatal
poisons, ordinarily causes death in similar circumstances, and the
victim knowingly applies it to the wound, the latter commits a
suicide of which the causer of the wound is an accomplice. Other
authorities, however, maintain that in this case there is only involuntary
suicide.

f Where several persons give another cuts with the lash so that death
is the consequence, though each stroke by itself is not mortal, the law
of talion is applicable only if the attack is made by a joint agreement.
This rule, however, is the subject of controversy. Where, on the other
hand, a single person has successively killed several others, he should
suffer the penalty of death for the first victim, and his estate is liable
for the price of blood as regards the others. In the case of the pre-
meditated homicide of several persons at once, it must first be decided
by lot for which of the victims the criminal is to suffer death, after
which his estate- is liable for the price of blood of the others. [Where
in these circumstances the criminal is put to death by the representative
of one of the victims other than that one for whose homicide he ought
to suffer death, it is a crime rendering that representative himself liable
to the law of talion; and the representative of the victim to whose
homicide the law of talion applied, can claim the price of blood.]

فصل ‏[‏في تغير حال المجروح بحرية أو عصمة أو إهدار إو بمقدار للمضمون به‏]‏

جَرَحَ حَرْبِيًّا أَوْ مُرْتَدًّا أَوْ عَبْدَ نَفْسِهِ فَأَسْلَمَ وَعَتَقَ ثُمَّ مَاتَ بِالْجُرْحِ فَلَا ضَمَانَ‏.‏

وَقِيلَ‏:‏ تَجِبُ دِيَةٌ، وَلَوْ رَمَاهُمَا فَأَسْلَمَ وَعَتَقَ فَلَا قِصَاصَ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ وُجُوبُ دِيَةِ مُسْلِمٍ مُخَفَّفَةً عَلَى الْعَاقِلَةِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ ارْتَدَّ الْمَجْرُوحُ وَمَاتَ بِالسِّرَايَةِ فَالنَّفْسُ هَدَرٌ، وَيَجِبُ قِصَاصُ الْجُرْحِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ يَسْتَوْفِيهِ قَرِيبُهُ الْمُسْلِمُ، وَقِيلَ الْإِمَامُ، فَإِنْ اقْتَضَى الْجُرْحُ مَالاً وَجَبَ أَقَلُّ الْأَمْرَيْنِ‏:‏ مِنْ أَرْشِهِ وَدِيَةٍ، وَقِيلَ أَرْشُهُ، وَقِيلَ هَدَرٌ‏.‏

وَلَوْ ارْتَدَّ ثُمَّ أَسْلَمَ فَمَاتَ بِالسِّرَايَةِ فَلَا قِصَاصَ، وَقِيلَ إنْ قَصُرَتْ الرِّدَّةُ وَجَبَ، وَتَجِبُ الدِّيَةُ وَفِي قَوْلٍ نِصْفُهَا، وَلَوْ جَرَحَ مُسْلِمٌ ذِمِّيًّا فَأَسْلَمَ أَوْ حُرٌّ عَبْدًا فَعَتَقَ وَمَاتَ بِالسِّرَايَةِ فَلَا قِصَاصَ‏.‏

وَتَجِبُ دِيَةُ مُسْلِمٍ وَهِيَ لِسَيِّدِ الْعَبْدِ، فَإِنْ زَادَتْ عَلَى قِيمَتِهِ فَالزِّيَادَةُ لِوَرَثَتِهِ، وَلَوْ قَطَعَ يَدَ عَبْدٍ فَعَتَقَ ثُمَّ مَاتَ بِسِرَايَةٍ فَلِلسَّيِّدِ الْأَقَلُّ مِنْ الدِّيَةِ الْوَاجِبَةِ وَنِصْفِ قِيمَتِهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ الْأَقَلُّ مِنْ الدِّيَةِ وَقِيمَتِهِ، وَلَوْ قَطَعَ يَدَهُ فَعَتَقَ فَجَرَحَهُ آخَرَانِ وَمَاتَ بِسِرَايَتِهِمْ فَلَا قِصَاصَ عَلَى الْأَوَّلِ إنْ كَانَ حُرًّا وَيَجِبُ عَلَى الْآخَرَيْنِ‏.‏

Section

No responsibility is incurred by mortally wounding an infidel not
subject to a Moslem prince, or an apostate, even though he should repent
of his errors before death. This principle extends also to a master who
mortally wounds his slave, and then frees him before his death. Others,
however, do not admit impunity ill these circumstances, but maintain
that one is then liable for the price of blood. Where, on the other hand,
one shoots at such infidel, or an apostate or one’s own slave, after which
the infidel or the apostate is converted, or one frees the slave, before
the projectile hits him, our school exacts the price of blood on the light er
scale, for the killing of a free Moslem. This price of blood is exigible
either from the criminal or from his adkila. .Where one wounds an. in-
dividual who abjures Islam before dying of the wound one is considered
to have killed a proscribed person ; *but one is nevertheless liable for
the wound inflicted, under the law of talion, and the nearest relative of
the apostate should claim the application of the penalty. Only a few
authorities consider that this is the duty of the Sovereign ; while if the
nature of the wound does not admit of an application of the law of
talion, but requires a pecuniary penalty, the criminal owes either an
indemnity or the price of blood, whichever is the more advantageous.
Some authorities insist in these circumstances upon the payment of an
indemnity always ; others maintain that there is no punishable offence.
Where one wounds a Moslem who thereupon abjures his faith but after-
wards repents before dying of the wound, one is not punishable with
death, unless, according to some authorities, the apostasy of the victim
has lasted only a very short time. But one is always liable in these
circumstances for the price of blood, or, according to one authority, to
half the price of blood. When a Moslem wounds an infidel subject of
one of our princes, and he embraces the faith after receiving the wound,
or when a free man wounds another’s slave who is enfranchised after
being wounded, the victim’s death in consequence of the wound does
not render the criminal liable to the law of talion, but he owes the price
of blood prescribed for the homicide of a free Moslem. In the case of
an enfranchised slave this price of blood is payable to his former master
in proportion to his value as a slave, and to his heirs for the remainder.
If the slave’s wound consists in the loss of a hand, and his master grants
him his freedom before he dies in consequence of the wound, his master
can claim either the price of blood due for the mutilation, or half the
value of the slave, at the criminal’s choice. One authority alone gives
the criminal a choice between the price of blood and the full value of
the slave. Where one man cuts off the hand of a slave whom his master
thereupon frees, and two others then each give the slave a new wound,
which combined with the loss of the hand cause the death of the victim,
it is these two latter persons who should suffer the penalty under the
law of talion, and not the one who cut off the hand.

فصل ‏[‏في شروط القصاص في الأطراف والجراحات والمعاني‏]‏

يُشْتَرَطُ لِقِصَاصِ الطَّرَفِ وَالْجُرْحِ مَا شُرِطَ لِلنَّفْسِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ وَضَعُوا سَيْفًا عَلَى يَدِهِ وَتَحَامَلُوا عَلَيْهِ دَفْعَةً فَأَبَانُوهَا قُطِعُوا‏.‏

وَشِجَاجُ الرَّأْسِ وَالْوَجْهِ عَشْرٌ‏:‏ حَارِصَةٌ، وَهِيَ مَا شَقَّ الْجِلْدَ قَلِيلاً، وَدَامِيَةٌ تُدْمِيهِ، وَبَاضِعَةٌ تَقْطَعُ اللَّحْمَ، وَمُتَلَاحِمَةٌ تَغُوصُ فِيهِ، وَسِمْحَاقٌ تَبْلُغُ الْجِلْدَةَ الَّتِي بَيْنَ اللَّحْمِ وَالْعَظْمِ، وَمُوضِحَةٌ تُوضِحُ الْعَظْمَ، وَهَاشِمَةٌ تَهْشِمُهُ، وَمُنَقِّلَةٌ تَنْقُلُهُ، وَمَأْمُومَةٌ تَبْلُغُ خَرِيطَةَ الدِّمَاغِ، وَدَامِغَةٌ تَخْرِقُهَا، وَيَجِبُ الْقِصَاصُ فِي الْمُوضِحَةِ فَقَطْ، وَقِيلَ وَفِيمَا قَبْلَهَا سِوَى الْحَارِصَةِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَ فِي بَاقِي الْبَدَنِ أَوْ قَطَعَ بَعْضَ مَارِنٍ أَوْ أُذُنٍ وَلَمْ يُبِنْهُ وَجَبَ الْقِصَاصُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَيَجِبُ فِي الْقَطْعِ مِنْ مَفْصِلٍ حَتَّى فِي أَصْلِ فَخِذٍ وَمَنْكِبٍ إنْ أَمْكَنَ بِلَا إجَافَةٍ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ‏.‏

وَيَجِبُ فِي فَقْءِ عَيْنٍ وَقَطْعِ أُذُنٍ وَجَفْنٍ وَمَارِنٍ وَشَفَةٍ وَلِسَانٍ وَذَكَرٍ وَأُنْثَيَيْنِ، وَكَذَا أَلْيَانِ وَشُفْرَانِ، فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَا قِصَاصَ فِي كَسْرِ الْعِظَامِ‏.‏

وَلَهُ قَطْعُ أَقْرَبِ مَفْصِلٍ إلَى مَوْضِعِ الْكَسْرِ، وَحُكُومَةُ الْبَاقِي‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَهُ وَهَشَمَ أَوْضَحَ وَأَخَذَ خَمْسَةَ أَبْعِرَةٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَ وَنَقَلَ أَوْضَحَ، وَلَهُ عَشَرَةُ أَبْعِرَةٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَهُ مِنْ الْكُوعِ فَلَيْسَ لَهُ الْتِقَاطُ أَصَابِعِهِ، فَإِنْ فَعَلَهُ عُزِّرَ وَلَا غُرْمَ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ لَهُ قَطْعَ الْكَفِّ بَعْدَهُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ كَسَرَ عَضُدَهُ وَأَبَانَهُ قُطِعَ مِنْ الْمِرْفَقِ، وَلَهُ حُكُومَةُ الْبَاقِي، فَلَوْ طَلَبَ الْكُوعَ مُكِّنَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَهُ فَذَهَبَ ضَوْءُهُ أَوْضَحَهُ فَإِنْ ذَهَبَ الضَّوْءُ وَإِلَّا أَذْهَبَهُ بِأَخَفِّ مُمْكِنٍ كَتَقْرِيبِ حَدِيدَةٍ مُحْمَاةٍ مِنْ حَدَقَتِهِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ لَطَمَهُ لَطْمَةً تُذْهِبُ ضَوْءَهُ غَالِبًا فَذَهَبَ لَطَمَهُ مِثْلَهَا، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَذْهَبْ أُذْهِبَ‏.‏

وَالسَّمْعُ كَالْبَصَرِ يَجِبُ الْقِصَاصُ فِيهِ بِالسِّرَايَةِ‏.‏

وَكَذَا الْبَطْشُ وَالذَّوْقُ وَالشَّمُّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَ أُصْبُعًا فَتَأَكَّلَ غَيْرُهَا فَلَا قِصَاصَ فِي الْمُتَأَكِّلِ‏.‏

Section

Punishment under the law of talion for the loss of one of the members
of the body or for some other wound is regulated by the same principles
as we have just explained relating to the application of the law of talion
for homicide. Thus, for example, where several persons have concurred
in the act of cutting off the victim’s hand by placmg a sabre upon his
wrist and each giving it a blow so as to sever the hand from the arm,
each must have his hand cut off under the law of talion.

Wounds on the head and face are of ten different kinds —

. Harisa, i.e. if only the skin has been cut or scraped.

. Damia , if blood has flowed.

. Badia , if the flesh has been injured.

. Mutalahima , if the flesh has been penetrated.

. Simhak , if the membrane enters the flesh and the bone is injured.

. Mudiha, if the bone has been uncovered.

. Hashima , if the bone itself has been injured.

. Munakkila, if the bone is broken, so that the fragments are
separated.

. Mamuma, if the membrane of the brain has been injured.

. Damigha , if the brain is injured.

The law of talion is applicable only to wounds of the sixth category ;
or, according to some authorities, to categories -G. As to other bodily
wounds they involve an application of the law of talion where the bone
is exposed, or where there has been mutilation of a part of the nose or
of the ears without exposure of the bone. This penalty is also incurred
by any one who cuts a member at a joint, even if this is at the beginning
of a thigh or of an arm, at any rate where such an amputation can take
place without wounding the interior of the body of the criminal, fflf
this is impossible a mutilation under the law of talion cannot take place,
for fear lest the punishment should exceed the crime. The law of talion
applies also to a person who tears out an eye, or cuts off an ear, an eyelid,
the nose, a lip, the tongue, the penis, the testicles, fthe buttocks, for
the edges of the vagina. On the other hand, the law of talion does not
apply to the breaking of a bone ; in this case it is enough to amputate
the bone of the criminal at the nearest lower joint, and make him pay
the fine, if the amputation is less serious than the hurt to the injured
party. In the case of a wound under the category mudiha and also
under the category hashima , the law of talion should be applied for the
former, and a price of blood of five camels exacted for the latter. In
the case of a wound under the category mudiha and also under munak
kila , an application of the law of talion may be claimed for the former,
and a price of blood of ten camels for the latter.

A person who may demand that the criminal’s wrist be severed
under the law of talion may not aggravate the penalty by exacting a
separate amputation of each finger ; and if he has in this way exceeded
his just due the court should inflict upon him a discretionary punish-
ment, without, however, condemning him to pay any price of blood,
f This punishment for an amputation of the fingers does not prevent an
amputation of the criminal’s hand.

Where the criminal breaks some one’s bone in the upper part of the
arm, and afterwards cuts the lower part, an amputation under the law
of talion is effected only at the elbow, and a fine is also due for rendering
useless the upper part of the arm. fThe injured party may also content
himself with the amputation of the criminal’s wrist, together with the
price of hlood for the part of the arm comprised between the wrist and
the place where the bone was broken.

A criminal who has caused some one a wound on the head under
the category mudiha , in consequence of which the injured party loses
his sight, should suffer a mudiha of the same kind under the law of
talion ; and if the criminal then loses his sight the matter may be con-
sidered at an end. Otherwise he must suffer the loss of his sight in the
most expeditious manner possible, e.g. by having a red-hot iron held
close to his eyeballs. And the same procedure must be followed in a
caso where one of the parties has given the other a blow likely in
ordinary circumstances to cause loss of sight, a blow which in fact does
cause blindness. Hearing is subject to exactly the same principles as
sight ; and the loss of either of these faculties involves an application
of the law of talion, even though it may be an indirect and not an
immediate consequence of the wound, f The same principles regulate
a case of loss of bodily strength, of taste, or of the sense of smell. On
the other hand, where one has cut some one’s finger, and the victim loses
another in consequence of the wound, one is liable under the law of
talion only for the finger one has cut, and not for the other lost as an
indirect consequence of the wound.

باب كَيْفِيَّةِ الْقِصَاصِ وَمُسْتَوْفِيهِ وَالِاخْتِلَافُ فِيهِ

CHAPTER II.— METHOD OF PUNISHMENT UNDER THE LAW OF TALION, AND THE PERSONS WHO CAN DEMAND ITS APPLICATION.

لَا تُقْطَعُ يَسَارٌ بِيَمِينٍ، وَلَا شَفَةٌ سُفْلَى بِعُلْيَا وَعَكْسُهُ، وَلَا أُنْمُلَةٌ بِأُخْرَى، وَلَا زَائِدٌ بِزَائِدٍ فِي مَحَلٍّ آخَرَ‏.‏

وَلَا يَضُرُّ تَفَاوُتُ كِبَرٍ وَطُولٍ وَقُوَّةِ بَطْشٍ فِي أَصْلِيٍّ، وَكَذَا زَائِدٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَيُعْتَبَرُ قَدْرُ الْمُوضِحَةِ طُولاً وَعَرْضًا‏.‏

وَلَا يَضُرُّ تَفَاوُتُ غِلَظِ لَحْمٍ وَجِلْدٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَ كُلَّ رَأْسِهِ، وَرَأْسُ الشَّاجِّ أَصْغَرُ اسْتَوْعَبْنَاهُ وَلَا نُتَمِّمُهُ مِنْ الْوَجْهِ وَالْقَفَا، بَلْ يُؤْخَذُ قِسْطُ الْبَاقِي مِنْ أَرْشِ الْمُوضِحَةِ لَوْ وُزِّعَ عَلَى جَمِيعِهَا‏.‏

وَإِنْ كَانَ رَأْسُ الشَّاجِّ أَكْبَرَ أُخِذَ قَدْرُ رَأْسِ الْمَشْجُوجِ فَقَطْ، وَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّ الِاخْتِيَارَ فِي مَوْضِعِهِ إلَى الْجَانِي‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَ نَاصِيَةً، وَنَاصِيَتُهُ أَصْغَرُ تُمِّمَ مِنْ بَاقِي الرَّأْسِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ زَادَ الْمُقْتَصُّ فِي مُوضِحَةٍ عَلَى حَقِّهِ لَزِمَهُ قِصَاصُ الزِّيَادَةِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ خَطَأً أَوْ عَفَا عَلَى مَالٍ وَجَبَ أَرْشٌ كَامِلٌ، وَقِيلَ قِسْطٌ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَهُ جَمْعٌ أَوْضَحَ مِنْ كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِثْلَهَا، وَقِيلَ قِسْطُهُ‏.‏

وَلَا تُقْطَعُ صَحِيحَةٌ بِشَلَّاءَ، وَإِنْ رَضِيَ الْجَانِي، فَلَوْ فَعَلَ لَمْ يَقَعْ قِصَاصًا بَلْ عَلَيْهِ دِيَتُهَا، فَلَوْ سَرَى فَعَلَيْهِ قِصَاصُ النَّفْسِ، وَتُقْطَعُ الشَّلَّاءُ بِالصَّحِيحَةِ إلَّا أَنْ يَقُولَ أَهْلُ الْخِبْرَةِ لَا يَنْقَطِعُ الدَّمُ وَيَقْنَعَ بِهَا مُسْتَوْفِيهَا‏.‏

وَيُقْطَعُ سَلِيمٌ بِأَعْسَمَ وَأَعْرَجَ، وَلَا أَثَرَ لِخُضْرَةِ أَظْفَارٍ وَسَوَادِهَا، وَالصَّحِيحُ قَطْعُ ذَاهِبَةِ الْأَظْفَارِ بِسَلِيمَتِهَا دُونَ عَكْسِهِ‏.‏

وَالذَّكَرُ صِحَّةً وَشَلَلاً كَالْيَدِ، وَالْأَشَلُّ‏:‏ مُنْقَبِضٌ لَا يَنْبَسِطُ أَوْ عَكْسُهُ، وَلَا أَثَرَ لِلِانْتِشَارِ وَعَدَمِهِ، فَيُقْطَعُ فَحْلٌ بِخَصِيٍّ، وَعِنِّينٍ‏.‏

وَأَنْفٌ صَحِيحٌ بِأَخْشَمَ‏.‏

وَأُذُنُ سَمِيعٍ بِأَصَمَّ لَا عَيْنٌ صَحِيحَةٌ بِحَدَقَةٍ عَمْيَاءَ‏.‏

وَلَا لِسَانٌ نَاطِقٌ بِأَخْرَسَ‏.‏

وَفِي قَلْعِ السِّنِّ قِصَاصٌ، لَا فِي كَسْرِهَا، وَلَوْ قَلَعَ سِنَّ صَغِيرٍ لَمْ يُثْغِرْ فَلَا ضَمَانَ فِي الْحَالِ، فَإِنْ جَاءَ وَقْتُ نَبَاتِهَا بِأَنْ سَقَطَتْ الْبَوَاقِي وَعُدْنَ دُونَهَا، وَقَالَ أَهْلُ الْبَصَرِ‏:‏ فَسَدَ الْمَنْبَتُ وَجَبَ الْقِصَاصُ، وَلَا يُسْتَوْفَى لَهُ فِي صِغَرِهِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَلَعَ سِنَّ مَثْغُورٍ فَنَبَتَتْ لَمْ يَسْقُطْ الْقِصَاصُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ نَقَصَتْ يَدُهُ أُصْبُعًا فَقَطَعَ كَامِلَةً قُطِعَ وَعَلَيْهِ أَرْشُ أُصْبُعٍ، وَلَوْ قَطَعَ كَامِلٌ نَاقِصَةً فَإِنْ شَاءَ الْمَقْطُوعُ أَخَذَ دِيَةَ أَصَابِعِهِ الْأَرْبَعِ، وَإِنْ شَاءَ لَقَطَهَا، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ حُكُومَةَ مَنَابِتِهِنَّ تَجِبُ إنْ لَقَطَ، لَا إنْ أَخَذَ دِيَتَهُنَّ، وَ أَنَّهُ يَجِبُ فِي الْحَالَيْنِ حُكُومَةُ خُمُسِ الْكَفِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَ كَفًّا بِلَا أَصَابِعَ فَلَا قِصَاصَ إلَّا أَنْ تَكُونَ كَفُّهُ مِثْلَهَا‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَ فَاقِدُ الْأَصَابِعِ كَامِلَهَا قَطَعَ كَفَّهُ وَأَخَذَ دِيَةَ الْأَصَابِعِ، وَلَوْ شَلَّتْ أُصْبُعَاهُ فَقَطَعَ يَدًا كَامِلَةً، فَإِنْ شَاءَ لَقَطَ الثَّلَاثَ السَّلِيمَةَ وَأَخَذَ دِيَةَ أُصْبُعَيْنِ، وَإِنْ شَاءَ قَطَعَ يَدَهُ وَقَنَعَ بِهَا‏.‏

CHAPTER II.— METHOD OF PUNISHMENT UNDER THE LAW OF TALION, AND THE PERSONS WHO CAN DEMAND ITS APPLICATION.

Section

The left hand may not be amputated, by way of talion, in exchange
for the right hand ; nor the lower lip instead of the upper ; nor vice
versa . Nor may the end of one finger be substituted for that of another ;
nor a member at one part of the body for a member at another. On the
other hand, it is of no consequence if the member of the criminal to be
amputated is thicker, longer, or stronger than that of the victim, whether
such member be for be not an organic member.

As to wounds of the category of the mudiha , i.e. the only ones that
admit of an application of the law of talion, the length and width — but
not the thickness — of the flesh and of the skin must be taken into con-
sideration. If the mudiha extends to the entire surface of the skull,
and the criminal’s skull is smaller than that of the victim, it is enough
to give him a similar wound extending to the entire surface of the skull,
but not affecting the face or the neck. The criminal then owes in
addition a pecuniary indemnity proportional to the greater gravity of
the victim’s wound. Where, on the other hand, the criminal’s skull is
the greater it is enough to give him a wound of the same extent as that
of the victim, even though this does not affect the entire skull ; ffand
in this case the criminal may even indicate the part of the skull upon
which he prefers to receive the wound. In the case of a mudiha that
removes the scalp, this is applied to the criminal to the same extent,
even though that part of the skull should be smaller than in the injured
person, and that in consequence the wound inflicted by way of talion
extends beyond the scalp. A person who may demand all application
of the law of talion for a mudiha, and who exceeds the measure of the
mudiha received, is liable himself under the law of talion for the excess.
In a case where the injured party has involuntarily exceeded this
measure, and also where the criminal is contented with a pecuniary
penalty for the injury wrongly suffered by him, the injured party owes
him the indemnity prescribed for the wound as a whole ; though some
authorities consider that the injured party is liable merely for an
indemnity proportional to the gravity of the excessive punishment he
has inflicted. Where several persons jointly inflict a mudiha upon
another, they are each individually liable to a mudiha ; or, according
to some authorities, to a single nudiha in common, so that the total
does not exceed the injury suffered by the victim.

A sound hand or a foot is not to be cut off for a mutilated hand or
foot, even with the criminars consent ; but if one commits a contraven-
tion of this rule, one is not liable under the law of talion, but only for
the price of blood. Should, however, the criminal die in consequence of
such an abuse, the injured party is liable under the law of talion to the
punishment for premeditated homicide. On the other hand, a mutilated
hand or foot may be amputated for a sound hand or foot, unless experts
declare that it will be impossible to stop the flow of blood. And the
injured party must in any case be content with the amputation of the
mutilated member, and cannot claim any fine in addition. A sound
hand or foot may be amputated for a crooked or lame hand or foot ;
and no attention need be paid to the colour of the nails of the member
to be amputated, ff A place where a nail has disappeared is amputated
for an entire nail, but not vice versa . The penis is subject to the same
principles as the hand or the foot, so far as regards normal or mutilated
state ; but it must be understood that the term “ mutilated ” applies
to a penis that has lost its natural elasticity, but not to one that has
merely lost its power of erection. Consequently the penis of a man in
full enjoyment of his virile faculties may be amputated for that of a
castrated or impotent person. Similarly, a sound nose is amputated
for a nose that has lost the sense of smell, a sound ear for a deaf one ;
but not a good eye for a blind eye, nor a sound tongue for a mute tongue.

The law of talion applies to the extraction but not to the breaking
of a tooth. Nothing is due for the moment from a person who tears
out a tooth from a child that still has its milk teeth, but if it subse-
quently appears when the child changes its teeth that the tooth in
question is not replaced, and experts declare it to be duo to a defect in
the jaw occasioned by the wound, the criminal is liable to the law of
talion, but never before the child comes of age. *ln the case of a tooth
torn out from a person who lias already lost his milk teeth, an application
of the law of talion does not depend upon the ascertainment of a new
tooth in the alveole.

If one cuts off a person’s sound hand, having oneself a hand with
only four fingers, one must suffer the amputation of this incomplete
hand, and pay in addition an indemnity for the injured party’s other
linger. Where, on the other hand, it is the injured party who lacked a
finger, he cannot claim the amputation of the criminal’s hand, but must
limit his demand either to the price of blood of his four fingers and
nothing else, or to the amputation of four fingers of the criminal, fplus
a fine for the part of the hand where the fingers were joined to if, fall
without prejudice to a fine of one-fifth of the price of blood for the hand,
due in the one case and in the other. Where, on the other hand, one
cuts some one’s hand that has no fingers at all, one is not liable under the
law of talion unless one has oneself a similar hand. Where one cuts a
sound hand, but lacks five fingers oneself, one suffers amputation of the
mutilated hand, and pays in addition the price of blood of the victim’s
live lingers. Where a criminal who has only two mutilated fingers cuts
the victim’s sound hand, the latter may choose between the amputation
of the criminal's three remaining fingers, plus the price of blood for the
two others he has lost, and the amputation of the criminal’s hand and
nothing more.

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏في اختلاف مستحق الدم والجاني‏]‏

قَدَّ مَلْفُوفًا وَزَعَمَ مَوْتَهُ صُدِّقَ الْوَلِيُّ بِيَمِينِهِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَ طَرَفًا وَزَعَمَ نَقْصَهُ فَالْمَذْهَبُ تَصْدِيقُهُ إنْ أَنْكَرَ أَصْلَ السَّلَامَةِ فِي عُضْوٍ ظَاهِرٍ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا‏.‏

أَوْ يَدَيْهِ وَرِجْلَيْهِ فَمَاتَ وَزَعَمَ سِرَايَةً، وَالْوَلِيُّ انْدِمَالاً مُمْكِنًا أَوْ سَبَبًا فَالْأَصَحُّ تَصْدِيقُ الْوَلِيِّ‏.‏

وَكَذَا لَوْ قَطَعَ يَدَهُ وَزَعَمَ سَبَبًا وَالْوَلِيُّ سِرَايَةً‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَهُ مُوضِحَتَيْنِ وَرَفَعَ الْحَاجِزَ وَزَعَمَهُ قَبْلَ انْدِمَالِهِ صُدِّقَ إنْ أَمْكَنَ، وَإِلَّا حَلَفَ الْجَرِيحُ وَثَبَتَ أَرْشَانِ‏.‏

قِيلَ‏:‏ وَثَالِثٌ‏.‏

Section

*When one cuts in two a person enveloped in some piece of cloth,
and then maintains it was a corpse, the legal presumption is in favour
of the representative of the victim, provided he takes an oath, and asserts
the victim was alive at the moment of the crime. According to our
school this presumption exists in favour of the criminal, though not on
oath, when, summoned to court for cutting a member of the body, he
alleges that the member had a natural defect, at least in the case of a
member usually visible. In any other case the presumption is in-
admissible. fWhere one cuts some one’s two hands and then his two
feet, and the victim dies, and one maintains that death was the con-
sequence of the wounds, while the victim’s representative alleges the
contrary, either on the ground that there was a sufficient interval for
the victim to be healed, or because death was due to some other cause,
the representative enjoys the benefit of the legal presumption, and the
criminal owes the price of blood, not for killing the victim, but for cutting
the two hands and the two feet, that is to say, the double. The repre-
sentative also enjoys this presumption if the criminal has cut only one
of the victim’s hands, and maintains that death is due to some other cause,
while the representative maintains that it is due to the wound, and that
consequently he may claim the price of blood for homicide and not for
the wound. When one gives some one two wounds of the category
mudiha , and then removes a portion of the skin between the two, in
order to make them appear to be only one, and so to be liable for only
one indemnity, one has a presumption in one’s favour if one alleges that
the new wound was made before the two others were healed, at least if
this is possible. In this case the injured party may confirm on oath
his statement that the new wound was caused after the healing of the
others, and the criminal must pay two indemnities, or even three,
according to some authorities.

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏في مستحق القود ومستوفيه وما يتعلق بهما‏]‏

الصَّحِيحُ ثُبُوتُهُ لِكُلِّ وَارِثٍ‏.‏

وَيُنْتَظَرُ غَائِبُهُمْ وَكَمَالُ صَبِيِّهِمْ، وَمَجْنُونِهِمْ‏.‏

وَيُحْبَسُ الْقَاتِلُ وَلَا يُخَلَّى بِكَفِيلٍ، وَلْيَتَّفِقُوا عَلَى مُسْتَوْفٍ‏.‏

وَإِلَّا فَقُرْعَةٌ‏.‏

يَدْخُلُهَا الْعَاجِزُ وَيَسْتَنِيبُ، وَقِيلَ لَا يَدْخُلُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ بَدَرَ أَحَدُهُمْ فَقَتَلَهُ فَالْأَظْهَرُ لَا قِصَاصَ، وَلِلْبَاقِينَ قِسْطُ الدِّيَةِ مِنْ تَرِكَتِهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ مِنْ الْمُبَادِرِ‏.‏

وَإِنْ بَادَرَ بَعْدَ غَيْرِهِ لَزِمَهُ الْقِصَاصُ، وَقِيلَ لَا إنْ لَمْ يَعْلَمْ، وَيَحْكُمْ قَاضٍ بِهِ، وَلَا يُسْتَوْفَى قِصَاصٌ إلَّا بِإِذْنِ الْإِمَامِ‏.‏

فَإِنْ اسْتَقَلَّ عُزِّرَ، وَيَأْذَنُ لِأَهْلٍ فِي نَفْسٍ، لَا فِي طَرَفٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

فَإِنْ أَذِنَ فِي ضَرْبِ رَقَبَةٍ فَأَصَابَ غَيْرَهَا عَمْدًا عُزِّرَ وَلَمْ يَعْزِلْهُ، وَلَوْ قَالَ‏:‏ أَخْطَأْت وَأَمْكَنَ عَزْلُهُ لَمْ يُعَزَّرْ‏.‏

وَأُجْرَةُ الْجَلَّادِ عَلَى الْجَانِي عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ‏.‏

وَيُقْتَصُّ عَلَى الْفَوْرِ، وَفِي الْحَرَمِ وَ الْحَرِّ وَالْبَرْدِ وَالْمَرَضِ‏.‏

وَتُحْبَسُ الْحَامِلُ فِي قِصَاصِ النَّفْسِ أَوْ الطَّرَفِ حَتَّى تُرْضِعَهُ اللِّبَأَ وَيَسْتَغْنِيَ بِغَيْرِهَا، أَوْ فِطَامِ حَوْلَيْنِ‏.‏

وَالصَّحِيحُ تَصْدِيقُهَا فِي حَمْلِهَا بِغَيْرِ مَخِيلَةٍ‏.‏

وَمَنْ قَتَلَ بِمُحَدَّدٍ أَوْ خَنِقٍ أَوْ تَجْوِيعٍ وَنَحْوِهِ اُقْتُصَّ بِهِ أَوْ بِسِحْرٍ فَبِسَيْفٍ‏.‏

وَكَذَا خَمْرٌ وَلِوَاطٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ جُوِّعَ كَتَجْوِيعِهِ فَلَمْ يَمُتْ زِيدَ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ السَّيْفُ‏.‏

وَمَنْ عَدَلَ إلَى سَيْفٍ فَلَهُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَ فَسَرَى فَلِلْوَلِيِّ حَزُّ رَقَبَتِهِ، وَلَهُ الْقَطْعُ ثُمَّ الْحَزُّ، وَإِنْ شَاءَ انْتَظَرَ السِّرَايَةَ‏.‏

وَلَوْ مَاتَ بِجَائِفَةٍ أَوْ كَسْرِ عَضُدٍ فَالْحَزُّ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ كَفِعْلِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَمُتْ لَمْ تَزِدْ الْجَوَائِفُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ اقْتَصَّ مَقْطُوعٌ ثُمَّ مَاتَ سِرَايَةً فَلِوَلِيِّهِ حَزٌّ، وَلَهُ عَفْوٌ بِنِصْفِ دِيَةٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قُطِعَتْ يَدَاهُ فَاقْتَصَّ ثُمَّ مَاتَ فَلِوَلِيِّهِ الْحَزُّ، فَإِنْ عَفَا فَلَا شَيْءَ لَهُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ مَاتَ جَانٍ مِنْ قَطْعِ قِصَاصٍ فَهَدَرٌ وَإِنْ مَاتَا سِرَايَةً مَعًا أَوْ سَبَقَ الْمَجْنِيُّ عَلَيْهِ فَقَدْ اقْتَصَّ، وَإِنْ تَأَخَّرَ فَلَهُ نِصْفُ الدِّيَةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَالَ مُسْتَحِقُّ يَمِينٍ أَخْرِجْهَا فَأَخْرَجَ يَسَارَهُ وَقَصَدَ إبَاحَتَهَا فَمُهْدَرَةٌ وَإِنْ قَالَ‏:‏ جَعَلْتُهَا عَنْ الْيَمِينِ وَظَنَنْتُ إجْزَاءَهَا فَكَذَّبَهُ فَالْأَصَحُّ لَا قِصَاصَ فِي الْيَسَارِ، وَتَجِبُ دِيَةٌ، وَيَبْقَى قِصَاصُ الْيَمِينِ، وَكَذَا لَوْ قَالَ دُهِشْتُ فَظَنَنْتُهَا الْيَمِينَ‏.‏

وَقَالَ الْقَاطِعُ ظَنَنْتُهَا الْيَمِينَ‏.‏

Section

ffThe victim’s heirs have a joint right to demand the punishment
of a criminal guilty of homicide, and if there are among them absentees,
minors, or lunatics, the prosecution must be adjourned until the first
return, the second come of age, and the last recover their reason. The
criminal must remain in prison until then ; and he cannot claim to be
released on bail. The heirs, however, should designate one of their
number to conduct the prosecution in their name as representative of
the victim ; and if they cannot agree it must be decided by lot who is
to discharge this duty. Where, under these circumstances, there is
chosen by lot a person who is in some respect unsuitable to perform the
task satisfactorily, he should be replaced by a substitute. According
to some authorities unsuitable persons should not be among those among
whom the lots are cast. *Moreover, where, in contravention of this
principle, one of the heirs presents himself of his own accord and pro-
ceeds to the application of the death penalty after obtaining the necessary
authorisation, he does not himself become liable under the law of talion,
and his coinheritors may still claim their share of the price of blood in
the criminal’s estate. Only one jurist maintains that it is the inheritor
who has thus overstepped the limits of his authority who owes them
this indemnity. If the heirs had already pardoned the criminal the
inheritor who on his own initiative has carried on a prosecution and
applied the capital punishment, is himself punishable with death under
the law of talion. This rule, however, is limited by some authorities
to the case where the inheritor in question, though knowing the others
had pardoned the criminal, still proceeded to the application of the
penalty in spite of the prohibition of the court.

Punishment under the law of talion may be carried out only after the
authorisation of the Sovereign or of his deputy. An injured party or
his representative who acts ou his own initiative is liable to punishment
at the discretion of the court. In any case the claimant is authorised
personally to apply the penalty only when that penalty is death. In
the case of all other punishments under the law of talion, such as the
amputation of a bodily member, etc., it is the official executioner who
must be charged with the duty of carrying them out. The penalty of
death must be carried out in the manner ordered by the judgment. Thus
a person who has been authorised to cut off the criminal’s head, and who
intentionally strikes him in another part of the body not indicated in
the judgment, is liable to punishment at the discretion of the court,
though his right to execute the judgment remains in its entirety. Where,
on the other hand, this person declares that he erroneously struck the
criminal in a place not indicated by the judgment, and the circumstances
admit of the truth of this assertion, the court should transfer the execu-
tion of the judgment to some one else, without pronouncing any punish-
ment. ffTlie hire of the executioner is defrayed by the condemned
person.

A penalty under the law of talion must be executed no long time
after the condemnation, without paying any attention to whether one
is in the sacred territory of Mecca, or whether it is hot or cold, or whether
the condemned person is sick. A death penalty or amputation cannot
be carried out immediately in the case of a pregnant woman. She must
remain in prison not only until she has suckled her child with the first
milk occurring after her accouchement, but also until another nurse has
been found, and if necessary until the child is weaned, that is, until it
is two years old. ffThe simple declaration of a condemned woman
that she is pregnant is sufficient, even in the absence of visible signs.

Where the victim has been killed by means of an instrument for
cutting, or by strangulation, burning, drowning, or starving, etc., the
criminal must be put to death in the same way ; but if the homicide
has been committed by means of magic, he must perish by the sword,
f This is also the case where the criminal killed his victim by making him
swallow wine, or by pederasty. If in case of homicide by starvation
the criminal remains without food for the same number of days as his
victim without death resulting, the execution must continue until death
ensues. According to one authority, however, the criminal should then
perish by the sword. A criminal who has killed his victim by the sword
may demand to be executed in the same way. If the victim did not
immediately succumb from the wound received, but did so later the
representative may. at his choice either at once cut off the condemned
person’s head, or first give him the wound he gave his victim and then
either cut his head off or leave him to die of the first wound. If the
victim succumbed to an internal wound, or to the breaking of his upper
arm, the criminal should have his head cut off. Only one author main-
tains that the criminal should then receive the same wound as the*
victim, *and that if he does not die he cannot be given another wound to
finish him. For instance, if the victim’s wound consists in the loss of
a hand, and he succumbs to the consequences of this wound after
amputation of the criminal’s hand under the law of talion, the victim’s
representative may either cut off the criminal’s head, or pardon him for
half the price of blood for homicide. When, in these circumstances the
victim’s wound consists in the loss of both hands, the representative
may none the less cut off the criminal’ s head after lie has suffered under
the law of talion for the two hands ; but if he pardons him he can claim
nothing more.

No responsibility is incurred where the criminal dies from wounds
given him under the law of talion. Thus, where there is the loss of a
hand, nothing is due from either side, when both the injured party and
the criminal die simultaneously of their wounds. And it is the same
where the injured party dies before the criminal. fBut if in these
circumstances the criminal dies first, the injured party may still claim
the half of the price of blood.

Where the criminal, told to present his right hand to be amputated
under the law of talion, presents his left, in order to have it also cut off,
nothing is due by the person who has obtained the judgment if lie in
fact cuts off that left hand ; and he may then proceed to the amputation
of the right hand. fBut when, in these same circumstances, the
criminal declares that he presented the left hand in order to suffer with
it the penalty under the law of talion, and the injured party is not
content with this, the amputation of the criminal’s right hand may bo
proceeded with, but the price of blood must be paid for the left hand
amputated by mistake. One is not liable under the law of talion in
this respect. The same rule is applicable where the criminal declares
that he presented the left hand in the confusion of the moment, believing
it to be the right, and the injured party says he also made the same
mistake.

فصل ‏[‏في موجب العمد وفي العفو‏]‏

مُوجَبُ الْعَمْدِ الْقَوَدُ، وَالدِّيَةُ بَدَلٌ عِنْدَ سُقُوطِهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ أَحَدُهُمَا مُبْهَمًا، وَعَلَى الْقَوْلَيْنِ لِلْوَلِيِّ عَفْوٌ عَلَى الدِّيَةِ بِغَيْرِ رِضَا الْجَانِي، وَعَلَى الْأَوَّلِ لَوْ أَطْلَقَ الْعَفْوَ فَالْمَذْهَبُ لَا دِيَةَ وَلَوْ عَفَا عَنْ الدِّيَةِ لَغَا، وَلَهُ الْعَفْوُ بَعْدَهُ عَلَيْهَا، وَلَوْ عَفَا عَلَى غَيْرِ جِنْسِ الدِّيَةِ ثَبَتَ إنْ قَبِلَ الْجَانِي، وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَلَا يَسْقُطُ الْقَوَدُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَيْسَ لِمَحْجُورِ فَلَسٍ عَفْوٌ عَنْ مَالٍ إنْ أَوْجَبْنَا أَحَدَهُمْ، وَإِلَّا فَإِنْ عَفَا عَلَى الدِّيَةِ ثَبَتَتْ، وَإِنْ أَطْلَقَ فَكَمَا سَبَقَ، وَإِنْ عَفَا عَلَى أَنْ لَا مَالَ فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَجِبُ شَيْءٌ، وَالْمُبَذِّرُ فِي الدِّيَةِ كَمُفْلِسٍ، وَقِيلَ كَصَبِيٍّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ تَصَالَحَا عَنْ الْقَوَدِ عَلَى مِائَتَيْ بَعِيرٍ لَغَا إنْ أَوْجَبْنَا أَحَدَهُمَا، وَإِلَّا فَالْأَصَحُّ الصِّحَّةُ، وَلَوْ قَالَ رَشِيدٌ‏:‏ اقْطَعْنِي فَفَعَلَ فَهَدَرٌ، فَإِنْ سَرَى أَوْ قَالَ اُقْتُلْنِي فَهَدَرٌ وَفِي قَوْلٍ تَجِبُ دِيَةٌ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قُطِعَ فَعَفَا عَنْ قَوَدِهِ وَأَرْشِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَسْرِ فَلَا شَيْءَ، وَإِنْ سَرَى فَلَا قِصَاصَ‏.‏

وَأَمَّا أَرْشُ الْعُضْوِ فَإِنْ جَرَى لَفْظُ وَصِيَّةٍ كَأَوْصَيْتُ لَهُ بِأَرْشِ هَذِهِ الْجِنَايَةِ فَوَصِيَّةٌ لِقَاتِلٍ، أَوْ لَفْظُ إبْرَاءٍ أَوْ إسْقَاطٍ، أَوْ عَفْوٌ سَقَطَ، وَقِيلَ وَصِيَّةٌ، وَتَجِبُ الزِّيَادَةُ عَلَيْهِ إلَى تَمَامِ الدِّيَةِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ إنْ تَعَرَّضَ فِي عَفْوِهِ لِمَا يَحْدُثُ مِنْهَا سَقَطَتْ‏.‏

فَلَوْ سَرَى إلَى عُضْوٍ آخَرَ فَانْدَمَلَ ضَمِنَ دِيَةَ السِّرَايَةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَمَنْ لَهُ قِصَاصُ نَفْسٍ بِسِرَايَةِ طَرَفٍ لَوْ عَفَا عَنْ النَّفْسِ فَلَا قَطْعَ لَهُ، أَوْ عَنْ الطَّرَفِ فَلَهُ حَزُّ الرَّقَبَةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَهُ ثُمَّ عَفَا عَنْ النَّفْسِ مَجَّانًا، فَإِنْ سَرَى الْقَطْعُ بَانَ بُطْلَانُ الْعَفْوِ، وَإِلَّا فَيَصِحُّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ وَكَّلَ ثُمَّ عَفَا فَاقْتَصَّ الْوَكِيلُ جَاهِلاً فَلَا قِصَاصَ عَلَيْهِ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ وُجُوبُ دِيَةٍ، وَأَنَّهَا عَلَيْهِ لَا عَلَى عَاقِلَتِهِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا يَرْجِعُ بِهَا عَلَى الْعَافِي‏.‏

وَلَوْ وَجَبَ قِصَاصٌ عَلَيْهَا فَنَكَحَهَا عَلَيْهِ جَازَ وَسَقَطَ، فَإِنْ فَارَقَ قَبْلَ الْوَطْءِ رَجَعَ بِنِصْفِ الْأَرْشِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ بِنِصْفِ مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ‏.‏

Section

All premeditated crimes are punishable under the law of talion and
subsidiarily by the price of blood ; or, according to one jurist, either by
the one or the other. In any case, however, the representative of the
victim has the right to pardon the criminal, i.e. to grant him a remission
of tho penalty under the law of talion and content himself with the price
of blood, even though this may be against the criminal’s wish. However,
if it be admitted that the price of blood is only a subsidiary penalty in
place of that under the law of talion, an unreserved remission of the
latter has, according to our school, the effect of implying a remission of
the price of blood ; while the remission of the price of blood alone is
invalid and forms no obstacle to a subsequent remission of the penalty
under the law of talion for this same price of blood. A remission of the
penalty under the law of talion may take place for an indemnity of some
other nature than the price of blood prescribed by law ; but in that case
the criminal’s consent is necessary, and in default of this the remission
is considered to be ipso facto retracted, so that the law of talion may be
applied. Where it is admitted that the law of talion and the price of
blood are equally applicable in the first instance, and that consequently a
remission of the price of blood alone is possible, a bankrupt may not
grant this remission. On the other hand, in the system maintained by
the majority of jurists a remission of the penalty under the law of talion
by a bankrupt for the price of blood, has the effect of rendering this
price of blood claimable, and the unreserved remission of the penalty
under the law of talion implies the remission of the price of blood as we
have just shown. Even the remission of the penalty under the law of
talion on the part of a bankrupt, on the special condition that no
pecuniary penalty should be incurred at all, is lawful, at least according
to our school. A person legally incapable by reason of prodigality is,
so far as regards the subject with which we are now occupied, in the
same position as the bankrupt ; or, according to other authorities, as
the minor. The remission of the penalty under the law of talion for an
indemnity of a similar nature to but greater than the price of blood,
e.g. of two hundred camels, is void, in the second system referred to,
even though the criminal consents ; jbut, according to the authorities
who consider the price of blood as a subsidiary penalty, such a compro-
mise would be lawful.

An adult whose intelligence is sufficiently developed to allow of his
managing his property may legally ask some one to give him a wound.
In such a case there is no crime on the part of the person who gives the
wound ; nor even where the individual in question asks to be killed
at once. One jurist, however, considers such person to be liable for the
price of blood.

Remission either of the penalty under the law of talion or of the
indemnity has for its consequence that the criminal owes nothing,
either in case of homicide or in case of a wound. Even where death is
the indirect consequence of a wound for which remission of the penalty
has been granted, the remission prevents any application of the law of
talion ; but as to the indemnity due for the wound it is only considered
to be remitted as well, under these circumstances, where the remission
is made —

. By the terms of a legacy, c.g. if one says, “ I leave to the criminal
the indemnity he owes me ” ; or

, Where one uses the explicit terms “ remission,” “ abolition,” or
“ pardon.” According to some authorities this also would be a legacy.

All these provisions relate only to the amount of the original
indemnity, that prescribed for the wound ; consequently, in case of
subsequent death from the wound, the criminal owes the difference
between this indemnity and the price of blood for homicide. Only one
jurist considers a remission granted to the person who inflicts a wound
as implying also the price of blood prescribed for loss of life, in all cases
where one specially stipulates that this remission relates not only to the
crime itself but also to its consequences. fWliere a wound inflicted
upon a member of the body does not cause death, but only the loss of
another member, the criminal still owes, in case of a remission of the
penalty under the law of "talion for the original wound, the price of
blood for the second member of the body lost by the victim as an indirect
consequence of the crime. When one has the right to claim a criminal’ s
execution because the wound he has inflicted upon the injured party lias
indirectly caused death, one cannot exact a penalty under the law of
talion for that wound, after granting pardon for the loss of life, f But,
on the other hand, a pardon granted for the wound does not imply a
remission of the capital penalty ; *but the criminal in these circum-
stances may claim to be executed in the most merciful way, by having
his head cut off. Where the penalty for the wound under the law of
talion has been already suffered, and the injured party then grants the
criminal a remission of what lie might claim in case his life was lost in
consequence of the wound, this remission is ipso facto null and void, if
the wound does in reality cause death, unless it has been granted for a
consideration.

If the principal, after telling an agent to see to the application of the
law of talion, pardons the criminal ; but the agent in ignorance of this
carries out his instructions, he is not liable under the law of talion for the
blood that has been unnecessarily shed. *But he is personally liable
for the price of blood, to the exclusion of his aakila, without proceeding
against the principal.

Where a woman incurs a penalty under the law of talion for a wound,
she is freed from liability by marrying the injured party; but if the
parties are separated before the consummation of the marriage the
woman in question owes the half of the indemnity, or, according to one
authority, the half of her proportional dower.

كتاب الدِّيَاتِ

BOOK 48 . — THE PRICE OF BLOOD

فِي قَتْلِ الْحُرِّ الْمُسْلِمِ مِائَةُ بَعِيرٍ مُثَلَّثَةٌ فِي الْعَمْدِ‏:‏ ثَلَاثُونَ حِقَّةً، وَثَلَاثُونَ جَذَعَةً، وَأَرْبَعُونَ خَلِفَةً‏:‏ أَيْ حَامِلاً، وَمُخَمَّسَةٌ فِي الْخَطَأِ‏:‏ عِشْرُونَ بِنْتَ مَخَاضٍ، وَكَذَا بَنَاتُ لَبُونٍ وَبَنُو لَبُونٍ وَحِقَاقٌ، وَجِذَاعٌ‏.‏

فَإِنْ قَتَلَ خَطَأً فِي حَرَمِ مَكَّةَ أَوْ الْأَشْهُرِ الْحُرُمِ‏:‏ ذِي الْقَعْدَةِ وَذِي الْحِجَّةِ وَالْمُحَرَّمِ وَرَجَبٍ‏.‏

أَوْ مَحْرَمًا ذَا رَحِمٍ فَمُثَلَّثَةٌ‏.‏

وَالْخَطَأُ وَإِنْ تَثَلَّثَ فَعَلَى الْعَاقِلَةِ مُؤَجَّلَةٌ‏.‏

وَالْعَمْدُ عَلَى الْجَانِي مُعَجَّلَةٌ‏.‏

وَشِبْهُ الْعَمْدِ مُثَلَّثَةٌ عَلَى الْعَاقِلَةِ مُؤَجَّلَةٌ‏.‏

وَلَا يُقْبَلُ مَعِيبٌ وَمَرِيضٌ إلَّا بِرِضَاهُ، وَيَثْبُتُ حَمْلُ الْخَلِفَةِ بِأَهْلِ خِبْرَةٍ، وَالْأَصَحُّ إجْزَاؤُهَا قَبْلَ خَمْسِ سِنِينَ، وَمَنْ لَزِمَتْهُ وَلَهُ إبِلٌ فَمِنْهَا، وَقِيلَ مِنْ غَالِبِ إبِلِ بَلَدِهِ، وَإِلَّا فَغَالِبِ قَبِيلَةِ بَدَوِيٍّ، وَإِلَّا فَأَقْرَبِ بِلَادٍ، وَلَا يَعْدِلُ إلَى نَوْعٍ وَقِيمَةٍ إلَّا بِتَرَاضٍ، وَلَوْ عُدِمَتْ فَالْقَدِيمُ أَلْفُ دِينَارٍ أَوْ اثْنَا عَشَرَ أَلْفَ دِرْهَمٍ‏.‏

وَالْجَدِيدُ قِيمَتُهَا بِنَقْدِ بَلَدِهِ‏.‏

وَإِنْ وُجِدَ بَعْضٌ أُخِذَ وَقِيمَةُ الْبَاقِي، وَالْمَرْأَةُ وَالْخُنْثَى كَنِصْفِ رَجُلٍ نَفْسًا وَجُرْحًا‏.‏

وَيَهُودِيٌّ وَنَصْرَانِيٌّ ثُلُثُ مُسْلِمٍ‏.‏

وَمَجُوسِيٌّ ثُلُثَا عُشْرِ مُسْلِمٍ، وَكَذَا وَثَنِيٌّ لَهُ أَمَانٌ‏.‏

وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّ مَنْ لَمْ يَبْلُغْهُ الْإِسْلَامُ إنْ تَمَسَّكَ بِدِينٍ لَمْ يُبَدَّلْ فَدِيَةُ دِينِهِ، وَإِلَّا فَكَمَجُوسِيٍّ‏.‏

BOOK 48 . — THE PRICE OF BLOOD

CHAPTER I.— GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section

The price of blood for the homicide of a free Moslem is one hundred
camels ; that is to say —

. In a case of premeditated homicide — thirty hikka, thirty jazaa,
and forty khalifa, or pregnant camels.

. In a case of involuntary homicide — twenty bent-makhad , twenty
bent-labuv, twenty ibu-labun , twenty hikka , and twenty jazaa, or four-
year-old camels.

Involuntary homicide committed —

. Within the sacred territory of Mecca, or

. In one of the sacred months, Zulkaida, Znl-Hejja, Muharram,
or Bejab, or

. Upon a relative within the prohibited degrees, is punishable
with the price of blood on the heavier scale, prescribed for cases of
premeditation.

The price of blood for involuntary homicide, even when aggravated
by one of the three circumstances just mentioned, is a debt for which
the aakila of the criminal are responsible ; but the price of blood for
premeditated homicide can only be recovered from the criminal himself,
and is due at any moment. As to voluntary homicide, this involves
payment of the price of blood under the heavier scale by a certain time,
and may be recovered from the aakila.

Camels that are sick or that have redhibitory defects cannot be
given except with the consent of the injured party ; and the state of
the khalifa should be ascertained by experts. fOn the other hand, it
is of no consequence whether the khalifa have attained their fifth year,
before which period camels do not usually become pregnant. One may
give camels of one’s own herd, without regard to the particular species,
provided they have the required qualities ; though some jurists main-
tain that one can only give camels of that locality. Where one is not
a camel owner it is agreed that one may only give camels of the locality.
A nomad must give camels of his tribe. If there are no camels of the
locality then camels of the nearest locality must be given. But it is
forbidden to give camels without the required qualities or not of the
necessary age ; or even to pay the value of the camels due, except by
mutual consent. If there are absolutely no camels one can oblige the
injured party to accept, instead of camels, a thousand dinar or twelve
thousand drahms. Such was Shafii’s original doctrine ; but during his
stay in Egypt he changed his opinion, and maintained that in such a
case one should substitute for the camels their equivalent in the money
current in the locality. Finally in a case where the camels can be pro-
cured only in part, it is enough to give as many camels as one can, and
i he money value of those that are wanting.

A woman, or a hermaphrodite, is worth half a man, whether in a
case of homicide or in a case of wounding. A Jew or a Christian is
worth the third of a Moslem. A fire-worshipper, or even an idolater
who has a safe conduct, is worth a fifth. According to our school
individuals belonging to foreign nations who have not yet been invited
to embrace the faith, and whose religion has not been expressly abolished
by the Prophet, keep their personal status so far as concerns crimes
committed against their person. Consequently, if one kills or wounds
them, one must pay the price of blood prescribed by their respective
religions. Where, however, the invitation to be converted to Islam
has been made to them, or where their religion has been expressly
abolished, crimes committed against their person incur payment of
the price of blood of a fire-worshipper.

فصل ‏[‏في موجب ما دون النفس من جرح أو نحوه‏]‏

فِي مُوضِحَةِ الرَّأْسِ أَوْ الْوَجْهِ لِحُرٍّ مُسْلِمٍ خَمْسَةُ أَبْعِرَةٍ، وَهَاشِمَةٍ مَعَ إيضَاحٍ عَشَرَةٌ، وَدُونَهُ خَمْسَةٌ، وَقِيلَ حُكُومَةٌ‏.‏

وَمُنَقِّلَةٍ خَمْسَةَ عَشَرَ وَمَأْمُومَةٍ ثُلُثُ الدِّيَةِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَ فَهَشَمَ آخَرُ، وَنَقَّلَ ثَالِثٌ، وَأَمَّ رَابِعٌ فَعَلَى كُلٍّ مِنْ الثَّلَاثَةِ خَمْسَةٌ، وَالرَّابِعِ تَمَامُ الثُّلُثِ‏.‏

وَالشِّجَاجُ قَبْلَ الْمُوضِحَةِ إنْ عُرِفَتْ نِسْبَتُهَا مِنْهَا وَجَبَ قِسْطٌ مِنْ أَرْشِهَا، وَإِلَّا فَحُكُومَةٌ كَجُرْحِ سَائِرِ الْبَدَنِ‏.‏

وَفِي جَائِفَةٍ ثُلُثُ دِيَةٍ، وَهِيَ جُرْحٌ يَنْفُذُ إلَى جَوْفٍ كَبَطْنٍ وَصَدْرٍ، وَثُغْرَةِ نَحْرٍ وَجَبِينٍ وَخَاصِرَةٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَوْضَحَ مَوْضِعَيْنِ بَيْنَهُمَا لَحْمٌ وَجِلْدٌ قِيلَ أَوْ أَحَدُهُمَا فَمُوضِحَتَانِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ انْقَسَمَتْ مُوضِحَتُهُ عَمْدًا وَخَطَأً أَوْ شَمِلَتْ رَأْسًا وَوَجْهًا فَمُوضِحَتَانِ، وَقِيلَ مُوضِحَةٌ، وَلَوْ وَسَّعَ مُوضِحَتَهُ فَوَاحِدَةٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ أَوْ غَيْرُهُ فَثِنْتَانِ‏.‏

وَالْجَائِفَةُ كَمُوضِحَةٍ فِي التَّعَدُّدِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ نَفَذَتْ فِي بَطْنٍ وَخَرَجَتْ مِنْ ظَهْرٍ فَجَائِفَتَانِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ أَوْصَلَ جَوْفَهُ سِنَانًا لَهُ طَرَفَانِ فَثِنْتَانِ‏.‏

وَلَا يَسْقُطُ أَرْشٌ بِالْتِحَامِ مُوضِحَةٍ وَجَائِفَةٍ‏.‏

وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّ فِي الْأُذُنَيْنِ دِيَةً لَا حُكُومَةً، وَبَعْضٌ بِقِسْطِهِ، وَلَوْ أَيْبَسَهُمَا فَدِيَةٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ حُكُومَةٌ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَ يَابِسَتَيْنِ فَحُكُومَةٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ دِيَةٌ‏.‏

وَفِي كُلِّ عَيْنٍ نِصْفُ دِيَةٍ، وَلَوْ عَيْنُ أَحْوَلَ وَأَعْمَشَ وَأَعْوَرَ، وَكَذَا مَنْ بِعَيْنِهِ بَيَاضٌ لَا يُنْقِصُ الضَّوْءَ، فَإِنْ نَقَصَ فَقِسْطٌ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْضَبِطْ فَحُكُومَةٌ‏.‏

وَفِي كُلِّ جَفْنٍ رُبْعُ دِيَةٍ، وَلَوْ لِأَعْمَى‏.‏

وَمَارِنٍ دِيَةٌ، وَفِي كُلٍّ مِنْ طَرَفَيْهِ وَالْحَاجِزِ ثُلُثٌ، وَقِيلَ فِي الْحَاجِزِ حُكُومَةٌ، وَفِيهِمَا دِيَةٌ‏.‏

وَفِي كُلِّ شَفَةٍ نِصْفُ دِيَةٍ‏.‏

وَلِسَانٍ وَلَوْ لِأَلْكَنَ وَأَرَتَّ وَأَلْثَغَ وَطِفْلٍ دِيَةٌ، وَقِيلَ شَرْطُ الطِّفْلِ ظُهُورُ أَثَرِ نُطْقٍ بِتَحْرِيكِهِ لِبُكَاءٍ وَمَصٍّ، وَلِأَخْرَسَ حُكُومَةٌ‏.‏

وَكُلِّ سِنٍّ لِذَكَرٍ حُرٍّ مُسْلِمٍ خَمْسَةُ أَبْعِرَةٍ سَوَاءٌ أَكَسَرَ الظَّاهِرَ مِنْهَا دُونَ السِّنْخِ أَوْ قَلَعَهَا بِهِ‏.‏

وَفِي سِنٍّ زَائِدَةٍ حُكُومَةٌ، وَحَرَكَةُ السِّنِّ إنْ قَلَّتْ فَكَصَحِيحَةٍ وَإِنْ بَطَلَتْ الْمَنْفَعَةُ فَحُكُومَةٌ، أَوْ نَقَصَتْ فَالْأَصَحُّ كَصَحِيحَةٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَلَعَ سِنَّ صَغِيرٍ لَمْ يُثْغَرْ فَلَمْ تَعُدْ وَبَانَ فَسَادُ الْمَنْبَتِ وَجَبَ الْأَرْشُ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ لَوْ مَاتَ قَبْلَ الْبَيَانِ فَلَا شَيْءَ، وَأَنَّهُ لَوْ قَلَعَ سِنَّ مَثْغُورٍ فَعَادَتْ لَا يَسْقُطُ الْأَرْشُ، وَلَوْ قُلِعَتْ الْأَسْنَانُ فَبِحِسَابِهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ لَا يَزِيدُ عَلَى دِيَةٍ إنْ اتَّحَدَ جَانٍ وَجِنَايَةٌ‏.‏

وَكُلِّ لَحْيٍ نِصْفُ دِيَةٍ وَلَا يَدْخُلُ أَرْشُ الْأَسْنَانِ فِي دِيَةِ اللَّحْيَيْنِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَكُلِّ يَدٍ نِصْفُ دِيَةٍ إنْ قُطِعَ مِنْ كَفٍّ، فَإِنْ قُطِعَ مِنْ فَوْقِهِ فَحُكُومَةٌ أَيْضًا‏.‏

وَفِي كُلِّ أُصْبُعٍ عَشَرَةُ أَبْعِرَةٍ، وَأُنْمُلَةٍ ثُلُثُ الْعَشَرَةِ، وَأُنْمُلَةِ الْإِبْهَامِ نِصْفُهَا‏.‏

وَالرِّجْلَانِ كَالْيَدَيْنِ‏.‏

وَفِي حَلَمَتَيْهَا دِيَتُهَا، وَحَلَمَتَيْهِ حُكُومَةٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ دِيَتُهُ‏.‏

وَفِي أُنْثَيَيْنِ دِيَةٌ‏.‏

وَكَذَا ذَكَرٌ وَلَوْ لِصَغِيرٍ وَشَيْخٍ وَعِنِّينٍ‏.‏

وَحَشَفَةٌ كَذَكَرٍ، وَبَعْضُهَا بِقِسْطِهِ مِنْهَا وَقِيلَ مِنْ الذَّكَرِ، وَكَذَا حُكْمُ بَعْضِ مَارِنٍ، وَحَلَمَةٍ‏.‏

وَفِي الْأَلْيَتَيْنِ الدِّيَةُ وَكَذَا شُفْرَاهَا وَكَذَا سَلْخُ جِلْدٍ، إنْ بَقِيَ حَيَاةٌ مُسْتَقِرَّةٌ، وَحَزَّ غَيْرُ السَّالِخِ رَقَبَتَهُ‏.‏

Section ()

One owes the price of blood for homicide if one causes some one to
lose his reason, and if madness is the consequence of a wound itself
involving an indemnity or a fine, the criminal should pay one or other
in addition. One jurist, however, maintains that in such a case the
greater sum includes the less. If the affair took place in some isolated
spot, and the injured party declares he lost his reason in consequence
of the wound so received, the price of blood is adjudged to him without
its being necessary for him to take an oath, even though his declaration
may be somewhat incoherent.

The price of blood for homicide is due in case of loss of hearing ;
and half is due if this loss is limited to one ear. Other authorities,
however, admit in the latter case only a price of blood proportional
to the damage sustained. The loss of both ears and of the sense of
hearing involves payment of twice the price of blood for homicide.
Loss of hearing is proved by the oath of the injured party, unless cir-
cumstances indicate that his assertion is false, e.g. if he jumps up at some
cry uttered while he was asleep or not thinking of the part he was playing.
In a case of incomplete deafness the criminal owes a proportional price
of blood if the degree of deafness can be ascertained, but otherwise a
fine of which the court should fix the amount after examination.
According to some jurists the degree of deafness can always be ascer-
tained by comparison with the strength of hearing of a normal individual
of the same age as the injured person. Thus the proportional degree
of deafness even of a single ear may be ascertained by first closing the
wounded ear and ascertaining the strength of hearing of that still un-
injured, and then closing that one and testing the strength of hearing
of the other.

For loss of sight in each eye the criminal owes the half of the price
of blood for homicide ; and if the eye is torn out nothing more is due.
Blindness is ascertained by experts ; or, if necessary, by suddenly
putting close to the alleged insensible eye a scorpion or a red-hot iron,
when, if the injured party remains motionless the truth of his woids
may be believed. Partial loss of sight follows the same rule as that
already established for cases of partial deafness.

f fLoss of smell involves payment of the price of blood for homicide.
Loss of the faculty of speaking also involves payment of the price
of blood for homicide ; but a loss of the faculty of pronouncing certain
letters is estimated proportionally, taking the Arabic alphabet as a
basis, i.e. twenty-eight letters, though some authorities do not count
labials and gutturals. In the case of a person who cannot pronounce
certain letters of the alphabet, the calculation differs according to whether
this defect is an original one, or the consequence of some malady sent
from heaven or resulting from a lesion. Now, if the defect was original
or the consequence of a malady the price of blood is due as if the defect
did not exist ; though some authorities in such case admit only a
proportional price of blood ; whereas, if the defect was the consequence
of a lesion, our school insists upon a proportional price of blood. A loss of
half the tongue as well as a loss of the faculty of pronouncing a quarter
of the letters renders the criminal liable to a payment of half the price of
blood. For a total loss of voice the law exacts payment of the full
price of blood for homicide. If the tongue has at the same time lost its
mobility, so as no longer to be able to articulate or vibrate, the criminal
is liable for twice the price of blood ; but some authorities have called
this last rule in question.

The sense of taste is equally rated upon the price of blood for
homicide. By taste is understood normally the human faculty of
distinguishing if a thing be sweet, sour, bitter, salt, or agreeable ; and a
partial loss of the faculty of distinguishing one or several of these five
qualities involves payment of a proportional price of blood. If this
partial loss means that one can still imperfectly distinguish all five, the
criminal owes a fine.

Payment of the price of blood for homicide is, however, incurred
for causing the loss of : —

. The power to masticate.

. The power to emit sperm, on account of some lesion of the spine.

. A woman’s power to become pregnant.

. Pleasurable feeling in the act of coition.

The price of blood is claimable also in a case where a husband or
another tears the perineum in the act of copulation. Some authorities
deduce the same consequence from a tearing by coition of the separation
between the vagina and the urethra ; and coition is forbidden, even to
the husband, if this act cannot be effected without causing the woman
such a wound.
As to loss of virginity, the following cases must bo distinguished : —

. Where it is caused by an individual who has no right to do so.
Here again the following distinctions must be made : —

(a) If it is caused in some other manner than by the introduction
of the penis into the vagina an indemnity is necessary.

( b ) If it is caused by an introduction of the penis, either by mutual
error, or by violation, there is necessary a payment of the proportional
dower which the girl could claim after being deflowered, as well as an
indemnity for the offence. According to other authorities the girl
can claim only the proportional dower that she was worth before her
deflowerment.

. Where it is caused by some one who has the right to do so. In
this case there is nothing punishable, though according to some autho-
rities an indemnity is due even in this case, whenever copulation has
taken place otherwise than by the introduction of the penis into the vagina.

Loss of muscular force or power of walking involves payment of the
price of blood for homicide ; and a fine is due for partial loss of one or
the other. Lesion of the spine, involving not only loss of power to
walk, but also of pleasurable feeling in the act of coition or of power to
emit sperm, is compensated by twice the price of blood for homicide,
a rule, however, that is not accepted by some jurists who think that the
price of blood is due only once.

فَرْعٌ ‏[‏في موجب إزالة المنافع‏]‏

فِي الْعَقْلِ دِيَةٌ، فَإِنْ زَالَ بِجُرْحٍ لَهُ أَرْشٌ أَوْ حُكُومَةٌ وَجَبَا، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَدْخُلُ الْأَقَلُّ فِي الْأَكْثَرِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ ادَّعَى زَوَالَهُ فَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْتَظِمْ قَوْلُهُ وَفِعْلُهُ فِي خَلَوَاتِهِ فَلَهُ دِيَةٌ بِلَا يَمِينٍ‏.‏

وَفِي السَّمْعِ دِيَةٌ، وَمِنْ أُذُنٍ نِصْفٌ، وَقِيلَ قِسْطُ النَّقْصِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَزَالَ أُذُنَيْهِ وَسَمْعَهُ فَدِيَتَانِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ ادَّعَى زَوَالَهُ وَانْزَعَجَ لِلصِّيَاحِ فِي نَوْمٍ وَغَفْلَةٍ فَكَاذِبٌ، وَإِلَّا حُلِّفَ وَأَخَذَ دِيَةً‏.‏

وَإِنْ نَقَصَ فَقِسْطُهُ إنْ عُرِفَ وَإِلَّا فَحُكُومَةٌ بِاجْتِهَادِ قَاضٍ، وَقِيلَ يُعْتَبَرُ سَمْعُ قَرْنِهِ فِي صِحَّتِهِ، وَيُضْبَطُ التَّفَاوُتُ‏.‏

وَإِنْ نَقَصَ مِنْ أُذُنٍ سُدَّتْ وَضُبِطَ مُنْتَهَى سَمَاعِ الْأُخْرَى ثُمَّ عُكِسَ وَوَجَبَ قِسْطُ التَّفَاوُتِ‏.‏

وَفِي ضَوْءِ كُلِّ عَيْنٍ نِصْفُ دِيَةٍ فَلَوْ فَقَأَهَا لَمْ يَزِدْ‏.‏

وَإِنْ ادَّعَى زَوَالَهُ سُئِلَ أَهْلُ الْخِبْرَةِ، أَوْ يُمْتَحَنُ بِتَقْرِيبِ عَقْرَبٍ أَوْ حَدِيدَةٍ مِنْ عَيْنِهِ بَغْتَةً، وَنُظِرَ هَلْ يَنْزَعِجُ‏؟‏ وَإِنْ نَقَصَ فَكَالسَّمْعِ‏.‏

وَفِي الشَّمِّ دِيَةٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَفِي الْكَلَامِ الدِّيَةُ، وَفِي بَعْضِ الْحُرُوفِ قِسْطُهُ، وَالْمُوَزَّعُ عَلَيْهَا ثَمَانِيَةٌ وَعِشْرُونَ حَرْفًا فِي لُغَةِ الْعَرَبِ، وَقِيلَ لَا يُوَزَّعُ عَلَى الشَّفَهِيَّةِ وَالْحَلْقِيَّةِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ عَجَزَ عَنْ بَعْضِهَا خِلْقَةً أَوْ بِآفَةٍ سَمَاوِيَّةٍ فَدِيَةٌ، وَقِيلَ قِسْطٌ أَوْ بِجِنَايَةٍ فَالْمَذْهَبُ لَا تَكْمُلُ دِيَةٌ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَ نِصْفَ لِسَانِهِ فَذَهَبَ رُبْعُ كَلَامِهِ أَوْ عَكْسٌ فَنِصْفُ دِيَةٍ‏.‏

وَفِي الصَّوْتِ دِيَةٌ‏.‏

فَإِنْ أَبْطَلَ مَعَهُ حَرَكَةَ لِسَانٍ فَعَجَزَ عَنْ التَّقْطِيعِ وَالتَّرْدِيدِ فَدِيَتَانِ، وَقِيلَ دِيَةٌ‏.‏

وَفِي الذَّوْقِ دِيَةٌ، وَيُدْرَكُ بِهِ حَلَاوَةٌ وَحُمُوضَةٌ وَمَرَارَةٌ وَمُلُوحَةٌ وَعُذُوبَةٌ، وَتُوَزَّعُ عَلَيْهِنَّ، فَإِنْ نَقَصَ فَحُكُومَةٌ‏.‏

وَتَجِبُ الدِّيَةُ فِي الْمَضْغِ‏.‏

وَقُوَّةِ إمْنَاءٍ بِكَسْرِ صُلْبٍ‏.‏

وَقُوَّةِ حَبَلٍ وَذَهَابِ جِمَاعٍ، وَفِي إفْضَائِهَا مِنْ الزَّوْجِ وَغَيْرِهِ دِيَةٌ وَهُوَ رَفْعُ مَا بَيْنَ مَدْخَلِ ذَكَرٍ وَدُبُرٍ، وَقِيلَ ذَكَرٍ وَبَوْلٍ‏.‏

فَإِنْ لَمْ يُمْكِنْ الْوَطْءُ إلَّا بِإِفْضَاءٍ فَلَيْسَ لِلزَّوْجِ‏.‏

وَمَنْ لَا يَسْتَحِقُّ افْتِضَاضَهَا فَأَزَالَ الْبَكَارَةَ بِغَيْرِ ذَكَرٍ فَأَرْشُهَا، أَوْ بِذَكَرٍ لِشُبْهَةٍ أَوْ مُكْرَهَةً فَمَهْرُ مِثْلٍ ثَيِّبًا وَأَرْشُ الْبَكَارَةِ، وَقِيلَ مَهْرُ بِكْرٍ، وَمُسْتَحِقُّهُ لَا شَيْءَ عَلَيْهِ، وَقِيلَ إنْ أَزَالَ بِغَيْرِ ذَكَرٍ فَأَرْشٌ‏.‏

وَفِي الْبَطْشِ دِيَةٌ وَكَذَا الْمَشْيُ، وَنَقْصِهِمَا‏:‏ حُكُومَةٌ‏.‏

وَلَوْ كَسَرَ صُلْبَهُ فَذَهَبَ مَشْيُهُ وَجِمَاعُهُ أَوْ وَمَنِيُّهُ فَدِيَتَانِ، وَقِيلَ دِيَةٌ‏.‏

فَرْعٌ ‏[‏في اجتماع جنايات على شخص‏]‏

أَزَالَ أَطْرَافًا وَلَطَائِفَ تَقْتَضِي دِيَاتٍ فَمَاتَ سِرَايَةً فَدِيَةٌ‏.‏

وَكَذَا لَوْ حَزَّهُ الْجَانِي قَبْلَ انْدِمَالِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

فَإِنْ حَزَّ عَمْدًا وَالْجِنَايَاتُ خَطَأٌ أَوْ عَكْسُهُ فَلَا تَدَاخُلَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَوْ حَزَّ غَيْرُهُ تَعَدَّدَتْ‏.‏

Section ()

The price of blood for the members of the body and for the bodily
organs is cumulative ; but if the victim dies from his wounds the price
of blood for homicide is duo and nothing more. fThis is so even if
the criminal cuts off his victim’s head before the wounds that he has
made are healed, provided only that the wounds and the mortal blow
are of the same nature, i.e. that one of the crimes has not been per-
petrated with premeditation and the- other involuntarily. There is
also plurality in the price of blood, where the wounds and the mortal
blow were not caused by the same person.

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏في الجناية التي لا تقدير لأرشها والجناية على الرقيق‏]‏

تَجِبُ الْحُكُومَةُ فِيمَا لَا مُقَدَّرَ فِيهِ‏:‏ وَهِيَ جُزْءٌ نِسْبَتُهُ إلَى دِيَةِ النَّفْسِ، وَقِيلَ إلَى عُضْوِ الْجِنَايَةِ نِسْبَةُ نَقْصِهَا مِنْ قِيمَتِهِ لَوْ كَانَ رَقِيقًا بِصِفَاتِهِ‏.‏

فَإِنْ كَانَتْ بِطَرَفٍ لَهُ مُقَدَّرٌ اُشْتُرِطَ أَنْ لَا تَبْلُغَ مُقَدَّرَهُ فَإِنْ بَلَغَتْهُ نَقَّصَ الْقَاضِي شَيْئًا بِاجْتِهَادِهِ، أَوْ لَا تَقْدِيرَ فِيهِ كَفَخِذٍ فَأَنْ لَا تَبْلُغَ دِيَةَ نَفْسٍ، وَيُقَوَّمُ بَعْدَ انْدِمَالِهِ فَإِنْ لَمْ يَبْقَ نَقْصٌ اُعْتُبِرَ أَقْرَبُ نَقْصٍ إلَى الِانْدِمَالِ، وَقِيلَ يُقَدِّرُهُ قَاضٍ بِاجْتِهَادِهِ، وَقِيلَ لَا غُرْمَ‏.‏

وَالْجُرْحُ الْمُقَدَّرُ كَمُوضِحَةٍ يَتْبَعُهُ الشَّيْنُ حَوَالَيْهِ‏.‏

وَمَا لَا يَتَقَدَّرُ يُفْرَدُ بِحُكُومَةٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَفِي نَفْسِ الرَّقِيقِ قِيمَتُهُ، وَفِي غَيْرِهَا مَا نَقَصَ مِنْ قِيمَتِهِ إنْ لَمْ يَتَقَدَّرْ فِي الْحُرِّ، وَإِلَّا فَنِسْبَتُهُ مِنْ قِيمَتِهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ مَا نَقَصَ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَطَعَ ذَكَرَهُ وَأُنْثَيَاهُ فَفِي الْأَظْهَرِ قِيمَتَانِ، وَالثَّانِي مَا نَقَصَ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْقُصْ فَلَا شَيْءَ

Section

A fine is due for wounds that are not rated by law. The amount
is determined by the court in accordance with the seriousness of the
case, and in due proportion to the price of blood due for homicide ; or,
according to some jurists, with the price of blood due for the wounded
member. The proportion to be observed in the application of the fine
is the same as the diminution in the value of a slave of the same qualities
as the victim clue to a similar mutilation. But a fine for the wounding
or partial loss of a bodily member should always be less than the legal
indemnity prescribed for the total loss of that member ; and where
an application of the above rule would load to another result, the court
should reduce the fine to an amount that appears to it to be reasonable.
In the case of a member such as the thigh, for which no indemnity has
been prescribed, the fine should always be less than the price of blood
for homicide. The penalty for a wound should be estimated after
healing, and where it appears that the victim has not suffered any appre-
ciable permanent lesion, the gravity of the lesion must be taken into
consideration immediately before complete recovery. Other autho-
rities, however, maintain that in such a case the court should fix a reason-
able amount as the fine, while yret others think that in these circumstances
there is no occasion for a fine. Wounds rated by the law, such as the
mudiha, may be taken as a basis for fixing the amount of fines due for
disfigurement : fbut fines for wounds not so rated may never be taken
as a basis for fixing the amount of others.

The price of blood for the homicide of a slave is the value of the
slave. As to lesions suffered by a slave, the price of blood varies in
proportion to his value, at any rate in the case of wounds not rated for
a free man. In the case of wounds that are rated bylaw, the same pro-
portion must be observed between the price of blood and the value of
the slave as between the price of blood for a similar wound to a free
man, and the price of blood for the homicide of a similar individual.
A single authority in these circumstances allows the amount to be
estimated according to the diminution in the specific value of the slave.
^Cutting off a slave’s penis and testicles is punishable with a fine
amounting to twice the value of the slave. It is true that another
doctrine tends to maintain that even in this case the criminal should
indemnify the master for the diminution in the slave’s value. Finally
the offender owes nothing for wounds that do not appreciably" diminish
the value of the slave.

باب مُوجِبَاتِ الدِّيَةِ وَالْعَاقِلَةِ وَالْكَفَّارَةِ

CHAPTER II.— OBLIGATION TO PAY THE PRICE OF BLOOD ; THE AAKILA: AND EXPIATION

صَاحَ عَلَى صَبِيٍّ لَا يُمَيِّزُ عَلَى طَرَفِ سَطْحٍ فَوَقَعَ بِذَلِكَ فَمَاتَ فَدِيَةٌ مُغَلَّظَةٌ عَلَى الْعَاقِلَةِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ قِصَاصٌ‏.‏

وَلَوْ كَانَ بِأَرْضٍ، أَوْ صَاحَ عَلَى بَالِغٍ بِطَرَفِ سَطْحٍ فَلَا دِيَةَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَشَهْرُ سِلَاحٍ كَصِيَاحٍ، وَمُرَاهِقٌ مُتَيَقِّظٌ كَبَالِغٍ وَلَوْ صَاحَ عَلَى صَيْدٍ فَاضْطَرَبَ صَبِيٌّ وَسَقَطَ فَدِيَةٌ مُخَفَّفَةٌ عَلَى الْعَاقِلَةِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ طَلَبَ سُلْطَانٌ مَنْ ذُكِرَتْ بِسُوءٍ فَأُجْهِضَتْ ضُمِنَ الْجَنِينُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ وَضَعَ صَبِيًّا فِي مَسْبَعَةٍ فَأَكَلَهُ سَبُعٌ فَلَا ضَمَانَ، وَقِيلَ إنْ لَمْ يُمْكِنْهُ انْتِقَالٌ ضَمِنَ‏.‏

وَلَوْ تَبِعَ بِسَيْفٍ هَارِبًا مِنْهُ فَرَمَى نَفْسَهُ بِمَاءٍ أَوْ نَارٍ أَوْ مِنْ سَطْحٍ فَلَا ضَمَانَ، فَلَوْ وَقَعَ جَاهِلاً لِعَمًى أَوْ ظُلْمَةٍ ضَمِنَ، وَكَذَا لَوْ انْخَسَفَ بِهِ سَقْفٌ فِي هَرَبِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ سُلِّمَ صَبِيٌّ إلَى سَبَّاحٍ لِيُعَلِّمَهُ فَغَرِقَ وَجَبَتْ دِيَتُهُ‏.‏

وَيَضْمَنُ بِحَفْرِ بِئْرٍ عُدْوَانٍ، لَا فِي مِلْكِهِ وَمَوَاتٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ حَفَرَ بِدِهْلِيزِهِ بِئْرًا وَدَعَا رَجُلاً فَسَقَطَ فَالْأَظْهَرُ ضَمَانُهُ، أَوْ بِمِلْكِ غَيْرِهِ أَوْ مُشْتَرَكٍ بِلَا إذْنٍ فَمَضْمُونٌ‏.‏

أَوْ بِطَرِيقٍ ضَيِّقٍ يَضُرُّ الْمَارَّةَ فَكَذَا، أَوْ لَا يَضُرُّ وَأَذِنَ الْإِمَامُ فَلَا ضَمَانَ، وَإِلَّا فَإِنْ حَفَرَ لِمَصْلَحَتِهِ فَالضَّمَانُ، أَوْ لِمَصْلَحَةٍ عَامَّةٍ فَلَا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَمَسْجِدٌ كَطَرِيقٍ‏.‏

وَمَا تَوَلَّدَ مِنْ جَنَاحٍ إلَى شَارِعٍ فَمَضْمُونٌ‏.‏

وَيَحِلُّ إخْرَاجُ الْمَيَازِيبِ إلَى شَارِعٍ، وَالتَّالِفُ بِهَا مَضْمُونٌ فِي الْجَدِيدِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ بَعْضُهُ فِي الْجِدَارِ فَسَقَطَ الْخَارِجُ فَكُلُّ الضَّمَانِ، وَإِنْ سَقَطَ كُلُّهُ فَنِصْفُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَإِنْ بَنَى جِدَارَهُ مَائِلاً إلَى شَارِعٍ فَكَجَنَاحٍ‏.‏

أَوْ مُسْتَوِيًا فَمَالَ وَسَقَطَ فَلَا ضَمَانَ، وَقِيلَ إنْ أَمْكَنَهُ هَدْمُهُ وَإِصْلَاحُهُ ضَمِنَ، وَلَوْ سَقَطَ بِالطَّرِيقِ فَعَثَرَ بِهِ شَخْصٌ أَوْ تَلِفَ مَالٌ فَلَا ضَمَانَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ طَرَحَ قُمَامَاتٍ وَقُشُورَ بِطِّيخٍ بِطَرِيقٍ فَمَضْمُونٌ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ وَلَوْ تَعَاقَبَ سَبَبَا هَلَاكٍ فَعَلَى الْأَوَّلِ بِأَنْ حَفَرَ وَوَضَعَ آخَرُ حَجَرًا عُدْوَانًا فَعُثِرَ بِهِ وَوَقَعَ الْعَاثِرُ بِهَا فَعَلَى الْوَاضِعِ الضَّمَانُ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَتَعَدَّ الْوَاضِعُ فَالْمَنْقُولُ تَضْمِينُ الْحَافِرِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ وَضَعَ حَجَرًا وَآخَرَانِ حَجَرًا فَعُثِرَ بِهِمَا فَالضَّمَانُ أَثْلَاثٌ، وَقِيلَ نِصْفَانِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ وَضَعَ حَجَرًا فَعَثَرَ بِهِ رَجُلٌ فَدَحْرَجَهُ فَعَثَرَ بِهِ آخَرُ ضَمِنَهُ الْمُدَحْرِجُ، وَلَوْ عَثَرَ بِقَاعِدٍ أَوْ نَائِمٍ أَوْ وَاقِفٍ بِالطَّرِيقِ وَمَاتَا أَوْ أَحَدُهُمَا فَلَا ضَمَانَ إنْ اتَّسَعَ الطَّرِيقُ، وَإِلَّا فَالْمَذْهَبُ إهْدَارُ قَاعِدٍ وَنَائِمٍ، لَا عَاثِرٍ بِهِمَا وَضَمَانُ وَاقِفٍ لَا عَاثِرٍ بِهِ‏.‏

CHAPTER II.— OBLIGATION TO PAY THE PRICE OF BLOOD ; THE AAKILA: AND EXPIATION

Section

When a minor who has not yet attained the age of discernment is upon
the edge of a terrace, and is frightened at the cry of a passer-byr, and
falls down and is killed, the passer by owes the price of blood on the
higher scale, and the obligation to pay it falls also on the cut fold.
According to one authority the law of talion may even be applied in
these circumstances. fWkere, on the other hand, the minor is on the
ground, or where it is an adult who is on the edge of the terrace, an
unexpected cry causing a fatal fall does not involve a payment of the
price of blood. Under the above circumstance, drawing a sword is
the same as uttering a cry ; while a minor who is almost an adult is
the same as an adult in this respect, provided he has a lively intelligence.
Where a person utters a cry as a warning of the presence of a wild beast,
and thereby so frightens a minor on the edge of a terrace that he falls
down and is killed, the price of blood on the lower scale is due by the
aaldla.

If the Sultan, or a judge, etc., sends for a pregnant woman accused
of some offence, and frightens her so that she has an untimely birth,
he is responsible for the abortion.

There is no punishable offence where a minor placed in a cave of
wild beasts is devoured by them ; provided, according to some autho-
rities, that he could have saved himself. Nor is there any punishable
offence where one pursues with a drawn sword a person who from fear
throws himself into the water or into the fire or from the top of a terrace
and so kills himself ; but if the person so pursued does not throw him-
self down, but falls accidentally, either through blindness or in the dark,
for if the terrace gives way under him, the pursuer is responsible for the
accident. Where a minor, sent to a swimming master to learn how to
swim, i; drowned, the master is responsible for the price of blood.

One is responsible for digging a well into which some one has fallen,
if the digging was in itself illicit. Consequently a man who digs a well
on his own ground or on uncultivated ground, is not responsible for the
accidents which may result from it ; but if he does so in the courtyard
of his house, he is responsible for the fall of a person he may invite to
such a spot which he knows to be dangerous. And besides this, a re-
sponsibility for accidents exists where a well has been dug —

. On another’s land without his knowledge.

. On a piece of land of which one is only the co-proprietor.

. On a narrow public way, so as to obstruct it. But where the
road is not obstructed there is no responsibility for a person who has
dug a well on the public roadway in the following cases : —

(a) If the Sovereign has approved it.

(b) *If the well is dug for the benefit of the public ; for where the
profit is merely personal the responsibility does exist.

In this matter a mosque is subject to the same rules as a public
road.

Olio is responsible for accidents caused by the construction of a
balcony opening upon a public road ; and even, according to the opinion
of Shafii in his second period, for having given too much prominence
to the pipes collecting the rainwater from the roofs, although this is
an act permitted to each proprietor. If the balcony or the water-pipe
partly rests upon a wall, and the protruding portion of the balcony or
the pipe falls, the proprietor is entirely responsible for the accident ;
fwhile he is only responsible for half of it, where the part which rests
upon the wall and the protruding portion both fall. A wall that leans
upon the side of a public road follows the same rule as a balcony ; but
no responsibility is incurred for accidents caused by the fall of a wall
constructed in vertical equilibrium that afterwards leans over. Other
authorities, however, admit this principle only where the proprietor
could not have prevented the accident by a demolition or reparation
of the wall that threatened to fall down. |Tlie responsibility never
extends to accidents that are the remote consequences of the fall of
the wall on the public road, e.g . if some passer-by stumbles against the
debris and falls, or wliero this debris affects another’s property. ffOn
the other hand, one is responsible for throwing into the road ordures,
melon skins, or other slippery objects that cause a passer-by to fall.

In a case where two causes of accident coincide, it is the more imme-
diate which determines the responsibility. Consequently where one
of two persons digs a well and the other places a stone at the edge of it,
the latter alone is responsible if another person stumbles against the stone
and falls into the well, where both of the two have acted illegally.
Where, on the other hand, the person who places the stone thereby
commits no illegal act, traditional doctrine admits the responsibility
of the person who dug the well. Where one person places a stone
somewhere and two others follow his example and together place
another stone, and a passer-by stumbles against them and falls, all
three are responsible for the accident ; though some authorities maintain
that the first individual is responsible for the half, and the two others
jointly for the other half. He who stumbles against a stone deposited
by another person and so pushes it before him, and another then stumbles
against it, is responsible for this latter accident ; but where he stumbles
on a big wide road against some one sitting or sleeping upon it, or
merely stopping upon it, no responsibility is incurred by either party
even if the accident causes the death of either or both. Where, on the
other hand, the accident occurs upon a narrow road, our school allows
that the death of the person sitting or asleep involves no responsibility
in the person who has stumbled against him ; but considers that the
former would be responsible for the death of the latter. In similar
circumstances a moving person is responsible for an accident to a
person stopping upon the road, but not vice versa .

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏في الاصطدام ونحوه مما يوجب الاشتراك في الضمان وما يذكر مع ذلك‏]‏

اصْطَدَمَا بِلَا قَصْدٍ فَعَلَى عَاقِلَةِ كُلٍّ نِصْفُ دِيَةٍ مُخَفَّفَةٍ‏.‏

وَإِنْ قَصَدَا فَنِصْفُهَا مُغَلَّظَةٌ، أَوْ أَحَدُهُمَا فَلِكُلٍّ حُكْمُهُ، وَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّ عَلَى كُلٍّ كَفَّارَتَيْنِ، وَإِنْ مَاتَا مَعَ مَرْكُوبَيْهِمَا فَكَذَلِكَ، وَفِي تَرِكَةِ كُلٍّ نِصْفُ قِيمَةِ دَابَّةِ الْآخَرِ، وَصَبِيَّانِ أَوْ مَجْنُونَانِ كَكَامِلَيْنِ، وَقِيلَ إنْ أَرْكَبَهُمَا الْوَلِيُّ تَعَلَّقَ بِهِ الضَّمَانُ، وَلَوْ أَرْكَبَهُمَا أَجْنَبِيٌّ ضَمِنَهُمَا وَدَابَّتَيْهِمَا‏.‏

أَوْ حَامِلَانِ وَأَسْقَطَتَا فَالدِّيَةُ كَمَا سَبَقَ، وَعَلَى كُلٍّ أَرْبَعُ كَفَّارَاتٍ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَعَلَى عَاقِلَةِ كُلٍّ نِصْفُ غُرَّتَيْ جَنِينَيْهِمَا‏.‏

أَوْ عَبْدَانِ فَهَدَرٌ أَوْ سَفِينَتَانِ فَكَدَابَّتَيْنِ، وَالْمَلَّاحَانِ كَرَاكِبَيْنِ إنْ كَانَتَا لَهُمَا، فَإِنْ كَانَ فِيهِمَا مَالُ أَجْنَبِيٍّ لَزِمَ كُلًّا نِصْفُ ضَمَانِهِ، وَإِنْ كَانَتَا لِأَجْنَبِيٍّ لَزِمَ كُلًّا نِصْفُ قِيمَتِهِمَا‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَشْرَفَتْ سَفِينَةٌ عَلَى غَرَقٍ جَازَ طَرْحُ مَتَاعِهَا، وَيَجِبُ لِرَجَاءِ نَجَاةِ الرَّاكِبِ، فَإِنْ طَرَحَ مَالَ غَيْرِهِ بِلَا إذْنٍ ضَمِنَهُ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَالَ‏:‏ أَلْقِ مَتَاعَك وَعَلَيَّ ضَمَانُهُ، أَوْ عَلَى أَنِّي ضَامِنٌ ضَمِنَهُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ اقْتَصَرَ عَلَى أَلْقِ فَلَا عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ وَإِنَّمَا يَضْمَنُ مُلْتَمِسٌ لِخَوْفِ غَرَقٍ، وَلَمْ يَخْتَصَّ نَفْعُ الْإِلْقَاءِ بِالْمُلْقِي‏.‏

وَلَوْ عَادَ حَجَرُ مَنْجَنِيقٍ فَقَتَلَ أَحَدَ رُمَاتِهِ هُدِرَ قِسْطُهُ، وَعَلَى عَاقِلَةِ الْبَاقِينَ الْبَاقِي، أَوْ غَيْرِهِمْ وَلَمْ يَقْصِدُوهُ فَخَطَأٌ أَوْ قَصَدُوهُ فَعَمْدٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ إنْ غَلَبَتْ الْإِصَابَةُ‏.‏

Section

Where two persons inadvertently stumble against each other, the
aakila of both are mutually liable for half the price of blood on the lighter
scale, if the accident has caused the death of both. If the affair is
intentional on both sides the aakila are responsible for half the price
of blood on the heavier scale ; if intentional upon one side only, each
should bo condemned to pay the price of blood prescribed for its parti-
cular case, ff In such a collision both estates are charged with double
expiation. Where the death of the two individuals is caused by the
collision of their respective mounts the consequences are the same
except that each estate is charged also with half the value of the other’s
mount, if the accident involved the death or mutilation of the animals.
And similarly where there is a collision, not between two sane adults,
but between two minors or two lunatics ; though according to some
jurists the guardian or the curator must personally guarantee the minor
or lunatic committed to their charge from the consequences of the suit
if he advised him to ride. Where a third party has caused a minor or
a lunatic to ride, jurists unanimously consider him to be responsible
for the prices of blood and injuries and damage due on both sides. A
collision between two pregnant women resulting in a double abortion
is punishable with the price of blood in the way we have explained,
f fand four times the expiation in each case ; while the aakila of the twTo
parties owe each other half the ghorra prescribed for abortions. A
collision between two slaves that results in the death of both constitutes
no offence.

A collision between two ships is regulated by the principles set out
with reference to riders, so far as concerns their captains, at any rate
where ships and cargoes belong to them. If the ships are loaded with
goods belonging to other persons, each captain owes the charterers half
the damage sustained by each of them. Finally, in a case where neither
the goods nor the ships belong to the captains, these latter are liable for
half the value both of theships and of the goods committed to theircharge.

When a vessel is in danger of shipwreck everything in it may be cast
into the sea, and this course is even obligatory if it appears that the
lives of the crew or of the passengers depend upon it. An indemnity
is duo for goods so cast that belong to a third party, unless ho con-
sented. The words, “Throw out your goods on my account,” or “ Throw
out your goods, I will be responsible,” involve an obligation to indemnify
the owner ; but our school does not recognise this obligation where one
merely says, even in the midst of a storm, “ Throw out your goods,”
and nothing more. The responsibility we are speaking of exists only
where the request to throw away the goods is made through fear of
sinking, and not if made when there is no danger ; and it is of no legal
consequence whether the casting is or is not profitable to the person
making it.

When the. projectile from an engine of war rebounds and returns
and kills one of the soldiers serving it, the price of blood is divided into
as many portions as the original number of soldiers, and each of the
dead man’s comrades owes his share to the estate. If the victim did not
belong to the working of the engine of war the fact constitutes an in-
voluntary homicide, if it is proved that the projectile was not aimed at
the victim ; but it becomes a premeditated homicide if the thing is
knowingly pointed at the victim, and the projectile can strike at that
distance in ordinary circumstances.

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏في العاقلة وكيفية تأجيل ما تحمله‏]‏

دِيَةُ الْخَطَأِ وَشِبْهِ الْعَمْدِ تَلْزَمُ الْعَاقِلَةَ‏:‏ وَهُمْ عَصَبَتُهُ إلَّا الْأَصْلَ وَالْفَرْعَ وَقِيلَ يَعْقِلُ ابْنٌ هُوَ ابْنُ ابْنِ عَمِّهَا، وَيُقَدَّمُ الْأَقْرَبُ، فَإِنْ بَقِيَ شَيْءٌ فَمَنْ يَلِيهِ، وَمُدْلٍ بِأَبَوَيْنِ، وَالْقَدِيمُ التَّسْوِيَةُ، ثُمَّ مُعْتِقٌ ثُمَّ عَصَبَتُهُ ثُمَّ مُعْتِقُهُ ثُمَّ عَصَبَتُهُ وَإِلَّا فَمُعْتِقُ أَبِي الْجَانِي ثُمَّ عَصَبَتُهُ ثُمَّ مُعْتِقُ مُعْتِقِ الْأَبِ وَعَصَبَتُهُ وَكَذَا أَبَدًا، وَعَتِيقُهَا يَعْقِلُهُ عَاقِلَتُهَا، وَمُعْتِقُونَ كَمُعْتِقٍ، وَكُلُّ شَخْصٍ مِنْ عَصَبَةِ كُلِّ مُعْتِقٍ يَحْمِلُ مَا كَانَ يَحْمِلُهُ ذَلِكَ الْمُعْتِقُ‏.‏

وَلَا يَعْقِلُ عَتِيقٌ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، فَإِنْ فُقِدَ الْعَاقِلُ أَوْ لَمْ يَفِ عَقَلَ بَيْتُ الْمَالِ عَنْ الْمُسْلِمِ، فَإِنْ فُقِدَ فَكُلُّهُ عَلَى الْجَانِي فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

وَتُؤَجَّلُ عَلَى الْعَاقِلَةِ دِيَةُ نَفْسٍ كَامِلَةٍ ثَلَاثَ سِنِينَ فِي كُلِّ سَنَةٍ ثُلُثٌ‏.‏

وَذِمِّيٍّ سَنَةً، وَقِيلَ ثَلَاثًا، وَامْرَأَةٍ سَنَتَيْنِ فِي الْأُولَى ثُلُثٌ، وَقِيلَ ثَلَاثًا‏.‏

وَتَحْمِلُ الْعَاقِلَةُ الْعَبْدَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، فَفِي كُلِّ سَنَةٍ قَدْرُ ثُلُثِ دِيَةٍ، وَقِيلَ فِي ثَلَاثٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ قَتَلَ رَجُلَيْنِ فَفِي ثَلَاثٍ، وَقِيلَ سِتٌّ، وَالْأَطْرَافُ فِي كُلِّ سَنَةٍ قَدْرُ ثُلُثِ دِيَةٍ، وَقِيلَ كُلُّهَا فِي سَنَةٍ وَأَجَلُ النَّفْسِ مِنْ الزُّهُوقِ وَغَيْرِهَا مِنْ الْجِنَايَةِ، وَمَنْ مَاتَ فِي بَعْضِ سَنَةٍ سَقَطَ‏.‏

وَلَا يَعْقِلُ فَقِيرٌ وَرَقِيقٌ وَصَبِيٌّ وَمَجْنُونٌ وَمُسْلِمٌ عَنْ كَافِرٍ وَعَكْسِهِ‏.‏

وَيَعْقِلُ يَهُودِيٌّ عَنْ نَصْرَانِيٍّ وَعَكْسُهُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

وَعَلَى الْغَنِيِّ نِصْفُ دِينَارٍ، وَالْمُتَوَسِّطِ رُبُعٌ كُلَّ سَنَةٍ مِنْ الثَّلَاثِ، وَقِيلَ هُوَ وَاجِبُ الثَّلَاثِ، وَيُعْتَبَرَانِ آخِرَ الْحَوْلِ، وَمَنْ أَعْسَرَ فِيهِ سَقَطَ‏.‏

Section

The price of blood for voluntary or involuntary homicide constitutes
a debt recoverable in the first instance from the offender, and sub-
sidiarily from his aakila , i.e. his agnates in collateral line. Some autho-
rities also consider a son to be amongst the aakila, provided he is at the
same time grandson of his father’s brother, as may occur where a
homicide is committed by a woman who has married her cousin on the
father’s side. Responsibility falls first upon the nearest aakila, and,
if all the sum due cannot be recovered from him, then from his nearest
full agnate, or, according to Shafii’s first doctrine, from his nearest
agnates whether full or only on the father’s side. After this it is the
offender’s patron who is responsible as aakila, then his agnates, then the
patron’s patron and his agnates. After this again the responsibility
falls upon the patron of the offender’s father, then upon his agnates,
his patron and his agnates, and so on. The aakila of a woman are
responsible for that woman’s freed slave, and if there is more than one
owner, they are jointly responsible for the total amount due ; whereas
each agnate of a patron is responsible only for the obligation of his
principal. *An enfranchised slave is never considered as being amongst
the aakila of his patron.

In default of aakila, or if their contributions are insufficient, the
State is responsible for a Moslem offender ; *and if for some reason
or other the amount cannot be recovered from the State, the responsi-
bility relapses entirely upon the offender himself.

The aakila should acquit themselves of their obligation within the
space of three years, if the price of blood is for the homicide of a free
Moslem, i.e. a third each year. The price of blood for the hoinicido
of an infidel subject of a Moslem prince must be paid in one year ; and
that for the homicide of a woman in two years, i.e. a third of the full
price of blood the first year and a sixth the second. However, according
to some jurists, the price of blood for such infidel and that for a woman
must be paid for in three years. The aakila are responsible just the
same *if the victim is a slave ; but whatever may have been the slave’s
value, the aakila are never obliged to pay each year more than a third
of the ordinary price of blood. According to some other authorities,
however, they must see that the total price of the slave is paid up within
the three years. In case of a homicide committed upon two victims
the two prices of blood must be paid within the three years like a single
one ; but according to some authorities the debt need only be paid
within six years. As for the price of blood for a wound or for the loss
of a bodily member, one need not pay more each year than a third of
the price of blood prescribed for homicide. Other authorities, however,
maintain that this is a debt payable in entirety at the end of the first
year. All the limits of time we have mentioned are calculated in case
of homicide from the moment of the victim’s death, and in case of other
offences from the moment the crime is committed.

The decease of one of the aakila in the course of the year has for its
consequence that his debt falls upon the others ; but no such responsi-
bility ever attaches to a poor man, a slave, a minor, or a madman. A
Moslem aakila is not responsible for an infidel offender, nor an infidel
aakila for a Moslem offender ; *but a Jew may be responsible for a
Christian offender, and vice versa. The responsibility of a rich aakila
never exceeds half a dinar , nor that of a man of moderate means a quarter
per annum ; or, according to others, for the three years. The state
of the fortune of the debtor is ascertained at the end of each year ;
while he who becomes insolvent in the course of the year owes nothing.

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏في جناية الرقيق‏]‏

مَالُ جِنَايَةِ الْعَبْدِ يَتَعَلَّقُ بِرَقَبَتِهِ، وَلِسَيِّدِهِ بَيْعُهُ لَهَا، وَفِدَاؤُهُ بِالْأَقَلِّ مِنْ قِيمَتِهِ وَأَرْشِهَا وَفِي الْقَدِيمِ بِأَرْشِهَا، وَلَا يَتَعَلَّقُ بِذِمَّتِهِ مَعَ رَقَبَتِهِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلَوْ فَدَاهُ ثُمَّ جَنَى سَلَّمَهُ لِلْبَيْعِ أَوْ فَدَاهُ، وَلَوْ جَنَى ثَانِيًا قَبْلَ الْفِدَاءِ بَاعَهُ فِيهِمَا أَوْ فَدَاهُ بِالْأَقَلِّ مِنْ قِيمَتِهِ وَالْأَرْشَيْنِ، وَفِي الْقَدِيمِ بِالْأَرْشَيْنِ، وَلَوْ أَعْتَقَهُ أَوْ بَاعَهُ وَصَحَّحْنَاهُمَا أَوْ قَتَلَهُ فَدَاهُ بِالْأَقَلِّ، وَقِيلَ الْقَوْلَانِ‏.‏

وَلَوْ هَرَبَ أَوْ مَاتَ بَرِئَ سَيِّدُهُ إلَّا إذَا طُلِبَ فَمَنَعَهُ، وَلَوْ اخْتَارَ الْفِدَاءَ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّ لَهُ الرُّجُوعَ وَتَسْلِيمَهُ وَيَفْدِي أُمَّ وَلَدِهِ بِالْأَقَلِّ، وَقِيلَ الْقَوْلَانِ، وَجِنَايَاتُهَا كَوَاحِدَةٍ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

Section

The person of a slave may be seized in satisfaction of a debt due for
an offence committed by him, but his master may, instead of abandoning
the culpable slave to be put up to auction, ransom him either with his
value or with the indemnity prescribed for a lesion, whichever is the
more advantageous for him. In his first period Shafii did not accept
this doctrine, maintaining that the prescribed indemnity is due in any
case, if the master wishes to avoid the seizure of the slave. *The money
duo for the offending slave is a material debt, and not an obligation
for which lie is personally responsible after being enfranchised. If the
slave, after being ransomed by his master, is guilty of another offence,
the master has again the choice between seizure and ransom ; but
if the second offence is committed before the payment of the first ransom
the slave may be seized for the total of the two debts, unless his master
ransoms him either with his value, or with the indemnities prescribed
for the two crimes, whichever is the more advantageous for him. In
these circumstances Shafii’s first doctrine allowed only the ransom with
the two indemnities. In the case of the enfranchisement or sale of the
slave after the offence, and supposing that the validity of these acts
depends upon the master’s solvency, the latter can no longer abandon
his slave, but is obliged to ransom him, in the manner already explained.
And it is the same if the master kills the slave after the offence. Accord-
ing, however, to other authorities Shafii’s first doctrine insisted even in
these circumstances upon the proscribed indemnity ; but the master
owes nothing where the slave, after committing the offence, takes to
flight or dies a natural or accidental death, unless tho master previously
opposes his seizure. If he opposes the seizure he implies an intention
to ransom the slave, fand though in ordinary circumstances he may
withdraw from a promise to ransom his slave and declare that he prefers
to abandon him, such retractation is no longer permissible as soon as
the slave’s death has rendered his seizure impossible. A master may
ransom his female slave enfranchised by reason of maternity in the
same way as his other slaves ; though according to some jurists Sliafii
originally insisted for her also upon payment of the indemnity as the
only possible ransom. *A plurality of offences committed by such
female slave does not in any way affect her master’s right of ransom.

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏في الغرة‏]‏

فِي الْجَنِينِ غُرَّةٌ إنْ انْفَصَلَ مَيِّتًا بِجِنَايَةٍ فِي حَيَاتِهَا أَوْ مَوْتِهَا‏.‏

وَكَذَا إنْ ظَهَرَ بِلَا انْفِصَالٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَإِلَّا فَلَا، أَوْ حَيًّا وَبَقِيَ زَمَانًا بِلَا أَلَمٍ ثُمَّ مَاتَ فَلَا ضَمَانَ وَإِنْ مَاتَ حِينَ خَرَجَ أَوْ دَامَ أَلَمُهُ وَمَاتَ فَدِيَةُ نَفْسٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَلْقَتْ جَنِينَيْنِ فَغُرَّتَانِ، أَوْ يَدًا فَغُرَّةٌ، إنْ انْفَصَلَ مَيِّتًا بِجِنَايَةٍ فِي حَيَاتِهَا أَوْ مَوْتِهَا، وَكَذَا إنْ ظَهَرَ بِلَا انْفِصَالٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَإِلَّا فَلَا‏.‏

وَكَذَا لَحْمٌ قَالَ الْقَوَابِلُ فِيهِ صُورَةٌ خَفِيَّةٌ، قِيلَ أَوْ لَا قُلْنَ لَوْ بَقِيَ لَتَصَوَّرَ‏.‏

وَهِيَ عَبْدٌ أَوْ أَمَةٌ، مُمَيِّزٌ سَلِيمٌ مِنْ عَيْبِ مَبِيعٍ، وَالْأَصَحُّ قَبُولُ كَبِيرٍ لَمْ يَعْجَزْ بِهَرَمٍ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ بُلُوغُهَا نِصْفَ عُشْرِ دِيَةٍ‏.‏

فَإِنْ فُقِدَتْ فَخَمْسَةُ أَبْعِرَةٍ، وَقِيلَ لَا يُشْتَرَطُ فَلِلْفَقْدِ قِيمَتُهَا وَهِيَ لِوَرَثَةِ الْجَنِينِ وَعَلَى عَاقِلَةِ الْجَانِي، وَقِيلَ إنْ تَعَمَّدَ فَعَلَيْهِ‏.‏

وَالْجَنِينُ الْيَهُودِيُّ أَوْ النَّصْرَانِيُّ قِيلَ كَمُسْلِمٍ، وَقِيلَ هَدَرٌ، وَالْأَصَحُّ غُرَّةٌ كَثُلُثِ غُرَّةِ مُسْلِمٍ‏.‏

وَالرَّقِيقُ عُشْرُ قِيمَةِ أُمِّهِ يَوْمَ الْجِنَايَةِ، وَقِيلَ الْإِجْهَاضُ لِسَيِّدِهَا، فَإِنْ كَانَتْ مَقْطُوعَةً وَالْجَنِينُ سَلِيمٌ قُوِّمَتْ سَلِيمَةً فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَتَحْمِلُهُ الْعَاقِلَةُ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

Section

Abortion involves the ghorra as price of blood for the foetus if brought
forth dead in consequence of the crime, without prejudice to the price
of blood for the mother, where the abortion causes her death also,
fit is the same if the foetus appears to be dead in the mother’s womb
in consequence of the crime, and cannot bo extracted because of her
death. If it is a question not of a foetus but of a child brought forth
by abortive means, and remaining some time alive without showing
signs of pain, its death is presumed to be natural and nothing is due for
the abortion ; but if the child dies immediately after birth, or somo
time afterwards, but with constant signs of pain, the person causing
the abortion owes tho ordinary price of blood due in case of homicide.
If there are two foetuses there are also two ghorras. The ghorra is due
in full even whore there issues from the womb merely a hand or a piece
of flesh virtually containing a human form, according to the midwives ;
or even, according to somo jurists, where there remains in the womb a
piece of flesh which, according to the midwives, could take a human
form.

The ghorra consists in a male or female slave of the age of discern-
ment without redhibitory defects. fThus one may give as ghorra a
slave of a certain age, provided that age does not approach decrepitude.
The value of the slave must not be less than one-twentieth of tho price
of blood duo for homicide ; and in default of a slave answering all these
conditions one owes five camels. Some authorities, however, do not
insist upon the slave having the value mentioned. In default of camels
their value must be substituted for them. The ghorra is payable to
the heirs of the foetus, and is a debt for which the aakila of the offender
are responsible ; though according to some jurists the offender alone is
responsible if the abortion has been caused with premeditation. Accord-
ing to some authorities the ghorra is the same for a foetus which at its
birth would have been Moslem as for one that would have been Jewish
or Christian. According to others nothing is duo for tho abortion of a
foetus which would have been infidel by birth ; f but the majority allow
for this foetus a ghorra of the amount of one-third of that for a foetus which
would have been Moslem. The abortion of a female slave is punished
with one-tenth of her value upon the day of the offence ; or, according
to others, on the day of the abortion ; and the amount goes to the
profit of the master. j*If the mother is deprived of a bodily member
or organ, but the foetus is without bodily defects, the value of which
one-tentli is due is the mother’s original value. *And the tenth due for
the abortion of a female slave is also a debt for which the aalcila are
responsible.

فصل ‏[‏في كفارة القتل‏]‏

تجب بالقتل كفارة وَإِنْ كَانَ الْقَاتِلُ صَبِيًّا أَوْ مَجْنُونًا عَبْدًا أَوْ ذِمِّيًّا وَعَامِدًا وَمُخْطِئًا وَمُتَسَبِّبًا بِقَتْلِ مُسْلِمٍ وَلَوْ بِدَارِ حَرْبٍ، وَذِمِّيٍّ وَجَنِينٍ وَعَبْدِ نَفْسِهِ وَنَفْسِهِ، وَفِي نَفْسِهِ وَجْهٌ‏.‏

لَا امْرَأَةٍ، وَصَبِيٍّ حَرْبِيَّيْنِ وَبَاغٍ وَصَائِلٍ وَمُقْتَصٍّ مِنْهُ‏.‏

وَعَلَى كُلٍّ مِنْ الشُّرَكَاءِ كَفَّارَةٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَهِيَ كَظِهَارٍ لَكِنْ لَا إطْعَامَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

Section G

A homicide requires an expiation, even where the offender is a
minor, a lunatic, a slave, or an inlidel subject of a Moslem prince ; and
it makes no difference whether the homicide is premeditated, voluntary,
or involuntary. Expiation is even necessary : —

. In case of excusable homicide, at least where the victim is a
Moslem.

. In case of homicide committed upon the territory of infidels not
subject to Moslem authority, at least where the victim is a Moslem.

. Where the victim is an infidel subject of a Moslem prince.

. Where the victim is still in his mother’s womb.
. Whore the victim is tho offender’s slave.

G. In ease of suicide. This, however, has been called in question.

Expiation is not due —

. For homicide committed upon an infidel woman or minor not
subject to our authority.

. For homicide committed upon a rebel.

. In case of legitimate defence.

. Where homicide is committed under the law of talion.

f An expiation is due for each accomplice. This expiation is equal
to that prescribed for injurious comparison ; *with the exception of
the option of maintaining sixty indigent persons.

كتاب دَعْوَى الدَّمِ وَالْقَسَامَةِ

BOOK 49 .— PROCEDURE IN CASE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

يُشْتَرَطُ أَنْ يُفَصِّلَ مَا يَدَّعِيهِ مِنْ عَمْدٍ وَخَطَإٍ وَانْفِرَادٍ وَشِرْكَةٍ، فَإِنْ أَطْلَقَ اسْتَفْصَلَهُ الْقَاضِي وَقِيلَ يُعْرِضُ عَنْهُ وَأَنْ يُعَيِّنَ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ، فَلَوْ قَالَ قَتَلَهُ أَحَدُهُمْ لَا يُحَلِّفُهُمْ الْقَاضِي فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيَجْرِيَانِ فِي دَعْوَى غَصْبٍ وَسَرِقَةٍ وَإِتْلَافٍ، وَإِنَّمَا تُسْمَعُ مِنْ مُكَلَّفٍ مُلْتَزِمٍ عَلَى مِثْلِهِ، وَلَوْ ادَّعَى انْفِرَادَهُ بِالْقَتْلِ ثُمَّ ادَّعَى عَلَى آخَرَ لَمْ تُسْمَعْ الثَّانِيَةُ، أَوْ عَمْدًا وَوَصَفَهُ بِغَيْرِهِ، لَمْ يَبْطُلْ أَصْلُ الدَّعْوَى فِي الْأَظْهَرِ‏.‏

وَتَثْبُتُ الْقَسَامَةُ، فِي الْقَتْلِ بِمَحَلِّ لَوْثٍ، وَهُوَ قَرِينَةٌ لِصِدْقِ الْمُدَّعِي بِأَنْ وُجِدَ قَتِيلٌ فِي مَحَلَّةٍ أَوْ قَرْيَةٍ صَغِيرَةٍ لِأَعْدَائِهِ، أَوْ تَفَرَّقَ عَنْهُ جَمْعٌ، وَلَوْ تَقَابَلَ صَفَّانِ لِقِتَالٍ وَانْكَشَفُوا عَنْ قَتِيلٍ، فَإِنْ الْتَحَمَ قِتَالٌ فَلَوْثٌ فِي حَقِّ الصَّفِّ الْآخَرِ، وَإِلَّا فَفِي حَقِّ صَفِّهِ‏.‏

وَشَهَادَةُ الْعَدْلِ لَوْثٌ‏.‏

وَكَذَا عَبِيدٌ أَوْ نِسَاءٌ، وَقِيلَ يُشْتَرَطُ تَفَرُّقُهُمْ وَقَوْلُ فَسَقَةٍ وَصِبْيَانٍ وَكُفَّارٍ لَوْثٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ ظَهَرَ لَوْثٌ فَقَالَ أَحَدُ ابْنَيْهِ‏:‏ قَتَلَهُ فُلَانٌ وَكَذَّبَهُ الْآخَرُ بَطَلَ اللَّوْثُ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ لَا وَقِيلَ لَا يَبْطُلُ بِتَكْذِيبِ فَاسِقٍ، وَلَوْ قَالَ أَحَدُهُمَا‏:‏ قَتَلَهُ زَيْدٌ وَمَجْهُولٌ، وَقَالَ الْآخَرُ عَمْرٌو وَمَجْهُولٌ حَلَفَ كُلٌّ عَلَى مَنْ عَيَّنَهُ وَلَهُ رُبُعُ الدِّيَةِ، وَلَوْ أَنْكَرَ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ اللَّوْثَ فِي حَقِّهِ فَقَالَ لَمْ أَكُنْ مَعَ الْمُتَفَرِّقِينَ عَنْهُ صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَلَوْ ظَهَرَ لَوْثٌ بِأَصْلِ قَتْلٍ دُونَ عَمْدٍ وَخَطَإٍ فَلَا قَسَامَةَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَا يُقْسَمُ فِي طَرَفٍ وَإِتْلَافِ مَالٍ إلَّا فِي عَبْدٍ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ وَهِيَ أَنْ يَحْلِفَ الْمُدَّعِي عَلَى قَتْلٍ ادَّعَاهُ خَمْسِينَ يَمِينًا، وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ مُوَالَاتُهَا عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَلَوْ تَخَلَّلَهَا جُنُونٌ أَوْ إغْمَاءٌ بَنَى، وَلَوْ مَاتَ لَمْ يَبْنِ وَارِثُهُ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَلَوْ كَانَ لِلْقَتِيلِ وَرَثَةٌ وُزِّعَتْ بِحَسَبِ الْإِرْثِ، وَجُبِرَ الْمُنْكَسِرُ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَحْلِفُ كُلٌّ خَمْسِينَ، وَلَوْ نَكَلَ أَحَدُهُمَا حَلَفَ الْآخَرُ خَمْسِينَ، وَلَوْ غَابَ حَلَفَ الْآخَرُ خَمْسِينَ وَأَخَذَ حِصَّتَهُ، وَإِلَّا صَبَرَ لِلْغَائِبِ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّ يَمِينَ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ بِلَا لَوْثٍ، وَالْمَرْدُودَةَ عَلَى الْمُدَّعِي أَوْ عَلَى الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ مَعَ لَوْثٍ، وَالْيَمِينَ مَعَ شَاهِدٍ خَمْسُونَ‏.‏

وَيَجِبُ بِالْقَسَامَةِ فِي قَتْلِ الْخَطَإِ، أَوْ شِبْهِ الْعَمْدِ دِيَةٌ عَلَى الْعَاقِلَةِ، وَفِي الْعَمْدِ عَلَى الْمَقْسَمِ عَلَيْهِ وَفِي الْقَدِيمِ قِصَاصٌ وَلَوْ ادَّعَى عَمْدًا بِلَوْثٍ عَلَى ثَلَاثَةٍ حَضَرَ أَحَدُهُمْ أَقْسَمَ عَلَيْهِ خَمْسِينَ وَأَخَذَ ثُلُثَ الدِّيَةِ، فَإِنْ حَضَرَ آخَرُ أَقْسَمَ عَلَيْهِ خَمْسِينَ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ خَمْسًا وَعِشْرِينَ إنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ ذَكَرَهُ فِي الْأَيْمَانِ، وَإِلَّا فَيَنْبَغِي الِاكْتِفَاءُ بِهَا بِنَاءً عَلَى صِحَّةِ الْقَسَامَةِ فِي غَيْبَةِ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ وَهُوَ الْأَصَحُّ‏.‏

وَمَنْ اسْتَحَقَّ بَدَلَ الدَّمِ أَقْسَمَ وَلَوْ مُكَاتَبًا لِقَتْلِ عَبْدِهِ، وَمَنْ ارْتَدَّ فَالْأَفْضَلُ تَأْخِيرُ أَقْسَامِهِ لِيُسْلِمَ، فَإِنْ أَقْسَمَ فِي الرِّدَّةِ صَحَّ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَمَنْ لَا وَارِثَ لَهُ لَا قَسَامَةَ فِيهِ‏.‏

BOOK 49 .— PROCEDURE IN CASE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

Section

The accuser must give a precise account of the offence, mentioning
whether it was premeditated or involuntary, whether the criminal
had accomplices or not, and so on ; and if he does not do this the court
shall require him to give details of his complaint ; or, according to
some authorities, it should dismiss him on the ground of there being
no case. According to others the accuser should also name in his com-
plaint the particular person alleged to have committed the crime, j* Thus
where the accuser confines himself to asserting that only one of several
accused persons committed a homicide, the court has no right to compel
them to take an oath, if they deny it. fThis principle applies not only
to the procedure we are here concerned with, but also in cases of usur-
pation, theft, and destruction. Moreover, an accusation can only be
received from a sane adult, whether a Moslem or an infidel subject of
our Sovereign or enjoying our protection, provided in the two last cases
that the accused is of the same quality.

One may not accuse a person of homicide after having previously
accused another person of the same offence, at any rate where one
asserted there were no accomplices ; *but there is no objection to first
bringing an accusation of premeditated homicide, and afterwards
limiting it to that of voluntary homicide.

An oath fifty times repeated is admissible as legal proof only in case
of grave suspicion, e.g . if the victim is found in the camp or village
of his enemies, if a band of men run away leaving a corpse lying on the
ground, or if two bands fight together furiously and a victim remains
on the spot. In this last case suspicion falls upon the band to which
the victim did not belong ; but if the bands did not fight, the fact of
the victim remaining dead at that place constitutes a grave suspicion
that he was killed by the band to which he belonged. The deposition
of a single witness of irreproachable character or that of several slaves
or women also constitutes a grave suspicion ; on condition, according
to some authorities, that the latter are separately examined. fA
similar suspicion results from the deposition of persons of notorious
misconduct, of minors, or of infidels. On the other hand, grave suspicion
never exists where the matter is open to doubt, e.g. where one of two
sons of the victim declares that so-and-so is guilty, and the other asserts
the contrary. A single jurist admits suspicion, even in these circum-
stances ; while others do not admit as a ground of doubt the denial of a
person of notorious misconduct. Where, however, in the circumstances
above mentioned, one of the sons declares that the homicide was com-
mitted by Zaid in complicity with a person he does not know, and the
other declares it was committed by Amr in complicity with a person
he does not know, each son may confirm upon oath, fifty times repeated,
the truth of his deposition, and then afterwards claim from the person
he has indicated one-quarter of the price of blood. As to grave suspicion
falling upon a band of men, an accused person who denies having formed
part of it has a presumption in his favour if he confirms his statement
upon oath, f The oath fifty times repeated is not to be taken by an
accuser, if the grave suspicion relates only to the material fact of
homicide, and does not indicate whether it is premeditated or not ;
and it can only be taken in case of homicide, not in cases of wounding
or destruction of property, unless the object destroyed is a slave.

This oath consists in the accuser swearing fifty times that his com-
plaint is true ; but our school does not insist upon the ceremony taking
place without interruption. Consequently an accuser struck with an
attack of madness or fainting may continue his oath upon coming to
himself. j*fBut if the accuser dies before finishing the fifty oaths
required, no right of continuation devolves upon his heir, who may,
however, on his part, pronounce a new series of fifty oaths. Where the
victim leaves several heirs who may jointly demand the punishment
of the guilty person, the fifty oaths are divided among them in propor-
tion to their respective shares in the estate ; except that any one who
would in this way take merely part of an oath, must take it in its entirely.
One authority even maintains that the oath should be taken fifty times
by each heir. The refusal of an heir to take this oath makes his right
pass to his coinheritor ; and if one of two coinheritors cannot perform
his oaths through absence the other may either take by himself the fifty
oaths prescribed and receive at once his portion of the price of blood,
or await the return of the absent coinheritor. Finally, in cases of
crimes against the person, our school insists all the same upon the
repetition of the oath fifty times —

. When it is taken by the accused, in default of grave suspicion.

. When it is taken by the accuser, or by the accused, in case of
grave suspicion.

. When it is taken to supplement the deposition of a single witness.
The result of the repealing of the oath fifty times is that the price
of blood becomes obligatory both for the criminal and for his aakila,
in case of voluntary or involuntary homicide, and that it is due from
the criminal alone in case of premeditat ed homicide. In his first period
Shafii considered that even in this last case the repetition of the oath
fifty times was sufficient proof for the law of talion.

Where there is grave suspicion of premeditated homicide against
three persons of whom one only has been arrested, the accuser begins
by taking an oath fifty times to give his complaint greater force against
the one arrested ; and after this the latter owes one-third of the price
of blood. If afterwards another of the accused persons is arrested,
the accuser again repeats the oath fifty times with respect to him ; but
doubt has been cast on this rule by a jurist who maintains that only
twenty-five oaths can be insisted on against the second accused, if the
accused does not mention him upon the first occasion. This jurist,
however, admits, as do the majority, that on the contrary supposition
the new oaths are of no value ; fin that case suffice the first fifty
oaths legally pronounced in the absence of the second accused.

The oath fifty times repeated is administered also to an individual
who can claim only a pecuniary penalty in place of talion, for instance,
to the master of a slave, even where the master in question is a slave
undergoing enfranchisement by contract. As to an accuser who becomes
an apostate it is preferable not to administer to him the oath with which
we are concerned, until he returns from his errors ; though according
to our school the validity of the oath is unquestionable if taken at once.
And finally, the oath repeated fifty times is not administered if the
victim leaves no heir.

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏فيما يثبت به موجب القود وموجب المال بسبب الجناية من إقرار وشهادة‏]‏

إنَّمَا يَثْبُتُ مُوجِبُ الْقِصَاصِ بِإِقْرَارٍ أَوْ عَدْلَيْنِ‏.‏

وَالْمَالِ بِذَلِكَ أَوْ بِرَجُلٍ وَامْرَأَتَيْنِ، أَوْ وَيَمِينٍ، وَلَوْ عَفَا عَنْ الْقِصَاصِ لِيَقْبَلَ لِلْمَالِ رَجُلٌ وَامْرَأَتَانِ لَمْ يُقْبَلْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَوْ شَهِدَ هُوَ وَهُمَا بِهَاشِمَةٍ قَبْلَهَا إيضَاحٌ لَمْ يَجِبْ أَرْشُهَا عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ وَلْيُصَرِّحْ الشَّاهِدُ بِالْمُدَّعَى، فَلَوْ قَالَ ضَرَبَهُ بِسَيْفٍ فَجَرَحَهُ فَمَاتَ لَمْ يَثْبُتْ حَتَّى يَقُولَ فَمَاتَ مِنْهُ أَوْ فَقَتَلَهُ، وَلَوْ قَالَ ضَرَبَ رَأْسَهُ فَأَدْمَاهُ أَوْ فَأَسَالَ دَمَهُ ثَبَتَتْ دَامِيَةٌ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ لِمُوضِحَةٍ ضَرَبَهُ فَأَوْضَحَ عَظْمَ رَأْسِهِ، وَقِيلَ يَكْفِي فَأَوْضَحَ رَأْسَهُ، وَيَجِبُ بَيَانُ مَحَلِّهَا وَقَدْرِهَا لِيُمْكِنَ الْقِصَاصُ وَيَثْبُتُ الْقَتْلُ بِالسِّحْرِ بِإِقْرَارٍ بِهِ، لَا بِبَيِّنَةٍ‏.‏

وَلَوْ شَهِدَ لِمُوَرِّثِهِ بِجُرْحٍ قَبْلَ الِانْدِمَالِ لَمْ تُقْبَلْ، وَبَعْدَهُ يُقْبَلُ وَكَذَا بِمَالٍ فِي مَرَضِ مَوْتِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَا تُقْبَلُ شَهَادَةُ الْعَاقِلَةِ بِفِسْقِ شُهُودِ قَتْلٍ يَحْمِلُونَهُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ شَهِدَ اثْنَانِ عَلَى اثْنَيْنِ بِقَتْلِهِ فَشَهِدَا عَلَى الْأَوَّلَيْنِ بِقَتْلِهِ فَإِنْ صَدَّقَ الْوَلِيُّ الْأَوَّلَيْنِ حُكِمَ بِهِمَا، أَوْ الْآخَرَيْنِ أَوْ الْجَمِيعَ أَوْ كَذَّبَ الْجَمِيعَ بَطَلَتَا، وَلَوْ أَقَرَّ بَعْضُ الْوَرَثَةِ بِعَفْوِ بَعْضٍ سَقَطَ الْقِصَاصُ‏.‏

وَلَوْ اخْتَلَفَ شَاهِدَانِ فِي زَمَانٍ أَوْ مَكَان أَوْ آلَةٍ أَوْ هَيْئَةٍ لَغَتْ، وَقِيلَ لَوْثٌ‏.‏

Section

No one can be condemned to a penalty under the law of talion
unless the fact has been proved, either by a confession, or by two male wit-
nesses of irreproachable conduct. But a criminal’s condemnation to a
pecuniary penalty may be based as well upon the deposition of a single
male witness, corroborated by that of two women or by an oath ; f with
the single exception that where an accuser demands an application of
the law of talion and afterwards finds that he can produce as witnesses
only one man and two women, he may not change his mind and remit
any proceeding under the law of talion and content himself with asking
for a pecuniary penalty ; although these witnesses would have sufficed
had he in the first instance applied for the imposition of a fine. And,
in accordance with the same principle, where a hashima, constituting
in the first instance a mudilia, is established by a man and two women,
the penalty prescribed for a hashima cannot be exacted, at least according
to our school, as the mudilia involves the law of talion, and consequently
cannot be proved in that manner. The depositions should indicate
precisely the fact with which the accused is charged. Thus a deposition
to the effect that “ the accused struck the victim with his sword and
wounded him and he is dead,” is not enough until completed by a de-
position to the effect that “ death was the consequence of the blow,”
or that “ it was the accused who killed him.” A damia is proved by a
deposition that “ the accused struck the victim on the head in such
a way as to cause it to bleed,” or “ to make the blood spurt forth; ” a
mudilia by a deposition that the accused struck him in such a way as
to uncover the bone ; though according to some authorities it is enough
to prove that the accused dealt the victim a mudilia upon the head.
In the case of a mudilia the deposition should also indicate precisely
the place and gravity of the wound, as otherwise it would be impossible
to apply the law of talion. A homicide committed by means of magic
is proved only by the criminal’s confession, and not by the testimony
of witnesses.

A deposition to the effect that a certain person, of whom one is
the heir, has been wounded by another, is admissible only when the
wound has been completely healed. Nor may one depose, in a civil
action, in favour of any one of whom one is the heir, during that person’s
last malady ; as the principle is admitted that no one may depose in
his own favour. Consequently the aahila cannot give evidence to the
effect that the witnesses for the accuser are of notorious misconduct,
at any rate where these same aahila would contribute to the price of
blood in case of condemnation. If two witnesses assert that two
persons have killed some one, but these two accused persons in their
turn accuse the two witnesses of being themselves the only guilty
parties, the latter are none the less condemned, if the representative
of the victim sides with the witnesses. On the other hand, the accusa-
tion on both sides should be rejected, if the representative sides with
the accused, or if he declares that both the accused and the witnesses
are guilty, or if he declares that they are all lying. A penalty may not
be pronounced under the law of talion, where some of the heirs of the
victim admit that their coheritors have already remitted this penalty ;
and the depositions of two witnesses who contradict one another as to
the time, the place, the instrument or the circumstances of the crime,
are void and of no effect. Some authorities admit depositions of this
nature merely as establishing grave suspicions.

كتاب الْبُغَاةِ

BOOK 50 . — REBELS

هُمْ مُخَالِفُو الْإِمَامِ بِخُرُوجٍ عَلَيْهِ وَتَرْكِ الِانْقِيَادِ، أَوْ مَنْعِ حَقٍّ تَوَجَّهَ عَلَيْهِمْ بِشَرْطِ شَوْكَةٍ لَهُمْ وَتَأْوِيلٍ، وَمُطَاعٍ فِيهِمْ، قِيلَ وَإِمَامٌ مَنْصُوبٌ، وَلَوْ أَظْهَرَ قَوْمٌ رَأْيَ الْخَوَارِجِ كَتَرْكِ الْجَمَاعَاتِ وَتَكْفِيرِ ذِي كَبِيرَةٍ وَلَمْ يُقَاتِلُوا تُرِكُوا، وَإِلَّا فَقُطَّاعُ طَرِيقٍ‏.‏

وَتُقْبَلُ شَهَادَةُ الْبُغَاةِ وَقَضَاءُ قَاضِيهِمْ فِيمَا يُقْبَلُ قَضَاءُ قَاضِينَا إلَّا أَنْ يَسْتَحِلَّ دِمَاءَنَا، وَيَنْفُذُ كِتَابُهُ بِالْحُكْمِ وَيُحْكَمُ بِكِتَابِهِ بِسَمَاعِ الْبَيِّنَةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

وَلَوْ أَقَامُوا حَدًّا وَأَخَذُوا زَكَاةً وَخَرَاجًا وَجِزْيَةً وَفَرَّقُوا سَهْمَ الْمُرْتَزِقَةِ عَلَى جُنْدِهِمْ صَحَّ، وَفِي الْأَخِيرِ وَجْهٌ‏.‏

وَمَا أَتْلَفَهُ بَاغٍ عَلَى عَادِلٍ وَعَكْسِهِ إنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ فِي قِتَالٍ ضَمِنَ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يَضْمَنُ الْبَاغِي‏.‏

وَالْمُتَأَوِّلُ بِلَا شَوْكَةٍ يَضْمَنُ، وَعَكْسُهُ كَبَاغٍ‏.‏

وَلَا يُقَاتِلُ الْبُغَاةَ حَتَّى يَبْعَثَ إلَيْهِمْ أَمِينًا فَطِنًا نَاصِحًا يَسْأَلُهُمْ مَا يَنْقِمُونَ، فَإِنْ ذَكَرُوا مَظْلِمَةً أَوْ شُبْهَةً أَزَالَهَا، فَإِنْ أَصَرُّوا نَصَحَهُمْ ثُمَّ آذَنَهُمْ بِالْقِتَالِ، فَإِنْ اسْتَمْهَلُوا اجْتَهَدَ وَفَعَلَ مَا رَآهُ صَوَابًا، وَلَا يُقَاتِلُ مُدْبِرَهُمْ وَلَا مُثْخَنَهُمْ وَأَسِيرَهُمْ وَلَا يُطْلَقُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ صَبِيًّا وَامْرَأَةً حَتَّى تَنْقَضِيَ الْحَرْبُ وَيَتَفَرَّقَ جَمْعُهُمْ إلَّا أَنْ يُطِيعَ بِاخْتِيَارِهِ، وَيَرُدُّ سِلَاحَهُمْ وَخَيْلَهُمْ إلَيْهِمْ إذَا انْقَضَتْ الْحَرْبُ وَأُمِنَتْ غَائِلَتُهُمْ، وَلَا يُسْتَعْمَلُ فِي قِتَالٍ إلَّا لِضَرُورَةٍ، وَلَا يُقَاتَلُونَ بِعَظِيمٍ كَنَارٍ وَمَنْجَنِيقٍ إلَّا لِضَرُورَةٍ كَأَنْ قَاتَلُوا بِهِ أَوْ أَحَاطُوا بِنَا وَلَا يُسْتَعَانُ عَلَيْهِمْ بِكَافِرٍ، وَلَا بِمَنْ يَرَى قَتْلَهُمْ مُدْبِرِينَ، وَلَوْ اسْتَعَانُوا عَلَيْنَا بِأَهْلِ حَرْبٍ وَآمَنُوهُمْ لَمْ يَنْفُذْ أَمَانُهُمْ عَلَيْنَا، وَنَفَذَ عَلَيْهِمْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَوْ أَعَانَهُمْ أَهْلُ الذِّمَّةِ عَالِمِينَ بِتَحْرِيمِ قِتَالِنَا انْتَقَضَ عَهْدُهُمْ، أَوْ مُكْرَهِينَ فَلَا، وَكَذَا إنْ قَالُوا ظَنَنَّا جَوَازَهُ أَوْ أَنَّهُمْ مُحِقُّونَ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَيُقَاتَلُونَ كَبُغَاةٍ‏.‏

BOOK 50 . — REBELS

Section

By rebels are understood those who revolt against the Sovereign, either
by attacking him, or by disobeying his orders, or by refusing services
or taxes legally due to him. In case of armed rebellion in which the
guilty parties are organised under chiefs, they must be marched against
and reduced to obedience ; provided, according to some authorities,
that there exists a Sovereign, recognised as their head by all Moslems.
As to persons whose rebellion consists only in their deviation from
recognised orthodox doctrine, those, for instance, who no longer observe
public prayer, or commit grave sins in secret, these must be left alone,
unless they trouble the internal security of the state with armed force,
for then they must be fought and punished like brigands.

Rebels remain capable of deposing as witnesses, and the judgments
rendered by their courts may be executed, except judgments that
would be illegal even if delivered by our courts, or such as approve of
hostile acts committed against true believers. j*Our courts may reply
to letters of requisition addressed to them by rebel courts, and may
accept as evidence informations drawn up by them. Definite penalties
pronounced and carried into effect by them are recognised as legal ;
as are also their charity tax, poll-tax, and land-tax, and even the appli-
cation of the proceeds of the charity-tax to the support of their soldiers.
This last rule, however, is doubtful.

Rebels are civilly responsible for all damage caused by them to the
property of loyal subjects ; and the latter are similarly responsible
for all damage caused by them to the property of the rebels otherwise
than in the war. One jurist, however, does not admit the responsibility
of loyal subjects in any case. Individuals forming part of an organisa-
tion, though not united in armed bands, are civilly responsible for any
destructive act, just like any other person ; but those who, though not
organised, are united in armed bands, should be considered in this respect
as rebels, even where there are no chiefs among them, and they offer
no opposition to lawful authority.

Rebels may not be fought with, until there has been previously
sent them some trustworthy and intelligent person, capable of advising
them to lay down their arms. He should begin by inquiring as to llieir
grievances, and if they complain of vexatious treatment or error on the
part of the lawful authorities, lie should put a stop to this at once, and
give the advice that may be necessary for the submission of the rebels.
If the rebels refuse to take this advice, the Sovereign should threaten
to reduce them to obedience by force of arms ; and if they ask for a
delay he may accord or refuse it as seems to him best.

It is forbidden to kill rebels when they take to flight, or when dis-
abled or when made prisoners. Prisoners, including minors and women,
must be retained until the end of the war and the complete dispersion
of the rebel bands, unless they declare their submission to lawful autho-
rity. After the pacification captured arms and horses are to be returned
to their owners, provided that nothing further is to be feared from them.
In warfare against rebels it is forbidden to make use of the arms and
horses taken from them, except in case of absolute necessity, or to use
methods of great destructiveness, such as fire or warlike machines,
unless such a course is rendered necessary by the rebels themselves
using these things in their defence, or by there being no other means
for our escape when surrounded by them.

It is equally forbidden to reduce rebels to obedience by means of
troops recruited from amongst the infidels, or even from amongst
Moslems who, like followers of the school of Abu Hanifa, maintain that
rebels who have taken to flight may be killed. Infidels not subject
to Moslem authority, enrolled by rebels in a war against us, and thus
enjoying their protection, have no title to be so considered by us ; ft he
rebels themselves, however, are bound to observe the engagements
they have contracted with the infidels in question. Infidel subjects
of our Sovereign who take part with the rebels against us, knowingly,
and of their own free will, lose all right to our protection ; but if they
are forced to join in the war, our engagements towards them remain
intact. It is the same where the infidels in question declare that they
believed in good faith that it was lawful for them to take part in the
war, and that the rebels were in the right. At least this is the theory
of our school. In all these circumstances infidel subjects of our
Sovereign should be treated in warfare like the rebels themselves.

فَصْلٌ ‏[‏في شروط الإمام الأعظم وبيان طرق الإمامة‏]‏

شَرْطُ الْإِمَامِ كَوْنُهُ مُسْلِمًا مُكَلَّفًا حُرًّا ذَكَرًا قُرَشِيًّا مُجْتَهِدًا شُجَاعًا ذَا رَأْيٍ وَسَمْعٍ وَبَصَرٍ وَنُطْقٍ‏.‏

وَتَنْعَقِدُ الْإِمَامَةُ بِالْبَيْعَةِ، وَالْأَصَحُّ بَيْعَةُ أَهْلِ الْحَلِّ وَالْعَقْدِ مِنْ الْعُلَمَاءِ وَالرُّؤَسَاءِ وَوُجُوهِ النَّاسِ الَّذِينَ يَتَيَسَّرُ اجْتِمَاعُهُمْ، وَشَرْطُهُمْ صِفَةُ الشُّهُودِ وَبِاسْتِخْلَافِ الْإِمَامِ، فَلَوْ جَعَلَ الْأَمْرَ شُورَى بَيْنَ جَمْعٍ فَكَاسْتِخْلَافٍ فَيَرْتَضُونَ أَحَدَهُمْ‏.‏

وَبِاسْتِيلَاءِ جَامِعِ الشُّرُوطِ، وَكَذَا فَاسِقٌ وَجَاهِلٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ‏.‏

قُلْتُ‏:‏ لَوْ ادَّعَى دَفْعَ زَكَاةٍ إلَى الْبُغَاةِ صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ، أَوْ جِزْيَةٍ فَلَا عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَكَذَا خَرَاجٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَيُصَدَّقُ فِي حَدٍّ إلَّا أَنْ يَثْبُتَ بِبَيِّنَةٍ، وَلَا أَثَرَ لَهُ فِي الْبَدَنِ وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ‏.‏

Section

Essential requisites for a Sovereign are to be a free, sane, adult,
male Moslem of the tribe of the Koraish ; of sufficient courage, dis-
cretion and knowledge of the law ; of sound sight, hearing, and speech.
Sovereignty is conferred —

. By election ; fto be carried out by the best scholars, chiefs, and
other persons occupying a high social position, or so many of them as
can be united in one place.

. By designation ; the Sovereign having the right to designate
his successor, and even to grant to several persons the right of desig-
nating one of them to be his successor.

. By the right of the stronger ; and this title to the supreme
authority is to be recognised not only where the Sovereign who is thus
imposed upon the faithful unites in his person all the requisite qualities,
fbut also if he possesses none of them, and is even of notorious mis-
conduct, or an ignorant person.

[A tax-payer who alleges that he has paid the rebels the tax due
from him, has a presumption in his favour ; but this presumption does
not exist with regard to the poll-tax for the land-tax. The same pre-
sumption exists in favour of a person who asserts that he has suffered
a definite penalty, unless the crime was proved by witnesses ; or unless
no trace of punishment can be found on the criminars body.]