Book 65: Administration of Justice (Qada)
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة
المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi
Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن
بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631
AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21
December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa,
present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of
study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of
thought
Type of literature dan reference: classical Arabic
Contents
- Book 65: Administration of Justice (Qada)
- Chapter I General provisions
- Chapter II Judgments by default
-
Chapter III Distribution of estates (Qismah)
- Book 66: Evidence of Witnesses (Shahadat)
- Book 67: Procedure ( Daawa wa beyyinat)
- Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi
كتاب القَضاءِ
BOOK 65 — ADMINISTRATION OB JUSTICE
هُوَ فَرْضُ كِفَايَةٍ.
فَإِنْ تَعَيَّنَ لَزِمَهُ طَلَبُهُ.
وَإِلَّا
فَإِنْ كَانَ غَيْرُهُ أَصْلَحَ، وَكَانَ يَتَوَلَّاهُ فَلِلْمَفْضُولِ
الْقَبُولُ، وَقِيلَ: لَا، وَيُكْرَهُ طَلَبُهُ، وَقِيلَ: يَحْرُمُ، وَإِنْ
كَانَ مِثْلَهُ فَلَهُ الْقَبُولُ.
وَيُنْدَبُ الطَّلَبُ إنْ كَانَ
خَامِلاً يَرْجُو بِهِ نَشْرَ الْعِلْمِ أَوْ مُحْتَاجًا إلَى الرِّزْقِ،
وَإِلَّا فَالْأَوْلَى تَرْكُهُ.
قُلْت: وَيُكْرَهُ عَلَى
الصَّحِيحِ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَالِاعْتِبَارُ فِي التَّعْيِينِ
وَعَدَمِهِ بِالنَّاحِيَةِ.
وَشَرْطُ الْقَاضِي مُسْلِمٌ مُكَلَّفٌ
حُرٌّ ذَكَرٌ عَدْلٌ سَمِيعٌ بَصِيرٌ نَاطِقٌ كَافٍ مُجْتَهِدٌ وَهُوَ أَنْ
يَعْرِفَ مِنْ الْكِتَابِ وَالسُّنَّةِ مَا يَتَعَلَّقُ بِالْأَحْكَامِ، وَ
خَاصَّهُ وَعَامَّهُ، وَمُجْمَلَهُ وَمُبَيَّنَهُ، وَنَاسِخَهُ وَمَنْسُوخَهُ،
وَمُتَوَاتِرَ السُّنَّةِ وَغَيْرَهُ، وَ الْمُتَّصِلَ وَالْمُرْسَلَ، وَحَالَ
الرُّوَاةِ قُوَّةً وَضَعْفًا، وَلِسَانَ الْعَرَبِ لُغَةً وَنَحْوًا،
وَأَقْوَالَ الْعُلَمَاءِ مِنْ الصَّحَابَةِ فَمَنْ بَعْدَهُمْ إجْمَاعًا
وَاخْتِلَافًا وَالْقِيَاسَ، بِأَنْوَاعِهِ فَإِنْ تَعَذَّرَ جَمْعُ هَذِهِ
الشُّرُوطِ فَوَلَّى سُلْطَانٌ لَهُ شَوْكَةٌ فَاسِقًا أَوْ مُقَلِّدًا نَفَذَ
قَضَاؤُهُ لِلضَّرُورَةِ.
وَيُنْدَبُ لِلْإِمَامِ إذَا وَلَّى
قَاضِيًا أَنْ يَأْذَنَ لَهُ فِي الِاسْتِخْلَافِ، فَإِنْ نَهَاهُ لَمْ
يَسْتَخْلِفْ، فَإِنْ أَطْلَقَ اسْتَخْلَفَ فِيمَا لَا يَقْدِرُ عَلَيْهِ لَا
غَيْرِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَشَرْطُ الْمُسْتَخْلَفِ كَالْقَاضِي، إلَّا أَنْ
يُسْتَخْلَفَ فِي أَمْرٍ خَاصٍّ: كَسَمَاعِ بَيِّنَةٍ فَيَكْفِي عِلْمُهُ بِمَا
يَتَعَلَّقُ بِهِ، وَيَحْكُمَ بِاجْتِهَادِهِ أَوْ بِاجْتِهَادِ مُقَلَّدِهِ إنْ
كَانَ مُقَلِّدًا، وَلَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَشْرِطَ عَلَيْهِ خِلَافَهُ.
وَلَوْ
حَكَّمَ خَصْمَانِ رَجُلاً فِي غَيْرِ حَدِّ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى جَازَ مُطْلَقًا
بِشَرْطِ أَهْلِيَّةِ الْقَضَاءِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ لَا يَجُوزُ.
وَقِيلَ:
بِشَرْطِ عَدَمِ قَاضٍ بِالْبَلَدِ.
وَقِيلَ يَخْتَصُّ بِمَالٍ
دُونَ قِصَاصٍ وَنِكَاحٍ وَنَحْوِهِمَا، وَلَا يَنْفُذُ حُكْمُهُ إلَّا عَلَى
رَاضٍ بِهِ فَلَا يَكْفِي رِضَا قَاتِلٍ فِي ضَرْبِ دِيَةٍ عَلَى عَاقِلَتِهِ،
وَإِنْ رَجَعَ أَحَدُهُمَا قَبْلَ الْحُكْمِ امْتَنَعَ الْحُكْمُ، وَلَا
يُشْتَرَطُ الرِّضَا بَعْدَ الْحُكْمِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ
نَصَبَ قَاضِيَيْنِ فِي بَلَدٍ وَخَصَّ كُلًّا بِمَكَانٍ أَوْ زَمَانٍ أَوْ
نَوْعٍ جَازَ، وَكَذَا إنْ لَمْ يَخُصَّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، إلَّا أَنْ يَشْتَرِطَ
اجْتِمَاعَهُمَا عَلَى الْحُكْمِ.
BOOK 65 — ADMINISTRATION OB JUSTICE
CHAPTER I.— GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section
The Moslem community
is collectively responsible for the administra-
tion of justice. A Moslem who feels
himself specially capable of
exercising
the functions of a judge, should solicit
those functions ; but
any individual may
accept these duties if the Sovereign
entrusts them to
him, even though
some other individual may be more
capable than he.
Some jurists, however,
have thrown doubt upon this rule.
But in such
a case it is undoubtedly
blamable to solicit the function of
judge ; and
some authorities even go
further and wholly forbid any such
solicitation.
Where one considers oneself
not inferior to another in juridical
capacity,
one may, it is universally
agreed, accept the position of judge ;
it is
even commendable to solicit it
where, being learned but obscure, one
hopes in this way to be able
to make one’s light shine for the
good of
humanity, or create for
oneself a respectable social position, [jf
Solicita-
tion is always blamable, except
in case of eminent capacity.] To know
whether one has special aptitudes
for the magistracy, it is only necessary
to compare oneself with the other
inhabitants of the district.
A judge
must be Moslem, adult, sane, free,
male, of irreproachable
character ; sound
of hearing, sight, and speech ; educated,
and enjoying
a certain degree of authority
in matters of law. Such an authority
can be attributed only to one
who understands the Koran and the
Sonna, and all the texts relating
to jurisprudence ; and who knows,
moreover, whether these texts have a
general or special signiiicance ;
whether
they are or are not still in
need of explanation ; whether they
abrogate other texts, or are
themselves abrogated by later ones ; whether
a certain tradition is or is not
based upon an uninterrupted line of
reporters ; whether the origin of a
tradition goes back to the companions
of the Prophet, or only to the
first generation after him ; and whether
the authority of the reporters is
strong or weak. A person wishing to
obtain a certain amount of authority
in matters of law should also
know —
. The Arabic language, both as
to the employment of words and
as
to grammatical rules ; and also the
opinions of jurists, beginning
with the
companions of the Prophet.
. Whether
these opinions are in harmony with
one another, or if
there is some
divergence between them.
. The
reasonings upon which these opinions are
based.
Where, however, there is no
one fulfilling these requirements, the
Sultan may, if necessary, appoint as
judge an individual of notorious mis-
conductor one absolutely incompetent, in
order to decide a particular
question. It
is then admitted, so far as regards
that case, that the
decisions of the
individual so appointed are regarded as
final, provided
only that he has
been nominated by a prince really invested
with supreme
authority.
The Sovereign
is recommended to authorise a person appointed
judge to choose his own substitute.
Where, however, this authorisation
has
been formally refused him, a judge has
no right to choose his own
substitute ; and where nothing has
been said about it he may only
choose one for the cases he is
unable to decide personally, not for the
others. The substitute must possess
the same qualifications as the
ordinary
judge, unless he has been designated
for some special duty,
c.cj. the
hearing of witnesses. In this latter
case only the qualifications
necessary for
that particular duty can be insisted
on. A substitute
who enjoys a certain
amount of authority in matters of
law may decide
cases himself ; but
otherwise ho should in all cases
refer to the authority
of the jurist
whose opinions he has embraced ; and
one has no right to
give him
any other instructions.
All proceedings
may be compounded, except where penalties
arc
incurred for offences against God, i.e
. unremissible penalties, provided
that the
arbitrator is a man capable of exercising
the functions of judge.
A single authority
does not admit arbitration ; while others
limit it
to cases where there is
no judge in the locality, and yet
others to pro-
ceedings that only involve
pecuniary consequences and so deny its
legality in disputes as to the
penalty of talion, marriage, etc. In no
case, however, is an arbitration of
effect as against third parties. Thus,
even where a composition is admitted
on the part of a person guilty
of
homicide, the arbitral decision cannot be
enforced against his aakila
for the
price of blood. Either party may
revoke his offer of composition
so
long as the arbitrator has not
pronounced his decision ; *but once
this
has been done no one’s approval is
necessary for the execution of
the
judgment.
The Sovereign may appoint
two judges in the same district, either
nominating each one to special
judicial functions, or to a particular
portion of the locality, or for a
particular time or for a certain kind of
proceedings ; or nominating both of
them to the same functions, except
that it is not lawful to order
them to give judgment together.
فَصْلٌ [فيما يقتضي انعزال القاضي أو عزله وما يذكر معه]
جُنَّ
قَاضٍ أَوْ أُغْمِيَ عَلَيْهِ أَوْ عَمِيَ أَوْ ذَهَبَتْ أَهْلِيَّةُ
اجْتِهَادِهِ وَضَبْطِهِ بِغَفْلَةٍ أَوْ نِسْيَانٍ لَمْ يَنْفُذْ حُكْمُهُ،
وَكَذَا لَوْ فُسِّقَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَإِنْ زَالَتْ هَذِهِ الْأَحْوَالُ لَمْ
تَعُدْ وِلَايَتُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلِلْإِمَامِ عَزْلُ قَاضٍ
ظَهَرَ مِنْهُ خَلَلٌ أَوْ لَمْ يَظْهَرْ، وَهُنَاكَ أَفْضَلُ مِنْهُ أَوْ
مِثْلُهُ وَفِي عَزْلِهِ بِهِ مَصْلَحَةٌ كَتَسْكِينِ فِتْنَةٍ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا
لَكِنْ يَنْفُذُ الْعَزْلُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ
لَا يَنْعَزِلُ قَبْلَ بُلُوغِهِ خَبَرَ عَزْلِهِ.
وَإِذَا كَتَبَ
الْإِمَامُ إلَيْهِ إذَا قَرَأْتَ كِتَابِي فَأَنْتَ مَعْزُولٌ فَقَرَأَهُ
انْعَزَلَ، وَكَذَا إنْ قُرِئَ عَلَيْهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَنْعَزِلُ
بِمَوْتِهِ وَانْعِزَالِهِ مَنْ أَذِنَ لَهُ فِي شَغْلٍ مُعَيَّنٍ كَبَيْعِ مَالِ
مَيِّتٍ وَالْأَصَحُّ انْعِزَالُ نَائِبِهِ الْمُطْلَقِ إنْ لَمْ يُؤْذَنْ لَهُ
فِي الِاسْتِخْلَافِ، أَوْ قِيلَ لَهُ: اسْتَخْلِفْ عَنْ نَفْسِكَ أَوْ
أَطْلَقَ، فَإِنْ قَالَ اسْتَخْلِفْ عَنِّي فَلَا.
وَلَا يَنْعَزِلُ
قَاضٍ بِمَوْتِ الْإِمَامِ وَلَا نَاظِرُ يَتِيمٍ وَوَقْفٍ بِمَوْتِ قَاضٍ.
وَلَا
يَقْبَلُ قَوْلُهُ بَعْدَ انْعِزَالِهِ: حَكَمْت بِكَذَا، فَإِنْ شَهِدَ مَعَ
آخَرَ بِحُكْمِهِ لَمْ يُقْبَلْ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، أَوْ بِحُكْمِ حَاكِمٍ جَائِزِ
الْحُكْمِ قُبِلَتْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيُقْبَلُ، قَوْلُهُ قَبْلَ
عَزْلِهِ: حَكَمْت بِكَذَا.
فَإِنْ كَانَ فِي غَيْرِ مَحِلِّ
وِلَايَتِهِ فَكَمَعْزُولٍ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَى شَخْصٌ عَلَى مَعْزُولٍ
أَنَّهُ أَخَذَ مَالَهُ بِرِشْوَةٍ أَوْ شَهَادَةِ عَبْدَيْنِ مَثَلاً أُحْضِرَ
وَفُصِلَتْ خُصُومَتُهُمَا.
وَإِنْ قَالَ حَكَمَ بِعَبْدَيْنِ
وَلَمْ يَذْكُرْ مَالاً أُحْضِرَ.
وَقِيلَ: لَا حَتَّى يُقِيمَ
بَيِّنَةً بِدَعْوَاهُ، فَإِنْ أُحْضِرَ وَأَنْكَرَ صُدِّقَ بِلَا يَمِينٍ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْتُ: الْأَصَحُّ بِيَمِينٍ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَوْ اُدُّعِيَ عَلَى قَاضٍ جَوْرٌ فِي حُكْمٍ لَمْ
يُسْمَعْ ذَلِكَ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ بَيِّنَةٌ، وَإِنْ لَمْ تَتَعَلَّقْ بِحُكْمِهِ
حَكَمَ بَيْنَهُمَا خَلِيفَتُهُ أَوْ غَيْرُهُ.
Section
Lunacy or unconsciousness
on the part of the judge, or
loss of sight
or of any of the
intellectual or moral qualifications required,
or care-
lessness or forgetfulness, has
the consequence of annulling his decrees ;
j*and it is the same where he
is of notorious misconduct, f A judge who
becomes incompetent for one of these
reasons cannot resume his duties
of
his own accord, even where the cause
of his incompetence has ceased
to exist.
The Sovereign may dismiss any
judge who appears to him to be
incapable of performing his duties ;
or even a judge who is in every
respect capable, if he can find
one still more capable. Where the
Sovereign has found an individual
neither more nor less capable than
the actual judge, he may,
nevertheless, effect the change if it
be for the
public interest, or if,
for instance, he hopes thereby to
appease a sedition,
f And the dismissal of
a judge has full legal validity in
spite of its being
in contravention
of the principles we have mentioned.
According to
our school the dismissal
of a judge has effect from the
moment he is
informed of it. Thus
where the Sovereign writes to him, “
Consider
yourself dismissed from the
moment you have read this letter,” the
judge is dismissed, not only when
lie reads the letter himself, fbut also
when another person reads it to him.
A person specially nominated by a
judge for some particular judicial
duty,
e.g. the sale of the property of a
deceased person, ceases ipso facto
o
be so authorised, either upon the
death or upon the destitution of
the
judge who nominated him. And it is
the same in the case of a sub-
stitute, if the Sovereign had not
empowered the judge to choose one ;
or if the authorisation was given
in the following terms, “ You may
choose a substitute of your own
accord,” or without mentioning if the
substitute was to be appointed by
the Sovereign or the judge. Where,
on the other hand, the authorisation
is to the effect that the judge may
take a substitute, but the latter’s
authority is to be derived from the
Sovereign alone, the substitute remains
in the exercise of his duties
in
spite of the death or dismissal of
the judge who nominated him.
The
death of the Sovereign does not
ij)so facto involve the dismissal of
the judges appointed by him ; nor
does the death of the judge involve
the dismissal of the persons he
has charged with the administration
of
the property of orphans, or of wakafs.
A judge who has been dismissed
no longer enjoys a legal presumption
in
favour of the truth of his words,
where he wishes to establish by a
simple declaration the contents of a
judgment he delivered before his
dismissal; ffand a declaration of this
nature from him is no longer
accepted in evidence, even though
confirmed by the testimony of another
witness. But a dismissed judge may
depose as an ordinary -witness
to
prove the existence of a legally delivered
arbitration award. A
judge who is
not yet dismissed may establish by
his mere declaration
the contents of
the judgments he has delivered ; provided
always,
however, that these judgments were
within his competence, for other-
wise he
should be considered in the matter
as a judge already dismissed.
Where,
after his dismissal, a judge is accused
of pronouncing an
unjust pecuniary award,
either because he was bribed or because,
for example, he has accepted as
sufficient the evidence of two slaves,
legal proceedings should be taken
against him for damages. An accu-
sation
is even admissible, and a summons may
be issued, upon the
evidence accepted
by the judge, e.g . the deposition of
two slaves, without
the plaintiff having
to plead that he has suffered any
pecuniary loss ;
though according to
some authorities the dismissed judge can
only be
summoned where this is the
case, unless the facts alleged have
already
been proved, flf, when he is
accused, the judge appears in person
and denies the charge, the
presumption is in his favour without his
taking an oath. [fHe does not
enjoy this presumption unless he takes
an oath.]
The accusation of a
magistrate in the exercise of his
functions,
implying deceit or fraud upon
his part, is nevor admissible, unless the
facts alleged have been already proved.
In every proceeding against a judge,
even when not amounting to
an
accusation ; his functions should be
performed by his substitutet
and the
case should, if necessary, be transferred
to the court of another
district.
فَصْلٌ [في آداب القضاء وغيرها]
لِيَكْتُب الْإِمَامُ لِمَنْ
يُوَلِّيهِ وَيُشْهِدْ بِالْكِتَابِ شَاهِدَيْنِ يَخْرُجَانِ مَعَهُ إلَى
الْبَلَدِ يُخْبِرَانِ بِالْحَالِ، وَتَكْفِي الِاسْتِفَاضَةُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ لَا
مُجَرَّدُ كتاب عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَيَبْحَثُ الْقَاضِي عَنْ حَالِ
عُلَمَاءِ الْبَلَدِ وَعُدُولِهِ، وَيَدْخُلُ يَوْمَ الِاثْنَيْنِ، وَيَنْزِلُ
وَسَطَ الْبَلَدِ.
وَيَنْظُرُ أَوَّلاً فِي أَهْلِ الْحَبْسِ،
فَمَنْ قَالَ حُبِسْت بِحَقٍّ أَدَامَهُ، أَوْ ظُلْمًا فَعَلَى خَصْمِهِ حُجَّةٌ،
فَإِنْ كَانَ غَائِبًا كَتَبَ إلَيْهِ لِيَحْضُرَ.
ثُمَّ فِي
الْأَوْصِيَاءِ، فَمَنْ ادَّعَى وِصَايَةً سَأَلَ عَنْهَا وَعَنْ حَالِهِ
وَتَصَرُّفِهِ فَمَنْ وَجَدَهُ فَاسِقًا أَخَذَ الْمَالَ مِنْهُ، أَوْ ضَعِيفًا
عَضَّدَهُ بِمُعِينٍ.
وَيَتَّخِذُ مُزَكِّيًا مُكَاتِبًا،
وَيُشْتَرَطُ كَوْنُهُ مُسْلِمًا عَدْلاً عَارِفًا بِكِتَابَةِ مَحَاضِرَ
وَسِجِلَّاتٍ، وَيُسْتَحَبُّ فِقْهٌ، وَوُفُورُ عَقْلٍ، وَجَوْدَةُ خَطٍّ.
وَمُتَرْجِمًا،
وَشَرْطُهُ عَدَالَةٌ، وَحُرِّيَّةٌ، وَعَدَدٌ، وَالْأَصَحُّ جَوَازُ أَعْمَى، وَ
اشْتِرَاطُ عَدَدٍ فِي إسْمَاعِ قَاضٍ بِهِ صَمَمٌ.
وَيَتَّخِذُ
دِرَّةً لِلتَّأْدِيبِ، وَ سِجْنًا لِأَدَاءِ حَقٍّ وَلِتَعْزِيرٍ.
وَيُسْتَحَبُّ
كَوْنُ مَجْلِسِهِ فَسِيحًا بَارِزًا مَصُونًا مِنْ أَذَى حَرٍّ وَبَرْدٍ
لَائِقًا بِالْوَقْتِ وَالْقَضَاءِ لَا مَسْجِدًا.
وَيُكْرَهُ أَنْ
يَقْضِيَ فِي حَالِ غَضَبٍ وَجُوعٍ وَشِبَعٍ مُفْرِطَيْنِ، وَكُلِّ حَالٍ يَسُوءُ
خُلُقُهُ فِيهِ، وَيُنْدَبُ أَنْ يُشَاوِرَ الْفُقَهَاءَ.
وَأَنْ
لَا يَشْتَرِيَ وَيَبِيعَ بِنَفْسِهِ.
وَلَا يَكُونَ لَهُ وَكِيلٌ
مَعْرُوفٌ، فَإِنْ أَهْدَى إلَيْهِ مَنْ لَهُ خُصُومَةٌ أَوْ لَمْ يُهْدِ قَبْلَ
وِلَايَتِهِ حَرُمَ قَبُولُهَا، وَإِنْ كَانَ يُهْدَى وَلَا خُصُومَةَ جَازَ
بِقَدْرِ الْعَادَةِ، وَالْأَوْلَى أَنْ يُثِيبَ عَلَيْهَا.
وَلَا
يَنْفُذُ حُكْمُهُ لِنَفْسِهِ وَرَقِيقِهِ وَشَرِيكِهِ فِي الْمُشْتَرَكِ،
وَكَذَا أَصْلُهُ وَفَرْعُهُ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَيْحُكُمْ لَهُ وَلِهَؤُلَاءِ
الْإِمَامُ أَوْ قَاضٍ آخَرَ، وَكَذَا نَائِبُهُ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَإِذَا
أَقَرَّ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ أَوْ نَكَلَ فَحَلَفَ الْمُدَّعِي وَسَأَلَ
الْقَاضِيَ أَنْ يُشْهِدَ عَلَى إقْرَارِهِ عِنْدَهُ أَوْ يَمِينِهِ أَوْ،
الْحُكْمَ بِمَا ثَبَتَ وَالْإِشْهَادَ بِهِ لَزِمَهُ.
أَوْ أَنْ
يَكْتُبَ لَهُ مَحْضَرًا بِمَا جَرَى مِنْ غَيْرِ حُكْمٍ أَوْ سِجِلًّا بِمَا
حَكَمَ اُسْتُحِبَّ إجَابَتُهُ، وَقِيلَ: تَجِبُ.
وَيُسْتَحَبُّ
نُسْخَتَانِ: إحْدَاهُمَا لَهُ، وَالْأُخْرَى تُحْفَظُ فِي دِيوَانِ
الْحُكْمِ.
وَإِذَا حَكَمَ بِاجْتِهَادِهِ ثُمَّ بَانَ خِلَافَ
نَصِّ الْكِتَابِ أَوْ السُّنَّةِ أَوْ الْإِجْمَاعِ أَوْ قِيَاسٍ جَلِيٍّ
نَقَضَهُ هُوَ وَغَيْرُهُ.
لَا خَفِيٍّ.
وَالْقَضَاءُ
يَنْفُذُ ظَاهِرًا لَا بَاطِنًا.
وَلَا يَقْضِي بِخِلَافِ عِلْمِهِ
بِالْإِجْمَاعِ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ يَقْضِي بِعِلْمِهِ إلَّا فِي حُدُودِ
اللَّهِ تَعَالَى.
وَلَوْ رَأَى وَرَقَةً فِيهَا حُكْمُهُ أَوْ
شَهَادَتُهُ أَوْ شَهِدَ شَاهِدَانِ أَنَّك حَكَمْت أَوْ شَهِدْتَ بِهَذَا لَمْ
يَعْمَلْ بِهِ وَلَمْ يَشْهَدْ حَتَّى يَتَذَكَّرَ، وَفِيهِمَا وَجْهٌ فِي
وَرَقَةٍ مَصُونَةٍ عِنْدَهُمَا وَلَهُ الْحَلِفُ عَلَى اسْتِحْقَاقِ حَقٍّ أَوْ
أَدَائِهِ اعْتِمَادًا عَلَى خَطِّ مُوَرِّثِهِ إذَا وَثِقَ بِخَطِّهِ
وَأَمَانَتِهِ.
وَالصَّحِيحُ جَوَازُ رِوَايَةِ الْحَدِيثِ بِخَطٍّ
مَحْفُوظٍ عِنْدَهُ.
Section
An appointment of a
judge by the Sovereign should not
only be
drawn up in writing, but
must be before two witnesses, who should
accompany the new judge to his
district in order to prove the authen-
ticity of his appointment. fPublic
notoriety, however, is sufficient as
to
this authenticity ; but our school never
admits in any case the
nomination of
a judge by means of an ordinary letter.
The new judge should begin by
making inquiries as to the learned
jurists and persons of irreproachable
character in the principal town
of
his district ; he should make his
entry there upon a Monday ; and
he
should alight in the centre of the
town, and first of all inspect t lie
prisons. He should order those
prisoners who admit having been
lawfully
incarcerated to remain there ; but if
any of them maintain
that they have
been wrongfully imprisoned, and produce
plausible
arguments in support of their
allegations, the judge should examine
into
the matter, and issue a summons to
the adverse parties if they are
not
upon the spot. Secondly, after that
the new judge should meet
all
testamentary executors and make inquiries
under what circumstances
the administration
of the legacies was entrusted to
them. He should
also examine into
their conduct and their administration,
and if he
perceives that either the
one or the other leaves something to
be desired,
he should withdraw from
their custody the funds entrusted to them.
Where, on the contrary, he perceives
that errors have been committed
in
the administration in good faith, and
merely through want of capacity
and
firmness, he should limit his action
to attaching to the testamentary
executors
a special adviser to assist them in
their duties. In the third
place the
judge should choose a mozakki, i.e. an
employe to give him
information as
to the witnesses, and an usher. This
latter should be
a Moslem of
irreproachable character and of sufficient
education to be
able to draw up
the record of proceedings and the
judgments ; and it is
recommendable that
he should have some knowledge of
law, a quick
intelligence, and a good
hand-writing. *The judge should also appoint
the interpreters, who must be free
persons of irreproachable character ;
but
it is not necessary that they shall
be able to see. If the judge is
hard of hearing several interpreters
must be nominated. And, finally,
the
judge must prepare the instruments
necessary for the execution
of his
sentences, e.g. a whip for flagellation,
and a prison for bodily
restraint and
for punishment at the discretion of
the court.
It is to be
recommended that the judge should hold
the sittings of
the court in some
large open court, where the audience
may be sheltered
from heat and cold,
adapted to the season and to the
object of the
hearing. It is
forbidden to hold sittings in a mosque.
It is blamablo
in a judge to deliver
a judgment when he is angry, or
hungry, or in a
state of excessive
satiety, or in general when he is
in any physical state
likely to
trouble his mind. The law recommends a
judge to consult
the jurists of the
town before pronouncing a decision.
A
judge is recommended not to go
personally to make his purchases
or
sell his goods, and even not to
have a recognised man of business.
He
is rigorously forbidden to receive a
present from one of the litigants,
unless such person was in the
habit of making him similar presents
before his appointment ; but he need
have no fear in continuing io
receive presents as usual from thoso
who already gave him such presents
before his appointment, and who are
not concerned in any proceedings
before
him. But even in this case it
is preferable to return the presents
received.
A judgment delivered by a
judge in his own favour, or in
that of
his slave, or of his
partner in the same firm, has no
legal effect ; ffand
similarly with a judgment
in favour of his ancestors or descendants.
In all these cases the judge
should decline to hear the case, and
should
refer the matter to the
Sovereign, or to another judge, or
to his sub-
stitute.
On the
demand of a successful litigant the judge
should have it
established by witnesses
that the defendant has made a judicial
admission, or that the defendant has
won his case upon taking an oath
administered to him, etc. He cannot
evade the obligation to pronounce
sentence
before witnesses, where the case is
ripe for decision. It is
to be
recommended that the judge should cause
to bo delivered to the
successful
litigant upon his request a minute of
all the proceedings in
court together
with a copy of the judgment delivered
in his favour.
According to some
authorities this is even obligatory. It
is also com-
mendable that the proceedings
and judgments should be made out in
duplicate, one for the successful
litigant and the other to be deposited
in the archives of the court. A
judgment that subsequently appears
to be
at variance with a text of the
Koran, with the Sonna, or with the
general opinion of jurists, or with
common-sense, should be quashed,
either by
the judge who delivered it, or by
his colleagues, substitutes,
or successors,
even where there is no doubt as
to his competence. Where,
on the
other hand, the only flaw in the
judgment is of a subtle nature,
the
decision holds good and cannot become
the subject of new pro-
ceedings. And
it must be observed in this
connection that the meaning of
a judgment
depends upon what is formally decided
in it, not upon what
the magistrate
meant to say. And there is general
agreement that even
where the matter
is legally proved a judge should never
pronounce a
sentence against any one
unless he is himself convinced that
that party
is in the wrong ; *and he
may even sentence a person upon his own
conviction alone, except in the case
of an irremissible penalty for which
a
special proof is required by law.
Where some one presents to the
judge a document containing one
of his
judgments, or where two witnesses declare
to him that he delivered
a certain
judgment, he may not accept the
document or the testimony
unless he
remembers the judgment in question. This
principle applies
also to witnesses who,
unless they can remember the matter,
may not
refer either to a document
containing their deposition, or to the
asser-
tions of other persons affirming
that they were witnesses of the event.
Authorities are not, however, agreed
upon these principles in the case
of
a document carefully kept by the judge
or by the interested witness.
One
may affirm upon oath that a person
to whom one is heir had a claim
or acquitted himself of an
obligation, on no other ground than docu-
ments written by him, at least where
one can recognise the deceased's
hand-writing, and has faith in his
sincerity. ffAnd, finally, one may
depose
upon the faith of a document, containing
the affirmation of a
fact, provided
that it has always remained in the
possession of the
witness.
فَصْلٌ [في التسوية وما يتبعها]
لِيُسَوِّ بَيْنَ الْخَصْمَيْنِ
فِي دُخُولٍ عَلَيْهِ وَقِيَامٍ لَهُمَا، وَاسْتِمَاعٍ، وَطَلَاقَةِ وَجْهٍ،
وَجَوَابِ سَلَامٍ وَمَجْلِسٍ، وَالْأَصَحُّ رَفْعُ مُسْلِمٍ عَلَى ذِمِّيٍّ
فِيهِ.
وَإِذَا جَلَسَا فَلَهُ أَنْ يَسْكُتَ، وَأَنْ يَقُولَ
لِيَتَكَلَّمْ الْمُدَّعِي.
فَإِذَا ادَّعَى طَالَبَ خَصْمَهُ
بِالْجَوَابِ، فَإِنْ أَقَرَّ فَذَاكَ، وَإِنْ أَنْكَرَ فَلَهُ أَنْ يَقُولَ
لِلْمُدَّعِي أَلَكَ بَيِّنَةٌ، وَأَنْ يَسْكُتَ، فَإِنْ قَالَ لِي بَيِّنَةٌ
وَأُرِيدُ تَحْلِيفَهُ فَلَهُ ذَلِكَ، أَوْ لَا بَيِّنَةَ لِي ثُمَّ أَحْضَرَهَا
قُبِلَتْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِذَا ازْدَحَمَ خُصُومٌ قُدِّمَ
الْأَسْبَقُ، فَإِنْ جَهِلَ أَوْ جَاءُوا مَعًا أُقْرِعَ وَيُقَدَّمُ
مُسَافِرُونَ مُسْتَوْفِزُونَ، وَ نِسْوَةٌ، وَإِنْ تَأَخَّرُوا مَا لَمْ
يَكْثُرُوا، وَلَا يُقَدَّمُ سَابِقٌ وَقَارِعٌ إلَّا بِدَعْوَى.
وَيَحْرُمُ
اتِّخَاذُ شُهُودٍ مُعَيَّنِينَ، لَا يَقْبَلُ غَيْرَهُمْ.
وَإِذَا
شَهِدَ شُهُودٌ فَعَرَفَ عَدَالَةً أَوْ فِسْقًا عَمِلَ بِعِلْمِهِ، وَإِلَّا
وَجَبَ الِاسْتِزْكَاءُ بِأَنْ يَكْتُبَ مَا يَتَمَيَّزُ بِهِ الشَّاهِدُ
وَالْمَشْهُودُ لَهُ وَعَلَيْهِ وَكَذَا قَدْرُ الدَّيْنِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ،
وَيَبْعَثَ بِهِ مُزَكِّيًا ثُمَّ يُشَافِهُهُ الْمُزَكِّيَ بِمَا عِنْدَهُ،
وَقِيلَ تَكْفِي كِتَابَتُهُ.
وَشَرْطُهُ كَشَاهِدٍ مَعَ مَعْرِفَةِ
الْجَرْحِ وَالتَّعْدِيلِ، وَخُبْرَةِ بَاطِنِ مَنْ يَعْدِلُهُ لِصُحْبَةٍ أَوْ
جِوَارٍ أَوْ مُعَامَلَةٍ، وَالْأَصَحُّ اشْتِرَاطُ لَفْظِ شَهَادَتِهِ، وَ
أَنَّهُ يَكْفِي: هُوَ عَدْلٌ، وَقِيلَ يَزِيدُ عَلَيَّ وَلِي، وَيَجِبُ ذِكْرُ
سَبَبِ الْجَرْحِ، وَيَعْتَمِدُ فِيهِ الْمُعَايَنَةَ أَوْ الِاسْتِفَاضَةَ،
وَيُقَدَّمُ عَلَى التَّعْدِيلِ.
فَإِنْ قَالَ الْمُعَدِّلُ:
عَرَفْتُ سَبَبَ الْجَرْحِ وَتَابَ مِنْهُ وَأَصْلَحَ قُدِّمَ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ
أَنَّهُ لَا يَكْفِي فِي التَّعْدِيلِ قَوْلُ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ: هُوَ
عَدْلٌ، وَقَدْ غَلِطَ.
Section
A judge should treat
the parties who appear before him in
an im-
partial manner. If he gets up
or remains seated upon the entry of
the
one he should do the same
for the other ; and he should listen
to their
respective pleadings without
giving any sign of approbation or of
blame. He should return the
salutations of both and make them sit
in the same row. fBut where
one of the adversaries is a Moslem, and
the other an infidel subject of
our Sovereign, he is permitted to show
more respect to the former than
to the latter. As soon as the
parties
have taken their places the
judge should cause silence to be
made in
the court, then call upon
the plaintiff to address him, and it
is only
after the plaintiff has
finished what he has to say that
the defendant is
called upon. Where
the defendant admits the claim the
matter is
simple, and the plaintiff
wins his case ; but if the defendant
denies, the
judge should call upon
the plaintiff to produce proof of
his allegations,
arid then be silent.
If the plaintiff, though able to
produce the required
proof, declares that
he prefers that an oath to determine
the matter
should be administered to
the opposite party, this request should be
complied with ; fand the plaintiff
still be permitted to produce his
proof, oven though at first he
said he had none. Where several persons
wish to be admitted to the
hearing, the first applicant has the
priority ;
where it is not known
which applied first, or where all
applied at the
same timo, reeourso
must be had to casting lots to
decide which case
should bo hoard
first. Priority must always bo given
to urgent cases
of travellers, and
to women's cases, even though of
later application,
unless their number is
exorbitant. Priority accorded to some one
either in consequence of prior
application, or because the lot was drawn
in his favour, applies only to a
single case, and not to all the
cases he
may claim to bring before
the court.
A judge is forbidden to
designate certain persons to have the ex-
clusive right of deposing before him
as witnesses. If a judge knows
that a
certain witness who comes to make a
deposition is of irreproachable
character,
or if he knows that another such
witness is of notorious
misconduct, he
should accept or reject the testimony
without further
inquiry ; but if he
has not this knowledge for certain,
he cannot either
accept or reject
the deposition until he has made
inquiry as to the
moral character of
the witness. This he may do by
taking note of the
name, etc., of
the witness and of the two
litigants, ffand the substance
of the
claim, and referring the matter to
the mozakki or officer employed
in
obtaining further information upon the
subject. The latter then
makes a verbal
report to the judge of the result
of his inquiries ; though,
according to
some authorities, the report may, if
necessary, be made in
writing. A mozakki
should not only possess all the
qualifications required
of a witness ; he
should also have an intelligence
sufficiently developed
to decide whether a
witness is or is not of
irreproachable conduct. He
cannot make
this declaration unless he knows the
witness intimately,
either as his friend
or his neighbour, or as having had
business dealings
with him. j*The mozakki
when making his report, should make
use of
the formal words of a
deposition, “ I bear witness that,” but he
need
not enter into the reasons for
considering a person to be irreproachable.
Only a few authorities require that
the inozakki should state it to be
his personal opinion. On the other
hand, when the mozakki declares
that
some one’s testimony should be rejected
in consequence of his
notorious
misconduct, he must give his reasons
for that opinion, founded
either upon
what he has himself observed, or
upon public notoriety.
The proof that a
witness is of notorious misconduct has
the value of a
positive fact, and
has preponderance over the negative proof
that he is
irreproachable ; unless the
person who maintains his character to be
irreproachable cannot give any positive
fact as the ground of his opinion,
c.g. where he declares that the
witness, though formerly of notorious
misconduct, has since become an
honourable citizen, fin order io
establish
an irreproachable character it is not
sufficient that the de-
fendant should
admit this circumstance, while declaring
that the
witness is mistaken in his
deposition.
باب الْقَضَاءِ عَلَى الْغَائِبِ
CHAPTER II.— JUDGMENTS BY DEFAULT
هُوَ جَائِزٌ إنْ كَانَ بَيِّنَةٌ.
وَادَّعَى الْمُدَّعِي
جُحُودَهُ، فَإِنْ قَالَ هُوَ مُقِرٌّ لَمْ تُسْمَعْ بَيِّنَتُهُ، وَإِنْ
أَطْلَقَ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهَا تُسْمَعُ.
وَ أَنَّهُ لَا يَلْزَمُ
الْقَاضِي نَصْبُ مُسَخَّرٍ يُنْكِرُ عَلَى الْغَائِبِ.
وَيَجِبُ
أَنْ يُحَلِّفَهُ بَعْدَ الْبَيِّنَةِ إنَّ الْحَقَّ ثَابِتٌ فِي ذِمَّتِهِ،
وَقِيلَ: يُسْتَحَبُّ، وَيَجْرِيَانِ فِي دَعْوَى عَلَى صَبِيٍّ أَوْ
مَجْنُونٍ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَى وَكِيلٌ عَلَى غَائِبٍ فَلَا
تَحْلِيفَ.
وَلَوْ حَضَرَ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ وَقَالَ لِوَكِيلِ
الْمُدَّعِي أَبْرَأَنِي مُوَكِّلُك أَمَرَ بِالتَّسْلِيمِ.
وَإِذَا
ثَبَتَ مَالٌ عَلَى غَائِبٍ وَلَهُ مَالٌ قَضَاهُ الْحَاكِمُ مِنْهُ، وَإِلَّا
فَإِنْ سَأَلَ الْمُدَّعِي إنْهَاءَ الْحَالِ إلَى قَاضِي بَلَدِ الْغَائِبِ
أَجَابَهُ فَيُنْهِي سَمَاعَ بَيِّنَةٍ لِيَحْكُمَ بِهَا ثُمَّ يَسْتَوْفِيَ
الْمَالَ، أَوْ حُكْمًا لِيَسْتَوْفِيَ.
وَالْإِنْهَاءُ أَنْ
يُشْهِدَ عَدْلَيْنِ بِذَلِكَ، وَيُسْتَحَبُّ كتاب بِهِ يَذْكُرُ فِيهِ مَا
يَتَمَيَّزُ بِهِ الْمَحْكُومُ عَلَيْهِ، وَيَخْتِمُهُ، وَيَشْهَدَانِ عَلَيْهِ
إنْ أَنْكَرَ، فَإِنْ قَالَ: لَسْتُ الْمُسَمَّى فِي الْكِتَابِ صُدِّقَ
بِيَمِينِهِ، وَعَلَى الْمُدَّعِي بَيِّنَةٌ بِأَنَّ هَذَا الْمَكْتُوبَ اسْمُهُ
وَنَسَبُهُ، فَإِنْ أَقَامَهَا فَقَالَ لَسْتُ الْمَحْكُومَ عَلَيْهِ لَزِمَهُ
الْحُكْمُ إنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ هُنَاكَ مُشَارِكٌ لَهُ فِي الِاسْمِ وَالصِّفَاتِ،
وَإِنْ كَانَ أُحْضِرَ، فَإِنْ اعْتَرَفَ بِالْحَقِّ طُولِبَ وَتُرِكَ
الْأَوَّلُ، وَإِلَّا بَعَثَ إلَى الْكَاتِبِ لِيَطْلُبَ مِنْ الشُّهُودِ
زِيَادَةَ صِفَةٍ تُمَيِّزُهُ وَيَكْتُبُهَا ثَانِيًا.
وَلَوْ
حَضَرَ قَاضِي بَلَدِ الْغَائِبِ بِبَلَدِ الْحَاكِمِ فَشَافَهَهُ بِحُكْمِهِ
فَفِي إمْضَائِهِ إذَا عَادَ إلَى وِلَايَتِهِ خِلَافُ الْقَضَاءِ بِعِلْمِهِ،
وَلَوْ نَادَاهُ فِي طَرَفَيْ وِلَايَتِهِمَا أَمْضَاهُ، وَإِنْ اقْتَصَرَ عَلَى
سَمَاعِ بَيِّنَةٍ كَتَبَ سَمِعْتُ بَيِّنَةً عَلَى فُلَانٍ، وَيُسَمِّيهَا
الْقَاضِي إنْ لَمْ يُعَدِّلْهَا، وَإِلَّا فَالْأَصَحُّ جَوَازُ تَرْكِ
التَّسْمِيَةِ.
وَالْكِتَابُ بِالْحُكْمِ يَمْضِي مَعَ قُرْبِ
الْمَسَافَةِ وَ بِسَمَاعِ الْبَيِّنَةِ لَا يُقْبَلُ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ إلَّا فِي
مَسَافَةِ قَبُولِ شَهَادَةٍ عَلَى شَهَادَةٍ.
CHAPTER II.— JUDGMENTS BY DEFAULT
Suction
Judgment may be given against
some one by default , where the
plaint iff
alleges that his adversary
denies the claim and produces sufficient
proof of his case, f A plaintiff may
also be allowed to prove the facts
allogod by him, though he make
no declaration as to the position taken
up by the defaulting party, and
in no case is it necessary for
the judge
to appoint some one to
maintain before him the denial of
the absent
defendant. The plaintiff, after
proving his case, is obliged to swear
that his claim still exists and
has not been satisfied, e.g. by payment
on the part of the debtor.
According, however, to other authorities,
it is only commendable and not
obligatory to administer this additional
oath ; and the same controversy
exists as to this oath when administered
in proceedings against a minor or a
lunatic who has no legal representa-
tive
at the hearing. Where the proceedings
against the defaulter are
not taken
by the plaintiff in person, but by
his agent, the oath we have
spoken
of is not administered to the latter
; and should the defendant
be present
and reply to the agent, “ Your
principal has freed me from
my
obligation,’’ this assertion, unless proved,
is not enough even to
cause the
judgment to be postponed. A judgment
against a defaulter
may be executed upon
the property which he possesses within
the juris-
diction of the court ; and if
he has none, the plaintiff may
demand that
the case be transferred
to the court in whose jurisdiction
the defaulter
is. This transfer may
take place either by having sent to
the latter
court the depositions of
the witnesses, in order that judgment
may be
entered there and executed
without any further informations being
necessary ; or by sending the
judgment of the first court to the
second
to be executed. For the
transfer it is enough to establish
by two
witnesses of irreproachable
character what has taken place at the
first hearing ; but the first court
is recommended to have sent to the
second a document sealed with its
seal in which the defaulter is indicated
in a way sufficient to establish his
identity. The two witnesses should
give
evidence against the defaulter if he
perseveres in his denial ; where,
on the
other hand, he declares, without admitting
or denying anything,
that he does
not bear the name indicated in the
letter of requisition,
he has a
presumption in his favour, provided he
confirms his declaration
upon oath ; and
in this latter case the plaintiff
must prove that the
person in
question is really the adverse party
whose name and parentage
are mentioned
in the letter. When this proof is
forthcoming, and the
adverse party
maintains that though bearing the same
name he is not
the person meant
by the former court, such a defence
cannot be admitted,
unless there be
in that locality a similar name answering
to the same
qualities. In this case
the person of the same name is
summoned, and
if he admits he is
the person described, the proceeding
should be con-
tinued against him, and
the former defendant dismissed. Where, on
the other hand, the person of
the same name denies that he is
the person
described, the matter should
be sent back to the former court,
in order
to obtain by tho evidence
of witnesses fuller information as to the
identity of the person to be
summoned, and the minutes of these fresh
proceedings should then be forwarded
to the second court. If the
judge
in whose jurisdiction the defaulter is,
arrives at the place where
the
proceedings were originally taken, he
should consult his colleague
as to
the decision to bo come to. As
to the question whether the judge,
on returning to his jurisdiction,
may give judgment in accordance with
the personal information he has thus
obtained, there is the same diver-
gence
of opinion as to whether he should
give judgment in accordance
with his
own certain knowledge without attending to
the legal proof.
But a judge may
order the execution of the judgment
whether the
defaulter is upon the
boundary of his jurisdiction or whether
he has
summoned him before him at
the ordinary hearing.
Where, in a
case of default, the court limits
itself to a hearing of
witnesses, it
should have minutes drawn up of the
depositions it has
received, and add
the name of the party against whom
these depositions
have been made. It
should also add the names, etc., of
the witnesses,
in all cases whore it
has not itself acknowledged their
character to be
irreproachable, in order
that tho judge before whom the proceedings
are continued may be able to
make inquiries upon the subject. fBut
where the court before which the
depositions were made certifies in
the
minutes of the proceedings that the
witnesses are of irreproachable
character,
no further information is required upon
the matter.
A case may be
transferred, however short may be the
distance
between the courts ; ffbut
requisitorial letters for the hearing of
witnesses cannot bo addressed to a
court whose jurisdiction is not distant
at least as far as would
permit of having recourse to hear-say
evidence
to establish the depositions of
the original witnesses.
فَصْلٌ [في بيان الدعوى بعين غائبة]
ادَّعَى عَيْنًا غَائِبَةً
عَنْ الْبَلَدِ يُؤْمَنُ اشْتِبَاهُهَا؛ كَعَقَارٍ وَعَبْدٍ وَفَرَسٍ
مَعْرُوفَاتٍ سَمِعَ بَيِّنَتَهُ وَحَكَمَ بِهَا وَكَتَبَ إلَى قَاضِي بَلَدِ
الْمَالِ لِيُسَلِّمَهُ لِلْمُدَّعِي وَيَعْتَمِدُ فِي الْعَقَارِ
حُدُودَهُ.
أَوْ لَا يُؤْمَنُ فَالْأَظْهَرُ سَمَاعُ الْبَيِّنَةِ،
وَيُبَالِغُ الْمُدَّعِي فِي الْوَصْفِ وَيَذْكُرُ الْقِيمَةَ، وَأَنَّهُ لَا
يَحْكُمُ بِهَا بَلْ يَكْتُبُ إلَى قَاضِي بَلَدِ الْمَالِ بِمَا شَهِدَتْ بِهِ
فَيَأْخُذُهُ وَيَبْعَثُهُ إلَى الْكَاتِبِ لِيَشْهَدُوا عَلَى عَيْنِهِ،
وَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّهُ يُسَلِّمُهُ إلَى الْمُدَّعِي بِكَفِيلٍ بِبَدَنِهِ فَإِنْ
شَهِدُوا بِعَيْنِهِ كَتَبَ بِبَرَاءَةِ الْكَفِيلِ، وَإِلَّا فَعَلَى
الْمُدَّعِي مُؤْنَةُ الرَّدِّ.
أَوْ غَائِبَةً عَنْ الْمَجْلِسِ
لَا الْبَلَدِ أُمِرَ بِإِحْضَارِ مَا يُمْكِنُ إحْضَارُهُ لِيَشْهَدُوا
بِعَيْنِهِ، وَلَا تُسْمَعُ شَهَادَةٌ بِصِفَةٍ.
وَإِذَا وَجَبَ
إحْضَارٌ فَقَالَ لَيْسَ بِيَدِي عَيْنٌ بِهَذِهِ الصِّفَةِ صُدِّقَ بِيَمِينِهِ
ثُمَّ لِلْمُدَّعِي دَعْوَى الْقِيمَةِ فَإِنْ نَكَلَ فَحَلَفَ الْمُدَّعِي أَوْ
أَقَامَ بَيِّنَةً كُلِّفَ الْإِحْضَارَ وَحُبِسَ عَلَيْهِ وَلَا يُطْلَقُ إلَّا
بِإِحْضَارِ أَوْ دَعْوَى تَلَفٍ، وَلَوْ شَكَّ الْمُدَّعِي هَلْ تَلِفَتْ
الْعَيْنُ فَيَدَّعِي قِيمَةً أَمْ لَا فَيَدَّعِيهَا فَقَالَ غَصَبَ مِنِّي
كَذَا، فَإِنْ بَقِيَ لَزِمَهُ رَدُّهُ وَإِلَّا فَقِيمَتُهُ سُمِعَتْ دَعْوَاهُ،
وَقِيلَ لَا بَلْ يَدَّعِيهَا وَيُحَلِّفُهُ ثُمَّ يَدَّعِي الْقِيمَةَ
وَيَجْرِيَانِ فِيمَنْ دَفَعَ ثَوْبًا لِدَلَّالٍ لِيَبِيعَهُ فَجَحَدَهُ وَشَكَّ
هَلْ بَاعَهُ فَيَطْلُبُ الثَّمَنَ، أَمْ أَتْلَفَهُ فَقِيمَتَهُ أَمْ هُوَ بَاقٍ
فَيَطْلُبُهُ حَيْثُ أَوْجَبْنَا الْإِحْضَارَ فَثَبَتَ لِلْمُدَّعِي
اسْتَقَرَّتْ مُؤْنَتُهُ عَلَى الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ، وَإِلَّا فَهِيَ وَمُؤْنَةُ
الرَّدِّ عَلَى الْمُدَّعِي.
Section
When a case is about a
certain, definite object, not in the
jurisdiction
of the court, but not
of a kind to be easily confused with
any other
object, such as a piece of
immovable property, a slave, or a horse, all
of which are known, the court
may permit the parties to prove their
rights, and then give judgment ; and
after this he should communicate
in
writing with the court in whose
jurisdiction the subject of the suit
is situated, in order that the
latter may have it given into the
possession
of the successful litigant. In
the case of immovable property it is
sufficient in these circumstances to
indicate its limits. * Where, on the
other hand, the object in dispute
is of a nature to be easily confused
with other things the court cannot
allow the parties to prove their claims
until the plaintiff lias first given
as minute a description of it as possible,
and stated its value. *Tlien the
court should hear the parties, but not
decide immediately in a case of this
sort ; he should communicate in
writing
with the court in whose jurisdiction
the thing is, and inform him
of
its distinctive marks, in order that
the latter may order it to be seized
and sent to him. The witnesses
that have been summoned should
then
declare whether they recognise the object ;
*and this cannot be
handed over to
the plaintiff in the meantime unless
he furnishes a
personal security for
it. The security can only be
released when the
court that has
given the plaintiff the object receives
from the court
before which the
proceedings are being taken a letter
informing it that
the object has
been recognised by the witnesses. And
if the object
is not recognised by
the witnesses the plaintiff who has
obtained tem-
porary possession of it must
pay the expense of restoring it to
the original
owner. In the case of
something which is in the jurisdiction
of the court
but is not brought
to the hearing, this must first of
all be sent for, if
it is
possible, in order that the witnesses
may establish its identity, for
in
such a caso recourso may not bo had,
even provisionally, to a mere
description.
Where the defendant declares that
he possesses no object of the kind
claimed from him, he has a
presumption in his favour, provided he
confirms his declaration upon oath ;
and unless the plaintiff is ablo to
prove that it is false, he
must confine himself to an action
for damages.
If the defendant refuses
to take the oath, and the plaintiff
is ready to
swear that the defendant
really has the thing in his
possession, or if
he can prove it,
the defendant should be ordered to
produce the object
in dispute, and
if necessary imprisoned until ho complies
with the order,
or until he proves
in court that the object no longer
exists. In case of
doubt on the
part of the plaintiff as to the
loss of the object, so that he
does not know whether to claim
its return or its value, he may
formulato
his claim as follows : “ The
adverse party has usurped such-and-such
a
thing which belongs to me, and I
demand its restitution, or in case it
has been destroyed, its value.” Some
authorities, however, do not allow
of
such an alternative claim ; they insist
first upon a claim for the return,
and then an oath, according to
the procedure we have mentioned ;
and only after this has been
done do they allow of a claim being
made
for the value. This same
controversy exists also in a case where
one
gives a coat to a broker to
sell, and ho denies the fact, so
that one does
not know whether he
has sold, lost, or kept it ; and as
to whether one
should bring against
him a personal action for payment of
the price
obtained, or for the
value, or for its return.
Where
it is admitted that the object
should be brought to the
hearing,
the expense of its transport must be
borne by the defendant,
in tho case
where the claim of the plaintiff
upon the thing in dispute
is
recognised by the court ; and if the
claim is dismissed, tho plaintiff
must
pay not only tho expense of bringing
the thing to the hearing,
but also
that of restoring it to the defendant.
فَصْلٌ [في بيان من يحكم عليه في غيبته وما يذكر معه]
الْغَائِبُ
الَّذِي تُسْمَعُ الْبَيِّنَةُ وَيُحْكَمُ عَلَيْهِ مَنْ بِمَسَافَةٍ بَعِيدَةٍ،
وَهِيَ الَّتِي لَا يَرْجِعُ مِنْهَا مُبَكِّرٌ إلَى مَوْضِعِهِ لَيْلاً، وَقِيلَ
مَسَافَةُ قَصْرٍ، وَمَنْ بِقَرِيبَةٍ كَحَاضِرٍ فَلَا تُسْمَعُ بَيِّنَتُهُ،
وَيُحْكَمُ بِغَيْرِ حُضُورِهِ إلَّا لِتَوَارِيهِ أَوْ تَعَزُّرِهِ.
وَالْأَظْهَرُ
جَوَازُ الْقَضَاءِ عَلَى غَائِبٍ فِي قِصَاصٍ وَحَدِّ قَذْفٍ وَمَنْعُهُ فِي
حَدٍّ لِلَّهِ تَعَالَى.
وَلَوْ سَمِعَ بَيِّنَةً عَلَى غَائِبٍ
فَقَدِمَ قَبْلَ الْحُكْمِ لَمْ يَسْتَعِدْهَا بَلْ يُخْبِرُهُ وَيُمَكِّنُهُ
مِنْ جَرْحٍ.
وَلَوْ عُزِلَ بَعْدَ سَمَاعِ بَيِّنَةٍ ثُمَّ وُلِّيَ
وَجَبَتْ الِاسْتِعَادَةُ.
وَإِذَا اُسْتُعْدِيَ عَلَى حَاضِرٍ
بِالْبَلَدِ أَحْضَرَهُ بِدَفْعِ خَتْمٍ طِينٍ رَطْبٍ أَوْ غَيْرِهِ، أَوْ
بِمُرَتَّبٍ لِذَلِكَ، فَإِنْ امْتَنَعَ بِلَا عُذْرٍ أَحْضَرَهُ بِأَعْوَانِ
السُّلْطَانِ وَعَزَّرَهُ.
أَوْ غَائِبٍ فِي غَيْرِ وِلَايَتِهِ
فَلَيْسَ لَهُ إحْضَارُهُ، أَوْ فِيهَا وَلَهُ هُنَاكَ نَائِبٌ لَمْ يُحْضِرْهُ
بَلْ يَسْمَعُ بَيِّنَةً وَيَكْتُبُ إلَيْهِ، أَوْ لَا نَائِبَ فَالْأَصَحُّ
يُحْضِرُهُ مِنْ مَسَافَةِ الْعَدْوَى فَقَطْ، وَهِيَ الَّتِي يَرْجِعُ مِنْهَا
مُبَكِّرٌ لَيْلاً.
وَأَنَّ الْمُخَدَّرَةَ لَا تُحْضَرُ، وَهِيَ
مَنْ لَا يَكْثُرُ خُرُوجُهَا لِحَاجَاتٍ.
Section
As to procedure in
case of absence, tho law insists
that the defaulter
must bo at a “
considerable ” distance, that is to say
that if one starts
in the morning
to look for him, one has not
returned by the following
night. Other
authorities say that the distance should
be such as enables
to abbreviate
prayer. On tho other hand, where the
defendant is in
the neighbourhood, the
court may not proceed in his absence
to the
hearing of the plaintiff’s
witnesses, nor give judgment ; unless he keeps
himself hidden, or occupies too high
a social position to bo summoned
to
attend the court.
* Judgment by
default is permitted not only in
civil matters, but also
in cases of
crimes against the person, and in
cases of defamation ; but
a person guilty
of any otlior crime may not be
sentenced in his absence.
Evidence
given in court against a defaulter who
appears before
judgment is pronounced does
not need to bo given a second time
in his
presence ; it is enough to
inform him of wliat has been done
in his
absence in order that he
may have an opportunity of challenging the
witnesses, etc. On the other hand,
tho whole proceedings must be
begun
afresh if, after the plaintiff’s witnesses
have been heard, the
judge is
dismissed and then reappointed.
The
summonsing of an individual who is
in the district in which the
court
is hold is effected either by
sending him the seal of tho court
upon
a piece of clay, etc., or by
means of an usher. If the defendant
refuses
to appear without valid excuse
tho court may have him brought before
it by force, and may also
inflict upon him a punishment at its
discretion.
On the other hand, in
the easo of an absent person the
following cases
must be distinguished : —
. If tho absent person is
not within the jurisdiction of the court,
ho cannot be summonsed, nor made
to appear by force.
. If the
absent person is within the jurisdiction
of the court at a
place where
the judge has a substitute, the court
should limit itself to
hearing the
witnesses for tho plaintiff, and then
send the proceedings
to the substitute.
. If tho absent person is
within tho jurisdiction of the court
at a
place where the judge has
no substitute, he may be summonsed
and, if
necessary, brought by force,
provided that the distance does not
prevent
this ; i.e. provided that the
bearer of the summons can leave in
the
morning and be back again by
the next night.
t A young woman,
even though she lives close to the
court, may not
be summonsed, when
she is mokhaddara, ix. when she is
not in the
habit of going out,
except in case of absolute necessity.
باب القسمة
CHAPTEB III.— DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATES
قَدْ يَقْسِمُ الشُّرَكَاءُ أَوْ مَنْصُوبُهُمْ أَوْ مَنْصُوبُ الْإِمَامِ.
وَشَرْطُ
مَنْصُوبِهِ: ذَكَرٌ حُرٌّ عَدْلٌ، يَعْلَمُ الْمِسَاحَةَ وَالْحِسَابَ، فَإِنْ
كَانَ فِيهَا تَقْوِيمٌ وَجَبَ قَاسِمَانِ، وَإِلَّا فَقَاسِمٌ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ
اثْنَانِ.
وَلِلْإِمَامِ جَعْلُ الْقَاسِمِ حَاكِمًا فِي
التَّقْوِيمِ فَيُعْمَلُ فِيهِ بِعَدْلَيْنِ، وَيَقْسِمُ.
وَيَجْعَلُ
الْإِمَامُ رِزْقَ مَنْصُوبِهِ مِنْ بَيْتِ الْمَالِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ
فَأُجْرَتُهُ عَلَى الشُّرَكَاءِ، فَإِنْ اسْتَأْجَرُوهُ وَسَمَّى كُلٌّ قَدْرًا
لَزِمَهُ، وَإِلَّا فَالْأُجْرَةُ مُوَزَّعَةٌ عَلَى الْحِصَصِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ
عَلَى الرُّءُوسِ ثُمَّ مَا عَظُمَ الضَّرَرُ فِي قِسْمَتِهِ كَجَوْهَرَةٍ
وَثَوْبٍ نَفِيسَيْنِ وَزَوْجَيْ خُفٍّ إنْ طَلَبَ الشُّرَكَاءُ كُلُّهُمْ
قِسْمَتَهُ لَمْ يُجِبْهُمْ الْقَاضِي، وَلَا يَمْنَعُهُمْ إنْ قَسَمُوا
بِأَنْفُسِهِمْ إنْ لَمْ تَبْطُلْ مَنْفَعَتُهُ كَسَيْفٍ يُكْسَرُ وَمَا يَبْطُلُ
نَفْعُهُ الْمَقْصُودُ كَحَمَّامٍ وَطَاحُونَةٍ صَغِيرَيْنِ لَا يُجَابُ طَالِبُ
قِسْمَتِهِ فِي الْأَصَحّ، فَإِنْ أَمْكَنَ جَعْلُهُ حَمَّامَيْنِ.
أُجِيبَ،
وَلَوْ كَانَ لَهُ عُشْرُ دَارٍ لَا يَصْلُحُ لِلسُّكْنَى، وَالْبَاقِي لِآخَرَ
فَالْأَصَحُّ إجْبَارُ صَاحِبِ الْعُشْرِ بِطَلَبِ صَاحِبِهِ دُونَ
عَكْسِهِ.
وَمَا لَا يَعْظُمُ ضَرَرُهُ قِسْمَتُهُ أَنْوَاعٌ:
أَحَدُهَا بِالْأَجْزَاءِ كَمِثْلِيٍّ وَدَارٍ مُتَّفِقَةِ الْأَبْنِيَةِ،
وَأَرْضٍ مُشْتَبِهَةِ الْأَجْزَاءِ فَيُجْبَرُ الْمُمْتَنِعُ فَتُعَدَّلُ
السِّهَامُ كَيْلاً وَوَزْنًا وَذَرْعًا بِعَدَدِ الْأَنْصِبَاءِ إنْ اسْتَوَتْ،
وَيَكْتُبُ فِي كُلِّ رُقْعَةٍ اسْمَ شَرِيكٍ أَوْ جُزْءًا مُمَيَّزًا بِحَدٍّ
أَوْ جِهَةٍ وَتُدْرَجُ فِي بَنَادِقَ مُسْتَوِيَةٍ ثُمَّ يُخْرِجُهَا مَنْ لَمْ
يَحْضُرْهَا رُقْعَةً عَلَى الْجُزْءِ الْأَوَّلِ إنْ كَتَبَ الْأَسْمَاءَ
فَيُعْطِي مَنْ خَرَجَ اسْمُهُ، أَوْ عَلَى اسْمِ زَيْدٍ إنْ كَتَبَ
الْأَجْزَاءَ، فَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَتْ الْأَنْصِبَاءُ كَنِصْفٍ وَثُلُثٍ وَسُدُسٍ
جُزِّئَتْ الْأَرْضُ عَلَى أَقَلِّ السِّهَامِ وَقُسِّمَتْ كَمَا سَبَقَ،
وَيُحْتَرَزُ عَنْ تَفْرِيقِ حِصَّةِ وَاحِدٍ.
الثَّانِي
بِالتَّعْدِيلِ كَأَرْضٍ تَخْتَلِفُ قِيمَةُ أَجْزَائِهَا بِحَسْبِ قُوَّةِ
إنْبَاتٍ وَقُرْبِ مَاءٍ، وَيُجْبَرُ الْمُمْتَنِعُ عَلَيْهَا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ،
وَلَوْ اسْتَوَتْ قِيمَةُ دَارَيْنِ أَوْ حَانُوتَيْنِ فَطَلَبَ جَعْلَ كُلٍّ
لَوَاحِدٍ فَلَا إجْبَارَ، أَوْ عَبِيدٍ أَوْ ثِيَابٍ مِنْ نَوْعٍ أُجْبِرَ، أَوْ
نَوْعَيْنِ فَلَا الثَّالِثُ بِالرَّدِّ بِأَنْ يَكُونَ فِي أَحَدِ
الْجَانِبَيْنِ بِئْرٌ أَوْ شَجَرٌ لَا يُمْكِنُ قِسْمَتُهُ فَيَرُدُّ مَنْ
يَأْخُذُهُ قِسْطَ قِيمَتِهِ، وَلَا إجْبَارَ فِيهِ، وَهُوَ بَيْعٌ، وَكَذَا
التَّعْدِيلُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَقِسْمَةُ الْأَجْزَاءِ إفْرَازٌ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ فِي الرَّدِّ الرِّضَا بَعْدَ خُرُوجِ
الْقُرْعَةِ، وَلَوْ تَرَاضَيَا بِقِسْمَةِ مَا لَا إجْبَارَ فِيهِ اُشْتُرِطَ
الرِّضَا بَعْدَ الْقُرْعَةِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، كَقَوْلِهِمَا رَضِينَا بِهَذِهِ
الْقِسْمَةِ، أَوْ بِمَا أَخْرَجَتْهُ الْقُرْعَةُ.
وَلَوْ ثَبَتَ
بِبَيِّنَةٍ غَلَطٍ أَوْ حَيْفٌ فِي قِسْمَةِ إجْبَارٍ نُقِضَتْ، فَإِنْ لَمْ
تَكُنْ بَيِّنَةٌ وَادَّعَاهُ وَاحِدٌ فَلَهُ تَحْلِيفُ شَرِيكِهِ.
وَلَوْ
ادَّعَاهُ فِي قِسْمَةِ تَرَاضٍ وَقُلْنَا هِيَ بَيْعٌ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا
أَثَرَ لِلْغَلَطِ، فَلَا فَائِدَةَ لِهَذِهِ الدَّعْوَى.
قُلْت:
وَإِنْ قُلْنَا إفْرَازٌ نُقِضَتْ إنْ ثَبَتَ، وَإِلَّا فَيَحْلِفُ شَرِيكُهُ،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَوْ اُسْتُحِقَّ بَعْضُ الْمَقْسُومِ
شَائِعًا بَطَلَتْ فِيهِ، وَفِي الْبَاقِي خِلَافُ تَفْرِيقِ الصَّفْقَةِ، أَوْ
مِنْ النَّصِيبَيْنِ مُعَيَّنٌ سَوَاءٌ بَقِيَتْ، وَإِلَّا بَطَلَتْ وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ
CHAPTEB III.— DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATES
The
distribution of an inheritance or of a
joint estato is effected
either by
the inheritors or the persons entitled
themselves, or by an
expert chosen
by them, or by an expert appointed
by the Sovereign.
The official expert
must be a free male of irreproachable
character,
versed in geometry and
arithmetic. Where the distribution necessitates
a valuation of some sort, this must
be made by two experts ; but in all
other cases one is enough. One
jurist maintains that two experts are
always necessary. The expert appointed
by the Sovereign to preside
at
distributions may also be authorised to
decide difference in the matter
of
valuation ; in which case the valuation
itself is effected by two
special
experts having the qualifications of
irreproachable witnesses ;
while a distribution
properly so called is always effected
by the official
expert himself. The
official expert receives a remuneration from the
public treasury ; and it is only in
times of penury that his payment
has
to be borne by the inheritors or
other persons entitled. In a case
where
the sharers themselves choose an expert,
and agree with him
upon the amount
of his remuneration, and the proportion
of it to be
paid by each of
them, each one owes him the amount
stipulated. In
default of any special
agreement about it tho stipulated remuneration
is levied proportionately upon the
shares ; a single authority maintaining
that
the sharers are then separately responsible.
Where there are articles that
it is not possible to divide up
without
a considerable diminution in their
value, such as a valuable diamond,
a
costly dress, or a pair of boots,
the court may not order their distri-
bution, even upon the request of all
tho parties entitled. But it cannot
oppose it, if the parties entitled
carry out the division themselves,
and
the object does not thereby lose all
its utility ; as, e.g. in the case
of a sabre which can still cut
though broken into pieces. fEven in
the case of something which by
its division, without precisely losing much
of its value, can no longer
serve tho purpose for which it was
made,
such as a bath or a small
millstone, the court cannot accede to an
application to order its distribution.
Such a request could only be
complied
with where, for example, the bath is
of a size that admits of
its being
made into two. fRy virtue of the
same principle if of two
proprietors
of a house one is entitled to
ninertenths, and the other
to one-tenth,
only the former may apply for its
distribution if the
tenth by itself
is uninhabitable.
As to things whose
nature admits of their being effectively
divided
without any considerable diminution
in their value, the following cases
must be distinguished : —
.
The distribution may be effected by a
simple division into equal
parts in
the case, e.g. of things that can
be estimated by measure, of a
house
that consists of several constructions of
the same kind, or of a
piece
of land of the same quality or
nature throughout. In this case
any
person entitled may oblige his
co-proprietors to proceed to a division,
which is carried out in the
following way. As many equal lots
are made
as there are persons
entitled, these lots being determined by
measure or
weight ; and after this
there is written upon a piece of
paper either the
name of each
sharer, or the description of each
lot, mentioning, for
example, its
boundaries and situation. These pieces of
paper are rolled
round little balls
of equal size, and finally these
balls are drawn by some
one who
was not present on the spot at
the moment when the pieces of
paper
were rolled round them. The first
ball is drawn for the first lot
which is in consequence given to
the person whose name is upon the
piece of paper, and so on with
the others. Where, on the other
hand, it
is the lots that have
been mentioned on the pieces of
paper, the first
ball is for that
one of the sharers previously designated ;
he is given the
lot indicated on
the first to come out, and so
on with the others. Where
all the
coproprietors are not entitled to the
same fraction, e.g. where
three persons
may claim respectively the half, the
third and the sixth
of a parcel of
land, the land must be divided into
as many lots as is
indicated by
the denominator of the smallest of
the fractions, and after
this has
been done the distribution should proceed
in the manner
already explained. But
in these circumstances care must be taken
not to assign to one person
lots that are separated from one another,
and so do not form one
continuous bit of land.
. Equal
distribution, i.e. a division into lots of
different sizes, but
of equal value,
is called for in the case of
land that is not of uniform
value
throughout, in consequence of one corner
being more fertile or
nearer water
than another. *This circumstance does not
prevent
distribution taking place upon the
application of each coproprietor.
Equal
distribution is impossible in the case
of two houses or of two
shops,
even where of equal intrinsic value ;
in this case neither of
two persons
entitled may insist upon one being
assigned to him
and the other to
his coproprietor. In the caso of
movable property,
i.e. slaves or clothes
of the same value and kind, one
may ask for
equal distribution ; but where
the slaves or the clothes, though
having the same value, are of
different kinds, such an application is
inadmissible.
. Adjustment is called
for where, for example, a parcel of
land is
divided into several lots in
one of which is a well or a tree
which it is
impossible to distribute.
In this case the person so favoured
owes to
the other a proportional
compensation ; but no one can force
his co*
proprietor to such a division,
as it is in reality a sale, and
this principle
is extended by our
school even to an equal distribution
as explained
under the preceding paragraph
No. . On the other hand, distribution
by a simple division, as in No.
, is in truth merely the act
of rendering
to each the exclusive
possession of what was already his
property. A
distribution by adjustment and
compensation requires also the consent
of
the interested parties after their
respective portions have been
assigned
them by lot. f And subsequent consent
is always necessary
where one of the
coproprietors could not have forced the
others to
proceed to a distribution, being
expressed as follows : “ We accept the
distribution that has been effected,”
or “ We accept what has been
assigned to us by lot.”
Obligatory distribution should be
rescinded upon the application
of any
person entitled who can prove that
there has been error or fraudu-
lent
infraction of his rights. Even where
such claimant cannot furnish
any legal
proof of this, he may still have
an oath administered to his
former
coproprietors. Where, however, the distribution
is really a
sale, there is no
ground for rescission on account of
error, and an appli-
cation for rescission
could not be received. [In cases
where the dis-
tribution is merely the
act of rendering to each person the
exclusive
possession of what is already
his property, there is ground for
rescission
in case of error legally
proved or established by oath.] Legal
seizure
of a portion of the succession
or joint estate has the effect of
annulling
the distribution as far as
concerns the property seized. As to the
question whether in spite of this
the distribution remains good
for the
remainder there is the same difference
of opinion as with regard
to the
partial dissolution of a bargain. Where
the seizure concerns
something certain and
definite, the distribution remains good if
each
lot is subject to an equal
or proportional diminution in value ; but
in
all other cases the distribution
is ipso facto annulled by the
circumstances
mentioned.
كتاب الشَّهَادَاتِ
BOOK .— EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES
مُكَلَّفٌ عَدْلٌ ذُو مُرُوءَةٍ غَيْرُ مُتَّهَمٍ.
وَشَرْطُ
الْعَدَالَةِ اجْتِنَابُ الْكَبَائِرِ، وَالْإِصْرَارِ عَلَى صَغِيرَةٍ.
وَيَحْرُمُ
اللَّعِبُ بِالنَّرْدِ عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَيُكْرَهُ بِشِطْرَنْجٍ، فَإِنْ شُرِطَ
فِيهِ مَالٌ مِنْ الْجَانِبَيْنِ فَقِمَارٌ.
وَيُبَاحُ الْحُدَاءُ
وَسَمَاعُهُ.
وَيُكْرَهُ الْغِنَاءُ بِلَا آلَةٍ، وَسَمَاعُهُ.
وَيَحْرُمُ
اسْتِعْمَالُ آلَةٍ مِنْ شِعَارِ الشَّرَبَةِ كَطُنْبُورٍ وَعُودٍ وَصَنْجٍ
وَمِزْمَارٍ عِرَاقِيٍّ وَ اسْتِمَاعُهَا، لَا يَرَاعٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْت:
الْأَصَحُّ تَحْرِيمُهُ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَيَجُوزُ دُفٌّ
لِعُرْسٍ وَخِتَانٌ، وَكَذَا غَيْرُهُمَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَإِنْ كَانَ فِيهِ
جَلَاجِلُ.
وَيَحْرُمُ ضَرْبُ الْكُوبَةِ، وَهِيَ طَبْلٌ طَوِيلٌ
ضَيِّقُ الْوَسَطِ.
لَا الرَّقْصُ إلَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ فِيهِ
تَكَسُّرٌ كَفِعْلِ الْمُخَنِّثِ.
وَيُبَاحُ قَوْلُ شَعْرٍ
وَإِنْشَادُهُ إلَّا أَنْ يَهْجُوَ أَوْ يُفْحِشَ، أَوْ يُعَرِّضَ بِامْرَأَةٍ
مُعَيَّنَةٍ.
وَالْمُرُوءَةُ تَخَلُّقٌ بِخُلُقِ أَمْثَالِهِ فِي
زَمَانِهِ وَمَكَانِهِ، فَالْأَكْلُ فِي سُوقٍ، وَالْمَشْيُ مَكْشُوفَ الرَّأْسِ،
وَقُبْلَةُ زَوْجَةٍ وَأَمَةٍ بِحَضْرَةِ النَّاسِ، وَإِكْثَارُ حِكَايَاتٍ
مُضْحِكَةٍ، وَلُبْسُ فَقِيهٍ قُبَاءَ وَقَلَنْسُوَةٍ حَيْثُ لَا يُعْتَادُ،
وَإِكْبَابٌ عَلَى لَعِبِ الشِّطْرَنْجِ أَوْ غِنَاءٍ أَوْ سَمَاعِهِ،
وَإِدَامَةُ رَقْصٍ يُسْقِطُهَا، وَالْأَمْرُ فِيهِ يَخْتَلِفُ بِالْأَشْخَاصِ
وَالْأَحْوَالِ وَالْأَمَاكِنِ، وَحِرْفَةٌ دَنِيئَةٌ كَحِجَامَةٍ وَكَنْسٍ
وَدَبْغٍ مِمَّنْ لَا تَلِيقُ بِهِ تُسْقِطُهَا، فَإِنْ اعْتَادَهَا وَكَانَتْ
حِرْفَةَ أَبِيهِ فَلَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَمَّا قَدَّمَ
الْمُصَنِّفُ مِنْ شُرُوطِ الشَّاهِدِ كَوْنَهُ غَيْرَ مُتَّهَمٍ بِتُهْمَةٍ
تَرُدُّ شَهَادَتَهُ بَيَّنَهَا بِقَوْلِهِ وَالتُّهْمَةُ أَنْ يَجُرَّ إلَيْهِ
نَفْعًا أَوْ يَدْفَعَ عَنْهُ ضَرَرًا فَتُرَدُّ شَهَادَتُهُ لِعَبْدِهِ
وَمُكَاتَبِهِ وَغَرِيمٍ لَهُ مَيِّتٍ أَوْ عَلَيْهِ حَجْرُ فَلَسٍ، وَبِمَا هُوَ
وَكِيلٌ فِيهِ.
وَبِبَرَاءَةِ مَنْ ضَمِنَهُ.
وَبِجِرَاحَةِ
مُوَرِّثِهِ، وَلَوْ شَهِدَ لِمُوَرِّثٍ لَهُ مَرِيضٍ أَوْ جَرِيحٍ بِمَالٍ
قَبْلَ الِانْدِمَالِ قُبِلَتْ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَتُرَدُّ شَهَادَةُ
عَاقِلَةٍ بِفِسْقِ شُهُودِ قَتْلٍ.
وَغُرَمَاءِ مُفْلِسٍ بِفِسْقِ
شُهُودِ دَيْنٍ آخَرَ.
وَلَوْ شَهِدَا لِاثْنَيْنِ بِوَصِيَّةٍ
فَشَهِدَا لِلشَّاهِدَيْنِ بِوَصِيَّةٍ مِنْ تِلْكَ التَّرِكَةِ قُبِلَتْ
الشَّهَادَتَانِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَا تُقْبَلُ لِأَصْلٍ وَلَا
فَرْعٍ وَتُقْبَلُ عَلَيْهِمَا وَكَذَا عَلَى أَبِيهِمَا بِطَلَاقِ ضَرَّةِ
أُمِّهِمَا أَوْ قَذْفِهَا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَإِذَا شَهِدَ
لِفَرْعٍ وَأَجْنَبِيٍّ قُبِلَتْ لِلْأَجْنَبِيِّ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
قُلْت:
وَتُقْبَلُ لِكُلٍّ مِنْ الزَّوْجَيْنِ وَلِأَخٍ وَصَدِيقٍ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَا تُقْبَلُ مِنْ عَدُوٍّ، وَهُوَ مَنْ يُبْغِضُهُ
بِحَيْثُ يَتَمَنَّى زَوَالَ نِعْمَتِهِ، وَيَحْزَنُ بِسُرُورِهِ وَيَفْرَحُ
بِمُصِيبَتِهِ، وَتُقْبَلُ لَهُ، وَكَذَا عَلَيْهِ فِي عَدَاوَةِ دِينٍ كَكَافِرٍ
وَمُبْتَدِعٍ.
وَتُقْبَلُ شَهَادَةُ مُبْتَدِعٍ لَا
نُكَفِّرُهُ.
لَا مُغَفَّلٍ لَا يَضْبِطُ.
وَلَا
مُبَادِرٍ.
وَتُقْبَلُ شَهَادَةُ الْحِسْبَةِ فِي حُقُوقِ اللَّهِ
تَعَالَى، وَفِيمَا لَهُ فِيهِ حَقٌّ مُؤَكَّدٌ كَطَلَاقٍ وَعِتْقٍ وَعَفْوٍ عَنْ
قِصَاصٍ، وَبَقَاءِ عِدَّةٍ وَانْقِضَائِهَا، وَحَدٍّ لَهُ، وَكَذَا النَّسَبُ
عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ.
وَمَتَى حَكَمَ بِشَاهِدَيْنِ فَبَانَا
كَافِرَيْنِ أَوْ عَبْدَيْنِ أَوْ صَبِيَّيْنِ نَقَضَهُ هُوَ وَغَيْرُهُ، وَكَذَا
فَاسِقَانِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ شَهِدَ كَافِرٌ أَوْ عَبْدٌ
أَوْ صَبِيٌّ ثُمَّ أَعَادَهَا بَعْدَ كَمَالِهِ قُبِلَتْ شَهَادَتُهُ، أَوْ
فَاسِقٌ تَابَ فَلَا، وَتُقْبَلُ شَهَادَتُهُ فِي غَيْرِهَا بِشَرْطِ
اخْتِبَارِهِ بَعْدَ التَّوْبَةِ مُدَّةً يُظَنُّ بِهَا صِدْقُ تَوْبَتِهِ،
وَقَدَّرَهَا الْأَكْثَرُونَ بِسَنَةٍ، وَيُشْتَرَطُ فِي تَوْبَةِ مَعْصِيَةٍ
قَوْلِيَّةٍ الْقَوْلُ فَيَقُولُ الْقَاذِفُ قَذْفِي بَاطِلٌ وَأَنَا نَادِمٌ
عَلَيْهِ وَلَا أَعُودُ إلَيْهِ، وَكَذَا شَهَادَةُ الزُّورِ.
قُلْت:
وَغَيْرُ الْقَوْلِيَّةِ يُشْتَرَطُ إقْلَاعٌ، وَنَدَمٌ، وَعَزْمٌ أَنْ لَا
يَعُودَ، وَرَدُّ ظُلَامَةِ آدَمِيٍّ إنْ تَعَلَّقَتْ بِهِ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ.
BOOK .— EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES
Section
No one can
be a witness except a free, adult, sane
Moslem of irreproach-
able and serious
character, not liable to suspicion. It
is necessary, to
constitute irreproachable
character, that tho witness should have
abstained entirely from committing capital
sins, and should not be in
the
habit of committing sins of a less
serious nature. Amongst illicit
pleasures
that offend respectability are counted the
game of backgammon
ff which is
rigorously forbidden, and that of chess
which is merely
blamable where there
is a stake, for in this case chess
is considered as a
true game of
chance, and in consequence rigorously
forbidden. It is
lawful to sing and
listen to the song to which the
camel-drivers make
their animals walk ;
but tho law blames all other singing
not accom-
panied by instruments of music
; and it forbids the use and the
sound
of any musical instrument tending
to excite to the use of forbidden
drinks, such as the guitar, lute,
cymbal, and Persian flute. fOn the
other hand, the flageolet is an
instrument of music which the law permits.
[The flageolet also is rigorously
forbidden.] A tambourine may be used
at a
marriage or a circumcision for any other
festival, even when bells
are attached
to it ; but one must never beat
the kuba, i.e . a long drum
narrow in
the middle.
The law permits dancing,
provided it is not of an enervating
character
like that of effeminate persons.
The declamation and recitation of
poetry
is permitted, provided there are no
satiric or obscene verses, nor
any
allusion to some particular woman.
By a man of “ serious ” character
is meant one who models his
conduct
upon tho respectable among his
contemporaries and fellow-
countrymen. Certain
actions are essentially incompatible wit h a
serious
character. One should regard, for
example, as wanting in seriousness
a
person who eats in public places and
walks there bare-headed ; who
embraces his
wife or his slave in the presence
of other persons ; who is
always
telling funny stories ; who wears a gown
and pointed cap as a
professional
jurist though this is not the custom
of the place ; who
habitually plays chess
or sings or listens to singing, or
who dances for
an excessively long
time. It is well, however, so far
as these acts aro
concerned, to take
into consideration the individuals, circumstances
and places. Besides this, there are
occupations so base in themselves as
to be incompatible with the
character of a witness ; for example, that
of a person who applies leeches, or
sweeps houses, or tans leather ;
persons
following such occupations, even though
they may be of as
high social
position, cannot depose as witnesses.
jThese occupations,
however, when exercised
as a trade by an individual whose father
before him was a barber, a sweeper,
or a tanner, form no obstacle to
a
deposition. By “ liable to suspicion ” is
meant a person who allows
himself to
be influenced by the idea of
procuring some advantage, or
protecting
himself against some damage.
Interested
witnesses may always be challenged.
Consequently one
cannot depose in favour
of one’s slave or dependent undergoing en-
franchisement by contract, nor can one
give evidence with regard to
an
estate inherited by one’s debtor, nor
in favour of one’s debtor who has
been declared bankrupt. For the same
reason may be challenged a
witness
with regard to a matter about which
he has been appointed
an agent, or
with regard to the remittance of a
debt for which he is
security, or
with regard to an assault against a
person of whom he is
the heir.
On the other hand, there is
objection to accepting in a ques-
tion of
real property or of money the
deposition of a sick or wounded
person
in favour of another of whom he
is the heir, even before his
recovery. The aakila cannot testify
to the notorious misconduct of
the
witnesses of a homicide, nor can the
creditors of a bankrupt testify
to the
notorious misconduct of witnesses called
by another person to
establish another
debt, f Where, however, two witnesses
prove a
testamentary disposition in favour
of two other persons, and these latter
subsequently declare that the witnesses
themselves were mentioned
in the same
will, none of this evidence can be
challenged as it really
relates to
different things. And finally, one cannot
depose in favour
of one’s ancestors
or descendants, though one may legally
do so against
them, *and the law
even specially allows a son the privilege
of deposing
against his father as to
a repudiation or a defamation uttered by the
latter against a wife who is not
the mother of that son. *Evidence
given in favour both of one’s
own descendants and also of a third party,
is valid only for the latter.
[Husband and wife may give evidence in
favour of each other, and one
may even depose in favour of one’s
brother
or of one’s friend.]
The
deposition of an enemy is not
admissible, i.e . of an individual
who
hates the adverse party to such a
degree as to wish to see him fall
into misery, to envy his prosperity,
and rejoice in his misfortune ; but
the favourable deposition of such an
enemy is admissible. An enemy’s
testimony
should be accepted in all cases
whore the ill-feeling is not
personal,
for example, if it is the result
of a difference of religion. Con-
sequently a
Moslem may depose against an infulel
or a heretic, and a
heretic whom we
do not regard as an infidel does
not lose his right to
give evidence.
It is permitted to challenge the
testimony of persons
who .are too
eager to give evidence, or so
indifferent ly careless that one
can
put no trust in their words ; but
one must accept the evidence of
police agents or of other persons
as to the accomplishment of a person’s
obligations towards God, and the
actions of private life that confer
an irrevocable right to a third
party, e.g. repudiation, enfranchisement,
remission of a penalty under the law
of talion, existence or expiration
of a
period of legal retirement, penalties of a
non-remissible character,
ffand even affiliation.
Judgments delivered upon the
testimony of two witnesses who
afterwards
are found to be infidels, slaves, or
minors, should be quashed
either by
the court that delivered them or by
any other court ; *and the
same is
the case where it appears too late
that the witnesses were of
notorious
misconduct. But the depositions of an
infidel, a slave, or a
minor should
be accepted if they repeat them
after the cause of their
incapacity
has ceased to exist ; though the law
does not accord this
favour to
individuals of notorious misconduct who
afterwards lead a
changed life. It
is only after a sufficient interval has
elapsed to admit
of the sincerity of
the change that they can again bo
accepted as witnesses,
and most
authorities fix the duration of this
interval at one whole year.
Where
the notorious misconduct is the
consequence of a verbal insult
to some
one, it is enough to make a verbal
retractation ; where, for
example, a person
proceeded against for defamation declares
that he
withdraws the insulting
expressions used, and adds that he
feels for
them profound regret, and
that he will in future abstain from
such a
crime, the court may accept
his testimony. This rule applies also to
false evidence. [Insults not expressed
in words but by acts are made
reparation for by ceasing to
manifest them, by showing one’s regret,
and proposing to abstain from such
things in future ; and also by com-
pensating the insulted party, so far
as this is within human power.]
فَصْلٌ [فيما يعتبر فيه شهادة الرجال]
لَا يُحْكَمُ بِشَاهِدٍ
إلَّا فِي هِلَالِ رَمَضَانَ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَيُشْتَرَطُ
لِلزِّنَا أَرْبَعَةُ رِجَالٍ وَلَلْإِقْرَارِ بِهِ اثْنَانِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ،
وَفِي قَوْلٍ أَرْبَعَةٌ، وَلِمَالٍ وَعَقْدٍ مَالِيٍّ كَبَيْعٍ وَإِقَالَةٍ
وَحَوَالَةٍ وَضَمَانٍ وَحَقٍّ مَالِيٍّ كَخِيَارٍ وَأَجَلٍ: رَجُلَانِ أَوْ
رَجُلٌ وَامْرَأَتَانِ وَلِغَيْرِ ذَلِكَ مِنْ عُقُوبَةٍ لِلَّهِ تَعَالَى أَوْ
لِآدَمِيٍّ وَمَا يَطَّلِعُ عَلَيْهِ رِجَالٌ غَالِبًا كَنِكَاحٍ وَطَلَاقٍ
وَرَجْعَةٍ وَإِسْلَامٍ وَرِدَّةٍ وَجَرْحٍ وَتَعْدِيلٍ وَمَوْتٍ وَإِعْسَارٍ
وَوَكَالَةٍ وَوِصَايَةٍ وَشَهَادَةٍ عَلَى شَهَادَةِ رَجُلَانِ.
وَمَا
يَخْتَصُّ بِمَعْرِفَتِهِ النِّسَاءُ أَوْ لَا يَرَاهُ رِجَالٌ غَالِبًا
كَبَكَارَةٍ وَوِلَادَةٍ وَحَيْضٍ وَرَضَاعٍ وَعُيُوبٍ تَحْتَ الثِّيَابِ
يَثْبُتُ بِمَا سَبَقَ، وَبِأَرْبَعِ نِسْوَةٍ.
وَمَا لَا يَثْبُتُ
بِرَجُلٍ وَامْرَأَتَيْنِ لَا يَثْبُتُ بِرَجُلٍ وَيَمِينٍ، وَمَا ثَبَتَ بِهِمْ
ثَبَتَ بِرَجُلٍ وَيَمِينٍ، إلَّا عُيُوبَ النِّسَاءِ وَنَحْوَهَا، وَلَا
يَثْبُتُ شَيْءٌ بِامْرَأَتَيْنِ وَيَمِينٍ، وَإِنَّمَا يَحْلِفُ الْمُدَّعِي
بَعْدَ شَهَادَةِ شَاهِدِهِ وَتَعْدِيلِهِ، وَيَذْكُرُ فِي حَلِفِهِ صِدْقَ
الشَّاهِدِ.
فَإِنْ تَرَكَ الْحَلِفَ وَطَلَبَ يَمِينَ خَصْمِهِ
فَلَهُ ذَلِكَ، فَإِنْ نَكَلَ فَلَهُ أَنْ يَحْلِفَ يَمِينَ الرَّدِّ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ كَانَ بِيَدِهِ أَمَةٌ وَوَلَدُهَا فَقَالَ
رَجُلٌ: هَذِهِ مُسْتَوْلَدَتِي عَلِقَتْ بِهَذَا فِي مِلْكِي وَحَلَفَ مَعَ
شَاهِدٍ ثَبَتَ الِاسْتِيلَادُ، لَا نَسَبُ الْوَلَدِ وَحُرِّيَّتُهُ فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ كَانَ بِيَدِهِ غُلَامٌ فَقَالَ رَجُلٌ:
كَانَ لِي وَأَعْتَقْتُهُ وَحَلَفَ مَعَ شَاهِدٍ فَالْمَذْهَبُ انْتِزَاعُهُ
وَمَصِيرُهُ حُرًّا.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَتْ وَرَثَةٌ مَالاً
لِمُوَرِّثِهِمْ وَأَقَامُوا شَاهِدًا وَحَلَفَ مَعَهُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَخَذَ
نَصِيبَهُ، وَلَا يُشَارَكُ فِيهِ وَيَبْطُلُ حَقُّ مَنْ لَمْ يَحْلِفْ
بِنُكُولِهِ إنْ حَضَرَ وَهُوَ كَامِلٌ، فَإِنْ كَانَ غَائِبًا أَوْ صَبِيًّا
أَوْ مَجْنُونًا فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَقْبِضُ نَصِيبَهُ، فَإِذَا زَالَ
عُذْرُهُ حَلَفَ وَأَخَذَ بِغَيْرِ إعَادَةِ شَهَادَةٍ.
وَلَا
تَجُوزُ شَهَادَةٌ عَلَى فِعْلٍ كَزِنًا وَغَصْبٍ وَإِتْلَافٍ وَوِلَادَةٍ إلَّا
بِالْإِبْصَارِ.
وَتُقْبَلُ مِنْ أَصَمَّ، وَالْأَقْوَالُ كَعَقْدٍ
يُشْتَرَطُ سَمْعُهَا وَإِبْصَارُ قَائِلِهَا، وَلَا يُقْبَلُ أَعْمَى إلَّا أَنْ
يُقِرَّ فِي أُذُنِهِ فَيَتَعَلَّقُ بِهِ حَتَّى يَشْهَدَ عِنْدَ قَاضٍ بِهِ
عَلَى الصَّحِيحِ، وَلَوْ حَمَلَهَا بَصِيرٌ ثُمَّ عَمِيَ شَهِدَ إنْ كَانَ
الْمَشْهُودُ لَهُ وَعَلَيْهِ مَعْرُوفَيْ الِاسْمِ وَالنَّسَبِ، وَمَنْ سَمِعَ
قَوْلَ شَخْصٍ أَوْ رَأَى فِعْلَهُ، فَإِنْ عَرَفَ عَيْنَهُ وَاسْمَهُ وَنَسَبَهُ
شَهِدَ عَلَيْهِ فِي حُضُورِهِ إشَارَةً، وَعِنْدَ غَيْبَتِهِ وَمَوْتِهِ
بِاسْمِهِ وَنَسَبِهِ، فَإِنْ جَهِلَهُمَا لَمْ يَشْهَدْ عَنَدَ مَوْتِهِ
وَغَيْبَتِهِ.
وَلَا يَصِحُّ تَحَمُّلُ شَهَادَةٍ عَلَى
مُتَنَقِّبَةٍ اعْتِمَادًا عَلَى صَوْتِهَا، فَإِنْ عَرَفَهَا بِعَيْنِهَا أَوْ
بِاسْمٍ وَنَسَبٍ جَازَ، وَيَشْهَدُ عِنْدَ الْأَدَاءِ بِمَا يَعْلَمُ، وَلَا
يَجُوزُ التَّحَمُّلُ عَلَيْهَا بِتَعْرِيفِ عَدْلٍ أَوْ عَدْلَيْنِ عَلَى
الْأَشْهَرِ، وَالْعَمَلُ عَلَى خِلَافِهِ، وَلَوْ قَامَتْ بَيِّنَةٌ عَلَى
عَيْنِهِ بِحَقٍّ فَطَلَبَ الْمُدَّعِي التَّسْجِيلَ سَجَّلَ الْقَاضِي
بِالْحِلْيَةِ لَا بِالِاسْمِ وَالنَّسَبِ، مَا لَمْ يَثْبُتَا، وَلَهُ
الشَّهَادَةُ بِالتَّسَامُعِ عَلَى نَسَبٍ مِنْ أَبٍ أَوْ قَبِيلَةٍ، وَكَذَا
أُمٌّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَمَوْتٌ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، لَا عِتْقٌ وَوَلَاءُ
وَوَقْفٌ وَنِكَاحٌ وَمِلْكٌ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْتُ: الْأَصَحُّ
عِنْدَ الْمُحَقِّقِينَ وَالْأَكْثَرِينَ فِي الْجَمِيعِ الْجَوَازُ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ وَشَرْطُ التَّسَامُعِ سَمَاعُهُ مِنْ جَمْعٍ يُؤْمَنُ تَوَاطُؤُهُمْ
عَلَى الْكَذِبِ، وَقِيلَ يَكْفِي مِنْ عَدْلَيْنِ، وَلَا تَجُوزُ الشَّهَادَةُ
عَلَى مِلْكٍ بِمُجَرَّدِ يَدٍ وَلَا بَيْدٍ، وَتَصَرُّفٍ فِي مُدَّةٍ قَصِيرَةٍ،
وَتَجُوزُ فِي طَوِيلَةٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَشَرْطُهُ تَصَرُّفُ مُلَّاكٍ مِنْ
سُكْنَى وَهَدْمٍ وَبِنَاءٍ وَبَيْعٍ وَرَهْنٍ، وَتُبْنَى شَهَادَةُ الْإِعْسَارِ
عَلَى قَرَائِنَ وَمَخَائِلِ الضُّرِّ و الْإِضَاقَةِ.
Section
The testimony of a
single individual is not enough to
prove any
fact, *except the appearance
of the new moon in the month
of Bamadan.
In order to prove the
crime of fornication four male witnesses
must be
produced, and two to prove
the culprit’s confession, though in this
latter case also one jurist
considers that four are necessary. Heal
property claims, and contracts having
consequences that are merely
pecuniary,
such as sale, cancellation by consent,
transfer of debts due
to one, and
security, as well as the rights
resulting from these contracts,
such as
right of option, or a term for
payment, may all be proved by
the
testimony of two male witnesses, or
of one male witness and two
women.
Two male witnesses are rigorously required
in all other con-
tested cases, whether
it be a matter of non-remissible
penalties, except
that for fornication, or
of remissible ones, or of some
dispute as to an
act of private
life ordinarily affected before men and
in their sight, such
as marriage,
repudiation, return to conjugal union,
conversion, apostasy,
notorious misconduct,
irreproachability, death, insolvency, appoint-
ment
of an agent, testamentary dispositions,
and the testimony which
two witnesses
have made a certain deposition. On the
other hand,
what is specially liable
to come under the observation of
women, and
in general facts which do
not usually take place in the
presence and in
the sight of men,
such as the existence of virginity,
accouchement,
menstruation, suckling, redhibitory
defects in women and in parts of
the body usually covered, are proved
as well by the evidence of two men
as by that of four women.
Facts which cannot be proved
by the evidence of one male witness
and of two women, cannot be so
either by the deposition of one male
witness and by a supplementary oath ; but
this oath may replace the
evidence
of two women in all cases where
their deposition together with
that of a
man is admissible, except only that
of women’s redhibitory
defects. In no
case can the deposition of two
women, plus a supplemen-
tary oath, be
accepted as sufficient proof of anything.
A supplementary
oath is administered to a
plaintiff only after the hearing of
his witness,
and after the latter
has been recognised to bo of
irreproachable charact or.
This oath
should contain an affirmation of the
truth of the deposition.
But the
plaintiff has a right to waive his
claim to take the oath, and to
have it offered to his opponent,
who in his turn has also a right
to refuse
to take it. *In this
latter case the plaintiff may still
take it. Where
some one owns a slavo
and her child another person may
prove en-
franchisement by reason of
maternity, producing in support of it a
single
male witness, and swearing that
the slave is the child’s mother ; *but
neither affdiation nor the freedom
of the child can bo established in
this
way. Our school admits that a
slave ceases to be his master’s property
and becomes free when another person
declares upon oath that the
slave in
question belonged to and*was enfranchised
by him, and these
facts are
corroborated by the evidence of a male
witness. Where
some one’s heirs claim
some property which they allege to
have belonged
to the deceased, though
they can only produce a single male
witness
of the truth of this, while
only a part of these heirs are ready
to confirm
their claim by a supplementary
oath, the property in question must be
adjudged to these latter only, in
proportion to their respective shares
in
the succession. As to the other
heirs who have not taken the oath,
not only are they not admitted
as persons entitled to the property
adjudged to their coinheritors, but
any claim on their part is rejected,
at any rate if they have
refused to take the oath while
capable of doing
so. But if they
have been prevented from taking the
oath, e.g . in case
of absence, minority,
or lunacy, our school, though rejecting
their claim,
allows them the right
of taking the oath afterwards, so
soon as the
cause of their
incapacity has been removed. The part
they claim
should then be adjudged
them, without its being necessary for
them to
produce again the witness
who has already deposed in their favour.
Witnesses called to prove a material
fact, such as fornication, usur-
pation,
destruction of property, or accouchement,
should have actually
seen the fact
themselves ; consequently a deaf man may
lawfully give
evidence in such cases.
On the other hand, witnesses called
to prove
that the adverse party has
spoken certain words ; for example, that
he
has made a bargain, or made an
admission, or repudiated a wife, should
not only have seen the individual
in question, but also heard the words
in dispute. Thus a blind man cannot
give evidence, ffunless it be in
the
case, e.g . of an admission uttered in
his ear by a person who has not
since left him, until the moment
of the deposition. And it is understood,
of course, that a blind person can
give evidence of a fact which he saw
before he was struck with blindness,
provided that he knows the name
and
origin of the two litigants. A witness
who has heard the words
and seen
the act of a person he knows, and
whose name and origin he
knows,
should point out that person if
present at the hearing ; but he
need
merely mention the name and origin,
if the person be absent or
deceased.
A witness who has forgotten the name
and origin of the
person in question
cannot depose. In the case of a
veiled woman a
witness cannot rely
upon her voice to prove her
identity, unless he
could recognise her
figure, and knows her name and
origin. Even in
these circumstances the
witness should limit himself to declaring,
as to
her identity, what he knows
for certain, without adding his conclusions.
Strictly speaking, he cannot either
identify the woman by referring to
one or two persons, even though
these may be of irreproachable
character ;
but the practice does not accord
with the precept. Where
the plaintiff,
after proving his claim ^against some
one present at the
hearing, demands a
sentence in writing, the judge should
describe that
person by his appearance,
and add his name and origin only
where these
have been proved before him.
A witness may prove in court some
one’s name and origin, according
to
what he has heard as to the
names of the father, the tribe, for
the
mother. Our school also permits
to be established in the same way
upon the ground of public notoriety,
the decease of any person, without
its being necessary for the witness
to have seen the dead body himself.
fSuch hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible in case of enfranchise-
ment,
patronage, conversion of property into
real estate, marriage,
or ownership.
[^According to the majority of authorities
of repute
evidence grounded upon public
notoriety is accepted in all these cases.
Public notoriety consists in the
fact of hearing an occurrence related
in the same manner by several
individuals whose words can be trusted ;
though, according to some authorities
it is enough to have heard it told
by two persons of irreproachable
conduct. A witness cannot declare
that a
certain individual is owner on the
mere ground that the latter
possesses
the object in dispute, nor even
because he has had possession
of it
and disposed of it for a short time,
f Where, on the other hand, the
period during which the individual
has had possession of and has dis-
posed of the object is long, this
fact must be accepted as affording a
presumption of ownership, on the
sole condition that the ways in which
it has been disposed of are of
such a nature that such a conclusion may
be deduced from them, e.g . if they
consist in the fact of having inhabited,
demolished, built, sold, or pledged a
house. Insolvency may be proved
by
alleging indications and arguments showing
that the individual in
question has
been struck by a series of misfortunes
and has lost his
fortune.
فَصْلٌ [في تَحَمُّلِ الشَّهَادَةِ وأدائها]
تَحَمُّلُ
الشَّهَادَةِ فَرْضُ كِفَايَةٍ فِي النِّكَاحِ، وَكَذَا الْإِقْرَارُ،
وَالتَّصَرُّفُ الْمَالِيُّ، وَكِتَابَةِ الصَّكِّ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِذَا لَمْ
يَكُنْ فِي الْقَضِيَّةِ إلَّا اثْنَانِ لَزِمَهُمَا الْأَدَاءُ، فَلَوْ أَدَّى
وَاحِدٌ وَامْتَنَعَ الْآخَرُ وَقَالَ احْلِفْ مَعَهُ عَصَى، وَإِنْ كَانَ
شُهُودٌ، فَالْأَدَاءُ فَرْضُ كِفَايَةٍ، فَلَوْ طَلَبَ مِنْ اثْنَيْنِ
لَزِمَهُمَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ إلَّا وَاحِدٌ لَزِمَهُ إنْ
كَانَ فِيمَا يَثْبُتُ بِشَاهِدٍ وَيَمِينٍ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَقِيلَ لَا
يَلْزَمُ الْأَدَاءُ إلَّا مَنْ تَحَمَّلَ قَصْدًا لَا اتِّفَاقًا، وَلِوُجُوبِ
الْأَدَاءِ شُرُوطٌ: أَنْ يُدْعَى مِنْ مَسَافَةِ الْعَدْوَى، وَقِيلَ دُونَ
مَسَافَةِ الْقَصْرِ، وَأَنْ يَكُونَ عَدْلاً فَإِنْ دُعِيَ ذُو فِسْقٍ مُجْمَعٍ
عَلَيْهِ، قِيلَ أَوْ مُخْتَلَفٍ فِيهِ لَمْ يَجِبْ، وَأَنْ لَا يَكُونَ
مَعْذُورًا بِمَرَضٍ وَنَحْوِهِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ أَشْهَدَ عَلَى شَهَادَتِهِ أَوْ
بَعَثَ الْقَاضِي مَنْ يَسْمَعُهَا.
Section
The Moslem community
is collectively responsible for the presence
of witnesses at marriages, ^confessions,
pecuniary, or real property
dispositions,
and the drawing up of documents, in
order to give these
different acts
the necessary authority. If an affair
of this sort happens
in presence of
two persons only they cannot refuse
to be witnesses.
This principle is
carried so far that one cannot shirk
this obligation if
the other declares
he is ready to undertake it, even
where the party
claiming their services
only needs a single witness, to be
supplemented
by an oath in case of
proceedings. When the affair happens in
the
presence of several persons, the
joint obligation requires that if the
interested party claims the services
of two of them they should consent,
fand have no right to refer
the interested party to other witnesses.
When the affair happens in the
presence of a single individual he must
give his services, unless it is a
fact that cannot be proved by a
single witness and a supplementary oath,
for in this case the
testimony of a
single witness would be of no use.
According, how-
ever, to some jurists the
obligation to serve as a witness is
incumbent
only upon those who are
intentionally present at the act, not upon
the persons who happen accidentally
to be there.
The law requires
also for a person’s appearance as a
witness : —
. That the distance
from the home of the witness does
not exceed
that within which the
court may order a personal summons ; or,
according to some authorities, that
the distance should be less than
that permitting of the abridgment of
prayer.
. That the witness should
be of irreproachable character ; for
notorious misconduct may be a reason
for refusing his services as useless.
However, a refusal to be a witness,
founded upon notorious misconduct,
is
admissible only in the case of
conduct that every one disapproves.
Only a
few authorities maintain that such refusal
may also be founded
upon misconduct
of which some doubt the perversity.
. That the witness should not
be prevented from appearing through
sickness, etc. And in this case
the evidence of tho witness who does
not appear may be proved at
tho hearing by two other witnesses,
or the
court may send some one
to take the deposition of the said
witness at
his domicile.
فَصْلٌ [في الشهادة على الشهادة]
تُقْبَلُ الشَّهَادَةُ عَلَى
الشَّهَادَةِ فِي غَيْرِ عُقُوبَةٍ، وَفِي عُقُوبَةٍ لِآدَمِيٍّ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ، وَتَحَمُّلِهَا بِأَنْ يَسْتَرْعِيَهُ فَيَقُولُ: أَنَا شَاهِدٌ
بِكَذَا، وَأُشْهِدُك أَوْ اشْهَدْ عَلَى شَهَادَتِي، أَوْ يَسْمَعَهُ يَشْهَدُ
عِنْدَ قَاضٍ، أَوْ يَقُولُ: أَشْهَدُ أَنَّ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى فُلَانٍ أَلْفًا
عَنْ ثَمَنِ مَبِيعٍ أَوْ غَيْرِهِ، وَفِي هَذَا وَجْهٌ، وَلَا يَكْفِي سَمَاعُ
قَوْلِهِ لِفُلَانٍ عَلَى فُلَانٍ كَذَا، أَوْ أَشْهَدُ بِكَذَا، أَوْ عِنْدِي
شَهَادَةٌ بِكَذَا، وَلِيُبَيِّن الْفَرْعُ عِنْدَ الْأَدَاءِ جِهَةَ
التَّحَمُّلِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يُبَيِّنْ وَوَثِقَ الْقَاضِي بِعِلْمِهِ فَلَا
بَأْسَ، وَلَا يَصِحُّ التَّحَمُّلُ عَلَى شَهَادَةِ مَرْدُودِ الشَّهَادَةِ،
وَلَا تَحْمِلُ النِّسْوَةُ.
فَإِنْ مَاتَ الْأَصْلُ أَوْ غَابَ
أَوْ مَرِضَ لَمْ يَمْنَعْ شَهَادَةَ الْفَرْعِ.
وَإِنْ حَدَثَ
رِدَّةٌ أَوْ فِسْقٌ أَوْ عَدَاوَةٌ مَنَعَتْ، وَجُنُونُهُ كَمَوْتِهِ عَلَى
الصَّحِيحِ.
وَلَوْ تَحَمَّلَ فَرْعٌ فَاسِقٌ أَوْ عَبْدٌ أَوْ
صَبِيٌّ فَأَدَّى وَهُوَ كَامِلٌ قُبِلَتْ.
وَيَكْفِي شَهَادَةُ
اثْنَيْنِ عَلَى الشَّاهِدَيْنِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يُشْتَرَطُ لِكُلِّ رَجُلٍ أَوْ
امْرَأَةٍ اثْنَانِ.
وَشَرْطُ قَبُولِهَا تَعَذُّرُ أَوْ تَعَسُّرُ
الْأَصِيلِ بِمَوْتٍ أَوْ عَمًى، أَوْ مَرَضٍ يَشُقُّ حُضُورُهُ، أَوْ غَيْبَةٌ
لِمَسَافَةِ عَدْوَى، وَقِيلَ قَصْرٍ.
وَأَنْ يُسَمِّيَ الْأُصُولَ،
وَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ أَنْ يُزَكِّيَهُمْ الْفُرُوعُ، فَإِنْ زَكَّوْهُمْ قُبِلَ،
وَلَوْ شَهِدُوا عَلَى شَهَادَةِ عَدْلَيْنِ أَوْ عُدُولٍ وَلَمْ يُسَمُّوهُمْ
لَمْ يَجُزْ.
Section
Hearsay or secondary
evidence is a deposition to the effect
that a
certain witness has proved
this or that fact. This evidence is
admissible
in civil cases, and according
to our school in criminal cases
also, except
in those in which the
penalties are not remissible. Such evidence,
however, is only to be admitted
in the following cases : —
.
Where the original says to the
secondary witness, I was a witness
of such-and-such fact, and I call
you to be a witness of my statement,”
or Be a witness to this
statement.”
. Where the secondary
witness has heard the original witness
give evidence in court.
.
Where the secondary witness has heard
from the original witness
a detailed
account, for example as follows : I
bear witness that so-
and-so owes
so-and-so a thousand pieces of money as
the price of such-
and-such a thing
bought,” or on some other ground ;
and it is necessary
in this case
that the original witness should have
specially asked the
second to bear
witness to his words.
The validity,
however, of hearsay evidence in the
circumstances
set out under sub-section
is not to be relied upon ; and it
is never
enough for the secondary
witness simply to say —
. That
he has heard say” by so-and-so
that one of the
litigants owes
such-and-such a sum ; that is, without adding
that
the person whose words he is
repeating uttered them as a piece of
evidence.
. That he has heard
say by so-and-so, “ I am a witness of
that debt,”
or “ I can be called as
a witness to that ; ” that is, without
adding the
cause of the obligation.
A deposition by hearsay should
contain the cause of its validity ;
though, strictly speaking, the court
can also accept a hearsay piece of
evidence where the cause is not
expressed, if the judge is morally certain
of the truth of the deposition.
Hearsay evidence may never rest upon
the words of a witness who is
to be rejected ; nor can one produce
women as secondary witnesses, even
where it is a matter of facts that
may be proved by women as
original witnesses. But the validity of
hearsay evidence is not invalidated
where the original witness is pre-
vented
from deposing by some physical cause
such as death, absence,
or sickness ;
though where the right of deposition
has been lost owing to
apostasy,
notorious misconduct, or enmity, one
cannot have recourse
to hearsay evidence
in order to bring in a deposition
that has become
inadmissible. ffLunacy has
the same effect as death. It matters
little whether the witness giving
hearsay evidence is of notorious
misconduct or a slave at the moment
of hearing the original
statement,
provided he is capable of deposing
at the moment of
the hearing.
The deposition of the original
witnesses is proved legally by two
hearsay witnesses ; though, according to
one jurist the deposition of
each
original witness should be proved
separately, without distinction
of sex, by
at least two male witnesses.
In
any case secondary evidence is only
permissible : —
. Where the original
witness has been prevented from coming, or
can only come personally with
difficulty, e.g. in consequence of disease,
blindness, serious illness or absence,
at least if the distance is such
that
the court could not order a
personal summons, or, according to some
authorities, if the distance is such
as to permit of the abridgment of
prayer.
. Where the names of
the original witnesses are given at
the hearing
by the witnesses who
give the hearsay evidence, though the
latter need
not guarantee their
irreproachability. There is, however, no
objection
to their affirming at the
same time the irreproachability of the
original
witnesses. Hearsay evidence in
which the names of the original
witnesses are not given is
valueless, even where the persons making
the
original statements are really
irreproachable, and more than sufficient
in number.
فَصْلٌ [في الرجوع عن الشهادة]
رَجَعُوا عَنْ الشَّهَادَةِ قَبْلَ
الْحُكْمِ امْتَنَعَ أَوْ بَعْدَهُ وَقَبْلَ اسْتِيفَاءِ مَالٍ اُسْتُوْفِيَ،
أَوْ عُقُوبَةٍ فَلَا، أَوْ بَعْدَهُ لَمْ يُنْقَضْ.
فَإِنْ كَانَ
الْمُسْتَوْفَى قِصَاصًا أَوْ قَتْلِ رِدَّةٍ أَوْ رَجْمِ زِنًا أَوْ جَلْدِهِ
وَمَاتَ وَقَالُوا تَعَمَّدْنَا فَعَلَيْهِمْ قِصَاصٌ أَوْ دِيَةٌ
مُغَلَّظَةٌ.
وَعَلَى الْقَاضِي قِصَاصٌ إنْ قَالَ تَعَمَّدْت،
وَإِنْ رَجَعَ هُوَ وَهُمْ فَعَلَى الْجَمِيعِ قِصَاصٌ إنْ قَالُوا:
تَعَمَّدْنَا، فَإِنْ قَالُوا أَخْطَأْنَا فَعَلَيْهِ نِصْفُ دِيَةٍ وَعَلَيْهِمْ
نِصْفٌ.
وَلَوْ رَجَعَ مُزَكٍّ فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ يَضْمَنُ، أَوْ
وَلِيٌّ وَحْدَهُ فَعَلَيْهِ قِصَاصٌ أَوْ دِيَةٌ أَوْ مَعَ الشُّهُودِ
فَكَذَلِكَ، وَقِيلَ: هُوَ وَهُمْ شُرَكَاءُ.
وَلَوْ شَهِدَا
بِطَلَاقٍ بَائِنٍ أَوْ رَضَاعٍ أَوْ لِعَانٍ وَفَرَّقَ الْقَاضِي فَرَجَعَا
دَامَ الْفِرَاقُ وَعَلَيْهِمْ مَهْرُ مِثْلٍ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ نِصْفُهُ إنْ كَانَ
قَبْلَ وَطْءٍ.
وَلَوْ شَهِدَا بِطَلَاقٍ وَفَرَّقَ فَرَجَعَا
فَقَامَتْ بَيِّنَةٌ أَنَّهُ كَانَ بَيْنَهُمَا رَضَاعٌ فَلَا غُرْمَ.
وَلَوْ
رَجَعَ شُهُودُ مَالٍ غَرِمُوا فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَمَتَى رَجَعُوا كُلُّهُمْ
وُزِّعَ عَلَيْهِمْ الْغُرْمُ، أَوْ بَعْضُهُمْ وَبَقِيَ نِصَابٌ فَلَا غُرْمَ،
وَقِيلَ يَغْرَمُ قِسْطَهُ، وَإِنْ نَقَصَ النِّصَابُ وَلَمْ يَزِدْ الشُّهُودُ
عَلَيْهِ فَقِسْطٌ، وَإِنْ زَادَ فَقِسْطٌ مِنْ النِّصَابِ، وَقِيلَ مِنْ
الْعَدَدِ، وَإِنْ شَهِدَ رَجُلٌ وَامْرَأَتَانِ فَعَلَيْهِ نِصْفٌ وَهُمَا
نِصْفٌ أَوْ وَأَرْبَعٌ فِي رَضَاعٍ فَعَلَيْهِ ثُلُثٌ وَهُنَّ ثُلُثَانِ، فَإِنْ
رَجَعَ هُوَ أَوْ ثِنْتَانِ فَلَا غُرْمَ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِنْ
شَهِدَ هُوَ وَأَرْبَعٌ بِمَالٍ فَقِيلَ كَرَضَاعٍ، وَالْأَصَحُّ هُوَ نِصْفٌ
وَهُنَّ نِصْفٌ، سَوَاءٌ رَجَعْنَ مَعَهُ أَوْ وَحْدَهُنَّ، وَإِنْ رَجَعَ
ثِنْتَانِ فَالْأَصَحُّ لَا غُرْمَ، وَأَنَّ شُهُودَ إحْصَانٍ أَوْ صِفَةٍ مَعَ
شُهُودِ تَعْلِيقِ طَلَاقٍ أَوْ عِتْقٍ لَا يَغْرَمُونَ شَيْئًا.
Section
The retractation of a
piece of evidence before judgment has been
delivered has as its consequence
that the court cannot take this evidence
into consideration as a ground for
its decision. Where the retractation
takes
place after sentence has been delivered,
but before it has been
executed, the
order holds good in a civil, but not
in a criminal matter.
A retractation after
execution of sentence has no effect
upon the validity
of the judgment,
either in a civil or in a criminal case.
Where, after execution of a death
penalty, either under the law of
talion, or for apostasy, or even
by stoning or whipping, the witnesses
declare that they have made a false
declaration, intentionally, against
the executed
person, they are punishablo either with
death under the
law of talion, or
with payment of the price of blood
on the higher scale,
according to
circumstances. If the judge himself, in
such a case,
declares that he has
intentionally delivered an unjust sentence, he
should be punished with death by
way of talion, whether the victim
has undergone capital punishment, or
suffered death in consequence of
the
application of some other penalty. Where
judge and witnesses
both declare they
have intentionally contributed to the
condemnation,
and consequently to the
death, of the viptim, they are all
punishable
under the law of talion ;
but where they merely declare that
they have
committed injustice by error,
half the price of blood should be
borne
by the judge, and the other
half by the witnesses jointly. A viozakki
who subsequently declares that he
has given false information with
regard
to the irreproachability of witnesses,
should bo punished himself
as a false
witness ; while the representative of the
victim who confesses
that he has
wrongly slain an innocent person under
the law of talion,
after that person
had been sentenced for premeditated
homicide, incurs
a penalty under the law
of talion, or liability to payment
of the price
of blood, according to
circumstances, whether his retractation is
or is
not accompanied by those of
the witnesses. In this latter case,
however,
some authorities consider the
representative and the witnesses as accom-
plices, each owing only a portion of
the price of blood, where this is
due.
Where two witnesses prove an
irrevocable repudiation, relationship
by
fosterage, or imprecation, and the court
decrees in consequence a
separation, this
separation is not annulled by a subsequent
retractation
of the depositions ; but the
false witnesses owe the woman proportional
dower ; or, according to one
authority, they owe the half of this
dower
if the marriage has not yet
been consummated. On the other hand,
where the separation is decreed, c.g .
for a cause of repudiation, upon the
testimony of two persons who
subsequently declaro that their evidence
is false, but it is proved
that the marriage was nevertheless illegal
in
consequence of relationship by
fosterage, the false witnesses owe no
reparation.
*False witnesses in
monetary matters or matters of real
property
are only liable, upon
retractation of their depositions, for damages
where these have really been
sustained. This means that, if all
retract,
they must make joint reparation
for the wrong that they have done ;
but the retractation of one or
some of them has no consequence, pro-
vided that the number of witnesses
who maintain the truth of their
depositions is sufficient to make
the judgment valid. However,
according to
some authorities, the witnesses who have
in this way
retracted their statements,
are liable in any case for damages,
in pro-
portion to their number, or
having regard to the number of witnesses
maintaining their statements. Where, on
the other hand, after re-
tractation by
some of the witnesses, there are not
enough left to furnish
legal proof,
the following cases must be distinguished
: —
. Where the total number
of witnesses heard does not exceed
the number required by law, the
witnesses who retract are liable for
damages in proportion to the number
of witnesses required.
. Where the
total number of witnesses heard exceeds
the number
required by law, the
witnesses who retract are liable for
damages, in
proportion to the number
of witnesses required ; or, according to
some
authorities, in proportion to the
total number of witnesses heard.
In
accordance with the same principles it
is necessary to determine
whether the
witnesses were not of the same sex.
Where, for example,
a fact has been
proved by the deposition of a man
and two women,
and all retract their
statements, the man is liable for
half the damages,
and the two women
jointly for the other half. Where it
is a matter of
some fact, such as
relationship by fosterage, to prove which
the law
requires either the evidence
of one man and two women, or
that of four
women, while the fact
has actually been proved by one. man
and four
women, the consequence of a
retractation by all of them is that
the man
owes merely one-third of the
damages, and the four women jointly
two-thirds. fWhere, on the contrary,
in the instance just mentioned
either
the man, or two of the four
women, retract their deposition,
there is
no liability, for the fact remains
legally proved. ^Finally, in
the case
of a real or pecuniary obligation, where
the law requires the
evidence of two
men, or that of one man and
two women, but in which
one man
and four women actually testify, a
retractation by two of the
women is
of no consequence ; while that of all
four women renders
them liable for
half the damage. The other half has
then to be borne
by the man in
case of a retractation on his part.
According, however,
to some authorities,
one must decide in this case as
in a matter of rela-
tionship by
fosterage, which can, strictly speaking,
be proved by four
women, fin
proceedings for the crime of fornication,
a retractation of
witnesses who have
merely established the status of mohsan
has no
consequence so far as they
are concerned ; and the same is the
case with
witnesses who retract their
statements in a matter of repudiation of
enfranchisement, in which they have
merely proved the modality or
suspensive
condition.
كتاب الدَعْوَى وَالْبَيِّنَاتُ
BOOK . — PROCEDURE
تُشْتَرَطُ الدَّعْوَى عِنْدَ قَاضٍ فِي عُقُوبَةٍ كَقِصَاصٍ وَقَذْفٍ.
وَإِنْ
اسْتَحَقَّ عَيْنًا فَلَهُ أَخْذُهَا إنْ لَمْ يَخَفْ فِتْنَةً وَإِلَّا وَجَبَ
الرَّفْعُ إلَى قَاضٍ، أَوْ دَيْنًا عَلَى غَيْرِ مُمْتَنِعٍ مِنْ الْأَدَاءِ
طَالَبَهُ بِهِ، وَلَا يَحِلُّ أَخْذُ شَيْءٍ لَهُ، أَوْ عَلَى مُنْكِرٍ وَلَا
بَيِّنَةَ لَهُ أَخَذَ جِنْسَ حَقِّهِ مِنْ مَالِهِ وَكَذَا غَيْرُ جِنْسِهِ إنْ
فَقَدَهُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، أَوْ عَلَى مُقِرٍّ مُمْتَنِعٍ، أَوْ مُنْكِرٍ
وَلَهُ بَيِّنَةٌ فَكَذَلِكَ.
وَقِيلَ يَجِبُ الرَّفْعُ إلَى قَاضٍ،
وَإِذَا جَازَ الْأَخْذُ فَلَهُ كَسْرُ باب وَنَقْبُ جِدَارٍ لَا يَصِلُ الْمَالَ
إلَّا بِهِ، ثُمَّ الْمَأْخُوذُ مِنْ جِنْسِهِ يَتَمَلَّكُهُ وَمِنْ غَيْرِهِ
يَبِيعُهُ، وَقِيلَ يَجِبُ رَفْعُهُ إلَى قَاضٍ يَبِيعُهُ وَالْمَأْخُوذُ
مَضْمُونٌ عَلَيْهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ فَيَضْمَنُهُ إنْ تَلِفَ قَبْلَ تَمَلُّكِهِ
وَبَيْعِهِ، وَلَا يَأْخُذُ فَوْقَ حَقِّهِ إنْ أَمْكَنَهُ الِاقْتِصَارُ.
وَلَهُ
أَخْذُ مَالِ غَرِيمِ غَرِيمِهِ، وَالْأَظْهَرُ أَنَّ الْمُدَّعِيَ مَنْ
يُخَالِفُ قَوْلُهُ الظَّاهِرَ، وَالْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ مَنْ يُوَافِقُهُ،
فَإِذَا أَسْلَمَ زَوْجَانِ قَبْلَ وَطْءٍ فَقَالَ أَسْلَمْنَا مَعًا
فَالنِّكَاحُ بَاقٍ، وَقَالَتْ مُرَتَّبًا فَهُوَ مُدَّعٍ.
وَمَتَى
ادَّعَى نَقْدًا اُشْتُرِطَ بَيَانُ جِنْسٍ وَنَوْعٍ وَقَدْرٍ وَصِحَّةٌ
وَتَكَسُّرٌ إنْ اخْتَلَفَتْ بِهِمَا قِيمَةٌ، أَوْ عَيْنًا تَنْضَبِطُ
كَحَيَوَانٍ وَصَفَهَا بِصِفَةِ السَّلَمِ.
وَقِيلَ: يَجِبُ
مَعَهَا ذِكْرُ الْقِيمَةَ، فَإِنْ تَلِفَتْ وَهِيَ مُتَقَوِّمَةٌ وَجَبَ ذِكْرُ
الْقِيمَةِ.
أَوْ نِكَاحًا لَمْ يَكْفِ الْإِطْلَاقُ عَلَى
الْأَصَحِّ، بَلْ يَقُولُ نَكَحْتُهَا بِوَلِيٍّ مُرْشِدٍ، وَشَاهِدَيْ عَدْلٍ
وَرِضَاهَا إنْ كَانَ يُشْتَرَطُ.
فَإِنْ كَانَتْ أَمَةً
فَالْأَصَحُّ وُجُوبُ ذِكْرِ الْعَجْزِ عَنْ طَوْلٍ وَخَوْفِ عَنَتٍ، أَوْ
عَقْدًا مَالِيًّا كَبَيْعٍ وَهِبَةٍ كَفَى الْإِطْلَاقُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَمَنْ
قَامَتْ عَلَيْهِ بَيِّنَةٌ فَلَيْسَ لَهُ تَحْلِيفُ الْمُدَّعِي، فَإِنْ ادَّعَى
أَدَاءً أَوْ إبْرَاءً أَوْ شِرَاءَ عَيْنٍ أَوْ هِبَتَهَا وَإِقْبَاضَهَا
حَلَّفَهُ عَلَى نَفْيِهِ.
وَكَذَا لَوْ ادَّعَى عِلْمَهُ بِفِسْقِ
شَاهِدِهِ أَوْ كَذِبَهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِذَا اسْتَمْهَلَ
لِيَأْتِيَ بِدَافِعٍ أُمْهِلَ ثَلَاثَةَ أَيَّامٍ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَى
رِقَّ بَالِغٍ فَقَالَ: أَنَا حُرٌّ فَالْقَوْلُ قَوْلُهُ، أَوْ رِقَّ صَغِيرٍ
لَيْسَ فِي يَدِهِ لَمْ يُقْبَلْ إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ، أَوْ فِي يَدِهِ حُكِمَ لَهُ
بِهِ إنْ لَمْ يَعْرِفْ اسْتِنَادَهَا إلَى الْتِقَاطٍ.
فَلَوْ
أَنْكَرَ الصَّغِيرُ وَهُوَ مُمَيِّزٌ فَإِنْكَارُهُ لَغْوٌ، وَقِيلَ
كَبَالِغٍ.
وَلَا تُسْمَعُ دَعْوَى دَيْنٍ مُؤَجَّلٍ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
BOOK . — PROCEDURE
Section
In
a criminal matter, even a case under the
law of talion, or the case of
a
penalty for defamation, no one may
exercise his right to carry out the
law against the guilty party until
he has obtained against him a judgment
delivered by the court. But when
it is the case of a real right,
sucli as
the ownership of some
particular object, one may of one’s
own accord
seize the object in
question, without having recourse to the
court, unless
one fears thereby to
commit some injustice. Where it is
the matter of
a debt due from some
one who does not refuse to pay,
one must confine
oneself to asking
for payment, and never seize the
debtor’s goods of one’s
own accord ;
but one may seize objects of the
same kind as those that
are due,
if the debtor denies his obligation,
and one is unable to prove
its
existence. This seizure may, if necessary,
according to our school,
be extended
to things of a different nature from
those due, where the
debtor has no
things of a similar kind. One may
act in the same way
towards a debtor
who admits his obligation but refuses
to pay, and
against one who denies
the debt which the creditor is able
to prove.
But in this case some
authors require a previous recourse to the
decision
of the court.
A person who
may legally seize something of his
own accord has the
right, if
necessary, to break a door, or pierce
through the walls of a shop
or house
where it is. If the objects thus
seized are of the same kind as
those due, the creditor becomes
their owner by the fact of the
seizure ;
otherwise he must put them
up to auction, and repay himself out
of the
amount so realised. Some
jurists maintain that this sale can
only take
place after a new authorisation
by the court, f Things seized are at
the
risk and peril of the person
seizing them ; that is to say that
he is
responsible for their loss,
even if accidental, before he becomes
their
owner, or before the sale, as
the case may be. The person seizing
them
should not seize more than is
necessary for recovering his debt, except
where the nature of the things
seized does not permit this to be
limited
exactly to the amount due.
Finally the law recognises the legality
of a
seizure of things in the
possession of the debtor’s debtor.
*By “ plaintiff” is understood that party
who maintains that the
ordinary appearanco
of things is not the truth ; and
by “ defendant ” is
understood the party
that maintains the contrary. Thus where
husband
and wife embrace Islam before
cohabitation, and the husband maintains
that tho two conversions took place
together, and that therefore the
marriage
remains valid, while the woman maintains
that the one con-
version preceded the
other, it is the husband who is
the plaintiff, and
the burden of
proof is upon him. The claim should
be precise ; thus,
in the matter of
a sum of money, the nature and
coinage of the pieces
should be
mentioned, their amount and whether they
were intact or not,
where these
details have any bearing upon the
value. In the case of
some
particular object that may be sufficiently
well described by its
qualities, e.g.
an animal, a description of it must
be given, as in a contract
of salam ;
and according to some jurists the
price must also be
mentioned. And
this is without doubt rigorously necessary
where the
claim is for damages for
the loss of something not capable of
measure-
ment. Where the plaintiff maintains
the existence of a marriage, fit
is
not enough to mention this engagement
and nothing more, but he
should say,
“ I married such-and-such a woman ; she was
given me by
a guardian capable of so
doing, before two witnesses of irreproachable
character.” It is even necessary to
add that it was with the full
consent
of tho woman in question, if
the law requires her consent for the
validity
of the marriage, f Where the
wife is a slave the husband should add
that he took the woman because
he had not the means of paying the
dower of a free woman, and that
he was afraid of his misconduct if
he
remained celibate, fit is only
when one maintains the existence of a con-
tract having merely pecuniary consequences,
such as a sale, a lease, or
a gift,
that it is enough to mention it,
without entering into fuller details
as
to the formalities or the cause.
A
party against whom a fact has been
proved has no right to have
the
supplementary oath administered again to
the plaintiff ; unless he
opposes to it a
rebuttal such as payment, return,
purchase, gift followed
by a taking of
possession, etc., for then the defendant
may demand from
the plaintiff his
oath that the rebutting circumstance is
unfounded,
f And it is the same
where the defendant alleges that the
plaintiff knew
of the notorious misconduct
or the want of veracity of his
own witnesses.
Where the defendant asks
for a postponement to produce proof of the
contrary, he must be allowed three
days.
When the plaintiff maintains
in court that a certain adult individual
is a slave, and the latter alleges
that he is free, this latter
assertion is
presumed to be true ;
but a claim of this nature brought
against a minor
not in one’s power
is inadmissible, even with the consent
of the minor in
question. In this
case the plaintiff must always prove
his allegation.
But in the case of a
minor already in one’s power a simple
declaration
that this possession is due
to a right of ownership is enough
for the child
to be adjudged to
one, unless the court is certainly
aware that the
possession of the
child is due to having found it.
In all these cases a
contrary
affirmation upon the part of the
minor is of no effect, even
though
he may have already attained the ago
of discernment ; some
authorities, however,
consider a minor who has attained the
age of dis-
cernment as subject to
the same rules as an adult.
fThe payment of a debt not yet
due can never be claimed in a court
of law.
فَصْلٌ [فيما يتعلق بجواب المدعى عليه]
أَصَرَّ الْمُدَّعَى
عَلَيْهِ عَلَى السُّكُوتِ عَنْ جَوَابِ الدَّعْوَى جُعِلَ كَمُنْكِرٍ نَاكِلٍ،
فَإِنْ ادَّعَى عَشَرَةً فَقَالَ لَا تَلْزَمُنِي الْعَشَرَةُ وَلَمْ يَكْفِ
حَتَّى يَقُولَ وَلَا بَعْضُهَا، وَكَذَا يَحْلِفُ، فَإِنْ حَلَفَ عَلَى نَفْيِ
الْعَشَرَةِ وَاقْتَصَرَ عَلَيْهِ فَنَاكِلٌ فَيَحْلِفُ الْمُدَّعِي عَلَى
اسْتِحْقَاقِ دُونَ الْعَشَرَةِ بِجُزْءٍ وَيَأْخُذُهُ.
وَإِذَا
ادَّعَى مَالاً مُضَافًا إلَى سَبَبٍ كَأَقْرَضْتكَ كَذَا كَفَاهُ فِي الْجَوَابِ
لَا تَسْتَحِقُّ عَلَيَّ شَيْئًا، أَوْ شُفْعَةً كَفَاهُ لَا تَسْتَحِقُّ عَلَيَّ
شَيْئًا، أَوْ لَا تَسْتَحِقُّ تَسْلِيمَ الشِّقْصِ.
وَيَحْلِفُ
عَلَى حَسَبِ جَوَابِهِ هَذَا، فَإِنْ أَجَابَ بِنَفْيِ السَّبَبِ الْمَذْكُورِ
حَلَفَ عَلَيْهِ، وَقِيلَ لَهُ الْحَلِفُ بِالنَّفْيِ الْمُطْلَقِ.
وَلَوْ
كَانَ بِيَدِهِ مَرْهُونٌ أَوْ مُكْرًى وَادَّعَاهُ مَالِكُهُ كَفَاهُ لَا
يَلْزَمُنِي تَسْلِيمُهُ، فَلَوْ اعْتَرَفَ بِالْمِلْكِ وَادَّعَى الرَّهْنَ
وَالْإِجَارَةَ فَالصَّحِيحُ أَنَّهُ لَا يُقْبَلُ إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ، فَإِنْ
عَجَزَ عَنْهَا وَخَافَ أَوَّلاً إنْ اعْتَرَفَ بِالْمِلْكِ جَحْدَهُ الرَّهْنَ
وَالْإِجَارَةَ فَحِيلَتُهُ أَنْ يَقُولَ: إِن ادَّعَيْت مِلْكًا مُطْلَقًا
فَلَا يَلْزَمُنِي تَسْلِيمٌ، وَإِنْ ادَّعَيْتَ مَرْهُونًا فَاذْكُرْهُ
لِأُجِيبَ.
وَإِذَا ادَّعَى عَلَيْهِ عَيْنًا فَقَالَ: لَيْسَ
هِيَ لِي، أَوْ هِيَ لِرَجُلٍ لَا أَعْرِفُهُ، أَوْ هِيَ لِابْنِي الطِّفْلِ،
أَوْ وَقْفٌ عَلَى الْفُقَرَاءِ، أَوْ مَسْجِدِ كَذَا، فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ لَا
تَنْصَرِفُ الْخُصُومَةُ وَلَا تُنْزَعُ مِنْهُ بَلْ يُحَلِّفُهُ الْمُدَّعِي
أَنَّهُ لَا يَلْزَمُهُ التَّسْلِيمُ إنْ لَمْ تَكُنْ بَيِّنَةٌ.
وَإِنْ
أَقَرَّ بِهِ لِمُعَيَّنٍ حَاضِرٍ يُمْكِنُ مُخَاصَمَتُهُ وَتَحْلِيفُهُ سُئِلَ،
فَإِنْ صَدَّقَهُ صَارَتْ الْخُصُومَةُ مَعَهُ، وَإِنْ كَذَّبَهُ تُرِكَ فِي يَدِ
الْمُقِرِّ، وَقِيلَ: تُسَلَّمُ إلَى يَدِ الْمُدَّعِي، وَقِيلَ يَحْفَظُهُ
الْحَاكِمُ لِظُهُورِ مَالِكٍ.
وَإِنْ أَقَرَّ بِهِ لِغَائِبٍ
فَالْأَصَحُّ انْصِرَافُ الْخُصُومَةِ عَنْهُ، وَيُوقَفُ الْأَمْرُ حَتَّى
يَقْدَمَ الْغَائِبُ فَإِنْ كَانَ لِلْمُدَّعِي بَيِّنَةٌ قَضَى بِهَا، وَهُوَ
قَضَاءٌ عَلَى الْغَائِبِ، فَيَحْلِفُ مَعَهَا، وَقِيلَ عَلَى حَاضِرٍ.
وَمَا
قُبِلَ إقْرَارُ عَبْدٍ بِهِ كَعُقُوبَةٍ فَالدَّعْوَى عَلَيْهِ وَعَلَيْهِ
الْجَوَابُ، وَمَا لَا كَأَرْشٍ فَعَلَى السَّيِّدِ.
Section
A defendant who refuses
to say anything at the hearing
should be
treated as being contumacious ;
but his silence cannot be considered as
an admission. Where the claim, for
example, is for ten pieces of money,
the defendant cannot even limit
himself to declaring that he does not
owe this amount ; he must also
add that he does not owe any
portion of
it before it is possible,
in default of proof, to have an
oath administered
to him in order to
confirm the presumption that exists in
favour of
every one who denies owing
anything. Where, then, the defendant is
only willing to swear that he
does not owe the amount claimed, instead
of swearing that he owes nothing
at all, he must be treated as con-
tumacious, and the plaintiff may swear
that the defendant owes him
any sum
not exceeding the ten pieces originally
claimed, and proceed
to the seizure
of the amount definitely adjudged. Where
the claim of
a sum of money is
accompanied by the reason, for example,
where the
plaintiff alleges that
such-and-such a sum was lent to the
defendant,
it is enough for the
latter to reply that “ the plaintiff
has no claim against
me,” without
its being necessary for him to deny
the loan in so many
words. Thus
one may oppose to a claim of
pre-emption the simple
statement that “
the plaintiff has no claim against
me,” or “ the plaintiff
cannot insist
upon delivery of the share in the
immovable property in
question.” In this
case the defendant need only swear
to the truth of
his statement ; but
if he has also formally denied the
claim, he should
also, upon the
order of the court, confirm his
denial of it by an oath.
According
to some authorities, however, it is
enough, even in this case,
to
confirm upon oath a general denial.
The person who has actual
possession of something that has been
engaged or hired by him, may
reply to the owner, “ that he is
not obliged
to return it to him,”
and nothing more ; ffbut if he
admits the owner-
ship alleged by his
adversary, and bases his refusal to
surrender the
object upon the terms
of the contract of pledge or lease,
this defence
throws upon him, in
case it is denied, the burden of
proving the
existence of this contract.
Where, in these circumstances, the defendant
is unable to prove the contract,
and is afraid that if he admits
the owner-
ship at the beginning, the
plaintiff will not admit on his part
the pledging
or the hiring, he may
oppose to the claim the following
reply ; — “ If
you claim the thing
simply because you are its owner, I
have no need to
return it to
you ; but if you claim it as a
pledge or a thing hired, then
say
so, in order that I may make my
reply to that.” j* Where the plaintiff
claims some particular object, and
the defendant replies that he cannot
return it, “ because he is not
the owner,” or “ because the thing belongs
to a third party whom he does
not know,” or “ because the object
belongs to his son who is a
minor,” or “ because it is a capital
invested
for the profit ” either “ of
the poor,” or “ of such-and-such a mosque,”
the defendant is not thereby
dismissed. But the plaintiff cannot
proceed immediately to seize the
object in dispute, until he has proved
his case, or, in default of
proof, had an oath administered to the
defendant, to the effect “ that ho
is not obliged to return him the
thing
in dispute.” Where, on the
other hand, the defendant declares that
the
object belongs to such-and-such a
third party, and this person can be
summoned to appear in court, so
that the proceedings may be begun again
against him, and an oath if
necessary administered to him, that person
should be summoned. Where he admits
the truth of the assertion of
the
original defendant, he alone should be
proceeded against ; but if
he denies it,
the proceedings should be continued
against the original
defendant. And until
the court delivers judgment, the original
defen-
dant should remain in possession of
the object claimed, in spite of his
admission that in any case the
thing is not his. According to some
jurists, however, the thing should
in this case be given provisionally to
the plaintiff, while others require
the court to order its sequestration
until the rightful owner be known,
j* Where the defendant admits that
the
object belongs to a third party who
cannot be summoned by reason
of
absence, the proceedings must be adjourned
until the return of that
person,
unless the plaintiff can prove the
truth of his case and tako the
oath required by the law in
cases of default. According to some
authorities there is no default in
the case mentioned, and consequently
the
supplementary oath is not to be
administered.
In a criminal matter the
confession of a slave is admissible. The
case should be brought against the
guilty slave personally, and it is he
who should plead ; but in a claim
for damages, i.e. a case in which the
admission of a slave is not binding,
proceedings should be taken against
his
master, even though arising out of
an act of the slave.
فَصْلٌ [في كيفية الحلف والتغليظ فيه]
تُغَلَّظُ يَمِينُ مُدَّعٍ
وَمُدَّعًى عَلَيْهِ فِيمَا لَيْسَ بِمَالٍ، وَلَا يُقْصَدُ بِهِ مَالٌ، وَفِي
مَالٍ يَبْلُغُ نِصَابَ زَكَاةٍ، وَسَبَقَ بَيَانُ التَّغْلِيظِ فِي
اللِّعَانِ.
وَيَحْلِفُ عَلَى الْبَتِّ فِي فِعْلِهِ، وَكَذَا
فِعْلُ غَيْرِهِ إنْ كَانَ إثْبَاتًا، وَإِنْ كَانَ نَفْيًا فَعَلَى نَفْيِ
الْعِلْمِ، وَلَوْ ادَّعَى دَيْنًا لِمُوَرِّثِهِ فَقَالَ أَبْرَأَنِي حَلَفَ
عَلَى نَفْيِ الْعِلْمِ بِالْبَرَاءَةِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ جَنَى عَبْدُك عَلَيَّ
بِمَا يُوجِبُ كَذَا فَالْأَصَحُّ حَلِفُهُ عَلَى الْبَتِّ.
قُلْتُ:
وَلَوْ قَالَ جَنَتْ بَهِيمَتُك حَلَفَ عَلَى الْبَتِّ قَطْعًا، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ، وَيَجُوزُ الْبَتُّ بِظَنٍّ مُؤَكَّدٍ يَعْتَمِدُ خَطَّهُ أَوْ خَطَّ
أَبِيهِ.
وَتُعْتَبَرُ نِيَّةُ الْقَاضِي الْمُسْتَحْلِفِ، فَلَوْ
وَرَّى أَوْ تَأَوَّلَ خِلَافَهَا أَوْ اسْتَثْنَى بِحَيْثُ لَا يَسْمَعُ
الْقَاضِي لَمْ يَدْفَعْ إثْمَ الْيَمِينِ الْفَاجِرَةِ.
وَمَنْ
تَوَجَّهَتْ عَلَيْهِ يَمِينٌ لَوْ أَقَرَّ بِمَطْلُوبِهَا لَزِمَهُ فَأَنْكَرَ
حُلِّفَ، وَلَا يُحَلَّفُ قَاضٍ عَلَى تَرْكِهِ الظُّلْمَ، وَلَا شَاهِدٌ أَنَّهُ
لَمْ يَكْذِبْ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ مُدَّعًى عَلَيْهِ: أَنَا صَبِيٌّ
لَمْ يُحَلَّفْ وَوُقِفَ حَتَّى يَبْلُغَ.
وَالْيَمِينُ تُفِيدُ
قَطْعَ الْخُصُومَةِ فِي الْحَالِ لَا بَرَاءَةً، فَلَوْ حَلَّفَهُ ثُمَّ أَقَامَ
بَيِّنَةً حَكَمَ بِهَا.
وَلَوْ قَالَ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ: قَدْ
حَلَّفَنِي مَرَّةً فَلْيَحْلِفْ أَنَّهُ لَمْ يُحَلِّفْنِي مُكِّنَ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَإِذَا نَكَلَ حَلَفَ الْمُدَّعِي وَقَضَى لَهُ وَلَا
يَقْضِي بِنُكُولِهِ، وَالنُّكُولُ أَنْ يَقُولَ: أَنَا نَاكِلٌ أَوْ يَقُولَ
لَهُ الْقَاضِي احْلِفْ فَيَقُولُ لَا أَحْلِفُ، فَإِنْ سَكَتَ حَكَمَ الْقَاضِي
بِنُكُولِهِ، وَقَوْلُهُ لِلْمُدَّعِي احْلِفْ حُكِمَ بِنُكُولِهِ.
وَالْيَمِينُ
الْمَرْدُودَةُ فِي قَوْلٍ كَبَيِّنَةٍ، وَفِي الْأَظْهَرِ كَإِقْرَارِ
الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ، فَلَوْ أَقَامَ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ بَعْدَهَا بَيِّنَةً
بِأَدَاءٍ أَوْ إبْرَاءٍ لَمْ تُسْمَعْ.
فَإِنْ لَمْ يَحْلِفْ
الْمُدَّعِي وَلَمْ يَتَعَلَّلْ بِشَيْءٍ سَقَطَ حَقُّهُ مِنْ الْيَمِينِ
وَلَيْسَ لَهُ مُطَالَبَةُ خَصْمِهِ، وَإِنْ تَعَلَّلَ بِإِقَامَةِ بَيِّنَةٍ
أَوْ مُرَاجَعَةِ حِسَابٍ أُمْهِلَ ثَلَاثَةَ أَيَّامٍ.
وَقِيلَ
أَبَدًا، وَإِنْ اُسْتُمْهِلَ الْمُدَّعَى عَلَيْهِ حِينَ اُسْتُحْلِفَ
لِيَنْظُرَ حِسَابَهُ لَمْ يُمْهَلْ.
وَقِيلَ ثَلَاثَةً، وَلَوْ
اُسْتُمْهِلَ فِي ابْتِدَاءِ الْجَوَابِ أُمْهِلَ إلَى آخِرِ الْمَجْلِسِ.
وَمَنْ
طُولِبَ بِزَكَاةٍ فَادَّعَى دَفْعَهَا إلَى سَاعٍ آخَرَ أَوْ ادَّعَى غَلَطَ
خَارِصٍ وَأَلْزَمْنَاهُ الْيَمِينَ فَنَكَلَ وَتَعَذَّرَ رَدُّ الْيَمِينِ
فَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهَا تُؤْخَذُ مِنْهُ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَى وَلِيُّ
صَبِيٍّ دَيْنًا لَهُ فَأَنْكَرَ وَنَكَلَ لَمْ يُحَلَّفْ الْوَلِيُّ.
وَقِيلَ:
يُحَلِّفُ.
وَقِيلَ: إنْ ادَّعَى مُبَاشَرَةَ سَبَبِهِ
حُلِّفَ.
Section
A judicial oath, whether
of a plaintiff or of a defendant, should
be
rendered moro solemn by repetition
in all cases where the proceedings
do not relate exclusively to some
real property claim, or to some
pecuniary obligation. This aggravation is
even obligatory in proceed-
ings about
some merely pecuniary claim, where the
amount in dispute
reaches the minimum
subject to the charity tax. We have
already
explained, when speaking of
imprecation, what an aggravation of the
oath implies.
The oath should
contain a pertinent declaration as to the
fact attested,
where this is to the
personal knowledge of the party, and
even when the
act has been done
by some one else, if one affirms
its existence ; but
where one denies a
fact alleged to have been done by
another, it is
enough to declare
that one knows nothing of it. Thus,
where one has
summoned the debtor of
a person of whom one is the heir,
and the
debtor pleads a remission of
the debt by the deceased, it is
enough to
declare upon oath that one
knows nothing of this remission, j* On the
other hand, where, for example, one
maintains that the slave of the
adverse party has committed a crime
by which damage has been caused
one,
the master should, if the fact is
denied, swear positively that the
slave
did not commit the alleged crime, if
it is to his personal knowledge.
[Even where the damage is alleged
to have been caused by an animal,
the responsible owner should, if he
can, affirm upon oath that the
animal has not caused the damage
of which the plaintiff complains.]
One may take an affirmative
oath, not only where one has personally
examined or observed the thing in
dispute, but also where one believes
firmly in the authenticity of some
fact upon the faith of one’s own
writing or that of one’s father.
The full bearing of a judicial
oath depends upon the intention of the
judge, and not upon that of
the individual who takes it. Consequently,
neither a mental reservation, nor an
interpretation contrary to the
meaning of
the words, nor a reservation made in
an undertone which
the judge cannot
hear, can free the witness from
having committed the
sin of perjury.
A person who admits the claim
against him should be ordered to fulfil
the resulting obligation ; but one
who denies should confirm his denial
upon oath, if the plaintiff is
unable to prove his case. A judge,
however,
who has been called to
account, can never be called upon to
swear “ that
he has not delivered
judgment in bad faith ” ; nor can a
witness be made
to swear “ that his
deposition is in conformity with the
truth ; ” as the
refusal to take
such an oath would be the
self-accusation of the person
in question.
Where the defendant alleges “ that he
has not yet attained
his majority,
this assertion is presumed to be
true, without his being
obliged to
confirm it upon oath ; and this
simple declaration is enough
to adjourn
the proceedings until he has come of
age. Moreover, an oath
taken by the
defendant, in default of proof on
the part of the plaintiff,
results
only in a lapse of the proceedings,
not in destroying the plaintiff’s
right.
Consequently the latter, after losing his
case in this way, can
begin it
again, if he can prove in court
the truth of the facts upon which
his claim is founded. fWhere,
however, the plaintiff begins his case
again, without being able to prove
his facts otherwise than by having
an oath administered to the
defendant, the latter may plead the
previous
judgment, and the fact that
the oath has been already administered to
him. If the plaintiff denies this
previous decision, the defendant may
insist upon his confirming this
denial by an oath, before taking new
proceedings. Where in these circumstances
the defendant, instead of
refusing,
proposes that the oath offered him
in default of plaintiff’s proof,
should
be administered to the plaintiff instead,
the latter may still
affirm upon
oath that his case is well founded,
and win it, without,
however, the
defendant being thereby considered to be
contumacious.
For one is only contumacious
where one declares formally, “ I refuse to
obey the order of the court to
take an oath,” or where one replies
to the
order of the court by
saying, “ I will not swear.” Then one
is con-
tumacious by the mere fact
of uttering these words ; but if the
defen-
dant, when ordered by the court
to swear, merely keeps an obstinate
silence, he is not ipso facto
contumacious. But the court may declare
him to be contumacious ; even implicitly,
by administering an oath
to the plaintiff.
An oath, whether administered to
the plaintiff at the instance of the
defendant, or by the judge in
case of the plaintiff’s contumacy, has the
same effect, according to one
jurist, as if the claim were proved
; *but
according to most authorities this
oath is equivalent to the admission of
the defendant. It results from this
latter doctrine that the defendant
is
estopped from subsequently proving a previous
extinction of the debt
by payment or
remission. A plaintiff who declines to
take the oath
so offered to him
loses his right to take it
afterwards, and cannot in any
case
begin the proceedings again, even though
he may be able to furnish
the
necessary proof. Where, on the contrary,
he declines the oath
because he
prefers to prove his claim, or
because he wishes first to verify
his accounts, he must be given a
respite of three days ; and, according
to some authorities, the hearing
should even be suspended until he desires
that it should be resumed. If
it is the plaintiff who, before
deciding as
to the oath offered him,
asks for a respite in which to
verify his accounts,
his application
should be rejected ; though, according to
some jurists,
the court should allow
him also a delay of three days. The
application
for adjournment can only be
made by tho plaintiff before he has
entered
into the merits of the case,
and he cannot be allowed for this
purpose a
longer delay than to the
end of the hearing.
f A person asked
to pay in his share of the
charity tax cannot limit
his defence
to stating that he has paid it
to another collector, or that the
expert has made a mistake ; he must
also take an oath ; and if he
refuses
to do this he must be
sentenced to perform his duty again,
even where
it is impossible for him
to have an oath administered to the
plaintiff.
All this is, however, upon
condition that the oath of the
tax-payer is
required by law when he
acquits himself of his obligation in
ordinary
circumstances. A guardian who, on
the account of his pupil, claims in
court the payment of a debt, cannot
be obliged to take an oath, in case
of a denial of the claim and a
refusal to be sworn on the part
of the
defendant ; unless, according to
some authorities, the cause of the debt
is a fact within the personal
knowledge of the guardian.
فَصْلٌ [في تعارض البينتين]
ادَّعَيَا عَيْنًا فِي يَدٍ ثَالِثٍ
وَأَقَامَ كُلٌّ مِنْهُمَا بَيِّنَةً سَقَطَتَا.
وَفِي قَوْلٍ
تُسْتَعْمَلَانِ، فَفِي قَوْلٍ يُقْسَمُ، وَقَوْلٍ يُقْرَعُ، وَ قَوْلٍ تُوقَفُ
حَتَّى يَبِينَ أَوْ يَصْطَلِحَا، وَلَوْ كَانَتْ فِي يَدِهِمَا وَأَقَامَا
بَيِّنَتَيْنِ بَقِيَتْ كَمَا كَانَتْ، وَلَوْ كَانَتْ بِيَدِهِ فَأَقَامَ
غَيْرُهُ بِهَا بَيِّنَةً وَهُوَ بَيِّنَةً قُدِّمَ صَاحِبُ الْيَدِ، وَلَا
تُسْمَعُ بَيِّنَتُهُ إلَّا بَعْدَ بَيِّنَةِ الْمُدَّعِي، وَلَوْ أُزِيلَتْ
يَدُهُ بِبَيِّنَةٍ ثُمَّ أَقَامَ بَيِّنَةً بِمِلْكِهِ مُسْتَنِدًا إلَى مَا
قَبْلَ إزَالَةِ يَدِهِ وَاعْتَذَرَ بِغَيْبَةِ شُهُودِهِ سُمِعَتْ وَقُدِّمَتْ،
وَقِيلَ: لَا وَلَوْ قَالَ الْخَارِجُ: هُوَ مِلْكِي اشْتَرَيْته مِنْك،
فَقَالَ بَلْ مِلْكِي وَأَقَامَا بَيِّنَتَيْنِ قُدِّمَ الْخَارِجُ.
وَمَنْ
أَقَرَّ لِغَيْرِهِ بِشَيْءٍ ثُمَّ ادَّعَاهُ لَمْ تُسْمَعْ إلَّا أَنْ يَذْكُرَ
انْتِقَالاً، وَمَنْ أُخِذَ مِنْهُ مَالٌ بِبَيِّنَةٍ ثُمَّ ادَّعَاهُ لَمْ
يُشْتَرَطْ ذِكْرُ الِانْتِقَالِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّ زِيَادَةَ
عَدَدِ شُهُودِ أَحَدِهِمَا لَا تُرَجِّحُ، وَكَذَا لَوْ كَانَ لِأَحَدِهِمَا
رَجُلَانِ وَلِلْآخَرِ رَجُلٌ وَامْرَأَتَانِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ لِلْآخَرِ شَاهِدٌ
وَيَمِينٌ رُجِّحَ الشَّاهِدَانِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ شَهِدَتْ
لِأَحَدِهِمَا بِمِلْكٍ مِنْ سَنَةٍ، وَلِلْآخَرِ مِنْ أَكْثَرَ، فَالْأَظْهَرُ
تَرْجِيحُ الْأَكْثَرِ، وَلِصَاحِبِهَا الْأُجْرَةُ وَالزِّيَادَةُ الْحَادِثَةُ
مِنْ يَوْمِئِذٍ.
وَلَوْ أَطْلَقَتْ بَيِّنَةٌ وَأَرَّخَتْ أُخْرَى
فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُمَا سَوَاءٌ، وَأَنَّهُ لَوْ كَانَ لِصَاحِبِ مُتَأَخِّرَةِ
التَّارِيخِ يَدٌ قُدِّمَ، وَ أَنَّهَا لَوْ شَهِدَتْ بِمِلْكِهِ أَمْسِ وَلَمْ
تَتَعَرَّضْ لِلْحَالِ لَمْ تُسْمَعْ حَتَّى يَقُولُوا وَلَمْ يَزُلْ مِلْكُهُ
أَوْ وَلَا نَعْلَمُ مُزِيلاً لَهُ.
وَتَجُوزُ الشَّهَادَةُ
بِمِلْكِهِ الْآنَ اسْتِصْحَابًا لِمَا سَبَقَ مِنْ إرْثٍ وَشِرَاءٍ
وَغَيْرِهِمَا.
وَلَوْ شَهِدَتْ بِإِقْرَارِهِ أَمْسِ بِالْمِلْكِ
لَهُ اُسْتُدِيمَ.
وَلَوْ أَقَامَهَا بِالْمِلْكِ دَابَّةً أَوْ
شَجَرَةً لَمْ يَسْتَحِقَّ ثَمَرَةً مَوْجُودَةً، وَلَا وَلَدًا مُنْفَصِلاً
وَيَسْتَحِقُّ حَمْلاً فِي الْأَصَحِّ وَلَوْ اشْتَرَى شَيْئًا فَأَخَذَ مِنْهُ
بِحُجَّةٍ مُطْلَقَةٍ رَجَعَ عَلَى بَائِعِهِ بِالثَّمَنِ، وَقِيلَ لَا إلَّا
إذَا اُدُّعِيَ فِي مِلْكٍ سَابِقٍ عَلَى الشِّرَاءِ.
وَلَوْ
ادَّعَى مِلْكًا مُطْلَقًا فَشَهِدُوا لَهُ مَعَ سَبَبِهِ لَمْ يَضُرَّ، وَإِنْ
ذَكَرَ سَبَبًا، وَهُمْ سَبَبًا آخَرَ ضَرَّ.
Section
Where two persons
claim a certain particular object in the
possession
of a third party, and both
are in a position to prove their
statements, the
two claims mutually annul
one another. However, according to one
jurist, the usufruct of the thing
in dispute should in this case be
adjudged
to the two claimants jointly ;
according to another, the object should
be divided between them ; according
to a third, recourse should be had
to casting lots ; while a fourth is
of opinion that the thing should be
sequestrated, until the truth of the
matter is manifested, or the interested
parties have come to a settlement.
In a case where two persons have
undivided possession of something of
which both can prove exclusive
ownership,
nothing is changed in the mutual
relation of the parties with
regard
to the object in question. Where,
however, a third party claims
an object
and proves his right of ownership,
while the actual possessor
does the
same, the latter has a presumption in
his favour. A possessor’s
claim to prove
his right of ownership is inadmissible,
unless a case is
brought against him.
Where one has been obliged to
give up a thing in one’s possession in
consequence of a legally proved claim,
to which one was able to oppose
a
more denial, in consequence, e.g., of
the absence of witnesses, one may
still take proceedings to prove that
one is the rightful owner, and, in
consequence, the legitimate possessor. And
in these circumstances, the
fact of
the possession one has lost constitutes a
presumption in one’s
favour. This rule,
however, has been denied by some
authorities.
Where the plaintiff claims a
thing, and alleges that he has become
the owner of it because the
defendant has sold it to him, and
the latter
merely opposes to this
claim his right of ownership, without
denying
the transfer asserted by the
plaintiff, the fact that the defendant is
actually in possession of the thing
in dispute gives rise to no presumption
in his favour, where both parties
produce evidence in support of their
case. A person who admits that a
certain thing belongs to so-and-so
cannot
afterwards claim that thing except by
virtue of a subsequent
transfer ; fbut
such a transfer need not be alleged
by a person who,
after surrendering his
property in consequence of a claim brought
and
legally proved against him,
subsequently obtains the required proof to
show that he is the rightful
owner. Should he then come and claim
the
object, his claim is still
admissible, as we have just seen.
Where two
parties both produce evidence
in support of their assertions, our school
allows no preponderance to the party
that happens to have the greater
number of witnesses ; nor to one
who has two male witnesses, while
the other has one male and two
female. *But where one of the parties
can produce two male witnesses, and
the other only one whose deposition
is confirmed by a supplementary oath,
the preponderance is, by an ex-
ception,
accorded to the former, though strictly
speaking, one witness
and the oath
would be enough to prove the fact.
*In a case where one
of the parties
can prove he has been owner for a
longer period, he wins
his case ;
and he may claim from the third
party actually in possession
the rent
and profits since that time. According
to our school, however,
such a
preponderance cannot be accorded to a
party who proves that he
has been
owner from a definite date, over one
that proves he has been
owner,
without mentioning any date. But our
school maintains a pre-
sumption in favour
of the possessor in all cases where
he can prove a
right of more
recent date than the right of the
adverse party. Our
school does not
admit as sufficient proof of actual
ownership a deposition
that “ yesterday
so-and-so was still owner,” without adding
who the
present owner is, unless the
witnesses declare that the person in
question
has not lost the ownership
since the date mentioned, or, at
least, that
they are not aware of
anything likely to cause such loss.
The witnesses
may even in this way
prove that so-and-so is the actual
owner, where
they know that the
ownership has been acquired by him
by way of suc-
cession, purchase, etc.,
and aro not aware of any subsequent
transfer.
An admission that the plaintiff
is owner, made just before by the
de-
fendant, and duly established at the
hearing, is presumed to apply still
to the actual ownership.
From the fact that one Is the
rlglitiul owner of an animal or of a
tree
it does not follow that one
is also the owner of the fruit
actually upon the
tree, or of the
young of the animal ; fbnt the foetus
belongs in all cases
to the owner
of the mother by right of accession.
The purchaser of an object
seized in consequence of a claim, even
though the latter be indefinite as
regards the date of the claimant’s
ownership, has a remedy against the
vendor for the amount of the price
he has paid ; though, according to
some authorities, such recovery is
admissible only where the claimant’s
title is prior to the purchase. The
testimony is not invalidated because
tho plaintiff alleges his right of
ownership without mentioning the transfer
of title, while the witnesses
add by
what title he obtained the object ; but
where the claimant
alleges some particular
title, and the witnesses another, their
deposition
is of no value.
فصل [في اختلاف المتداعيين في العقود]
قَالَ آجَرْتُك هَذَا
الْبَيْتَ بِعَشْرَةٍ، فَقَالَ بَلْ جَمِيعَ الدَّارِ بِالْعَشَرَةِ وَأَقَامَا
بَيِّنَتَيْنِ تَعَارَضَتَا، وَفِي قَوْلٍ تُقَدَّمُ بَيِّنَةُ
الْمُسْتَأْجِرِ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَيَا شَيْئًا فِي يَدِ ثَالِثٍ
وَأَقَامَ كُلٌّ مِنْهُمَا بَيِّنَةً أَنَّهُ اشْتَرَاهُ وَوَزَنَ لَهُ ثَمَنَهُ
فَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَ تَارِيخٌ حُكِمَ لِلْأَسْبَقِ، وَإِلَّا تَعَارَضَتَا.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ كُلٌّ مِنْهُمَا بِعْتُكَهُ بِكَذَا وَأَقَامَاهُمَا، فَإِنْ اتَّحَدَ
تَارِيخُهُمَا تَعَارَضَتَا، وَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَ لَزِمَهُ الثَّمَنَانِ وَكَذَا إنْ
أَطْلَقَتَا أَوْ إحْدَاهُمَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ مَاتَ عَنْ
ابْنَيْنِ مُسْلِمٍ وَنَصْرَانِيٍّ فَقَالَ كُلٌّ مِنْهُمَا: مَاتَ عَلَى
دِينِي، فَإِنْ عُرِفَ أَنَّهُ كَانَ نَصْرَانِيًّا صُدِّقَ النَّصْرَانِيُّ،
فَإِنْ أَقَامَا بَيِّنَتَيْنِ مُطْلَقَتَيْنِ قُدِّمَ الْمُسْلِمُ، وَإِنْ
قَيَّدَتْ أَنَّ آخِرَ كَلَامِهِ إسْلَامٌ وَعَكَسَتْهُ الْأُخْرَى تَعَارَضَتَا،
وَإِنْ لَمْ يُعْرَفْ دِينُهُ وَأَقَامَ كُلٌّ بَيِّنَةً أَنَّهُ مَاتَ عَلَى
دِينِهِ تَعَارَضَتَا.
وَلَوْ مَاتَ نَصْرَانِيٌّ عَنْ ابْنَيْنِ
مُسْلِمٍ وَنَصْرَانِيٍّ فَقَالَ الْمُسْلِمُ أَسْلَمْت بَعْدَ مَوْتِهِ
فَالْمِيرَاثُ بَيْنَنَا، فَقَالَ النَّصْرَانِيُّ: بَلْ قَبْلَهُ صُدِّقَ
الْمُسْلِمُ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَإِنْ أَقَامَاهُمَا قُدِّمَ النَّصْرَانِيُّ.
فَلَوْ
اتَّفَقَا عَلَى إسْلَامِ الِابْنِ فِي رَمَضَانَ، وَقَالَ الْمُسْلِمُ مَاتَ
الْأَبُ فِي شَعْبَانَ، وَقَالَ النَّصْرَانِيُّ فِي شَوَّالٍ صُدِّقَ
النَّصْرَانِيُّ، وَتُقَدَّمُ بَيِّنَةُ الْمُسْلِمِ عَلَى بَيِّنَتِهِ.
وَلَوْ
مَاتَ عَنْ أَبَوَيْنِ كَافِرَيْنِ وَ ابْنَيْنِ مُسْلِمَيْنِ فَقَالَ كُلٌّ
مَاتَ عَلَى دِينِنَا صُدِّقَ الْأَبَوَانِ بِالْيَمِينِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يُوقَفُ
حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ أَوْ يَصْطَلِحُوا.
وَلَوْ شَهِدَتْ أَنَّهُ
أَعْتَقَ فِي مَرَضِهِ سَالِمًا، وَأُخْرَى غَانِمًا وَكُلُّ وَاحِدٍ ثُلُثُ
مَالِهِ، فَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَ تَارِيخُ تَقْدِيمٍ قُدِّمَ الْأَسْبَقُ، وَإِنْ
اتَّحَدَ أُقْرِعَ، وَإِنْ أَطْلَقَتَا قِيلَ يُقْرَعُ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يُعْتِقُ
مِنْ كُلٍّ نِصْفَهُ.
قُلْتُ: الْمَذْهَبُ يُعْتِقُ مِنْ كُلٍّ
نِصْفَهُ وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
وَلَوْ شَهِدَ أَجْنَبِيَّانِ
أَنَّهُ أَوْصَى بِعِتْقِ سَالِمٍ وَهُوَ ثُلُثُهُ، وَوَارِثَانِ حَائِزَانِ
أَنَّهُ رَجَعَ عَنْ ذَلِكَ، وَوَصَّى بِعِتْقِ غَانِمٍ وَهُوَ ثُلُثُهُ ثَبَتَ
لِغَانِمٍ، فَإِنْ كَانَ الْوَارِثَانِ فَاسِقَيْنِ لَمْ يَثْبُتْ الرُّجُوعُ
فَيَعْتِقُ سَالِمٌ، وَمِنْ غَانِمٍ ثُلُثُ مَالِهِ بَعْدَ سَالِمٍ.
Section
Where one ligitant
maintains that he has rented a room
to another
for ten pieces of money,
and the other says that the whole
house was
rented to him for that
sum, and both can bring evidence in
support of
their case, the two
claims mutually annul one another.
According to
one jurist, however, the
tenant has a presumption in his favour.
Where two persons claim something
in the possession of a third, each
alleging that he has bought and
paid for the object in question, and
each bringing evidence in support of
their claim, the object should be
adjudged to that purchaser whose
contract has the priority. Where
it
is not clear which is the earlier,
the two claims mutually annul each
other. Where two persons prove in
court that they havo sold an object
to a third, for such-and-such an
amount, the two claims mutually annul
each other, if the alleged sales
are of the same date. On the
other hand,
the purchaser should pay
twice the amount agreed upon, where
the two
claimants prove that the
sales took place at different times ;
for if
neither of the sales is
of a certain date ; or if one of
the sales is proved to
have been
effected at a certain date, but not
the other.
Where a deceased person
leaves two sons, one a Moslem and
the other
a Christian, who each maintain
that their father died in the
religion he
professes, the following cases
must be distinguished : —
. Where
it is a matter of public notoriety
that the father was a
Christian, then —
(a) In default of proof, the
assertion of the Christian son is presumed
to be true.
(b) Tho same
presumption exists in favour of the
Moslem son, if both
sons have
furnished general legal proof of the
truth of their statements.
(c) If
the proofs furnished do not concern
generally the religion
professed by the
father, but special circumstances from
which his
religion may be inferred,
e.g. his last words, the two claims
are mutually
annulled.
. Where the
religion of tho deceased is not. a matter
of public
notoriety, and each son
produces proof of the truth of his
statements,
in this case also tho
two claims are mutually annulled.
A
Christian leaves a Moslem son and a
Christian son. The former
declares that
ho only embraced the faith after his
father’s death, so that
he ought not
to be excluded from tho succession
in consequence of differ-
ence of
religion, while the son who has
remained a Christian alleges that
his
brother was already converted. In this
case the Moslem, in default
of legal
proof, has a presumption in his favour,
provided he takes an
oath to that
effect. On tho other hand, if in
these circumstances, both
sons prove the
truth of their assertions, the presumption
is in favour of
the Christian. And
the latter also has the presumption
in his favour, in
default of proof,
where both brothers agree that tho
conversion took
place, c.g. in the
month of Ramadan, but the Moslem
maintains that
their father died in
the preceding month of Shaban, while
according to
the Christian tho decease
did not take place until tho
following month
of Sliawal. Where,
however, both sons can call evidence
in support of
their assertions, tho
presumption is in favour of tho
Moslem. Where
the deceased has left
an infidel father and mother, and
two Moslem
sons, who all maintain
that tho deceased died in their
religion, the
parents enjoy a presumption
in their favour, provided they take
an oath ; though according to one
jurist, the matter should then
remain
in suspense until the truth is known
or tho litigants come
to a compromise.
In a case where one litigant
proves that tho deceased enfranchised
upon
his death-bed a slave called Salim, while
the adverse party brings
proof to
show that it was Ghanim who was
thus freed, and tho en-
franchisement of
either would just exhaust the third
capable of being
disposed of, the
law considers to be preponderant the
proof of the earlier
enfranchisement. If
it is proved that the enfranchisements
took place
simultaneously, whether Salim
or Ghanim shall be freed must be
decided
by casting lots. According to
somo authorities this method of decision
should also bo had recourse to
where neither of tho enfranchisements
are
of certain date ; according to others
one jurist maintained the
opinion that
the two slaves are both half-freed.
[This latter theory is
that of our
school.] Finally, in a case where two
persons unconnected
with tho deceased
declare that ho bequeathed his liberty
to his slave
Salim, while two
residuary inheritors declare that the
deceased retracted
this disposition and
loft his liberty to another of his
slaves called
Ghanim, and the
enfranchisement of either would exhaust
the third
capable of being disposed
of, it is Ghanim that the law
considers to be
enfranchised. Where,
however, the two inheritors may be
challenged
as witnesses on account of
notorious misconduct, the retractation cannot
be proved by their deposition, and
Salim is freed altogether. In
order
to punish the inheritors, Ghanim also
is enfranchised, up to the
amount of
the third of the succession that
remains, after deducting
the value of
Salim.
فصل [في شروط القائف]
شَرْطُ الْقَائِفِ: مُسْلِمٌ عَدْلٌ،
مُجَرَّبٌ، وَالْأَصَحُّ اشْتِرَاطُ حُرٍّ ذَكَرٍ، لَا عَدَدٍ، وَلَا كَوْنِهِ
مُدْلِجِيًّا، فَإِذَا تَدَاعَيَا مَجْهُولاً عُرِضَ عَلَيْهِ، وَكَذَا لَوْ
اشْتَرَكَا فِي وَطْءٍ فَوَلَدَتْ وَلَدًا مُمْكِنًا مِنْهُمَا وَتَنَازَعَاهُ
بِأَنْ وَطِئَا امْرَأَةً بِشُبْهَةٍ أَوْ مُشْتَرَكَةً لَهُمَا أَوْ وَطِئَ
زَوْجَتَهُ وَطَلَّقَ فَوَطِئَهَا آخَرُ بِشُبْهَةٍ أَوْ نِكَاحٍ فَاسِدٍ، أَوْ
أَمَتَهُ فَبَاعَهَا فَوَطِئَهَا الْمُشْتَرِي وَلَمْ يَسْتَبْرِئْ وَاحِدٌ
مِنْهُمَا، وَكَذَا لَوْ وَطِئَ مَنْكُوحَةً فِي الْأَصَحِّ، فَإِذَا وَلَدَتْ
لِمَا بَيْنَ سِتَّةِ أَشْهُرٍ وَأَرْبَعِ سِنِينَ مِنْ وَطْأَيْهِمَا
وَادَّعَيَاهُ عُرِضَ عَلَيْهِ، فَإِنْ تَخَلَّلَ بَيْنَ وَطْأَيْهِمَا حَيْضَةٌ
فَلِلثَّانِي إلَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ الْأَوَّلُ زَوْجًا فِي نِكَاحٍ صَحِيحٍ،
وَسَوَاءٌ فِيهِمَا اتَّفَقَا إسْلَامًا وَحُرِّيَّةً أَمْ لَا.
Section
A physiognomist cannot be
summoned as a witness unless he is a
Moslem of irreproachable character and
of long experience. fThe law
also
requires that he should be free, and
a man ; but it does not insist
upon
recourse being always had to more
than one physiognomist, nor
that he
must belong to the Arab tribe of
the Beni Modlij. The report
of a
physiognomist is indispensable in the case
of proceedings relative
to filiation ; or
with regard to a person whose parentage
is not known,
for example, a foundling ;
or a person of whom two others may
consider
themselves to be the father,
for example, a child born of a woman
who has had commerce with two
men within a short interval. This can
happen, even in good faith, in
the following cases : — -
. Where
each has exercised coition with her,
believing her to be
his own wife.
. Where the woman was their
joint slave.
. Where one repudiates
his wife immediately after coition ; and
the other then has her in his
bed by error, or by virtue of
an illegal
marriage.
. Where a
master sells his female slave after
coition, and the
purchaser cohabits with
her without observing her period of
purification.
. f Where a master cohabits
with his married slave.
In all
these cases the matter must be
submitted to a physiognomist ,
where a
child is born within a period between
six months after the later
and four
months after the earlier act of
coition, and each man claims
the
child as his. But where there has
been a menstruation between
two cohabitations
the law considers the later as the
sole cause of the
pregnancy. To this
rule there is but one exception,
that is to say,
whero the earlier
act of coition has been accomplished
by the legal
husband, and the later
by error or by fornication ; but it
is of little
consequence whether the
persons who consider themselves to be the
father are or are not free
Moslems.[]