Book 68: Simple Manumission (Itiq)
Title of book: Minhaj al-Talibin wa Umdat al-Muftin (منهاج الطالبين وعمدة المفتين في الفقه)
Author: Imam Nawawi
Full name: Imam Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف بن مُرِّيِّ بن حسن بن حسين بن محمد جمعة بن حِزام الحزامي النووي الشافعي)
Born: Muharram 631 AH/ October 1233 Nawa, Ayyubid Sultanate
Died: 24 Rajab 676 AH [9]/ 21 December 1277 (age 45) Nawa, Mamluk Sultanate
Resting place: Nawa, present Syria
Translated into English by: E. C. HOWARD
Field of study: sharia, Islamic law, fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence of Shafi'i's school of thought
Type of literature dan reference: classical Arabic
Contents
- Book 68: Simple Manumission (Itiq)
- Book 69: Testamentary Manumission (Tadbir)
- Book 70: Enfranchisement by Contract (Kitaba)
- Book 71: Freedom on Account of Maternity (Ummahat al-Awlad)
- Return to: Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam Nawawi
كتاب العِتْقِ
BOOK 68. —SIMPLE MANUMISSION
إنَّمَا يَصِحُّ مِنْ مُطْلَقِ التَّصَرُّفِ، وَيَصِحُّ تَعْلِيقُهُ وَ
إضَافَتُهُ إلَى جُزْءٍ فَيَعْتِقُ كُلُّهُ.
وَصَرِيحُهُ تَحْرِيرٌ
وَإِعْتَاقٌ، وَكَذَا فَكُّ رَقَبَةٍ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، وَلَا يَحْتَاجُ إلَى
نِيَّةٍ، وَيَحْتَاجُ إلَيْهَا كِنَايَتُهُ، وَهِيَ لَا مِلْكَ لِي عَلَيْكَ، لَا
سُلْطَانَ، لَا سَبِيلَ، لَا خِدْمَةَ، أَنْتَ سَائِبَةٌ، أَنْتَ مَوْلَايَ،
وَكَذَا كُلُّ صَرِيحٍ أَوْ كِنَايَةٍ لِلطَّلَاقِ، وَقَوْلُهُ لِعَبْدٍ:
أَنْتِ حُرَّةٌ، وَلِأَمَةٍ أَنْتَ حُرٌّ صَرِيحٌ، وَلَوْ قَالَ عِتْقُكَ إلَيْك
أَوْ خَيَّرْتُك وَنَوَى تَفْوِيضَ الْعِتْقِ إلَيْهِ فَأَعْتَقَ نَفْسَهُ فِي
الْمَجْلِسِ عَتَقَ، أَوْ أَعْتَقْتُك عَلَى أَلْفٍ، أَوْ أَنْتَ حُرٌّ عَلَى
أَلْفٍ فَقَبِلَ أَوْ قَالَ لَهُ الْعَبْدُ أَعْتِقْنِي عَلَى أَلْفٍ فَأَجَابَهُ
عَتَقَ فِي الْحَالِ، وَلَزِمَهُ الْأَلْفُ، وَلَوْ قَالَ بِعْتُكَ نَفْسَكَ
بِأَلْفٍ فَقَالَ اشْتَرَيْت فَالْمَذْهَبُ صِحَّةُ الْبَيْعِ وَيَعْتِقُ فِي
الْحَالِ وَعَلَيْهِ الْأَلْفُ.
وَالْوَلَاءُ لِسَيِّدِهِ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ لِحَامِلٍ أَعْتَقْتُكِ أَوْ أَعْتَقْتُكِ دُونَ حَمْلِكَ عَتَقَا، وَلَوْ
أَعْتَقَهُ عَتَقَ دُونَهَا، وَلَوْ كَانَتْ لِرَجُلٍ وَالْحَمْلُ لِآخَرَ لَمْ
يَعْتِقْ أَحَدُهُمَا بِعِتْقِ الْآخَرِ.
وَإِذَا كَانَ بَيْنَهُمَا
عَبْدٌ فَأَعْتَقَ أَحَدُهُمَا كُلَّهُ أَوْ نَصِيبَهُ عَتَقَ نَصِيبُهُ فَإِنْ
كَانَ مُعْسِرًا بَقِيَ الْبَاقِي لِشَرِيكِهِ، وَإِلَّا سَرَى إلَيْهِ، أَوْ
إلَى مَا أَيْسَرَ بِهِ وَعَلَيْهِ قِيمَةُ ذَلِكَ يَوْمَ الْإِعْتَاقِ، وَتَقَعُ
السِّرَايَةُ بِنَفْسِ الْإِعْتَاقِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ بِأَدَاءِ الْقِيمَةِ،
وَقَوْلٍ إنْ دَفَعَهَا بَانَ أَنَّهَا بِالْإِعْتَاقِ، وَاسْتِيلَادُ أَحَدِ
الشَّرِيكَيْنِ الْمُوسِرِ يَسْرِي، وَعَلَيْهِ قِيمَةُ نَصِيبِ شَرِيكِهِ
وَحِصَّتُهُ مِنْ مَهْرِ مِثْلٍ، وَتَجْرِي الْأَقْوَالُ فِي وَقْتِ حُصُولِ
السِّرَايَةِ، فَعَلَى الْأَوَّلِ وَالثَّانِي لَا تَجِبُ قِيمَةُ حِصَّتِهِ مِنْ
الْوَلَدِ، وَلَا يَسْرِي تَدْبِيرٌ، وَلَا يَمْنَعُ السِّرَايَةَ دَيْنٌ
مُسْتَغْرِقٌ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ لِشَرِيكِهِ
الْمُوسِرِ: أَعْتَقْت نَصِيبَك فَعَلَيْك قِيمَةُ نَصِيبِي فَأَنْكَرَ صُدِّقَ
بِيَمِينِهِ فَلَا يَعْتِقُ نَصِيبُهُ وَيَعْتِقُ نَصِيبُ الْمُدَّعِي
بِإِقْرَارِهِ إنْ قُلْنَا يَسْرِي بِالْإِعْتَاقِ، وَلَا يَسْرِي إلَى نَصِيبِ
الْمُنْكِرِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ لِشَرِيكِهِ: إنْ أَعْتَقْت نَصِيبَكَ فَنَصِيبِي
حُرٌّ بَعْدَ نَصِيبِك فَأَعْتَقَ الشَّرِيكُ وَهُوَ مُوسِرٌ سَرَى إلَى نَصِيبِ
الْأَوَّلِ إنْ قُلْنَا: السِّرَايَةُ بِالْإِعْتَاقِ، وَعَلَيْهِ قِيمَتُهُ،
وَلَوْ قَالَ فَنَصِيبِي حُرٌّ قَبْلَهُ، فَأَعْتَقَ الشَّرِيكُ، فَإِنْ كَانَ
الْمُعَلِّقُ مُعْسِرًا عَتَقَ نَصِيبُ كُلٍّ عَنْهُ، وَالْوَلَاءُ لَهُمَا،
وَكَذَا إنْ كَانَ مُوسِرًا وَأَبْطَلْنَا الدَّوْرَ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا يَعْتِقُ
شَيْءٌ.
وَلَوْ كَانَ عَبْدٌ لِرَجُلٍ نِصْفُهُ، وَلِآخَرَ
ثُلُثُهُ، وَلِآخَرَ سُدُسُهُ فَأَعْتَقَ الْآخَرَانِ نَصِيبَيْهِمَا مَعًا
عِتْقًا، فَالْقِيمَةُ عَلَيْهِمَا نِصْفَانِ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَشَرْطُ
السِّرَايَةِ إعْتَاقُهُ بِاخْتِيَارِهِ، فَلَوْ وَرِثَ بَعْضَ وَلَدِهِ لَمْ
يَسْرِ، وَالْمَرِيضُ مُعْسِرٌ إلَّا فِي ثُلُثِ مَالِهِ، وَالْمَيِّتُ مُعْسِرٌ،
فَلَوْ أَوْصَى بِعِتْقِ نَصِيبِهِ لَمْ يَسْرِ.
BOOK 68. —SIMPLE MANUMISSION
Section
The
manumission of a slave is legal only
on the part of a master who has
the free disposition of his
property. Enfranchisement may be made to
depend upon a condition, and may be
limited either to a member of the
body or to a fraction of the
slave ; but in these two last cases
the slave
is none the less wholly
freed in accordance with the distinctions
which
we shall afterwards set out.
Enfranchisement may be expressed in
explicit terms, such as, “ I
make
you free, “ I enfranchise you,” for “ You
are no longer liable to
the law
of property.” It is then of no
consequence whether one has or
has
not the intention to manumit. On the
other hand, such intention
is rigorously
necessary where one makes use of
implicit terms, such as,
“ I have no
longer upon you the right of
property,” “ I have no longer
any power
over you,” “ There is no longer any
bond between you and
me,” “ I have
no longer the right to make use
of your services,” “ You
can go
where you please,” “ You will be
henceforward under my
patronage.” Moreover,
the law considers as implicit terms
for ex-
pressing manumission all phrases
that declare repudiation, explicitly
or
implicitly. The words, “ You are free,”
said to a slave of either sex
constitute an explicit manumission ; and
the validity of the act is in
no way affected if the master
in saying them commits a fault against
grammatical gender. Where a master says
to his slave, “ Your en-
franchisement is
given you,” or “ I permit you to
choose between slavery
and liberty,”
intending to grant him his freedom,
the slave is free as
soon as
he declares that he wishes to make
use of this permission. And
the same
is the case where —
. The
master says, “ I enfranchise you for one
thousand pieces of
money,” or “ You
are free for one thousand pieces of
money,” and the
slave accepts.
.
The slave asks his master to free
him for one thousand pieces of
money, and tho master consents to
do so.
In both cases tho sum
mentioned is immediately due by the slave.
When the master offers to allow
the slave to redeem himself for one
thousand pieces of money, and the
slave accepts, this sale is, according
to our school, not only perfectly
valid, but the slave is immediately free,
though liable to his master for
the amount mentioned, and remaining
under
his patronage.
The manumission of a
pregnant female slave at the same
time in-
cludes ipso facto the freedom
of the foetus in her womb ; and
any special
reservation of this at
the time of the mother’s enfranchisement
is null
and void. Granting freedom
to the foetus alone, and nothing more,
does not imply that of the
mother, and where mother and foetus belong
to different persons the manumission
of the one never implies that of
the other.
A slave belonging in
common to two masters, of whom one
manumits
him, either entirely or
partially, obtains his liberty in this
way only as
regards the share of
that master ; and if the latter is
insolvent, the
part share of the
other is unaffected by this act.
Where, however, the
master who
enfranchises a slave of whom he is
coproprietor is solvent,
the share of
the slave that has not been freed
returns to him all the same
by
virtue of the right of redemption,
but he must indemnify his co-
proprietor
in proportion to the latter’s rights,
and according to the value
of the
slave upon the day of manumission.
Then, where the master
who enfranchises
can only pay a portion of the value
of the slave, he
must indemnify the
coproprietor according to his means, and
the
slave remains, so far as the
latter is concerned, in his original
condition,
due proportion being kept
between the manumitted share and the
indemnity received. Enfranchisement by
virtue of right of redemption
is an
immediate consequence of the original
manumission ; or, according
to one jurist,
a consequence of the payment of the
indemnity. Another
authority maintains, however,
that the payment of the indemnity has
retrospective force, in the sense
that this fact indicates the existence of
the manumission by virtue of the
right of redemption from the moment
of the original enfranchisement.
Manumission by reason of maternity
on
the part of one of two coproprietors
has the same consequence as
regards
right of redemption as simple manumission,
with the exception
that the part
owner who enfranchises in this way,
though solvent, should
not only indemnify
the other part-owner for the slave
but also for the
proportional dower.
As to the question from what moment
a manu-
mission by virtue of right of
redemption in these circumstances counts,
opinions are divided as we have
explained when speaking of simple
manumission ; but it must bo
understood that the theories set out upon
this subject, both firstly and
lastly, do not imply that the part-owner
who enfranchises must indemnify the
other for the value of the child
born to the slave. Enfranchisement
by will on the part of one of
the
coproprietors does not imply a right
of redemption ; *but the fact
that a
part-owner who enfranchises, though solvent,
has contracted
debts that exhaust his
fortune, is no obstacle to this
right. When one
says to one’s
coproprietor, “ You have enfranchised your
share in the
slave, and so you
should indemnify me for mine,” he
has a presumption
in his favour, provided
he takes an oath, if the manumission
is denied.
However, those jurists who
consider enfranchisement by virtue of a
right of redemption as an immediate
consequence of the original manu-
mission
maintain that in this case, the
share of the speaker is ipso facto
enfranchised, by reason of his
implied admission ; but without admitting
a
right of redemption in consequence of
this secondary manumission.
According to
these same jurists there is even
ground for a right of re-
demption and
indemnity when one’s coproprietor says to
one, “ If you
enfranchise your share
in our slave, my share will also
be free after your
manumission,” but
on condition that the person to whom
this phrase
is addressed is solvent.
Where, however, in this phrase, one
uses the
words, “ My share will be
free before yours,” an enfranchisement by
the
coproprietor thus addressed, has for
its effect that the share of the
other
owner becomes free, even if he
is insolvent, by the accomplishment of
the condition, and not by reason
of the right of redemption. The
patronage falls in these circumstances
to the two masters by their own
right. Where, on the other hand,
the co-proprietor who spoke the words
in question is solvent, the same
effect is caused only where the validity
of such a retrospective condition is
not admitted. Where it is admitted,
and the speaker is solvent, there
is no manumission by virtue of right
of
redemption. In the case where a
slave belongs for a half, a third, and a
sixth to throe different masters, of
whom the two last enfranchise their
respective shares, our school considers
that each owes the first half the
indemnity. Moreover, an essential
condition for right of redemption
is
that manumission takes place willingly.
Consequently, there is no
right of
redemption where, by right of succession,
for instance, a father
becomes coproprietor
of his son. And, finally, a person
who is danger-
ously ill should be
considered insolvent, so far as regards
this point, as
to any amount
exceeding the third of which he can
dispose ; and a
deceased person should
even be considered as absolutely insolvent.
Consequently, right of redemption cannot
be exercised where a testa-
mentary executor
is charged with manumitting a slave of
whom a share
belonged to the deceased.
فصل [في العتق بالبعضية]
إذَا مَلَكَ أَهْلُ تَبَرُّعٍ أَصْلَهُ
أَوْ فَرْعَهُ عَتَقَ.
وَلَا يَشْتَرِي لِطِفْلٍ قَرِيبَهُ، وَلَوْ
وَهَبَ لَهُ أَوْ وَصَّى لَهُ فَإِنْ كَانَ كَاسِبًا فَعَلَى الْوَلِيِّ
قَبُولُهُ، وَيَعْتِقُ وَيُنْفِقُ مِنْ كَسْبِهِ، وَإِلَّا فَإِنْ كَانَ
الصَّبِيُّ مُعْسِرًا وَجَبَ الْقَبُولُ، وَنَفَقَتُهُ فِي بَيْتِ الْمَالِ، أَوْ
مُوسِرًا حَرُمَ.
وَلَوْ مَلَكَ فِي مَرَضِ مَوْتِهِ قَرِيبَهُ
بِلَا عِوَضٍ عَتَقَ مِنْ ثُلُثِهِ، وَقِيلَ مِنْ رَأْسِ الْمَالِ أَوْ بِعِوَضٍ
بِلَا مُحَابَاةٍ فَمِنْ ثُلُثِهِ، وَلَا يَرِثُ فَإِنْ كَانَ عَلَيْهِ دَيْنٌ
فَقِيلَ لَا يَصِحُّ الشِّرَاءُ، وَالْأَصَحُّ صِحَّتُهُ، وَلَا يَعْتِقُ بَلْ
يُبَاعُ لِلدَّيْنِ، أَوْ بِمُحَابَاةٍ فَقَدْرُهَا كَهِبَةٍ، وَالْبَاقِي مِنْ
الثُّلُثِ.
وَلَوْ وَهَبَ لِعَبْدٍ بَعْضَ قَرِيبٍ سَيِّدُهُ
فَقَبِلَ وَقُلْنَا يَسْتَقِلُّ بِهِ عَتَقَ وَسَرَى، وَعَلَى سَيِّدِهِ قِيمَةُ
بَاقِيهِ.
Section
Where a person, capable
of alienating his property for nothing
becomes owner of one of his
ascendants or descendants who are slaves,
that ascendant or descendant is ipso
facto freed, without distinction of
sex
or degree. In the case of a person
who is incapable of alienating
his
property for nothing, his guardian or
curator may not purchase for
him one
of his ascendants or descendants. If a
minor obtains the
ownership of one
of his ascendants by way of gift
or legacy, his guardian
should accept
the liberality only where the slave
in question is capable
of exercising a
trade. In this case the slave is
ipso facto enfranchised ;
but he
need not be maintained by the donee,
because of the relationship.
Where, on
the other hand, the slave in
question is not in a state to main-
tain himself, the guardian should accept
only in the case of the insolvency
of his pupil, because then the
relative has to be maintained out of
tho
public treasury ; but he is rigorously
forbidden to accept the gift or
legacy of an ascendant or descendant
incapable of exercising a trade,
if his
pupil is solvent and maintenance will
consequently have to be paid
for by
him.
Where some one upon his
death-bed becomes gratuitously the owner
of his ascendant or descendant, that
relative is ijiso facto freed, and his
value is levied upon the third
of which the testator can dispose ; or,
according to some authorities upon
the estate ; but where the acquisi-
tion
is effected for a consideration, the two
following cases must be
distinguished.
. If the acquisition for a
consideration is effected without the seller,
when stipulating the price, making
any sacrifice upon his part, the
enfranchisement must be paid for out
of the third of which the deceased
can dispose, and the slave has
no share out of the succession. If
the
sick man, when making the
acquisition was insolvent, some authorities
do not admit the validity of
such a purchase ; but the majority consider
that the acquisition holds good,
though in that case enfranchisement
does
not result. In these circumstances the
slave should be sold again
to
satisfy the creditors.
. If, on
the other hand, the acquisition for a
consideration is affected
for a very low
price, with which tho vendor is
content out of consideration
for the
purchaser, tho difference between the
price stipulated and the
real value
of the slave constitutes a gift upon
the part of the vendor, so
that
the manumission is a charge upon the
third of which the testator
can
dispose only for the amount of the
stipulated price.
Where a third party
makes a gift to a slave of a share
in another slave,
who is the
ascendant or descendant of the donee,
and the slave accepts
this donation,
the share of the ascendant or
descendant thus given is
ipso facto
enfranchised ; at least where it is
admitted that the slave can
accept a
gift of his own accord. And besides,
the master must in-
demnify the
coproprietors of the relative by reason
of the right of
redemption.
فَصْلٌ [في الإعتاق في مرض الموت وبيان القرعة في العتق]
أَعْتَقَ
فِي مَرَضِ مَوْتِهِ عَبْدًا لَا يَمْلِكُ غَيْرَهُ عَتَقَ ثُلُثُهُ، فَإِنْ
كَانَ عَلَيْهِ دَيْنٌ مُسْتَغْرِقٌ لَمْ يَعْتِقْ شَيْءٌ مِنْهُ.
وَلَوْ
أَعْتَقَ ثَلَاثَةً لَا يَمْلِكُ غَيْرَهُمْ، وَقِيمَتُهُمْ سَوَاءٌ عَتَقَ
أَحَدُهُمْ بِقُرْعَةٍ وَكَذَا لَوْ قَالَ أَعْتَقْتُ ثُلُثَكُمْ، أَوْ
ثُلُثُكُمْ حُرٌّ، وَلَوْ قَالَ أَعْتَقْت ثُلُثَ كُلِّ عَبْدٍ أُقْرِعَ وَقِيلَ
يَعْتِقُ مِنْ كُلٍّ ثُلُثَهُ.
وَالْقُرْعَةُ أَنْ يُؤْخَذَ ثَلَاثُ
رِقَاعٍ مُتَسَاوِيَةٌ يُكْتَبُ فِي ثِنْتَيْنِ رِقٌّ وَفِي وَاحِدَةٍ عِتْقٌ،
وَتُدْرَجُ فِي بَنَادِقَ كَمَا سَبَقَ، وَتَخْرُجُ وَاحِدَةٌ بِاسْمِ
أَحَدِهِمْ، فَإِنْ خَرَجَ الْعِتْقُ عَتَقَ وَرَقَّ الْآخَرَانِ، أَوْ الرِّقُّ
رَقَّ وَأُخْرِجَتْ أُخْرَى بِاسْمٍ آخَرَ، يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَكْتُبَ أَسْمَاءَهُمْ
ثُمَّ تُخْرَجُ رُقْعَةٌ عَلَى الْحُرِّيَّةِ، فَمَنْ خَرَجَ اسْمُهُ عَتَقَ
وَرَقَّا، وَإِنْ كَانُوا ثَلَاثَةً قِيمَةَ وَاحِدٍ مِائَةٌ، وَآخَرُ
مِائَتَانِ، وَآخَرُ ثَلَاثُمِائَةٍ أُقْرِعَ بِسَهْمَيْ رِقٍّ وَسَهْمِ عِتْقٍ،
فَإِنْ خَرَجَ الْعِتْقُ لِذِي الْمِائَتَيْنِ عَتَقَ وَرَقَّا، أَوْ لِلثَّالِثِ
عَتَقَ ثُلُثَاهُ، أَوْ لِلْأَوَّلِ عَتَقَ ثُمَّ يُقْرَعُ بَيْنَ الْآخَرَيْنِ
بِسَهْمِ رِقٍّ وَسَهْمِ عِتْقٍ، فَمَنْ خَرَجَ تُمِّمَ مِنْهُ الثُّلُثُ، وَإِنْ
كَانُوا فَوْقَ ثَلَاثَةٍ وَأَمْكَنَ تَوْزِيعُهُمْ بِالْعَدَدِ وَالْقِيمَةِ
كَسِتَّةٍ قِيمَتُهُمْ سَوَاءٌ جُعِلُوا اثْنَيْنِ اثْنَيْنِ، أَوْ بِالْقِيمَةِ
دُونَ الْعَدَدِ كَسِتَّةٍ قِيمَةُ أَحَدِهِمْ مِائَةٌ، وَقِيمَةُ اثْنَيْنِ
مِائَةٌ، وَثَلَاثَةٍ مِائَةٌ جُعِلَ الْأَوَّلُ جُزْءًا، وَالِاثْنَانِ جُزْءًا،
وَالثَّلَاثَةُ جُزْءًا، وَإِنْ تَعَذَّرَ بِالْقِيمَةِ كَأَرْبَعَةٍ قِيمَتُهُمْ
سَوَاءٌ، فَفِي قَوْلٍ يُجَزَّءُونَ ثَلَاثَةَ أَجْزَاءٍ: وَاحِدٌ وَوَاحِدٌ،
وَاثْنَانِ، فَإِنْ خَرَجَ الْعِتْقُ لِوَاحِدٍ عَتَقَ ثُمَّ أُقْرِعَ
لِتَتْمِيمِ الثُّلُثِ، أَوْ لِلِاثْنَيْنِ رَقَّ الْآخَرَانِ ثُمَّ أُقْرِعَ
بَيْنَهُمَا فَيَعْتِقُ مَنْ خَرَجَ لَهُ الْعِتْقُ وَثُلُثُ الْآخَرِ، وَفِي
قَوْلٍ يُكْتَبُ اسْمُ كُلِّ عَبْدٍ فِي رُقْعَةٍ فَيَعْتِقُ مَنْ خَرَجَ
أَوَّلاً وَثُلُثُ الثَّانِي قُلْتُ: أَظْهَرُهُمَا الْأَوَّلُ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ، وَالْقَوْلَانِ فِي اسْتِحْبَابٍ، وَقِيلَ إيجَابٍ، وَإِذَا
أَعْتَقْنَا بَعْضَهُمْ بِقُرْعَةٍ فَظَهَرَ مَالٌ وَخَرَجَ كُلُّهُمْ مِنْ
الثُّلُثِ عَتَقُوا، وَلَهُمْ كَسْبُهُمْ مِنْ يَوْمِ الْإِعْتَاقِ، وَلَا
يَرْجِعُ الْوَارِثُ بِمَا أَنْفَقَ عَلَيْهِمْ، وَإِنْ خَرَجَ بِمَا ظَهَرَ
عَبْدٌ آخَرُ أُقْرِعَ، وَمَنْ عَتَقَ بِقُرْعَةٍ حُكِمَ بِعِتْقِهِ مِنْ يَوْمِ
الْإِعْتَاقِ، وَتُعْتَبَرُ قِيمَتُهُ حِينَئِذٍ، وَلَهُ كَسْبُهُ مِنْ
يَوْمِئِذٍ غَيْرَ مَحْسُوبٍ مِنْ الثُّلُثِ، وَمَنْ بَقِيَ رَقِيقًا قُوِّمَ
يَوْمَ الْمَوْتِ وَحُسِبَ مِنْ الثُّلُثَيْنِ هُوَ وَكَسْبُهُ الْبَاقِي قَبْلَ
الْمَوْتِ، لَا الْحَادِثُ بَعْدَهُ، فَلَوْ أَعْتَقَ ثَلَاثَةً لَا يَمْلِكُ
غَيْرَهُمْ قِيمَةَ كُلٍّ مِائَةٌ، وَكَسَبَ أَحَدُهُمْ مِائَةً أُقْرِعَ، فَإِنْ
خَرَجَ الْعِتْقُ لِلْكَاسِبِ عَتَقَ وَلَهُ الْمِائَةُ، وَإِنْ خَرَجَ
لِغَيْرِهِ عَتَقَ ثُمَّ أُقْرِعَ، فَإِنْ خَرَجَتْ لِغَيْرِهِ عَتَقَ ثُلُثُهُ،
وَإِنْ خَرَجَتْ لَهُ عَتَقَ رُبُعُهُ، وَتَبِعَهُ رُبُعُ كَسْبِهِ.
Section
Where some one upon
his death-bed voluntarily manumits a slave,
the sole property he possesses, the
enfranchisement is valid only for
one-third ; and, in case of the
master’s insolvency, the act has no effect
at all. By virtue of the same
principle, the manumission upon a death-
bed
of three slaves, all of equal value,
effected by an individual having
no
other property, should be limited in
its effect to one of them ; and
which of the three is to be
freed must in this case be
determined by cast-
ing lots. And recourse
must also be had to casting lots
when the
deceased in these circumstances
says to his three slaves all of
equal
value, “ I enfranchise a third of
you three,” “ A third of you three is
free,” or “ I enfranchise a third of
all my slaves.” In this last case,
however, according to some jurists,
all the three are free for one-third.
A recourse to casting lots takes
place as follows : — Three pieces of
paper are taken of equal size ;
on two of them is written the word
“ slavery,” and upon the third the
word “ enfranchisement,” and they
are
rolled round three balls, as we
mentioned before. A ball is then
drawn
for one of the slaves, and if
it is that upon which is the paper
with “ enfranchisement ” written upon it,
that slave is free, and the
others
remain slaves. Where, on the other
hand, the one drawn con-
tains the
word “ slavery,” that slave remains a
slave ; and a second ball
is drawn
for one of the two others. The
names of the three slaves may
also
be written upon papers, and the
slave whose name is first drawn be
freed, while the others remain
slaves. When the decision has to be
made
between three slaves of different
value, for example, when one is worth
one hundred pieces of money, the
second two hundred, and the third
three hundred, and the deceased has
left no other property, two balls
are placed in the urn with the
word " slavery ” on them, and a single
one with the word “ enfranchisement.”
If the one with the word
“
enfranchisement ” is drawn for the slave
worth two hundred, he alone
is free
and entirely free ; but if this word
is ylrawn for the one worth
three
hundred, he is freed only for
two-thirds. Finally, if the word has
been drawn for the slave worth
one hundred pieces, not only is this
slave entirely free, but there must
be another drawing with two balls
labelled “ slavery ” and “enfranchisement.”
That one of the two
slaves for
whom this latter ball is drawn
becomes enfranchised up to
the limit
of what remains of the third of
which the testator could dispose,
deducting the former manumission. Where,
in these circumstances,
there are more
than three slaves, of whom the
number and value permit
of a threefold
partition, for example, six slaves all
of the same value,
the same
procedure is adopted in casting lots,
except that each of the
three lots
refer to two persons instead of one.
Where, on the other
hand, it is
only the total value and not the
number that can be divided
into
three portions, where, for example, of
six slaves one is worth one
hundred
pieces of money, two others one
hundred together, and also
the three
others together one hundred, one lot
must be made for the
first slave,
one for the next two, and one
for the three others. But
where
neither the number nor the value
permit of being divided into
three
lots, for example, where there are
four slaves all of an equal value
not divisible by three, one
authority recommends to proceed as follows : —
The number of the slaves is
divided into three lots, two of
which are
composed of a single slave
and the third of two slaves, and
when the
ball bearing the word “
enfranchisement ” is drawn for one of
the two
first lots, the slave
included in this lot is freed. After
this it is decided
by casting lots
which of the three other slaves is
to be freed, up to the
amount
that remains of the third that can
be disposed of, deducting
the cost
of the first manumission. Where it
is the third lot that wins,
the
two slaves that compose the first
and second lots remain slaves, and
lots must be drawn to decide
between the two slaves forming the third
lot, to know which of the two
is to be completely enfranchised, and
which is to be enfranchised only
up to what remains of the third
of which
one can dispose, deducting
the cost of the first enfranchisement.
Another jurist, however, recommends
writing the names of the slaves
upon
four different pieces of paper, and
afterwards proceeding to the
drawing ; the
one whose name first comes out of
the urn is enfranchised
up to the
amount that remains of the third
that can be disposed of,
after
deducting the cost of the first
manumission. [*The former pro-
cedure is
preferable.] But the entire controversy as
to procedure in
drawing lots refers
only to precepts of the Sonna. Some
authorities,
however, regard these precepts
as obligatory.
Where the manumission
can only be partially effected, because a
complete enfranchisement would exceed the
third that can be disposed
of, but
other property belonging to the estate
is found afterwards, the
manumission must
be continued up to the third of
the total net assets.
Slaves manumitted
afterwards in this way may keep for
themselves
what they have gained by
their labour from the day of their
enfranchise-
ment by the deceased ; and
the heir may not even claim the
restitution
of what he has already
spent for their maintenance. Where it
transpires
later that the deceased,
besides the slaves manumitted, had another
slave whom he had just enfranchised,
the latter has a right to be admitted
to the drawing of lots for
manumission. A slave, enfranchised by
drawing
lots, is considered as free from the
day when the deceased
declared his
manumission ; and the value of this slave
to be allowed
for in the partition
is his value at that moment. In
consequence what
the slave gains is
really his, and cannot bo included
when determining
the amount of the
third that can bo disposed of. On
the other hand,
those that remain
slaves because the drawing of the
lots was un-
favourable to them should
be assessed according to their value upon
the day of the decease ; they
form a portion of the two-thirds due to
the heirs, including what they have
gained from that moment, provided
that
this gain is composed of things
still existing in kind. Gain earned
after the decease goes always, not
to the estate, but to the heir
to whom
the slave is assigned at
the distribution. Thus, where the deceased
only
had three slaves whom he
enfranchised upon his death-bed, each of
whom is worth one hundred pieces
of money, but one of whom has made,
between the manumission and the
decease, a gain of one hundred pieces,
lots are first of all drawn,
and if this slave wins, not only
is he enfran-
chised, but he keeps
as well the hundred pieces which he
has gained.
Where, on the other
hand, the result of the drawing is
to manumit one
of the two slaves
who have gained nothing by their
labour, lojs must bo
drawn again,
and if the other slave that has
gained nothing wins he is
freed for
one-third. But where upon this second
drawing the slave
that has made some
gain wins, he is only free for
one quarter. Over and
above this he
must be given as earnings one-quarter
of what he has
gained, and the
other three-quarters of this gain go
to the heir whose
property he
becomes for three-quarters on distribution.
فصل [في الولاء]
مَنْ عَتَقَ عَلَيْهِ رَقِيقٌ بِإِعْتَاقٍ أَوْ
كِتَابَةٍ وَتَدْبِيرٍ وَاسْتِيلَادٍ وَقَرَابَةٍ وَسِرَايَةٍ فَوَلَاؤُهُ
لَهُ.
ثُمَّ لِعَصَبَتِهِ، وَلَا تَرِثُ امْرَأَةٌ بِوَلَاءٍ إلَّا
مِنْ عَتِيقِهَا وَأَوْلَادِهِ وَعُتَقَائِهِ، فَإِنْ عَتَقَ عَلَيْهَا أَبُوهَا
ثُمَّ أَعْتَقَ عَبْدًا فَمَاتَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِ الْأَبِ بِلَا وَارِثٍ فَمَالُهُ
لِلْبِنْتِ، وَالْوَلَاءُ لِأَعْلَى الْعَصَبَاتِ.
وَمَنْ مَسَّهُ
رِقٌّ فَلَا وَلَاءَ عَلَيْهِ إلَّا لِمُعْتِقِهِ وَعَصَبَتِهِ.
وَلَوْ
نَكَحَ عَبْدٌ مُعْتَقَةً فَأَتَتْ بِوَلَدٍ فَوَلَاؤُهُ لِمَوْلَى الْأُمّ،
فَإِنْ أُعْتِقَ الْأَبُ انْجَرَّ إلَى مَوَالِيهِ، وَلَوْ مَاتَ الْأَبُ
رَقِيقًا وَعَتَقَ الْجَدُّ انْجَرَّ إلَى مَوَالِيهِ، فَإِنْ أُعْتِقَ الْجَدُّ
وَالْأَبُ رَقِيقٌ انْجَرَّ، فَإِنْ أُعْتِقَ الْأَبُ بَعْدَهُ انْجَرَّ إلَى
مَوَالِيهِ، وَقِيلَ يَبْقَى لِمَوَالِي الْأُمِّ حَتَّى يَمُوتَ الْأَبُ
فَيَنْجَرَّ إلَى مَوَالِي الْجَدِّ، وَلَوْ مَلَكَ هَذَا الْوَلَدُ أَبَاهُ
جُرَّ وَلَاءُ إخْوَتِهِ إلَيْهِ، وَكَذَا وَلَاءُ نَفْسِهِ فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
قُلْت:
الْأَصَحُّ الْمَنْصُوصُ لَا يَجُرُّهُ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
Section
A person who frees a
slave retains over him a right of
patronage,
without any distinction between
simple manumission, or liberation
under
the terms of a will, or enfranchisement
by contract, or on account
of
maternity or relationship or right of
redemption. In case of the
master’s
decease the right passes to his
agnates. A woman is never
called to
the succession by right of patronage,
unless it be to that of
some
one she herself has manumitted, or
of his children or enfranchised
slaves.
For example, where a daughter becomes the
owner of her father
who is a slave
the latter is ipso facto liberated ;
and where the father in
his turn
manumits one of his slaves, and then
dies, and later this slave
also
dies, and neither leaves heirs, the
daughter is called to the succession
as the slave’s patroness, and not
as his patron’s daughter. In case of
the patron’s decease the patronage
can be exercised only by the nearest
agnate as a personal right, and in
general a manumitted slave can have
no
other patron but his master or his
master’s agnates. If a slave
marries an
enfranchised woman, the child born of
this union is free and
under the
patronage of its mother’s patron ; but
if the father is after-
wards
enfranchised, the patronage of the child
passes to the father’s
patron. If
the father dies a slave, and afterwards
the father’s father is
manumitted, the
patronage of the child passes to the
patron of this
rolative ; and it is
the same where the liberation of the
father’s father
takes place during the
lifetime and slavery of the father,
except that in
this case the
patronage is transferred to the father’s
patron, if the father
is afterwards
enfranchised. According to other authorities,
however,
the patronage remains with the
mother’s patron, so long as the
father is
a slave, and is only
transferred to the patron of the
father’s father by
the father’s death.
Where, finally, the child in question
becomes the
property of his slave
father, he is ipso facto liberated ;
but, if there is
occasion for it,
the patronage of the father’s other
children, ix. his
brothers and sisters,
and half brothers and half sisters
on the father’s
side, fand of
himself, is acquired by that child.
[fAccording to Shafii’s
personal opinion
this patronage of a person over himself
cannot
exist.]
كتاب التَدْبِيْرِ
BOOK 69 .— TESTAMENTARY MANUMISSION
صَرِيحُهُ أَنْتَ حُرُّ بَعَدَ مَوْتِي، أَوْ إذَا مِتُّ أَوْ مَتَى مِتُّ
فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ، أَوْ أَعْتَقْتُكَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِي وَكَذَا دَبَّرْتُكَ وَكَذَا
دَبَّرْتُكَ أَوْ أَنْتَ مُدَبَّرٌ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَيَصِحُّ بِكِنَايَةِ
عِتْقٍ مَعَ نِيَّةٍ كَخَلَّيْتُ سَبِيلَكَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِي.
وَيَجُوزُ
مُقَيَّدًا كَإِنْ مِتُّ فِي ذَا الشَّهْرِ أَوْ الْمَرَضِ فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ،
وَمُعَلَّقًا كَإِنْ دَخَلْتُ فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ بَعْدَ مَوْتَى، فَإِنْ وُجِدَتْ
الصِّفَةُ وَمَاتَ عَتَقَ وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَيُشْتَرَطُ الدُّخُولُ قَبْلَ مَوْتِ
السَّيِّدِ، فَإِنْ قَالَ إنْ مِتُّ ثُمَّ دَخَلْتَ فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ اُشْتُرِطَ
دُخُولٌ بَعْدَ الْمَوْتِ، وَهُوَ عَلَى التَّرَاخِي وَلَيْسَ لِلْوَارِثِ
بَيْعُهُ قَبْلَ الدُّخُولِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ إذَا مِتُّ وَمَضَى شَهْرٌ فَأَنْتَ
حُرٌّ فَلِلْوَارِثِ اسْتِخْدَامُهُ فِي الشَّهْرِ لَا بَيْعُهُ.
وَلَوْ
قَالَ إنْ شِئْت فَأَنْتَ مُدَبَّرٌ أَوْ أَنْتَ حُرٌّ بَعْدَ مَوْتِي إنْ شِئْتَ
اُشْتُرِطَتْ الْمَشِيئَةُ مُتَّصِلَةً، وَإِنْ قَالَ: مَتَى شِئْتَ
فَلِلتَّرَاخِي.
وَ لَوْ قَالَا لِعَبْدِهِمَا: إذَا مُتْنَا
فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ لَمْ يَعْتِقْ حَتَّى يَمُوتَا، فَإِنْ مَاتَ أَحَدُهُمَا
فَلَيْسَ لِوَارِثِهِ بَيْعُ نَصِيبِهِ.
وَلَا يَصِحُّ تَدْبِيرُ
مَجْنُونٍ وَصَبِيٍّ لَا يُمَيِّزُ، وَكَذَا مُمَيِّزٌ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ،
وَيَصِحُّ مِنْ سَفِيهٍ وَكَافِرٍ أَصْلِيٍّ، وَتَدْبِيرُ الْمُرْتَدِّ يُبْنَى
عَلَى أَقْوَالِ مِلْكِهِ، وَلَوْ دَبَّرَ ثُمَّ ارْتَدَّ لَمْ يَبْطُلْ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ، وَلَوْ ارْتَدَّ الْمُدَبَّرُ لَمْ يَبْطُلْ، وَلِحَرْبِيٍّ حَمْلُ
مُدَبَّرِهِ إلَى دَارِهِمْ.
وَلَوْ كَانَ لِكَافِرٍ عَبْدٌ
مُسْلِمٌ فَدَبَّرَهُ نُقِضَ وَبِيعَ عَلَيْهِ.
وَلَوْ دَبَّرَ
كَافِرٌ كَافِرًا فَأَسْلَمَ وَلَمْ يَرْجِعْ السَّيِّدُ فِي التَّدْبِيرِ نُزِعَ
مِنْ يَدِ سَيِّدِهِ، وَصُرِفَ كَسْبُهُ إلَيْهِ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ يُبَاعُ.
وَلَهُ
بَيْعُ الْمُدَبَّرِ، وَالتَّدْبِيرُ تَعْلِيقُ عِتْقٍ بِصِفَةٍ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ
وَصِيَّةٌ.
فَلَوْ بَاعَهُ ثُمَّ مَلَكَهُ لَمْ يَعُدْ التَّدْبِيرُ
عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَلَوْ رَجَعَ عَنْهُ بِقَوْلِهِ كَأَبْطَلْته فَسَخْتُهُ
نَقَضْتُهُ رَجَعْتُ فِيهِ صَحَّ إنْ قُلْنَا وَصِيَّةٌ وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَلَوْ
عُلِّقَ مُدَبَّرٌ بِصِفَةٍ صَحَّ وَعَتَقَ بِالْأَسْبَقِ مِنْ الْمَوْتِ
وَالصِّفَةِ.
وَلَهُ وَطْءُ مُدَبَّرَةٍ، وَلَا يَكُونُ رُجُوعًا،
فَإِنْ أَوْلَدَهَا بَطَلَ تَدْبِيرُهُ، وَلَا يَصِحُّ تَدْبِيرُ أُمِّ
وَلَدٍ.
وَيَصِحُّ تَدْبِيرُ مُكَاتَبٍ وَكِتَابَةُ مُدَبَّرٍ.
BOOK .— TESTAMENTARY MANUMISSION
Section
Enfranchisement by will may be
expressed explicitly by the phrase
“ You
will be free after my death,” “ when
I am dead,” or “ as soon as
I am
dead,” or by the phrase, “ I manumit
you after my death.”
According to
our school the expressions “ I make you,”
or “ You will
be my testamentary
enfranchised slave,” are also explicit.
This manu-
mission may also be legally
expressed by all terms that imply a simple
manumission, such as, “My death will
dissolve the bond between you and
me,” but in such a case the
master must have really had the
intention to
accomplish that act. One
may pronounce a testamentary manumission
subject
to a restriction, e.g. “ If I die this
month,” or “ in this sickness,”
“ you
are free ; ” or make it depend upon
a condition, as for example,
“If you
enter the house you will be free
after my death.” In these
cases the
enfranchisement depends upon the operation
of the restriction
or the accomplishment
of the condition. In the example
last given the
slave must enter the
house before Iris master’s death ; but the
entry
should, on the contrary, be
after that event if the master says,
“ You
will be free if you enter
the house after my death.” In this
latter case,
however, the slave need
not make his entry immediately after his
master’s death, and the heir cannot
sell him in the mean time. Where
the master says, “ You will be
free as soon as one month has passed
after my death,” the heir cannot
sell the slave during this period, but
there is no objection to his
employing him in his service in the
mean-
time, both in this case and in
the preceding one. Manumission in the
words, “ If you like you can
be my testamentary enfranchised slave,”
or
“If you like you can be my
enfranchised slave after my death,”
requires that the slave should say
at once what he decides to do,
but if
the master says, “ As soon
as you have expressed your wishes in
the
matter,” the slave need not do
so immediately. Where two part-owners
of a
slave declare that he will be free “
after their death,” he is not com-
pletely enfranchised until after the death
of both of them ; though
after the
death of one, his heir cannot sell
the share of the slave forming
part
of the inheritance.
Testamentary
manumission is forbidden to the lunatic
or the minor,
*even where the latter
has attained the age of discernment.
On the
other hand, it is permitted
to imbeciles and infidels. As to an
apostate
there is the same divergence
of opinion as about his right of
ownership.
Our school, however, maintains
in all cases a testamentary manu-
mission
spoken before apostasy ; and the apostasy
of a slave, enfranchised
by will while
he was still a believer, does not
cause him to lose his liberty.
An
infidel^ who is not a subject has a
right to take his testamentary
enfranchised slave who is an infidel
into his own country ; but when an
infidel of any kind grants his
liberty to a Moslem slave by his
will, the
act is null and void,
because the law prescribes that such a
slave should
be seized and sold on
his account. In the case of an
infidel slave, en-
franchised by his
master’s will, his master also an
infidel, who after his
manumission
embraces the faith, without his master
revoking his former
disposition, this
conversion is enough to withdraw him
from his master’s
control, and he
can then work for his master’s
account and repay him
the gain
resulting from this labour. According to
one jurist, however,
even in this
case the enfranchised slave should be
sold, and the price
given to his
master.
The master of a testamentary
enfranchised slave may sell him, and
this sale ipso facto annuls the
manumission. For a testamentary
enfranchisement
is nothing more than a simple manumission,
depending
upon a condition, or according
to one authority a legacy. According
to
our school the enfranchisement remains
none the less annulled where
one
again becomes the owner of the
testamentary enfranchised slave
that one
had sold. As to the revocation of
the sort of manumission
with which
we are here occupied, excepting the
case where it is a neces-
sary consequence
of the sale, it is not lawful
unless it be admitted that
the act
constitutes a legacy. One may then express
the revocation
by the words — “ I annul,” “ I
declare dissolved,” “ I break,” or “ I
revoke the testamentary manumission.” If,
on the other hand, one
admits, with
most authorities, that the act constitutes
a simple manu-
mission depending on a condition,
one cannot revoke it.
There is
no objection to manumitting in the
ordinary way a slave
one has already
enfranchised by will, and making this
later manu-
mission depend upon a condition,
or naming a specified time for its
operation. In the latter case the
slave becomes free as soon as one of
the following things happens — the
master’s death, or the accomplish-
ment of
the condition, or the expiry of the
term. The testamentary
manumission of a
slave does not prevent her master,
during his lifetime,
having the right
to cohabit with her, and this act
leaves the previous
enfranchisement intact,
unless the slave becomes a mother, in
which
case tho testamentary manumission is
annulled and becomes a liberation
on
account of maternity.' On the other
hand, enfranchisement on account
of
maternity cannot become a testamentary
manumission. The libera-
tion under the
terms of a will of a slave undergoing
enfranchisement by
contract, and the
manumission by contract of a testamentary en-
franchised slave are both permitted by
law.
فَصْلٌ [في حكم حمل المدبرة]
وَلَدَتْ مُدَبَّرَةٌ مِنْ نِكَاحٍ
أَوْ زِنًا لَا يَثْبُتُ لِلْوَلَدِ حُكْمُ التَّدْبِيرِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ
دَبَّرَ حَامِلاً ثَبَتَ لَهُ حُكْمُ التَّدْبِيرِ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، فَإِنْ
مَاتَتْ أَوْ رَجَعَ فِي تَدْبِيرِهَا دَامَ تَدْبِيرُهُ، وَقِيلَ: إنْ رَجَعَ
وَهُوَ مُتَّصِلٌ فَلَا، وَلَوْ دَبَّرَ حَمْلاً صَحَّ، فَإِنْ مَاتَ عَتَقَ
دُونَ الْأُمِّ، وَإِنْ بَاعَهَا صَحَّ وَكَانَ رُجُوعًا عَنْهُ.
وَلَوْ
وَلَدَتْ الْمُعَلَّقُ عِتْقُهَا لَمْ يَعْتِقْ الْوَلَدُ، وَفِي قَوْلٍ إنْ
عَتَقَتْ بِالصِّفَةِ عَتَقَ.
وَلَا يَتْبَعُ مُدَبَّرًا وَلَدُهُ،
وَجِنَايَتُهُ كَجِنَايَةِ قِنٍّ.
وَيَعْتِقُ بِالْمَوْتِ مِنْ
الثُّلُثِ كُلِّهِ أَوْ بَعْضُهُ بَعْدَ الدَّيْنِ، وَلَوْ عَلَّقَ عِتْقًا عَلَى
صِفَةٍ تَخْتَصُّ بِالْمَرَضِ كَإِنْ دَخَلْت فِي مَرَضِ مَوْتِي فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ
عَتَقَ مِنْ الثُّلُثِ، وَإِنْ احْتَمَلَتْ الصِّحَّةَ فَوُجِدَتْ فِي الْمَرَضِ
فَمِنْ رَأْسِ الْمَالِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَى عَبْدُهُ
التَّدْبِيرَ فَأَنْكَرَهُ فَلَيْسَ بِرُجُوعٍ بَلْ يَحْلِفُ.
وَلَوْ
وُجِدَ مَعَ مُدَبَّرٍ مَالٌ فَقَالَ: كَسَبْته بَعْدَ مَوْتِ السَّيِّدِ،
وَقَالَ الْوَارِثُ قَبْلَهُ صُدِّقَ الْمُدَبَّرُ بِيَمِينِهِ، وَإِنْ أَقَامَا
بَيِّنَتَيْنِ قُدِّمَتْ بَيِّنَتُهُ.
Section
*When a testamentary
enfranchised slave gives birth to a child
during her master’s lifetime either
in consequence of her marriage, or
of the crime of fornication, it
remains a slave until the master’s death.
Where, on the other hand,
testamentary enfranchisement is granted
to a
pregnant slave our school permits not
only that the child should
be
included in its mother’s manumission, but
also that it should bo
considered a
testamentary enfranchised slave, where the
manumission
of tho mother does not
actually take place, either in consequence
of her
previous death, or of a
revocation. Some authorities, however, main-
tain that the child, before its
birth, follows its mother’s condition in
ease of revocation. Moreover, a foetus
in the mother’s womb is capable
of
testamentary enfranchisement before birth, and
this manumission
does not involve that
of the mother, though her sale
before accouche-
ment implies ipso facto
the revocation of the enfranchisement of
the
foetus. Where a slave, manumitted in
the ordinary way, under some
condition,
gives birth to a child, it is not
ipso facto enfranchised with
its mother
when that condition is fulfilled.
According to a single
authority the child
is ipso facto manumitted when the
condition is accom-
plished during the
mother’s lifetime, but remains a slave
when the
condition is only fulfilled
after the mother’s death. A testamentary
manumission in favour of a male
slave never extends to his children.
In the matter of crimes
against the person a testamentary en-
franchised
slave of either sex remains during
the master’s lifetime subject
to the
ordinary law applicable to slaves. At
his master’s death the
testamentary
enfranchised slave obtains his entire
freedom, and his
value is debited to
the third of the estate of which
the master could
dispose, after deducting
the debts. If this third is not
sufficient, the
slave becomes only
partially free. For the same reason
is debited to
the third of the
estate a simple manumission depending upon a
condition
relative to the last illness ;
for example, where the deceased declares,
“ You will be free if you
enter the house during my last
sickness ; ”
*but where the condition
may bo fulfilled while the testator
is in good
health, the fact that
it is accidentally accomplished during his
last
malady does not prevent the
manumission being debited to the entire
estate.
Where a slave maintains in a
court of law that he was enfranchised
by will, and the master denies
this, the latter must take an oath
and
declare that this contradiction is
equivalent to a revocation, and that
in
consequence the claim is inadmissible.
This rule is admitted even by
the
authority who assimilates testamentary
manumission to a legacy,
and who
consequently admits its revocability.
Where a testamentary enfranchised slave,
on becoming free, finds
himself in
the possession of a sum of money,
and declares that he gained
it after
his master’s death, while the heir
maintains that it is his earnings
amassed during the master’s lifetime,
and that in consequence it should
be
paid in to the assets of the
estate, the enfranchised slave has a pre-
sumption in his favour, provided he
takes an oath. Even where, in
these
circumstances, the two parties can bring
evidence in support of
their assertions,
the enfranchised slave still has the
presumption in his
favour.
كتاب الْكِتَابَةِ
BOOK 70 .— ENFRANCHISEMENT BY CONTRACT
هِيَ مُسْتَحَبَّةٌ إنْ طَلَبَهَا رَقِيقٌ أَمِينٌ قَوِيٌّ عَلَى كَسْبٍ، قِيلَ
أَوْ غَيْرُ قَوِيٍّ، وَلَا تُكْرَهُ بِحَالٍ.
وَصِيغَتُهَا
كَاتَبْتُكَ عَلَى كَذَا مُنَجَّمًا إذَا أَدَّيْتَهُ فَأَنْتَ حُرٌّ،
وَيُبَيِّنُ عَدَدَ النُّجُومِ وَقِسْطَ كُلِّ نَجْمٍ، وَلَوْ تَرَكَ لَفْظَ
التَّعْلِيقِ وَنَوَاهُ جَازَ، وَلَا يَكْفِي لَفْظُ كِتَابَةٍ بِلَا تَعْلِيقٍ،
وَلَا نِيَّةٍ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ، وَيَقُولُ الْمُكَاتَبُ قَبِلْتُ.
وَشَرْطُهُمَا
تَكْلِيفٌ وَإِطْلَاقٌ.
وَكِتَابَةُ الْمَرِيضِ مِنْ الثُّلُثِ،
فَإِنْ كَانَ لَهُ مِثْلَاهُ صَحَّتْ كِتَابَةُ كُلِّهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَمْلِكْ
غَيْرَهُ وَأَدَّى فِي حَيَاتِهِ مِائَتَيْنِ، وَقِيمَتُهُ مِائَةٌ عَتَقَ،
وَإِنْ أَدَّى مِائَةً عَتَقَ ثُلُثَاهُ.
وَلَوْ كَاتَبَ مُرْتَدٌّ
بُنِيَ عَلَى أَقْوَالِ مِلْكِهِ، فَإِنْ وَقَفْنَاهُ بَطَلَتْ عَلَى
الْجَدِيدِ.
وَلَا تَصِحُّ كِتَابَةُ مَرْهُونٍ، وَمُكْرًى.
وَشَرْطُ
الْعِوَضِ كَوْنُهُ دَيْنًا مُؤَجَّلاً، وَلَوْ مَنْفَعَةً، وَمُنَجَّمًا
بِنَجْمَيْنِ فَأَكْثَرَ، وَقِيلَ: إنْ مَلَكَ بَعْضَهُ وَبَاقِيهِ حُرٌّ لَمْ
يُشْتَرَطْ أَجَلٌ وَتَنْجِيمٌ، وَلَوْ كَاتَبَ عَلَى خِدْمَة شَهْرٍ وَدِينَارٍ
عِنْدَ انْقِضَائِهِ صَحَّتْ أَوْ عَلَى أَنْ يَبِيعَهُ كَذَا فَسَدَتْ، وَلَوْ
قَالَ كَاتَبْتُكَ وَبِعْتُكَ هَذَا الثَّوْبَ بِأَلْفٍ وَنَجَّمَ الْأَلْفَ
وَعَلَّقَ الْحُرِّيَّةَ بِأَدَائِهِ فَالْمَذْهَبُ صِحَّةُ الْكِتَابَةِ دُونَ
الْبَيْعِ، وَلَوْ كَاتَبَ عَبِيدًا عَلَى عِوَضٍ مُنَجَّمٍ وَعَلَّقَ عِتْقَهُمْ
بِأَدَائِهِ فَالنَّصُّ صِحَّتُهَا، وَيُوَزِّعُ عَلَى قِيمَتِهِمْ يَوْمَ
الْكِتَابَةِ فَمَنْ أَدَّى حِصَّتَهُ عَتَقَ، وَمَنْ عَجَزَ رَقَّ.
وَتَصِحُّ
كِتَابَةُ بَعْضِ مَنْ بَاقِيهِ حُرٌّ فَلَوْ كَاتَبَ كُلَّهُ صَحَّ فِي الرِّقِّ
فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَلَوْ كَاتَبَ بَعْضَ رَقِيقٍ فَسَدَتْ إنْ كَانَ بَاقِيهِ
لِغَيْرِهِ وَلَمْ يَأْذَنْ، وَكَذَا إنْ أَذِنَ أَوْ كَانَ لَهُ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَوْ كَاتَبَاهُ مَعًا أَوْ وَكَّلَا صَحَّ إنْ
اتَّفَقَتْ النُّجُومُ وَجُعِلَ الْمَالُ عَلَى نِسْبَةِ مِلْكَيْهِمَا، فَلَوْ
عَجَزَ فَعَجَّزَهُ أَحَدُهُمَا وَأَرَادَ الْآخَرُ إبْقَاءَهُ فَكَابْتِدَاءِ
عَقْدٍ، وَقِيلَ يَجُوزُ، وَلَوْ أَبْرَأَ مِنْ نَصِيبِهِ أَوْ أَعْتَقَهُ عَتَقَ
نَصِيبُهُ، وَقُوِّمَ الْبَاقِي إنْ كَانَ مُوسِرًا.
BOOK 70 .— ENFRANCHISEMENT BY CONTRACT
Section
Enfranchisement
by contract is a meritorious act upon
the master’s
part, when asked for by
a slave worthy of confidence and capable
of
exercising a trade. According to some
authorities even this last con-
dition is
not necessary to render the act
meritorious, and in any case
enfranchisement by contract is never
blamable. The words by which
the
master may legally manifest his wish
to enfranchise in this way
are, “ I
make you my enfranchised slavo by
contract for such and such
a sum
AVhicli you will pay by periodical
instalments ; and when the
whole has
been paid you will bo free.” The
number cf instalments
must bo mentioned,
and the amount of the debt to
be paid upon each
occasion ; but the
contract remains valid even where one
may have
omitted to add the
condition upon which tho liberation
depends, i.e .
the concluding phrase, “
and when,” etc. ; provided always that tho
intention to enfranchise is not
wanting, for in that caso our school
does not admit the validity of
the act. And, moreover, the law insists
that the slave should formally
declare that he accepts the offer
made by
his master, and that tho
contracting parties, that is to say
both the slave
and his master, are
adult sane Moslems capable of tho
free disposition
of their property. It
follows from this latter condition that
enfranchise-
ment by contract effected by a
master in his last illness is
debited to
the third of the estate
of which he can dispose. Where in
these circum-
stances a master leaves three
slaves all of equal value, the
enfranchise-
ment by contract of one of
them is perfectly legal. And it is
the same
where the slave thus
enfranchised, though the only property of
the
deceased, has already paid during
his master’s lifetime two hundred
pieces
of money, while ho was only rated
at one hundred. If the slave
had
only paid one hundred his enfranchisement
would have counted
only for two-thirds.
The validity of an enfranchisement by
contract
effectod by an apostate depends
upon the question whether his right
of ownership ceases to exist or
not. Where it is admitted that his
right
of ownership romains in suspense,
there must be admitted also the
nullity of the enfranchisement by
contract, according to the opinion
adopted
by Shafii during his stay in Egypt.
A slave pledged or hired
can no
longer be enfranchised by contract by
his master during the
continuance of
the engagement.
The equivalent that
is due by the slave for his
liberty is upon his
part a debt for
a term, even where this debt only
consists in the use of
something, or
of his services. The debt should be
paid in at least two
instalments ;
although, according to some jurists, one
may also stipu-
late that the whole
debt shall be due immediately where
the slave is
only partially owned by
the master, and is otherwise free.
If one has
stipulated, as an
equivalent, that the slave should continue
to give
his services for a month,
and pay at the end of it one
dinar , a regular
enfranchisement has been
contracted for ; but it would be irregular
if the master stipulated as an
equivalent that the slave should sell him
such and such an object. Where
the master stipulates as follows :
“ I
contract to make you my enfranchised
slave, if you buy from me
this
coat for one thousand pieces of
money, payable by instalments,
your
liberation not to take place until
the debt has been paid,” our
school
admits only the validity of the
enfranchisement, but not that
of the
debt. Where one manumits several slaves
at once for a single
sum of money
to be paid by instalments, on
condition that no one of
them is
to be free before the whole of
the debt is paid, this enfranchise-
ment
is valid, according to Shafii’s personal
opinion. Then, however,
the sum mentioned
is ijjso facto divided in proportion
to the respective
value of each of
the slaves upon the day of tho
contract, so that the one
who pays
his becomes free, and the one who
does not remains a slave.
Enfranchisement
by contract may also be effected
with regard to a
slave who has
already been previously and partially
enfranchised, *and
a contract to enfranchise
such a slave entirely is limited ipso
facto to
the portion still capable
of being enfranchised. Enfranchisement by
contract cannot bo effected by one
of two coproprietors even if the
other subsequently consents to it,
at least according to our school ;
and a contract to partially enfranchise a
slave of whom one is the sole
owner is also forbidden by our
school. Enfranchisement by contract
of a
slave belonging to two masters may
lawfully take place when both
at the
same time give their consent either
personally or by agent, and
both
stipulate the same terms of payment.
The sum stipulated is then
divided
in proportion to their reciprocal rights.
Where the slave is
not in a
condition to fulfil his engagement, and
one of the coproprietors
considers that
for this reason the contract should
be cancelled — but the
other thinks it
should remain good, it is as if
the contract for enfranchise-
ment had
been effected only by one of the
coproprietors, and the
act is then
illegal. According to other authorities,
however, these
circumstances do not
invalidate the contract. Where, finally,
one of the
co-proprietors remits what
the slave owes, or manumits him
later in
the ordinary way, then only
this owner’s portion becomes free, subject
to indemnity and right of
redemption, if the coproprietor is solvent*
فَصْلٌ [فيما يلزم السيد بعد الكتابة]
يَلْزَمُ السَّيِّدَ أَنْ
يَحُطَّ عَنْهُ جُزْءًا مِنْ الْمَالِ أَوْ يَدْفَعَهُ إلَيْهِ، وَالْحَطُّ
أَوْلَى، وَفِي النَّجْمِ الْأَخِيرِ أَلْيَقُ، وَالْأَصَحُّ أَنَّهُ يَكْفِي مَا
يَقَعُ عَلَيْهِ الِاسْمُ وَلَا يَخْتَلِفُ بِحَسَبِ الْمَالِ، وَأَنَّ وَقْتَ
وُجُوبِهِ قَبْلَ الْعِتْقِ، وَيُسْتَحَبُّ الرُّبُعُ، وَإِلَّا
فَالسُّبُعُ.
وَيَحْرُمُ وَطْءُ مُكَاتَبَتِهِ، وَلَا حَدَّ فِيهِ،
وَيَجِبُ مَهْرٌ، وَالْوَلَدُ حُرٌّ، وَلَا تَجِبُ قِيمَتُهُ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ،
وَصَارَتْ مُسْتَوْلَدَةً مُكَاتَبَةً فَإِنْ عَجَزَتْ عَتَقَتْ بِمَوْتِهِ.
وَوَلَدُهَا
مِنْ نِكَاحٍ أَوْ زِنًا مُكَاتَبٌ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ يَتْبَعُهَا رِقًّا
وَعِتْقًا، وَلَيْسَ عَلَيْهِ شَيْءٌ، وَالْحَقُّ فِيهِ لِلسَّيِّدِ، وَفِي
قَوْلٍ لَهَا، فَلَوْ قَتَلَ فَقِيمَتُهُ لِذِي الْحَقِّ، وَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّ
أَرْشَ جِنَايَتِهِ عَلَيْهِ، وَكَسْبَهُ وَمَهْرَهُ يُنْفَقُ مِنْهَا عَلَيْهِ،
وَمَا فَضَلَ وُقِفَ، فَإِنْ عَتَقَ فَلَهُ، وَإِلَّا فَلِلسَّيِّدِ.
وَلَا
يَعْتِقُ شَيْءٌ مِنْ الْمُكَاتَبِ حَتَّى يُؤَدِّيَ الْجَمِيعَ.
وَلَوْ
أَتَى بِمَالٍ فَقَالَ السَّيِّدُ هَذَا حَرَامٌ وَلَا بَيِّنَةَ حَلَفَ
الْمُكَاتَبُ أَنَّهُ حَلَالٌ، وَيُقَالُ لِلسَّيِّدِ تَأْخُذُهُ أَوْ تُبْرِئُهُ
عَنْهُ، فَإِنْ أَبَى قَبَضَهُ الْقَاضِي، فَإِنْ نَكَلَ الْمُكَاتَبُ حَلَفَ
السَّيِّدُ.
وَلَوْ خَرَجَ الْمُؤَدَّى مُسْتَحَقًّا رَجَعَ
السَّيِّدُ بِبَدَلِهِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ فِي النَّجْمِ الْأَخِيرِ بَانَ أَنَّ
الْعِتْقَ لَمْ يَقَعْ.
وَإِنْ كَانَ قَالَ عِنْدَ أَخْذِهِ أَنْتَ
حُرٌّ.
وَإِنْ خَرَجَ مَعِيبًا فَلَهُ رَدُّهُ وَأَخْذُ
بَدَلِهِ.
وَلَا يَتَزَوَّجُ إلَّا بِإِذْنِ سَيِّدِهِ، وَلَا
يَتَسَرَّى بِإِذْنِهِ عَلَى الْمَذْهَبِ.
وَلَهُ شِرَاءُ
الْجَوَارِي لِلتِّجَارَةِ فَإِنْ وَطِئَهَا فَلَا حَدَّ، وَالْوَلَدُ نَسِيبٌ
فَإِنْ وَلَدَتْهُ فِي الْكِتَابَةِ أَوْ بَعْدَ عِتْقِهِ لِدُونِ سِتَّةِ
أَشْهُرٍ تَبِعَهُ رِقًّا وَعِتْقًا، وَلَا تَصِيرُ مُسْتَوْلَدَةً فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ، وَإِنْ وَلَدَتْهُ بَعْدَ الْعِتْقِ لِفَوْقِ سِتَّةِ أَشْهُرٍ
وَكَانَ يَطَؤُهَا فَهُوَ حُرٌّ وَهِيَ أُمُّ وَلَدٍ.
وَلَوْ
عَجَّلَ النُّجُومَ لَمْ يُجْبَرْ السَّيِّدُ عَلَى الْقَبُولِ إنْ كَانَ لَهُ
فِي الِامْتِنَاعِ غَرَضٌ كَمُؤْنَةِ حِفْظِهِ أَوْ خَوْفٍ عَلَيْهِ، وَإِلَّا
فَيُجْبَرُ فَإِنْ أَبَى قَبَضَهُ الْقَاضِي.
وَلَوْ عَجَّلَ
بَعْضَهَا لِيُبْرِئَهُ مِنْ الْبَاقِي فَأَبْرَأَ لَمْ يَصِحَّ الدَّفْعُ وَلَا
الْإِبْرَاءُ.
وَلَا يَصِحُّ بَيْعُ النُّجُومِ، وَلَا
الِاعْتِيَاضُ عَنْهَا، فَلَوْ بَاعَ وَأَدَّى إلَى الْمُشْتَرِي لَمْ يَعْتِقْ
فِي الْأَظْهَرِ، وَيُطَالِبُ السَّيِّدُ الْمُكَاتَبَ، وَالْمُكَاتَبُ
الْمُشْتَرِيَ بِمَا أَخَذَ مِنْهُ، وَلَا يَصِحُّ بَيْعُ رَقَبَتِهِ فِي
الْجَدِيدِ، فَلَوْ بَاعَ فَأَدَّى إلَى الْمُشْتَرِي فَفِي عِتْقِهِ
الْقَوْلَانِ، وَهِبَتُهُ كَبَيْعِهِ.
وَلَيْسَ لَهُ بَيْعُ مَا فِي
يَدِ مُكَاتَبِهِ وَإِعْتَاقُ عَبْدِهِ وَ تَزْوِيجُ أَمَتِهِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ لَهُ
رَجُلٌ أَعْتِقْ مُكَاتَبَك عَلَى كَذَا فَفَعَلَ عَتَقَ وَلَزِمَهُ مَا
الْتَزَمَ.
Section
The master is obliged
either to remit the slave a portion
of his debt,
or to return him a
part of the sum received. Remission,
however, is
preferable, especially in the
case of the last instalment, fThe
^aw d°es
not prescribe either a maximum
or a minimum for remission or restitu-
tion, but either must bo something
capable of being the subject of
obligation. fRemission or restitution
should take place immediately
before
complete enfranchisement, and it is
commendable to make it
consist of a
quarter or a seventh of the sum
stipulated.
The law forbids a master
to cohabit with his female slave under-
going enfranchisement by contract, in the
exercise of his right of owner-
ship ;
but a contravention of this rule does
not incur the definite penalty
for
fornication. The master, however, in these
circumstances is liable
for dower, and a
child born of this illicit union is
free. On the other
hand, tlio master
is not obliged as well to pay
the mother the value of
the child,
at least according to our school. As
to the slave herself, she
becomes
enfranchised on account of maternity ; without
prejudice to
the contract of
enfranchisement, that is to say that
in case of non-
execution of her
obligations under it, she none the
less becomes free
upon her master’s
death. *A child born of a slave
under a contract
of enfranchisement, either
in consequence of a marriage or of
the crime
of fornication, is also
under the contract and follows the
condition of
his mother, whether slave
or free. The child, however, owes nothing
for his own liberty, though he
remains the property of the
master,
or, according to one authority, the
property of his mother,
until his
complete liberation. In case of homicide
the value of the
child goes to
the owner, but the pecuniary consequences
of a crime
committed by the child
must be borne by itself. The profits
which it
gains, either by its work
or in any other way, e.g. as
dower, should be
employed in the
first place for its necessary maintenance,
and the
remainder should be sequestrated
in order to be returned to it
on its
freedom, or to the master
if it is not freed.
A slave
under a contract of enfranchisement does
not obtain his
liberty, even partially,
until he has paid the whole of
the amount he
owes. Where such slave
wishes his master to accept in payment
something which the latter is of
opinion cannot be given, in default
of legal proof it is the slave
who has a presumption in his favour, and
should swear that it is a thing
the use of which is permitted him.
The
master is then obliged to accept
it, or to give a receipt for the
amount
offered by the slave or if
necessary the latter may deposit the
thing in
court. Should the slave
under the contract refuse to take an
oath, it
should be administered to
the master. Where the thing is
seized by
legal process the master
may insist upon the slave giving him
another
thing of the same kind and
value, and where a dispute of this
sort arises
as to the last of
the periodic payments, complete enfranchisement
is
suspended until the legal claim
has been dismissed, or the slave has
given something else. This rule must
be observed, even where the
master
on receiving the object says, “ Now
you are free.” Institution
on account
of redhibitory defects has the same
consequences as legal
seizure.
A slave
under contract of enfranchisement cannot
be married
without the master’s consent,
until he has paid up the whole
of the
debt. Our school even forbids
him to cohabit with one of his
slaves
by virtue of his right of
ownership, even though the master authorises
him to do so. This prohibition
to cohabit with one of his slaves
does
not, however, prevent his purchasing
slaves, e.g . for trading in them.
Besides, a contravention in this respect
does not involve a penalty for
the
crime of fornication, and a child born
of such illicit union is none
the
less its father’s legitimate child. Such
child follows the condition
of his
father as regards freedom or slavery,
when he is born either before
his
father’s complete enfranchisement, or within
six months after that
event ; *but
in these circumstances the mother never
becomes en-
franchised on account of
maternity. But a child born of such a
union
six months or more after the
father’s complete manumission is free,
and
then the mother also becomes free by
reason of maternity.
A master is not
obliged to accept payment in anticipation,
where
he can give a valid reason for
his refusal, e.g . that thus the expense
of keeping the money or other
things received will fall upon him, or
that he is afraid of losing
them. On the other hand, where there
is
no valid reason the master cannot
object to a slave under contract
of
enfranchisement paying him before the due
date, and the latter may
then, if
necessary, be liberated by a judicial
order. But an anticipation
of the
instalments can never be a ground for
any diminution in the debt,
even
with the consent of the interested
parties. These instalments
cannot be
transferred by sale, or exchange, before
the master takes
possession ; *and when
the slave under contract of enfranchisement
pays a purchaser of the debt, ho
does not obtain his liberty. Eor the
master may none the less insist
upon full payment ; though in this
case
the slave has a remedy against the
purchaser for the amount he
has
erroneously paid him.
According to
the opinion of Shafii in his second
period a slave under
contract of
enfranchisement cannot any longer be sold
by his master,
and if sold in
spite of this does not become free
upon making the stipu-
lated payments to
his new master. Gift is equivalent
to sale in this
respect. Nor can
the master dispose of the earnings
of a slave under
contract of
enfranchisement, nor liberate nor give in
marriage a slave
of such slave.
Finally, where a third party asks a
master “ to liberate immediately
his slave
under contract of enfranchisement for such
and such an
amount,” and the master
agrees, it is this third party and
not the slave
who is liable for
the sum promised.
فَصْلٌ [في بيان لزوم الكتابة وجوازها]
الْكِتَابَةُ لَازِمَةٌ
مِنْ جِهَةِ السَّيِّدِ، لَيْسَ لَهُ فَسْخُهَا إلَّا أَنْ يَعْجِزَ عَنْ
الْأَدَاءِ، وَجَائِزَةٌ لِلْمُكَاتَبِ، فَلَهُ تَرْكُ الْأَدَاءِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ
مَعَهُ وَفَاءٌ، فَإِذَا عَجَّزَ نَفْسَهُ فَلِلسَّيِّدِ الصَّبْرُ وَ الْفَسْخُ
بِنَفْسِهِ، وَإِنْ شَاءَ بِالْحَاكِمِ، وَلِلْمُكَاتَبِ الْفَسْخُ فِي
الْأَصَحِّ.
وَلَوْ اسْتَمْهَلَ الْمُكَاتَبُ عِنْدَ حُلُولِ
النَّجْمِ اُسْتُحِبَّ إمْهَالُهُ، فَإِنْ أَمْهَلَ ثُمَّ أَرَادَ الْفَسْخَ
فَلَهُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَعَهُ عُرُوضٌ أَمْهَلَهُ لِيَبِيعَهَا، فَإِنْ عَرَضَ
كَسَادٌ فَلَهُ أَنْ لَا يَزِيدَ فِي الْمُهْلَةِ عَلَى ثَلَاثَةِ أَيَّامٍ،
وَإِنْ كَانَ مَالُهُ غَائِبًا أَمْهَلَهُ إلَى إحْضَارِهِ إنْ كَانَ دُونَ
مَرْحَلَتَيْنِ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا.
وَلَوْ حَلَّ النَّجْمُ وَهُوَ
غَائِبٌ فَلِلسَّيِّدِ الْفَسْخُ، فَلَوْ كَانَ لَهُ مَالٌ حَاضِرٌ فَلَيْسَ
لِلْقَاضِي الْأَدَاءُ مِنْهُ.
وَلَا تَنْفَسِخُ بِجُنُونِ
الْمُكَاتَبِ، وَيُؤَدِّي الْقَاضِي إنْ وَجَدَ لَهُ مَالاً وَلَا
بِالْحَجَرِ.
بِجُنُونِ السَّيِّدِ، وَيَدْفَعُ إلَى وَلِيِّهِ،
وَلَا يَعْتِقُ بِالدَّفْعِ إلَيْهِ.
وَلَوْ قَتَلَ سَيِّدَهُ
فَلِوَارِثِهِ قِصَاصٌ، فَإِنْ عَفَا عَلَى دِيَةٍ أَوْ قَتَلَ خَطَأً أَخَذَهَا
مِمَّا مَعَهُ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ فَلَهُ تَعْجِيزُهُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، أَوْ
قَطَعَ طَرَفَهُ فَاقْتِصَاصُهُ وَالدِّيَةُ كَمَا سَبَقَ.
وَلَوْ
قَتَلَ أَجْنَبِيًّا أَوْ قَطَعَهُ فَعُفِيَ عَلَى مَالٍ أَوْ كَانَ خَطَأً
أَخَذَ مِمَّا مَعَهُ وَمِمَّا سَيَكْسِبُهُ الْأَقَلَّ مِنْ قِيمَتِهِ
وَالْأَرْشِ.
فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ مَعَهُ شَيْءٌ وَسَأَلَ
الْمُسْتَحِقُّ تَعْجِيزَهُ عَجَّزَهُ الْقَاضِي وَبِيعَ بِقَدْرِ الْأَرْشِ،
فَإِنْ بَقِيَ مِنْهُ شَيْءٌ بَقِيَتْ فِيهِ الْكِتَابَةُ.
وَلِلسَّيِّدِ
فِدَاؤُهُ وَإِبْقَاؤُهُ مُكَاتَبًا، وَلَوْ أَعْتَقَهُ بَعْدَ الْجِنَايَةِ أَوْ
أَبْرَأَهُ عَتَقَ وَلَزِمَهُ الْفِدَاءُ، وَلَوْ قَتَلَ الْمُكَاتَبُ بَطَلَتْ
وَمَاتَ رَقِيقًا.
وَلِسَيِّدِهِ قِصَاصٌ عَلَى قَاتِلِهِ
الْمُكَافِئِ، وَإِلَّا فَالْقِيمَةُ.
وَيَسْتَقِلُّ بِكُلِّ
تَصَرُّفٍ لَا تَبَرُّعَ فِيهِ وَلَا خَطَرَ، وَإِلَّا فَلَا، وَيَصِحُّ بِإِذْنِ
سَيِّدِهِ فِي الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَوْ اشْتَرَى مَنْ يَعْتِقُ عَلَى
سَيِّدِهِ صَحَّ، فَإِنْ عَجَزَ وَصَارَ لِسَيِّدِهِ عَتَقَ، أَوْ عَلَيْهِ لَمْ
يَصِحَّ بِلَا إذْنٍ، وَبِإِذْنٍ فِيهِ الْقَوْلَانِ، فَإِنْ صَحَّ فَمُكَاتَبٍ
عَلَيْهِ، وَلَا يَصِحُّ إعْتَاقُهُ وَ كِتَابَتُهُ بِإِذْنٍ عَلَى
الْمَذْهَبِ.
Section
An enfranchisement by
contract, legally executed, does not admit
of a revocation by the master,
except where its terms are not carried
out by the slave; but the
latter may renounce it when he pleases,
simply by ceasing to make the
periodic payments, though he may be
quite capable of continuing them.
Where a slave under a contract
of service
declares himself to be incapable of
paying, the master may
either givo
him time or dissolve the agreement.
This dissolution for
non-execution has no
need to be pronounced by the court ;
it can not
only be enounced by
the master, but even by the slave
himself, where
the master is not
willing to cancel the contract in
spite of the slave’s
wishes. When at
the end of one of the periods
the slave under contract
of
enfranchisement asks for some delay, it
is recommendable to grant
it him ;
but this indulgence on the part of
the master leaves intact his
right
to insist later, whenever he pleases,
upon a dissolution of the
contract for
non-execution. Where the slave cannot pay
but still
possesses some property, the
delay allowed should be long enough to
allow of its realisation ; but where
the goods are unsaleable the master
is not obliged to grant for
this purpose a longer delay than three
days.
As to the property of the
slave under contract of enfranchisement,
property that is in another place,
the master must grant him merely
the
delay necessary to send for them if
the distance is less than two days’
march. If upon the expiry of a
period the slave is absent, the master
may cancel the contract for
non-execution, even although the slave
has
in tho place property in sufficient
quantity. For no one, not even
the
court, may use these things to pay
the debt, without the previous
authorisation of the slave in
question. Enfranchisement by contract
is
not vitiated by the slave’s lunacy,
for then the court can proceed
to
the payment of the instalments, but
in this case the slave should pay
his curator, and cannot obtain his
liberty by payments to the master
in
person.
Premeditated homicide of a master
by his slave under contract of
enfranchisement gives the master’s heir
the right to demand an appli-
cation
of the law of talion ; and in the
case of pardon or of voluntary
or
involuntary homicide all the slave’s
property may be seized to satisfy
the price of blood, fin default
of property the heir may dissolve the
contract for non-execution, so that
the slave resumes his previous state
of slavery. If it is not a
case of homicide, but of a wound, it
is the master
himself who can demand
either an application of the law of
talion, or
the price of blood, as
we have explained in reference to
the heir in the
case of homicide.
Premeditated homicide or wounding, committed
by a slave under contract of
enfranchisement with respect to any other
person than his master, also
involves an application of the law of
talion, unless the injured party or
his representative grants pardon.
In this
latter case, as also in case of
voluntary or involuntary homicide,
not
only all that the slave possesses,
but also all that he subsequently
gains, can be seized, up to
the value of the slave himself or
of the in-
demnity, whichever is the
more advantageous for him. In default of
goods to seize the injured party
or his representative may ask the court
to declare the slave incapable of
fulfilling his obligation ; and after
this
the slave returns to ordinary servitude,
and is put up to auction,
up
to the amount of the indemnity. If
his value exceeds this amount
the
contract of enfranchisement remains intact,
and even in the contrary
hypothesis
the master always has the right to
ransom him for this amount
and thus
keep him as his slave under contract
of enfranchisement.
Simple manumission, or a
remission of instalments upon the part of
the master, after the slave has
committed the crime, cannot be attacked
by the injured party ; but the
master must then pay ransom, because
the slave’s sale has become
impossible. A contract of enfranchisement
is
annulled by the premeditated homicide of
the slave, for in these
circumstances
he is considered to have died in a
state of slavery. Con-
sequently the
master may demand an application of
the law of talion
if the criminal
is not of a social position superior
to that of his victim ;
otherwise
ho may exact payment of the value
of the slave killed.
A slave under
contract of enfranchisement may of his
own accord
freely dispose of his
property, provided that it is not
for nothing, or
part of a hazardous
speculation, *unless the master has authorised
acts of this nature. Ho may
even buy a slave whose enfranchisement
would be obligatory for his master ;
and such a slave becomes in fact
free ipso facto, if he falls
into the master s possession by a dissolution
of the contract in consequence of
non-execution. Where, on the con-
trary,
it is a case of the purchase of a
slave whose enfranchisement would
be
obligatory for the slave himself who
is under contract, the act is
illegal if without the master’s
authorisation, but not where this has
been obtained. Where the validity of
the act in question is admitted
the
slave whose enfranchisement should ipso
facto take place, becomes
the master’s
slave under contract of enfranchisement.
But our school
forbids a slave under a
contract of enfranchisement to manumit another
slave in his turn, either simply
or by contract, even though authorised
so to do.
فَصْلٌ [في مشاركة الكتابة الصحيحة الفاسدة]
الْكِتَابَةُ
الْفَاسِدَةُ لِشَرْطٍ أَوْ عِوَضٍ أَوْ أَجَلٍ فَاسِدٍ؛ كَالصَّحِيحَةِ فِي
اسْتِقْلَالَةِ بِالْكَسْبِ، وَفِي أَخْذِ أَرْشِ الْجِنَايَةِ عَلَيْهِ وَمَهْرِ
شُبْهَةٍ، وَفِي أَنَّهُ يَعْتِقُ بِالْأَدَاءِ وَيَتْبَعُهُ كَسْبُهُ،
وَكَالتَّعْلِيقِ فِي أَنَّهُ لَا يَعْتِقُ بِإِبْرَاءٍ.
وَتَبْطُلُ
بِمَوْتِ سَيِّدِهِ.
وَتَصِحُّ الْوَصِيَّةُ بِرَقَبَتِهِ، وَلَا
يُصْرَفُ إلَيْهِ مِنْ سَهْمِ الْمُكَاتَبِينَ.
وَتُخَالِفُهُمَا
فِي أَنَّ لِلسَّيِّدِ فَسْخَهَا، وَأَنَّهُ لَا يَمْلِكُ مَا يَأْخُذُهُ، بَلْ
يَرْجِعُ الْمُكَاتَبُ بِهِ إنْ كَانَ مُتَقَوِّمًا، وَهُوَ عَلَيْهِ بِقِيمَتِهِ
يَوْمَ الْعِتْقِ.
فَإِنْ تَجَانَسَا فَأَقْوَالُ التَّقَاصِّ،
وَيَرْجِعُ صَاحِبُ الْفَضْلِ بِهِ.
قُلْتُ: أَصَحُّ أَقْوَالِ
التَّقَاصِّ سُقُوطُ أَحَدِ الدَّيْنَيْنِ بِالْآخَرِ بِلَا رِضًا، وَالثَّانِي
بِرِضَاهُمَا، وَالثَّالِثُ بِرِضَا أَحَدِهِمَا، وَالرَّابِعُ لَا يَسْقُطُ،
وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
فَإِنْ فَسَخَهَا السَّيِّدُ
فَلْيُشْهِدْ.
فَلَوْ أَدَّى الْمَالَ فَقَالَ السَّيِّدُ: كُنْتُ
فَسَخْت فَأَنْكَرَهُ صُدِّقَ الْعَبْدُ بِيَمِينِهِ.
وَالْأَصَحُّ
بُطْلَانُ الْفَاسِدَةِ بِجُنُونِ السَّيِّدِ وَإِغْمَائِهِ وَالْحَجْرِ
عَلَيْهِ، لَا بِجُنُونٍ الْعَبْدِ.
وَلَوْ ادَّعَى كِتَابَةً
فَأَنْكَرَهُ سَيِّدُهُ أَوْ وَارِثُهُ صُدِّقَا، وَيَحْلِفُ الْوَارِثُ عَلَى
نَفْيِ الْعِلْمِ.
وَلَوْ اخْتَلَفَا فِي قَدْرِ النُّجُومِ أَوْ
صِفَتِهَا تَحَالَفَا، ثُمَّ إنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ قَبَضَ مَا يَدَّعِيهِ لَمْ
تَنْفَسِخْ الْكِتَابَةُ فِي الْأَصَحِّ، بَلْ إنْ لَمْ يَتَّفِقَا فَسَخَ
الْقَاضِي.
وَإِنْ كَانَ قَبَضَهُ وَقَالَ الْمُكَاتَبُ: بَعْضُ
الْمَقْبُوضِ وَدِيعَةٌ عَتَقَ وَرَجَعَ هُوَ بِمَا أَدَّى، وَالسَّيِّدُ
بِقِيمَتِهِ، وَقَدْ يَتَقَاصَّانِ، وَلَوْ قَالَ: كَاتَبْتُكَ وَأَنَا
مَجْنُونٌ أَوْ مَحْجُورٌ عَلَيَّ فَأَنْكَرَ الْعَبْدُ صُدِّقَ السَّيِّدُ إنْ
عُرِفَ سَبْقُ مَا ادَّعَاهُ، وَإِلَّا فَالْعَبْدُ.
وَلَوْ قَالَ
السَّيِّدُ: وَضَعْتُ عَنْكَ النَّجْمَ الْأَوَّلَ أَوْ قَالَ الْبَعْضَ،
فَقَالَ بَلْ الْآخِرَ أَوْ الْكُلَّ صُدِّقَ السَّيِّدُ.
وَلَوْ
مَاتَ عَنْ ابْنَيْنِ وَعَبْدٍ فَقَالَ كَاتَبَنِي أَبُوكُمَا، فَإِنْ أَنْكَرَا
صُدِّقَا، وَإِنْ صَدَّقَاهُ فَمُكَاتَبٌ، فَإِنْ أَعْتَقَ أَحَدُهُمَا نَصِيبَهُ
فَالْأَصَحُّ لَا يَعْتِقُ، بَلْ يُوقَفُ، فَإِنْ أَدَّى نَصِيبَ الْآخَرِ عَتَقَ
كُلُّهُ وَوَلَاؤُهُ لِلْأَبِ، وَإِنْ عَجَزَ قُوِّمَ عَلَى الْمُعْتِقِ إنْ
كَانَ مُوسِرًا، وَإِلَّا فَنَصِيبُهُ حُرٌّ، وَالْبَاقِي مِنْهُ قِنٌّ
لِلْآخَرِ.
قُلْتُ: بَلْ الْأَظْهَرُ الْعِتْقُ، وَاَللَّهُ
أَعْلَمُ، وَإِنْ صَدَّقَهُ أَحَدُهُمَا فَنَصِيبُهُ مُكَاتَبٌ، وَنَصِيبُ
الْمُكَذِّبِ قِنٌّ، فَإِنْ أَعْتَقَهُ الْمُصَدِّقُ فَالْمَذْهَبُ أَنَّهُ
يُقَوَّمُ عَلَيْهِ إنْ كَانَ مُوسِرًا.
Section
A contract of
enfranchisement into which there has been
introduced
an illicit condition, equivalent,
or term, is illegal, but not absolutely
null. Such an enfranchisement has
the same consequences as a regular
contract of enfranchisement for all
that concerns the slave’s capacity
to
gain money on his own account, the
obligation to pay an indemnity
for a
crime, the right to claim dower,
even for erroneous cohabitation,
complete
enfranchisement upon payment of the entire
sum stipulated,
and the right to
keep for himself any gain that may
have been made in
the mean time.
The illegal contract of enfranchisement of
which we
are here speaking is
assimilated to a regular contract of
enfranchisement
depending upon a condition in
respect that the slave does not become
free when the master remits his debt
; that tho master’s death annuls
the
agreement ; that the master may dispose by
will of the slave ; and
that the
latter does not participate in the
portion of the charity tax
appropriated
to tho use of slaves under contract
of enfranchisement.
And this illegal
contract has another peculiarity in that
the master may
revoke it when he
pleases, and that the master does
not become the
owner of the property
acquired by the slave ; these revert
in kind to
the latter at the
moment of complete enfranchisement if they
are of any
value. The slave,
however, should then pay the master
his own value
upon the day of
his liberation. Where master and slave
each owe the
other something in
these respects, a balance is struck
between them,
and the excess alone
can bo claimed. [|The striking of
the balance
extinguishes the smaller sum
due, ipso facto , and whether the parties
are aware of it or not.
According to another opinion, however, this
can only take place with their
consent. According to a third opinion
it
takes place upon the desire of one
of the parties ; while according to
a
fourth it is not a cause of
extinction at all.]
The illegal
contract of enfranchisement with which we
are concerned
can be revoked by the
master. This revocation should take place
before witnesses ; for in default of
legal proof the slave who denies this
revocation has a presumption in his
favour, provided he takes an oath.
Thus a master cannot refuse an
offered payment upon the ground of
such revocation. fLunacy, unconsciousness,
or legal incapacity, on
the part of
the master, annul ipsojado this illegal
contract of enfranchise-
ment ; but the
slave’s lunacy does not do so. A
master or his heir who
denies the
contract alleged by his slave, has a
presumption in favour
of the truth
of his statement. The heir should
also swear that he is
ignorant of
the fact. Where the proceedings relate
only to the quantity
or the nature
of the periodic payments, the parties
should, in default
of legal proof,
swear to the truth of what they
maintain ; after Avhich
the following
cases must be distinguished : —
.
fflf the master has not yet taken
possession of what he alleges
he
stipulated, the enfranchisement by contract,
not yet being ijisofado
broken, should
be declared to be dissolved by the
court where the parties
cannot agree.
. If the master has already
taken possession of what he alleges
to have been stipulated, while the
slave maintains that the master has
received a portion of that sum, not
as periodic payments, but as a
deposit ; the slave obtains immediately
his complete freedom ; and the
master
must return him all he has received.
On the other hand, the
slave owes
the master, as an equivalent, his
own value ; but these debts
may be
balanced against each other, if there
is occasion for this.
A master who
declares that he effected a contract of
enfranchise-
ment while in a state of
lunacy or legal incapacity in other
respects,
has a presumption in his favour
if the slave denies it, provided
that it
is a matter of public
notoriety that he was in the
condition alleged ;
otherwise there is a
presumption in favour of the slave
who maintains
that he was legally
enfranchised. The master still enjoys a
presumption
in his favour, where he
alleges that he remitted the first
instalment,
or a portion of the periodic
payments ; while the slave maintains that
it was the last or all of
the instalments that were remitted.
Where a master leaves two sons
and a slave who maintains that the
master enfranchised him by contract,
the two sons have a presumption
in
their favour if they both deny it.
If both admit it the slave becomes
under contract of enfranchisement.
j*Where, in this latter case, one
of
the sons manumits his portion later
in the ordinary way, this portion
does not become free immediately but
remains in suspense until the
slave
has acquitted himself of his obligation
towards the other son.
Then the
patronage falls to the sons, not on
their own account, but as
their
father’s heirs. Where in these
circumstances it appears that the
slave
is unable to complete his engagement,
there is a right of redemption
and
the value of the slave should be
paid by the son who has just manu-
mitted him, if ho is solvent. If
not, only the enfranchised portion of
the slave becomes free immediately,
without prejudice to the other
son’s
right of ownership over the portion
remaining in slavery. [*On
the contrary, a
simple manumission of his portion by
one of the sons
does not remain
in suspense, but takes effect
immediately.] Where,
in those circumstances,
one of the two sons admits the
contract of en-
franchisement, his portion
becomes enfranchised, while the other portion
remains as before. Where, however,
the son who admits the contract
afterwards, manumits the slave for
his portion in the ordinary way,
there is still a right of
redemption, at least according to our
school ;
and the son who thus
manumits should indemnify his brother, if
he is
solvent.
كتاب أُمَّهَاتِ الأَولادِ
BOOK 71 .— FREEDOM ON ACCOUNT OF MATERNITY
إذَا أَحْبَلَ أَمَتَهُ فَوَلَدَتْ حَيًّا أَوْ مَيِّتًا أَوْ مَا تَجِبُ فِيهِ
غُرَّةٌ عَتَقَتْ بِمَوْتِ السَّيِّدِ.
أَوْ أَمَةَ غَيْرِهِ
بِنِكَاحٍ فَالْوَلَدُ رَقِيقٌ، وَلَا تَصِيرُ أُمَّ وَلَدٍ إذَا مَلَكَهَا.
أَوْ
بِشُبْهَةٍ فَالْوَلَدُ حُرٌّ، وَلَا تَصِيرُ أُمَّ وَلَدٍ إذَا مَلَكَهَا فِي
الْأَظْهَرِ.
وَلَهُ وَطْءُ أُمِّ الْوَلَدِ وَاسْتِخْدَامُهَا
وَإِجَارَتُهَا وَأَرْشُ جِنَايَةٍ عَلَيْهَا.
وَكَذَا تَزْوِيجُهَا
بِغَيْرِ إذْنِهَا فِي الْأَصَحِّ.
وَيَحْرُمُ بَيْعُهَا
وَرَهْنُهَا وَهِبَتُهَا.
وَلَوْ وَلَدَتْ مِنْ زَوْجٍ أَوْ زِنًا
فَالْوَلَدُ لِلسَّيِّدِ يَعْتِقُ بِمَوْتِهِ كَهِيَ.
وَأَوْلَادُهَا
قَبْلَ الِاسْتِيلَادِ مِنْ زِنًا أَوْ زَوْجٍ لَا يَعْتِقُونَ بِمَوْتِ
السَّيِّدِ، وَلَهُ بَيْعُهُمْ.
وَعِتْقُ الْمُسْتَوْلَدَةِ مِنْ
رَأْسِ الْمَالِ، وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
BOOK 71 .— FREEDOM ON ACCOUNT OF MATERNITY
When a master has cohabited
with one of his female slaves, and
rendered
her pregnant, she becomes free
upon her master’s death, whether the
child to which she gives birth
is living or dead. But if it
is still-born
the law insists that
it must have attained a development
sufficient to
be an occasion for
ghorra in case of abortion. A child
born of a slave
belonging to another,
to whom one is married, is not
free but remains
the property of
that slave’s master. Such a slave does
not become
free on account of
maternity where her husband afterwards
becomes her
master. Where, on the
other hand, a child is born of the
slave of a third
party, with whom
one has cohabited through error, the
child is free,
and is regarded as
its father’s legitimate son ; but the
mother does not
become free on
account of maternity should the man
who rendered
her pregnant subsequently
become her master.
Freedom on
account of maternity leaves intact the
master’s right
to cohabit with the
slave during his lifetime by reason
of his ownership ;
he may even
employ her in his service, or hire
out her services to another ;
she
may be seized for the indemnity if
she commits a crime ; fand
the master
may even give her in marriage
without her consent. Her
sale, pledging,
or gift are the only things
forbidden him. The master
also remains
the owner of any child born of
the slave, either in conse-
quence of
marriage with another person, or of
the crime of fornication,
but the
child is always free upon the
master’s death. On the other
hand,
children that the woman in question
gave birth to before her
enfranchisement
on account of maternity remain slaves
and do not
become free upon the
master’s death ; whether they were conceived
in marriage or by the crime of
fornication. Consequently the master
may
sell these children as he pleases.
Finally, upon the master’s death,
the
consequences of enfranchisement on account
of maternity must be
defrayed out of
the whole estate, and not out of
the third of which lie
can dispose.
Glory to God, the lord of
all created things. God grant His grace
to our master Muhammad. God grant
him His grace and His blessing ;
to him and his family and his
companions. May He grant them all
His grace and His blessing. God
sufficetli for us. He is the supremo
mediator. There is no force nor
power but in God Most High.[]